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thesis adviser. He suggested the project originally, assisted
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so necessary for a project of this kind. On top of joining me
in England with our family, my wife has also done all the typing
connected with this dissertation. This is a big accomplishment.
Finally, I would like to mention my father and late mother whose

vi
deep respect for academic knowledge and faithful support have




lt should be emphasized at this point that the judgments
and opinions expressed in this study are mine alone. They do
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Although the pre-war British Navy was probably the
world's best documented, there has been remarkably little
written since World War II diagnosing its continually evolving
role. Certainly there has been a great deal published describ-
ing the technical aspects of its ships, weapons and tactical
doctrines. However, the few commentaries on the Royal Navy's
place in the overall defense picture have largely confined
themselves to a particular point in time or to a limited area
of investigation.
This can perhaps be explained by referring very quickly
to some of the traumatic changes which have occurred in the
British defense establishment over the last few years. The
Royal Navy is no longer "second to none" among the world's
navies, and In turn has abdicated the pre-eminent position
which it held for so many decades in the British scheme of
national strategy. The traditional task of defending the home
islands from attack and protecting the links of Empire which
once were the primary responsibility of the Royal Navy are now
shared with the British Army and the Royal Air Force. As a
result there has been an increasing tendency to treat British
defense policy as a whole rather than as the sum of individual
naval, air and army policies. At the same time the rapid march
of technology has thrown the art of war into disarray. The
most significant defense dispute in post-war Britain has
revolved around nuclear weapons and served to a large extent
to thrust into the background such lesser matters as purely
naval strategy. In short events have combined to reduce the
1

2time, effort and attention devoted specifically to British
naval problems.
Nevertheless, it remains a fruitful topic for study.
Along with practically every other element of British life the
Navy has undergone some agonizing changes in adjusting to the
realities of the mid-twentieth century. For the first decade
after V/orld Yfar II the Navy's professional and political leaders
were beset with a host of unforeseen problems - economic, tech-
nical, and international - which upset the traditional modes
of thinking and which left the Admiralty searching for new
concepts, rationales, and guideposts. This was a particularly
trying period for the senior Service and at times there were
doubts even among career officers as to whether the Navy had
any significant role to play in the nuclear age. It is not
only the story of physical responses but of complex psycho-
logical reactions as the Navy's leaders adjust to the new
facts of life. Most of them were products of the pre-war era
and were thoroughly indoctrinated with the Nelsonlan traditions
of British greatness and the Fleet's invincibility. To say the
least it was difficult for these men to acknowledge the new
order of things. Predictably this has been an important factor
in the post-war policy process.
Gradually, however, the bi-polar nuclear stalemate
and a precarious domestic economy made it clear to the British
that they could no longer act with the freedom of old. Con-
currently they came to the realization that Britain must act
in partnership with the rest of the "free world" and that its
traditional role must be scaled down correspondingly. For the
Royal Navy this meant that the Fleet could no longer be expected
to "rule the seas" or to secure the Empire's communications
lines. These global tasks would have to be shared with allies.
On the other hand Britain still had overseas responsibilities,
and it was here that the Fleet could make a unique contribution.
Under the sheltering umbrella of the "balance of terror" the
greatest threat to peace and order has become the "brush fire"

3or "local" war which threatens to escalate into major conflict.
Mobile naval forces which can project air and land forces
quickly to the scene are admirably suited to such operations
and allow Britain still to play a meaningful role in the
troubled areas of the Middle and Far East.
In addition to its important duties as a limited war
force, the Royal Navy is now in the process of taking over the
prime responsibility for Britain's nuclear deterrent. Ballistic
missiles are in the process of replacing manned aircraft as the
delivery agent for strategic weapons, and nuclear submarines
have proved to be an ideal launching platform for such missiles.
The Admiralty is presently in the process of constructing a
small number of Polaris submarines which will by 1970 form the
nation's nuclear deterrent force.
Today the Royal Navy is still the third largest in the
p
world and it has over 140 men-of-war actively deployed in
every ocean. It boasts over 100,000 officers and men and a
supporting establishment of over 140,000 civilians. Its Fleet
is one of the main contributors to the naval forces of the
Western Alliance and plays a major part in the continuing
struggle for a more stable world order. After a prolonged
period of decline, confusion and doubt the Admiralty has suc-
ceeded in defining a significant role for Britain's seagoing
forces under dramatically altered and still changing conditions.
This investigation is concerned primarily with this
.
search for a new role - in short, with the making of British
naval policy. It is not a history of the Royal Navy since
World War II. It is rather an attempt to delineate the major
themes of naval policy, to discover the influences which have
shaped them, to portray the physical result, and to suggest some
of the more significant lessons of that experience. Hopefully
a careful study of naval policy will offer several rewards:
(1) Most important it should give the reader a clearer
understanding of what the policy was since 1945 and of how
it has been translated into hardware and force levels.

4Policies are not always accurately reflected in public
declarations and documents. One has to look behind the
public facade and to flesh out the picture with less
obvious evidence which is nevertheless important and reveal-
ing. Sometimes research uncovers nothing to disaffirm the
official public image, but until the search is carried out
it is Impossible to draw firm conclusions with any certitude.
(2) In addition this is an investigation of the inter-
action between governmental decision-makers which resulted
in naval policy. In this regard it should offer the reader
a fuller understanding of why individual steps were taken
and how various political pressures combine to shape the
policy product. Hopefully, it will explain to the practic-
ing American naval officer why the Royal Navy responds the
way it does and why it often reacts differently than the
U. S. Navy in similar circumstances. The writer is a
career naval officer, well aware that even as close as
the American Navy and Royal Navy have been in thought and
action, they exhibit different perspectives and many
mutually misunderstood images and doctrines. Hopefully,
this study may clear away some of this confusion and
muddle.
(3) On a more general level this investigation is
intended to offer the political analyst some empirical data
against which to test general hypotheses regarding the British
political system. This study of necessity is concerned with
decision-making groups within the British Government and
their relationships with each other. To diagnose the for-
mation of naval policy is to examine the political process
in action. This policy-making exhibits the familiar tech-
niques - persuasion, bargaining and negotiation. Such a
study inevitably offers opportunities for asking and
answering important questions about the British system in
general. What groups have influenced naval policy? What
techniques are used and how successful are they? Are

5administrative arrangements important in determining
policy? What part does inertia and routine play in one
department's relationships with another? These, of course,
are only a few of the analytical questions which such a
review might facilitate answering with regard to one organ-
ization's experience within the larger milieu of parlia-
mentary government. This study will attempt to examine the
Royal Navy's experience in this context and to draw some
conclusions of more general relevance for political science.
(4) In the same vein an investigation of the Royal Navy
during this period is also a partial examination of a great
nation's reaction when its ability to manipulate the inter-
national environment is declining. Since World War II
Great Britain has been beset with economic, technical and
diplomatic difficulties which have steadily undermined its
political potential in the society of nations. The Govern-
ment has had to make painful adjustments in order to cope
with these unwelcome problems. One of the most important
aspects of this process has been its military policy.
There has been too little analysis of the process of
decline, and it is hoped that a close look at the evolution
of British naval policy will in some measure fill in one
small portion of this pattern.
(5) The last objective is strictly a practical one.
It is extremely easy to find parallels between British and
American experience and nowhere is this more true than in
a study of military policy. Even more vital the examiner
inevitably notes problems which have confronted Her
Majesty's Government and which may very well in the near
future plague American planners. For example both the
English and American defense establishments exhibit the
phenomenon of heavy commitments and limited resources.
British experience may well have relevance for American
planners and perhaps can offer them some helpful guidlines
in meeting their own problems. This study will examine the
Royal Navy's post-war evolution in this spirit.

6It is appropriate at this point to say something about
the methods employed in this study. The best evidence for this
type of investigation would be such material as minutes of
Defense Committee or Board of Admiralty meetings, memoranda or
instructions by Ministers or Chiefs of Staff, and staff studies
on which their considerations were based. There are, of course,
severe restrictions on the use of such documents, and hence on
the study of the interior processes of the British government
3for any recent period. Many of the most pertinent documents
carry a security classification that prevents their use in an
open study.
This limitation manifestly enhances the opportunity for
error. One cannot estimate the degree of distortion without
access to the secret archives of the British government.
Nevertheless, this writer believes that the importance of the
subject justifies a contemporary effort with materials avail-
able. Certainly a more definitive history will be welcome when
it is practical to produce one, but no one can deny that fifty
years hence the data will have lost much of its significance for
the practicing military officer and politician. Effort has been
made to reduce error by confining the study to general policy
matters and by buttressing published information with personal
interviews.
At this point It would be wise to describe briefly the
writer's reasoning and methods in more detail so that the
reader may make his own judgments as to the likelihood of dis-
tortion. The primary themes are those of naval policy and of
the considerations which form them. It was chosen deliberately,
because it implies a very general level of discourse and is not
concerned so much with the classified details of weapons, dimen-
sions of ships, missile performance and similar technical infor-
mation. On the contrary it revolves around more basic issues
such as the state of the economy, the balance of power in world
politics, the nation's international responsibilities, prevailing
strategical concepts and the availability of nuclear weapons.

7These issues are dealt with in parliamentary debates, public
Government documents, White Papers, and Service estimates.
This is not to say that these sources in themselves are adequate
or that this type of information is always readily available.
Nevertheless, many of these matters are widely discussed in the
popular press and in professional military literature. Often
it is not so much events that are important as perspectives.
The prevailing attitudes among naval officers, scientists and
politicians are often much more helpful in explaining policy
decisions than the memoranda which formalize those decisions.
Such information can often be deduced from professional liter-
ature, newspaper statements and official declarations, when
these are pieced into the overall picture. An effort was made
to consult all of the public sources available.
Anyone with even superficial knowledge of British
defense planning is well aware that a great amount of highly
classified information finds its way into the public news media,
particularly when it concerns policy choices made at the polit-
ical level. Unfortunately, many misleading reports also appear
in newsprint. The difficulty, of course, is to separate "the
wheat from the chaff." To do this the writer has supplemented
his library research with some ninety-seven personal interviews
over a period of four months in England and a postal exchange
of questionnaires with a number of other individuals. These
included politicians (of both parties), scientists, professional
officers of all three Services (with heavy emphasis on the Royal
Navy), civil servants, journalists, historians and others.
Needless to say these interviews were invaluable as a guide
to public sources, as a check on published reports and as a
means of eliciting substantive data not otherwise available.
Since this study rests heavily on these Interviews it
is appropriate to comment briefly on this phase of the research.
A serious attempt was made to cover the relevant branches of
government. The Departments represented Included the three
military Departments, the Ministry of Aviation (at one time

8Ministry of Supply), the Ministry of Defense, and the Treasury.
Many of the persons interviewed presently hold official positions,
but a determined effort was also made to interview individuals
who had contributed to the discussions, debates and decisions of
previous Governments. In the same vein some officials were
sought out not so much for their general knowledge but because
of their ability to throw light on a particular decision, period
of time, or facet of activity.
It was not practical to ask a common set of questions
due to the wide differences in experience, background, and
responsibility among the interviewees. Therefore conversations
were tailored to capitalize on the respondent's particular
knowledge and training. In order to make the exchange of infor-
mation as free as possible all respondents were assured that al-
though their comments might be used there would be no attributions
or citations by name. It is difficult to document, but the
writer is confident that this procedure increased the candor of
the interviews and enhanced their overall value. In some
instances there was a visible lowering of the guard once the
respondent was assured that his name would not be cited. Inter-
views varied in length from thirty minutes to five hours, and
some individuals were visited more than once. In some cases the
writer was invited to take notes and in others the general bear-
ing of the respondent seemed to dictate a conversational approach.
In these instances I prepared a detailed summary of the interview
at the first opportunity. These summaries are by no means exact
transcripts, but I am confident that they captured the essence
of the conversations. The difficulty here is not so much to
record what was said as to understand it. "The problem of com-
munications exists even between societies with as much in common
as Britain and the United States. Although every effort was
made to avoid this pitfall one has no sure way of testing his
degree of success or failure.
Needless to say, information and opinions from these
interviews have been used throughout the thesis. Statements

9attributed to interviews are normally the writer's impression
of the respondent's remarks. A serious effort has been made
to use interview data cautiously. In some instances the inter-
viewee had actually made the decisions which were being invest-
igated, and in other cases the writer has had to rely on the
testimony of individuals who were observing the decision-making
process from varying distances. In the latter case I have used
only data which represent opinions shared by several respondents.
Every effort will be made here to alert the reader when conclu-
sions are particularly controversial or where interviewees were
in marked disagreement. Where interview data corresponded to
published reports, the latter have been cited.
Due to the fact that the dissertation necessarily rests
in large part on interviews I purposely selected 1 963 as the
cut-off date for my research. This decision was dictated by
the understandable reluctance of officials to comment on current
affairs. Consequently, the knowledgeable reader will note that
the thesis has neglected the "multi-lateral force" and the im-
portant reorganization which was consummated in early 196"5»
These are only two of the more prominent examples. I would have
liked very much to have brought the study up to the present date,
but in view of this practical obstacle I am confident that it
would not have been fruitful. In line with this reasoning no
questions were asked about contemporary issues, although the
initial negotiations were in some cases being carried out in
1963 or earlier. An even earlier cut-off date was seriously
considered, but 1 963 seems to lend itself to a study of the
Navy, because it took in the significant decisions to adopt
Polaris and to build a new carrier.
Now a word about the organization of the dissertation.
Its major focus is the formation of naval policy since World
War II. Consequently the first few chapters will be devoted
to tracing that policy and to analysing the forces which
moulded it. Chapter II sketches the economic, international,
technical and administrative background against which British
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naval policy has been made since 19^5. It is essential to
understand these general parameters before undertaking a more
detailed analysis. Chapters III, IV and V trace the evolution
of the mainstream of naval thinking and how it was translated
into concrete policy from 19^5 to 1963. Chapter VI deals with
the Royal Navy's introduction to nuclear propulsion and its
rather belated adoption of the Polaris missile and the "fleet
ballistic missile submarine." This train of events is treated
separately, because the Royal Navy has only entered this field
with the greatest reluctance. Chapters VII and VIII are devoted
to an analysis of the mechanics of policy formation and of the
Admiralty's role in the overall process. These two chapters
attempt to point up the more significant administrative lessons
which the Royal Navy's post-war experience offers. Hopefully
this will be of some benefit to the political scientist and
professional administrator as well as to the practicing naval
officer. Chapter IX is the concluding one. It presents an
overview of naval policy in terms of the post-war environment




1. The most complete bibliographic summary of works on post-war
British defense policy is in William P. Snyder, The Politics
of British Defense Policy. 1945 -1 962 (Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1964")
,
pp. 261-272. He does not mention
one single book or article devoted specifically to the
post-war Royal Navy. There has been one book published
dealing with the Royal Navy's post-war technical achieve-
ments: Paul E. Garbutt, Naval Challenge.1945-1961 (London:
Macdonald & Co. , 1961). However, this work in no sense
deals with policy problems.
2. As the reader is no doubt aware, the largest is the U. S.
Navy, and the second is the Soviet Navy.
3. The British government operates under a "fifty year rule"
which normally precludes the release of internal govern-
•
mental records of any kind for fifty years. The outstand-
ing exception to this was the release of documents to the
team of official historians appointed by the Government
to write the military and civil histories of World War II.
However, this seems to be a one-time exception, and there
have been no significant relaxations made regarding the
post-war years, as far as this writer knows. Even if an
author is so fortunate as to get access to records he
must submit his final product for inspection and clearance.
Needless to say this severely limits his freedom and con-
sumes considerable time. There is no question that this
practice has contributed in large measure to the prevail-
ing attitude among British historians that contemporary
affairs (interpreted to mean any events in the last half
century) are not a suitable subject for study. On the
other hand there are a few authors and historians in
Great Britain who disagree vehemently with this attitude
and believe that contemporary history is most important.
Some of this group are presently carrying on a bitter
fight to get this harsh rule relaxed, but as yet there
are no serious indications that the Government will
retreat.
4. Perhaps it should be mentioned that even with such access,
problems of interpretation would remain and that the prob-
abilities of distortion although reduced would still be
present. This, of course, is the fundamental challenge
of writing history and political analysis.
5. William P. Snyder, "The Politics of British Defense Policy,
1951-1961" (Ph.D. dissertation Princeton University, 1 963)
,
p. 16. This dissertation has subsequently been published
with some extensive alterations, The Politics of British
Defense Policy 1945-1962 (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1964). In referring to his work the book will be
cited wherever possible, but occasionally it will be
necessary to refer to passages in the dissertation which
were not reproduced in the book.
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6. There Is one exception to the 1 963 cut-off date. The
sequence of events leading to the decision to purchase
American aircraft for the Fleet Air Arm is treated although
they extended into early 1964. This was necessary, because




Anthony Hartley in A State of England declares that
"the main fact governing English life since 1939 - a fact so
obvious that it is frequently overlooked altogether - is loss
of power." Great Britain entered World War II as one of the
most influential nations of the world and took with it "over-
seas possessions which were then at the most extensive they
had ever been." It emerged from this conflict victorious,
but seriously depleted. The post-war world was a great deal
different than that of 1939, and Britain drifted into an un-
anticipated decline. Since 19^5 the nation has been beset with
difficulties which have severely Impaired its ability to manip-
ulate events in its favor. Economic problems have plagued all
post-war Governments. The pressing demands of nationalism have
gradually eroded the Empire, and diplomatically London's ability
to influence world affairs has steadily diminished. These de-
velopments have necessitated a series of painful adjustments.
In essence post-war statecraft has been dominated by the need
to readjust traditional perspectives to Britain's "reduced
status in the world scale of power. "^ This has been strikingly
illustrated in the case of military policy. However, to
appreciate fully this process it is essential first to sketch
the major roots of British power and to trace how time and
changing conditions have stunted their growth.
Although there is some controversy as to the degree of
England's historic pre-eminence, there is a general consensus
that about the middle of the nineteenth century Great Britain
was the leading global power. She carried on a thriving trade




high; and militarily she was as secure in the home islands as
any country had ever been or has been since. Lord William
Strang in discussing this period attributed Britain's influ-
ence and position to three main factors: (1) her naval
strength and the military potential which "she was believed
to be capable of developing and using"; (2) her "outstanding
commercial, financial and industrial strength"; and (3) "the
relative weakness of the other great powers. This simple
classification offers an easy lead into the problem of back-
ground. It is proposed to examine briefly these categories
and to illustrate how they contributed to Britain's nineteenth
century greatness and how, in turn, altering conditions have
undermined them. Only against such a backdrop can the dra-
matic transformations which have occurred since 19^5 be
adequately appreciated. It is then intended to close by
briefly discussing the formal decision-making structure in
order to give the reader a framework within which the post-war
evolution of naval policy can be fitted.
Traditional Military Posture
The very cornerstone of England's rise to prominence
was sea power. Without control of the oceans the British
Empire could never have been built or maintained. Due to a
unique combination of geographical factors and material re-
sources Great Britain was able to develop an unchallenged Navy
and in turn to extend its influence throughout the world. When
the political and economic emphasis shifted to Western Europe,
Britain found itself no longer on the periphery but at the
focal point of power. Its insularity provided security and
the advantage of a central position. The lack of continental
frontiers allowed it to concentrate on maritime forces. No
other European power could afford to devote so high a pro-
portion of its military energies to sea power. England s
geographical position put it between Europe and the Atlantic
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and athwart the principal maritime trade routes to Europe.
This combination soon led to both economic and military control
of the English Channel and the North Sea.
As trade grew the Royal Navy likewise expanded, and the
two made possible the extension of British influence and power.
It was only natural that the Royal Navy was soon pushing into
the Mediterranean and casting its eyes towards the tip of
Spain. In 1704 Gibraltar was captured. This assured Great
7Britain control of the remaining European sea. Complementing
the iron ring which the Royal Navy was forging around Europe,
the Government was gradually expanding its dominion along the
principal sea routes of the world. A series of outposts were
annexed, developed and fortified - Bermuda (1609), Jamaica
(1655), Halifax (1713), Cape Town (1805), Ceylon (1805),
Singapore (1805), Malta (18U), Falkland Islands (1832),
Aden (1839), Hong Kong ( 1 84 1 ) and Suez (1869) were among the
more significant accessions. Many of these had insular
characteristics, similar to England's, which made them highly
defensible, and all of them were strategically located. These
bases extended the Royal Navy's tentacles to the remotest
corners of the world.
This maritime strategy not only allowed Great Britain
to expand its economic influence and to protect its investments,
but also to control the competition. Its main rival France
was never able to break Britain's grip on its colonies or to
attack the home islands successfully. On the other hand, the
Royal Navy made it possible for the British to defeat the
French in North America and India, and to fight on the Conti-
nent at times and places of their own choosing. The same
forces that defended England could be used to project its
offensive might and to guard its trade lanes. This was economy
of force in the highest sense of the word. By the middle of
the nineteenth century England had attained a degree of
security such as no country had ever known or probably ever
will know again. In effect the Royal Navy exercised "a lever-
et
age on world affairs without precedent in naval annals.'
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But change is an immutable rule and the passing of the
nineteenth century brought with it disturbing signs. As long
as European states were the only ones possessing large navies
Great Britain's control of the narrow European Seas assured
it mastery of the world's oceans. By concentrating its naval
might at home and in the Mediterranean it was possible to con-
tain and neutralize the enemies' fleets. The remaining oceans
fell by default. However, the rise of non-European sea powers
seriously challenged this strategic doctrine.
In the late 1800's both the Japanese and American navies
underwent significant development. Breaking away from their
traditional "small navy" frame of reference these two new arrivals
on the imperialist scene commenced constructing modern fleets
modeled after the British example. The Admiralty's only alter-
native was to either relinquish its maritime grip in the Far
East and in the Western Hemisphere or to strengthen its overseas
forces by crippling its European squadrons. At this moment a
third development interjected itself. Shortly after the turn
of the century the German Navy launched a rapid expansion pro-
gram which threatened to tip the scales in European waters.
Rating the continental danger as the gravest His Majesty's
Government chose to maintain superiority in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean at the cost of weakening their overseas forces.
In typical British style diplomacy was utilized to cover this
retreat. In the Far East England entered into a military treaty
with Japan. In effect it was acceding to joint control of the
oriental oceans. In the Western Hemisphere Great Britain
initiated a policy of friendship and co-operation with the United
States in order to secure the Carribbean and Western Atlantic.
The Royal Navy was still second to none, but in effect the
United Kingdom was relying on the United States and Japan for
overseas support and cooperation.
World War I demonstrated that England's trust in seapower
had not been misplaced. The Home Fleet succeeded in bottling up
the German High Seas Fleet. The United Kingdom was secured from
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invasion; British troops were put ashore on the Continent and
supported by the Royal Navy. The decision to commit a land
army on the Western front was not unprecedented nor necessarily
inconsistent with the traditional reliance on a maritime strat-
egy. On the other hand the determination to decide the issue
in Western France and to keep pouring men and resources into
the trenches no matter what the cost, sacrificed the main ad-
vantages which seaborne forces could offer. The Dardanellas
campaign, of course, was an effort to avoid the impasse in
Flanders and to utilize the mobility which the Fleet possessed.
This was more in line with the traditional British approach and
had a commendable air of innovation about it. But It failed due
to a variety of causes; the most important of which was apathetic
execution. Unfortunately, this disaster strengthened the argu-
ments of those "cavalry" generals who were mesmerized by the
Western front, and the Fleet was once again relegated to a
blockading role which it carried out with telling effect.
However, during World War I a number of new weapons
were introduced to sea warfare which indicated that the tra-
ditional role of fleets were beginning to change. Although the
Royal Navy managed to keep open Britain's supply lines it was
literally a fight for life, and the margin of success was a
narrow one. German U-boats sank some 10 million tons of
1 2
allied shipping. The submarine counter-blockade of the
United Kingdom came within a hair's breadth of choking off its
1 3
vital supply lines. -' Only a super-human effort upon the part
of British seamen, and the entrance of the United States into
the war managed to turn the tide. Submarines literally inter-
jected a new dimension into naval warfare. In addition the
use of aircraft at sea opened up a host of possibilities for
progressive tacticians. Not only the evolving political
patterns were eroding the position of British sea power, but
technological advance was also threatening the Royal Navy's
ability to defend the United Kingdom.
Despite these ominous portents the Royal Navy emerged
from the Great War stronger than ever before. With "over
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1,300 combatant vessels of all classes, including forty-two
first-line capital ships she had no peer. On the other
side of the ledger, however, the United States had accelerated
its naval program and was operating from a position of new-
found economic strength which had been stimulated by the war
but not overtaxed by it. In the Western Pacific Japan's
strategic position had improved as a result of the acquisition
of Germany's Pacific islands, and it was laying new emphasis
on naval power.. Although Great Britain was free to cast its
eyes either East or West, it was obvious that to reestablish
the world-wide pre-eminence that the Royal Navy enjoyed in the
nineteenth century was neither practicable nor feasible. In
fact there was every danger of a disastrous naval arms race
ensuing which would lead to an unacceptable economic burden
and possibly to war.
This grim prospect was averted by the Washington
1 SConference of 1922. In the resulting treaty J Great Britain
discarded its "centuries-old policy of a predominant Navy
1 f\
and agreed to parity with the United States." It was agreed
that the capital ships and carrier tonnage of Britain, the
United States, and Japan should be proportioned in the ratio
5-5-3. There were a number of other provisions but this
feature was the most important. In 1930 the London Naval
Conference met and extended the qualitative limitations of
the Washington treaty. A proposal to restrict the number of
cruisers was adopted, and England agreed to a limit of fifty.
This was the last positive step taken to reduce fleets. By
1933 the Royal Navy had shrunk to 15 capital ships, 47 cruisers,
1
7
132 destroyers and 56 submarines. In 1932 the Geneva Dis-
armament Conference failed, and shortly thereafter Japan
served the necessary two years notice to terminate the
Washington agreement. In turn Germany repudiated the naval
and military limitations imposed upon it at Versailles. This
was the signal for the long suppressed naval arms race.
His Majesty's Government picked up the gauntlet. In




it was accelerated in 1937 and 1938. This was part of a
general rearmament policy, but the lion's share of money and
effort was devoted to the Navy. It was not until 1939 that




The inter-war period had seen little change in naval
thinking, although there had been some technological progress.
The aircraft carrier had become an integral part of modern
20fleets, and submarines had been further developed and assim-
ilated into all the large navies. Ship design and naval ord-
nance had undergone some improvement, but no radical modifi-
cations were evident. The major emphasis was still on the
battleship and the battle line. The Royal Navy continued to
envision itself as the United Kingdom's first line of defense.
Commander Russell Grenfell, one of the foremost naval author-
ities of that period, set out the Fleet's four main tasks as:
preventing invasion; covering the movement of troops overseas;
protecting incoming supplies; blockading the enemy and driving
21his shipping from the ocean.
While it was never to reestablish the lead it enjoyed
in 1919. by the outbreak of World War II Britain was again
the leading sea Power in the world. Its Navy was larger
than those of Germany, Italy and France combined, and more ships
were coming off the ways every month. It was firmly e' sconced
in the home islands and the Mediterranean. British strategists
strongly believed that if the United States and Japan would
remain neutral, the Royal Navy could fulfill its traditional
tasks in any European war and insure eventual victory.
The saga of World War II is too involved and too well
known to repeat in any detail. Every school boy knows how
close Great Britain came to the brink of disaster and how
Germany employed armour and air power with such devastating
effect. The magnificent role the Royal Air Force played in
staving off defeat is now legend, and the dramatic rise of air
forces to ascendancy in the military hierarchy is common
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knowledge. Yet the day of sea power had not completely passed.
An instrumental factor in preventing the German invasion was
22
England's vast naval superiority. After Dunkirk its hopes
and fears rested solely on a small air force and a ready navy
that was prepared and willing to bar the channel to German
ships and barges. In the Mediterranean the British warships
without adequate air support fought an up and down battle for
command of that narrow sea. The Navy needed the help of both
land-based aircraft and army troops to finally establish firm
control of the Mediterranean, but its achievements in that
theatre added another glorious chapter to its history. The
fight to keep open the Atlantic supply lines was even more
desperate than in World War I. The issue was in doubt until
America's intervention began to shift the balance, and the
battle was only narrowly won through the frantic and often
gallant efforts of allied scientists, shipbuilders and seamen.
The Royal Navy emerged from this holocaust victorious, but
battered and shaken.
World War II had brought drastic changes in warfare
in general and in naval weapons and tactics in particular.
Sea warfare had become both extremely complex and expensive.
Carriers had replaced battleships as the number one naval
weapon system. They had made it possible for fleets to pro-
ject their offensive might over great distances and into the
enemy's heartland. Amphibious operations had been used with
great success against heavily defended beaches demonstrating
the advantages of mobility. The submarine had again proved its
tremendous value in attacking merchant traffic and combatting
capital ships. More significantly the year 19^5 witnessed the
first atomic bomb and the defeat of Japan's island empire with-
out one American invading the home islands. This development
alone threatened to revolutionize the nature of warfare.
It was painfully manifest that warships alone could no
longer defend the United Kingdom and that this task would now
have to be shared with the Royal Air Force. Aside from that
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there were few clear guidelines as to the future of Britain's
traditional maritime strategy. During the war His Majesty's
Government had once again committed a vast army to the Conti-
nent; there were some signs that this might become a permanent
feature of British defense policy. The advent of atomic weapons
had led many to believe that the days of armies and navies were
numbered. In turn they contended that only air forces would be
viable in this new era. On the other hand Britain is an island
completely dependent on the sea, and there was a general reluc-
tance to discard traditional concepts until the road ahead was
more clearly marked than it was in 1 9^-5* In essence the armis-
tice found the field of military strategy in some disarray.
One of the chief post-war tasks of the Government would be to
assimilate the new military developments and arrive at a sat-
isfactory accommodation with these new realities.
Economic Backdrop
In the nineteenth century Great Britain occupied an
enviable economic position. It was truly "the most important
of trading nations and the leaders in the economic development
of the world. " ^ This was the result of a number of rein-
forcing factors, some of which were not economic such as the
stability of the British government, the trustworthiness of
its financial institutions, and its ability to protect its
trade. From a financial standpoint this pre-eminence rested
on a long head start in the mechanization of industry and
transportation which assured Britons "a generally favorable
• 24
competitive position that lasted for several decades." In
fact until about 1880 Great Britain was the only thoroughly
25developed industrial state in the world*
Drawing on their overwhelming superiority in industrial
techniques Britons were able to establish a trade pattern which
both enriched their coffers and brought others to rely on them
as suppliers. Great Britain's trade at mid-century took the
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form mainly of an exchange of manufactured products against
imported foodstuffs and raw materials. "it was the trade of an
industrial state with countries still largely agrari a and, as
such, it was world-wide. ' By steadily reducing and eventually
eliminating customs duties on primary products, British poli-
ticians made this trade pattern increasingly attractive and
profitable for less mechanized countries. "industrial leader-
ship and a bulk cargo, coal, to fill the ships on outbound
voyages fostered the growth of the British merchant marine,
which provided cheap and reliable ocean transportation. " ' This
was a unique combination of factors which assured Britain the
commercial leadership of the world.
Profits resulted in savings and in turn capital invest-
ment abroad, particularly in the colonies. Overseas investments
brought in their wake British managers, engineers and other
orofessionals. This made it possible for the possessions to
absorb Britain's surplus population. Inevitably this tied the
Empire closer together and expedited the development of the
colonies as primary producers. However, investments were not
limited to the Empire. Great amounts were likewise deposited in
Europe, South America and the United States. By 1871 Britons had
invested over £800 million overseas, and this figure increased
to approximately £3,500 million by 1913. Great Britain had
become a creditor nation with all the advantages that the term
implies.
Income from foreign investments became a substantial
source of profits serving to cushion the national balance of pay-
ments in years which were bad for exports. In turn sterling
became an international currency as the nation's money handling
facilities expanded. In the middle 1900' s Great Britain became
the center of the world's economic activities, and many nations
depended heavily upon the financial services of London. British
capitalists had considerable control over the stability of the
international economy. Their decisions affected every continent.
Consequently, there was a world-wide interest in the "uninterrupted
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continuance of access to British goods, markets, and services"
and a general willingness to defer to British policies. It was
an enviable system which assured Britain's commercial ascendancy
and correspondingly strengthened her position diplomatically and
militarily. 31
However, this ideal economic situation could hardly
be expected to continue indefinitely. Just as Britain's
impregnable military position fell victim to the march of
events, her economic pre-eminence gradually succumbed to
changing conditions. W. H. B. Court struck to the heart of
the problem when he characterized Great Britain's nineteenth
century manufacturing monopoly as "the kind which is always
dying." It was impossible to sell manufactured products all
over the world at great profit without stimulating the hunger of
other countries for industry and its benefits. Not only did the
English example excite envy and stimulate foreign industrial
activity, but its exports in the form of machinery and capital
facilitated the rise of overseas competitors. Starting some-
where around 1880 Britain's long-time dominance began to under-
"33
go gradual but nevertheless significant alterations. ^ The
main element in this great change was the relatively rapid
industrialization of western Europe and America. As in the
case of the United States many primary producers began to pro-
cess their own raw materials. This had several adverse effects
on British traders. The price of foodstuffs and raw materials
gradually increased; many of the traditional markets for con-
sumer goods disappeared; and a host of new competitors appeared
in the international market place.
By the late 1 800 ' s Britain's reliance on its manu-
facturing capacity and ability to organize a trade in industrial
goods had made it dangerously dependent on imports of food and
raw materials. By 1 870 over 50% of the total food in England
was imported. By 1930 the figure was to reach 75/£o Although
imports exceeded exports by as much as 20^ this did not prove
too much of a handicap in the late 1800's. Added to income
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from exports were sizeable payments for British shipping and
commercial services which more than paid the bill for foreign
goods and left the nation a considerable sum for reinvestment
abroad. However, as overseas competition and the price of imports
increased the selling of exports became more difficult. The
34balance of payments inevitably became a bothersome problem.
There was one important factor which allegiated the
effects of this adverse trend. By 1913 Great Britain's overseas
investments had built up to approximately £3,500 million. The
annual interest due on foreign loans was sufficiently large to
fill the balance of payments gap. This situation was by no
means as satisfactory as that of the mid-nineteenth century, but
it nevertheless stilled the cries of alarm and served to confirm
Briton's faith in their financial position.
However, starting in 1914 the British economy was to
receive a series of shocks. The First World War administered a
temporary but immense setback to Britain's balance of payments.
Foreign trade and the amount of industrial production available
for exports were both severely reduced early in the struggle.
Concurrently a large volume of necessary imports, including
materials of war from the United States, had to be paid for.
This led to the sale of foreign assets. From one-fifth to one-
fourth of the pre-war volume of overseas investments was liqui-
35
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fell, and the earnings from shipping and financial services
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declined markedly.
During the inter-war years production, trade, and
investment resumed their pre-war growth. This trend camouflaged
the setbacks of the war and caused many Britons to overlook the
basic transformations which had taken place. Good years were
treated as normal, and bad years were attributed to the war or
the Government. However, no one could overlook the failure of
the export trade to revive. By 1929 it was still below the 1913
level. Unemployment consistently plagued the biggest exporters -
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the coal, shipbuilding and textile industries. The depression
of 1929 brought further distress and disorganized many foreign
accounts. "it carried away much Victorian rigging, the gold
standard and free trade included, within two years ( 1 931 -1 932
)
and left an altered world behind. "^°
Moreover the line between ' industrial and primary
producing states continued to grow fainter as the 1929 depression
forced countries to rely on their own resources. Great Britain
suffered progressive losses in consumer goods which were not
made up by the sales of capital goods. Her economic structure
was founded on coal, steam engineering, and iron production, but
the world was turning to new techniques, fuels and metals.
British industries and businessmen proved to be conservative,
complacent and rigid. It was well into the 1930's before they
began to respond to the demands of the times, and by then it
was too late for new export industries to make up for the losses
of the old. Attention had turned to preparations for war. Fearful
nations began to draw back from international trade. This came
at a critical juncture for Albion, just as her foreign accounts
were beginning to recover from the aftermath of World War I.
The effects of the Second World War dwarfed those of the
1914-1918 conflict. Physical losses alone were astronomical.
Over £18.1 billion worth of capital assets were consumed by this
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conflict. This included bomb damage, shipping losses and re-
duction in value due to the inability to repair and maintain
physical equipment. In material terms this represented the loss
of one-half her merchant marine, destruction or damage to nearly
one-third of all the homes in Britain, badly run down industrial
plants. Pre-war overseas investments totalled some S3. 7 billion.
One-third to one-half of these were liquidated by sale or
destroyed by enemy action. In place of these assets the nation
acquired "overseas debts totalling £2.9 billion to cover war
H 3Qpurchases and the cost of maintaining military forces. -^ The
interest upon debts incurred during the war was to consume one-
40
sixth of the national budget in coming years. Paralleling

this were many losses more difficult to estimate. Invisible
sources of income such as shipping and overseas banking operations
dropped off sharply. Even more vital were the many overseas
customers who turned away from Britain during the course of the
war. Many of these contacts had been built up through centuries
of trade and yet disappeared in just a few years. Taken as a
whole these setbacks dealt the British economy an unprecedented
blow and left the nation in a genuinely precarious economic
situation.
The most important fact-of-life in post-war Great
Britain has been its unstable economy. Correspondingly it has
been the most significant single determinant of the size and
shape of the military Services. In order to appreciate the
evolution of defense policy since World War II, it is essential
for the reader to have a clear understanding of the special
nature of the economic situation since 1945*
By that date Britain found Itself a small, densely
settled and highly industrialized country. Approximately 5% of
the population is engaged in agriculture, forestry and fisheries
combined. The bulk of the population is involved in manufacturing,
trade and finance. Its many decades of industrialization have
systematically depleted the island* s natural resources, and the
only raw material in which the United Kingdom could be considered
self-sufficient is coal. About half of its food is imported. In
essence the British depend on imports for their very existence.
The only way to pay this imposing import bill is to sell
goods and services abroad. Even more discouraging "as many of
its exports are made largely of imported materials, 'exports must
meet the cost of these imports as well as those retained for
consumption at home." In the final analysis the health of the
British economy depends primarily on its ability to export.
Industry must not only manufacture goods for foreign shipment,
but sell them successfully abroad. This total dependence on
foreign trade makes Britain highly vulnerable to the vagaries of




Actually Great Britain has been an importing nation
for many years, but the losses suffered in World War II have
severely complicated her basic problems and made exports even
more crucial. In order to repay her war debts, to revamp her
damaged manufacturing plants, and to make her industry competi-
tive again, it was necessary to allocate a large share of
output to investment. Of course, the equipment needed for
modernisation and expansion also contains a large proportion
of imported materials and in turn demands a higher level of
exports to balance the account. In previous years the gap
between exports and imports was filled by invisible overseas
profits from banking services, shipping, Insurance and
particularly the interest on foreign investments. Before the
war these sources of revenue normally ran over 8% of the Gross
National Product. As a result of the war this income has
declined to less than 2% of the GNP. This has dramatically
widened the trade voice, and as a result It has been necessary
to expand drastically the amount of exports In order to
counter-balance the losses in these areas. These reinforcing
_.._
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calls for more imports and 9 in turn, a higher level of exports.
This vicious cycle has plagued every British post-war Govern-
ment and required a continuing effort to improve the nation's
export position.
The need for exports and the crucial balance of payments
problem have put relentless pressure on the Government since
1945 to reduce defense expenditures. To fully understand the
relationship of military spending to the economy it is necessary
to look at the overall distribution of goods and services in the
United Kingdom. J There are a number of more or less distinct
markets competing for a share of the total. The five main
categories in normal order of magnitude are:
(1 ) The personal consumption market;
(2) The export market;
(3) The domestic capital market;
(4) The civil governments, national and local;
(5) She defense establishment.
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It must be borne in mind that each of these competing markets
requires imports of food and raw materials which must be paid
for by greater exports of goods and services. In turn, to
increase exports requires more imported materials.
The military Services find themselves at a great
disadvantage in this system, since defense consumes imports
and contributes nothing to the export sector. Since World
War II Britain's export trade has relied heavily on the
engineering and metals industries. These are the very ones
which supply the bulk of the defense establishment's equipment.
This means that defense production and exports are in constant
competition. In essence the overriding need for exports imposes
limits on the nation's ability to respond to defense requirements
and to accelerate arms production when necessary. For example
during the Korean War the Government's rearmament program was
continually hampered and eventually had to be cut back as a
result of the heavy pressure for exports. In the same manner
military demands detract from the domestic capital market, and
yet in an economy so dependent on international trade it is
essential to keep investing in new factories and machinery.
Another facet of this same problem is the human
resources which must be allocated to competing sectors of the
economy. Defense projects consume scientists, engineers and
large amounts of manpower which can be employed profitably in
export industries. Diverting scientific and technical personnel
to defense industries may retard export production and weaken
Britain's competitive position. Off and on throughout the post-
war period this has been of some concern to the Government.
Again it has been a question of balancing the competing claims
of different consumers against limited resources.
Even defense deployments effect the balance of payments
44
and put additional pressure on the economy. When military
personnel are stationed abroad both the Government and the
individual Service men expend large sums in the purchase of
foreign goods and services. "For balance of payments purposes
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both expenditures are outflows or deficits - the equivalent of
imports into the British economy," ° This increases the gap
between payments and receipts that must be filled by exports.
As a result there is continuous agitation to reduce the size
of the Services and the numbers stationed overseas. However,
the important point is that a primary goal of post-war British
policy has had to be a balance of payments surplus, and this
has constrained the general level of defense spending.
Thus far the discussion has been limited to the
relationship between only three of the five sectors - defense,
exports and domestic capital* There are two other markets
which likewise compete for goods and services - the personal
consumer and civil governments. There are only two ways to
increase the share of a consumer. One is to expand the
nation's Gross National Product (the total of goods and services
available) and. the other is to reduce the share that goes to
other markets. Consequently, in studying defense policy it
is necessary to examine defense expenditures in terms of the
total product available and in relation to its competitors.
Government policies markedly affect the allocation of goods
and services among the competing sectors of the economy, and
the way expenditures are divided often reveals a great deal
about the political climate. Although defense expenditures
may detract from the export sector, it would still be possible
to maintain a balance by cutting back personal consumption
and/or non-military governmental expenditures. The willingness
of the Government to do this will depend on a number of con-
ditions. In times of crisis one standard will prevail and
when there is no external threat another.
What should be stressed is that the economic problem
is not merely a two way relationship between the defense and
export sectors of the economy. It is more involved than that.
When a defense White Paper insists that economic pressures
preclude increased expenditures on the military, it is often
saying "that it x^ould be politically inexpedient to make deep
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cuts either in personal consumption or in government spending
for non-military purposes." In post-war Britain the Govern-
ment has become heavily committed to a large and broad program
of social services. Likewise the lean years of World War II
and its immediate aftermath were followed by an immense demand
for consumer goods. Once rationing and controls were lifted
personal spending expanded rapidly, and the British people were
loath to sacrifice any of their new-found opportunities. Post-
war governments have had to take these pressures into account
and have proved extremely reluctant to reduce expenditures in
these areas. In essence the Government is dealing in "the logic
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of priorities. ' It is often not only economic pressure which
limits defense expenditures but a combination of political
expediency and fiscal considerations. Together these factors
have served to restrict severely post-war defense spending.
International Relationships
Lord Strang attributed Britain's nineteenth century
hegemony partially to the weakness of other European countries,
particularly France. ' In sua he was saying that there were no
competitors who could mount a serious challenge to Albion's
leadership. As the previous discussion has indicated, hy
implication if not explicitly, the deterioration of England's
military and economic position signaled the rapid rise of a
number of nations to new levels of affluence and power. In
1870 the United Kingdom (including the Irish) had a population
of 32 million people. This was roughly comparable to Germany's
40 million, France's 36 million and America's 40 million. By
the First World War uneven population growth had significantly
altered this state of affairs. The United States had increased
to 91 million, Germany to 64 million and Britain to only 45
4Q
million. y This corresponded roughly to changes in production
and trade. At the end of the third quarter in the nineteenth
century British output had exceeded the combined French, German
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and American production In three vital fields - coal, pig-iron
and cotton. By the early 1900 9 s American coal output exceeded
Britain's, Germany and America were producing more pig-iron
than England, and both were rapidly moving Into the textile
markot. 3^ *914 tho Unitod States had become the world ! j d^-d-
ing manufacturing country in terms of value and volume of pro-
duct, and Germany was second. Besides these two main competitors
a number of other countries were undergoing industrialization -
Sweden, Russia, Canada, Japan - and were exerting increased
influence on world events. The international patterns of power
were changing radically.
These alterations were reflected by British foreign
SOpolicy. Around the turn of the century Great Britain took a
series of steps designed to reduce its overseas anxieties, so
that it could devote more attention to Europe. The Hay-
Paunceforte Treaty of 1 901 agreed to exclusive American control
of the Panama Canal and for all intents and purposes left the
Caribbean to the United States. The same long-range aims In-
spired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 which gave Japan a
free hand in the Orient. The Entente Cordial of 1904 with
France and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 were intended
to reduce friction in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.
Although it was not so obvious at the time these steps reversed
a standing policy of isolation. Never again would Great
Britain be able to act with the independence it had enjoyed
throughout the nineteenth century.
It was soon manifest to British statesmen that those
were not the only compromises which were necessary. Germany's
rise to prominence and its apparently limitless ambitions could
not be countered by Britain alone. Germany's unwelcome interest
in Morocco in 1905 and the resulting Algerian Conference served
to throw France and England closer together and gave the Great
Powers the first hint of a possible European war. Building on
the foundation of the Entente Cordial the two countries in
1906 commenced non-committal talks on the possibilities of
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conducting joint land operations on the Continent, This was
a revolutionary move for a peacetime British Government, but
one which was dictated by Britain's declining position in the
international power structure. The coming years witnessed
further Anglo-French collaboration as Germany's strength con-
tinued to grow. Although the United Kingdom was not formally
committed to support France in 1914, the strong ties which had
been forged between the two nations placed a genuine moral
obligation on Britain. Even more important British leaders
were well aware that Germany could only be defeated by a com-
bl^ctic^ of opponent j.
Although World War I temporarily eliminated Germany
as a serious competitor in the international arena, it served
to accelerate the significant trends which have Just been
discussed. The inroads which World War I made into Britain's
economic position and maritime strategy have already been
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noted. She had lost over a million of her young men, and
her material resources had been drastically depleted. On the
other hand America had entered the ranks of the Great Powers,
She had been called upon to redress "the balance which Europe
..CO
herself had been no longer able to maintain and had
emerged with enhanced prestige, a greatly expanded industrial
plant, and as the world's largest creditor. America's refusal
to assume the mantle of world leadership in the inter-war
years disguised to a certain extent her impressive power, but
the fact remains that World War I had catapulted her to a
position of ascendancy.
The international power structure had changed funda-
mentally. Britain's welfare was Inextricably linked with the
security of western Europe. Despite some halfhearted
attempts in the inter-war years to return to its old isolation,
she found it impossible to do so. This dependence was reflected
by her participation in the League of Nations and even more by
the signing of the Treaty of Locarno in 1925. This instrument
guaranteed Germany's western border from attack by either side.
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It was an attempt to bring Germany back into harmonious relations
with its neighbors and to put European security on a permanent
basis. Although Britain and France seemingly appreciated the
need for cooperation and European security, they were not
willing to do more than negotiate to attain their ends. By the
1930 ! s Communism and Facism had gained a firm foothold. The die
was cast, American isolationism combined with Britain and
France's refusal to take any positive action pressed Russia into
an alliance with Hitler, and left the way open for Germany's
legions to raze Europe for the second time in twenty years.
The changes in the international community wrought by
World War II were even more dramatic and significant than
those fashioned during the 1914 to 19^8 era. The tremendous
devastation which Britain suffered was more than matched by the
damage done in Europe, Germany* 3 collapse was combined with
vast physical destruction in practically every part of the
Continent.
Over extensive areas there was unrelieved chaos.
Transport had in many places come to a standstill;
farm products were hoarded in the countryside through
mistrust of unstable currencies; raw material stocks
for industry had rundown; shortages of food and clothing
kept workers at home. The sheer problem of dealing with
refugees and displaced persons caused organized life to
hang by a thread. 54
The Allies had no choice but to assume sovereignty over Europe
and to attempt to bring order out of confusion. With Soviet
power on the Elbe the security of the western nations was in
British and American hands. Continental Europe temporarily
disappeared as a force in world politics.
In contrast to this picture of devastation America's
power and prestige had expanded immensely. It had not only
fought in Europe but had borne the great bulk of the effort
in the Pacific against Japan. Washington's pre-eminent position
technically and militarily was symbolized by its monopoly of
atomic weapons. The war had stimulated the United States to
herculean efforts and as a result had increased her manufacturing
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and agricultural capacity some one and one half times in the
short space of six years. * As in World War I she had again
become the Allied Powers 1 banker and creditor except on a
vastly increased scale. By 1945 America had extended over
§42 billion in loans, gifts and credits to her allies. At
the same time she was the only major participant to be spared
the horrors of physical attack and to enter the post-war period
without a pressing rehabilitation problem. Columbia came out
of that conflict as the undisputed leader of the free world.
Although the United States was the only major power
to escape widespread destruction, she was not the only one to
emerge from World War II with enhanced status. Under Stalin's
leadership the Soviet Union had accomplished prodigious feats
of arms. The Communists had stemmed the Nazi tide and even-
tually rolled it back to Berlin. In the process Russia had
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suffered incredible casualties and lost a significant pro-
portion of her economic base located in western Russia. How-
ever, these losses had heen partly counterbalanced by heavy
American aid (Lend-Lease and technological advice), the intro-
duction of new manufacturing processes, a sweeping standard-
ization of industry, and, due to the stimulus of war, the
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erection of hundreds of new plants East of the Urals.
Even more vital was the vast empire in eastern Europe
which the Soviets had acquired by force of arms. When Germany
surrendered the Russians had at their disposal "35% of Germany's
1936 industrial capacity, or 41$ of the 1943 capacity. "-^
Similarly she was able to extract at will from the Satellites
minerals, oil, optical and electrical instruments, sugar and
fats, and large portions of their industrial output. In many
instances whole plants were moved to Russia along with workers,
engineers and scientists. These acquisitions combined with the
Communist system of Government, which allows the leaders iron-
fisted control over the nation's resources and people, offered
the Soviet Union an excellent base for recovery. Georg von
Rauch comments in this regard that "the year 1945 saw the Soviet

35
Union emerging from the Second World War in a position of power
which was far removed from the nadir of the year of 1938 and
exceeded the wildest expectations of the Kremlin. " There
is little argument that the most important outcome of World
War II was to propel the Soviet Union and the United States
to positions of overwhelming power and affluence. Although
the signs were by no mean3 clear at the time that conflict laid
the groundwork for the subsequent bi-polarization of inter-
national politics which has dominated the post-war era.
Britain found herself one of the leaders of the
victorious coalition in 19^5, but nevertheless a relatively
weak junior partner. Diplomatically it was no longer possible
to play the "balance -of-power" game as it had been known in
the past. Europe was now a power void, and consequently
Britain's freedom of maneuver had been severely reduced. The
world was soon to be rent by a schism between Communism and
the West which would be the outstanding feature of world
politics. The main actors in this drama would be the United
States and the U.S.S.R. Britain's major foreign policy task
would be to carve out for herself a meaningful role which would
accord with these new realities.
Thus far the discussion has concentrated on Britain's
relationships with the other so called Great Powers. However,
these are only a portion of the international problems which
confront England's political overlords. In the nineteenth
century British strength rested to a great extent on a vast
colonial empire which extended to the remotest corners of the
world and which offered the United Kingdom many advantages in
the international competition for power. As with all other
aspects of British life the tie3 between the homeland and the
possessions have undergone considerable change in the last
hundred years. This evolution ha3 not only played a vital part
in the decline of Britain's influence, but at the same time
saddled the Government with a number of unique responsibilities
and problems. Therefore it is important to examine briefly the
course of these relationships.
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The primary benefits which the colonies offered have
already been touched upon. They furnished the Royal Navy a
chain of bases around the globe from which it could exercise
control of the seas. The Army maintained garrisons in these
bases which could be easily deployed to trouble spots and
contain crises before they became unmanageable. Moreover the
Army drew heavily on colonial manpower (particularly India).
This considerably reduced the money and men which Great
Britain had to invest in a standing peacetime army. Econom-
ically the possessions were primary producers. They furnished
foodstuffs and raw materials to stok© English industry and
concurrently purchased an important share of the finished
products. All in all this was a rather enviable arrangement.
Still the Empire held ita own seeds of dissolution.
The loosening of the bonds commenced in the large colonies
located in the temperate zones which had attracted great numbers
of British emigrants - Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and later
South Africa. These settlers took with them English traditions
of law, government and liberty. Once they became thoroughly
identified with their new homes it was inevitable that they
gradually began to press for political autonomy. In this
respect the American revolution was a compelling example which
was always in the background inspiring this trend.
"The industrial revolution in Britain proved to be
more than a technological affair" and furnished much of the
impetus for this evolution. Railways and steamships linked up
countries and continents. The fruits of manufacturing stimulated
colonial appetites, and Britain's prosperity demonstrated the
rewards of possessing an indigenous industry. In essence tech-
nical advances and economic pressures were likewise encouraging
independent relations and reinforcing the centrifugal tendencies
developing within the Empire.
By 1907 Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa
had established parliaments and attained a considerable measure
of self-government. Although the British Imperial Parliament
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was still supreme, this meant in practice that these colonies
could control their own internal affairs subject to London's
rarely Invoked veto. Foreign affairs and defense matters were
still the prerogative of the Government in London which acted
for the entire Empire, but the "whit© settlement" colonies had
for all intents and purposes moved from the old pattern of
centralised control to local government.
These steps set the precedent, and the remaining
possessions were soon developing varying forms of legislative
councils elected locally to assist the appointed officials in
the making of laws and ordinances, "India, by reason of its
size, great population and ancient civilization" ^ was granted
considerable autonomy in its affairs and by the 'first World
War was enjoying a modified form of parliamentarian! em. Never-
theless Whitehall still commanded the Empire's allegiance, and
in 1914 the House of Commons declared war on behalf of the whole
British Empire without consulting the possessions. The Dominions
supported the war effort wholeheartedly, but four years of extreme
crisis served to accelerate their drift away from British domi-
nation. All of them had been stimulated to accelerate their
industrialisation and to become more self-sufficient. In
addition they had contributed a full measure to the winning of
the war. This gave them confidence in their abilities and
inspired increased agitation for full independence.
As a reflection of their new status the Dominions and
India were represented independently at the Peace Conference
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and in the League of Nations. It was during this period that
General Smut 3 of South Africa originated the term "The British
Commonwealth of Nations" to describe the new relationship of
the Dominions. ^ At a Commonwealth Conference in 1926 the
famous Balfour Declaration was Issued confirming that the
"United Kingdom and the Dominions were 'autonomous' communities
within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way sub-
ordinate one to another. " This definition was formalized by




As the settlement colonies gradually broke their ties
with London attention turned more and more to the Crown
Colonies, protectorates and strategic bases. The warmer zones
of the Empire had never attracted large numbers of white
settlers and here control rested on the shoulders of those who
had gone to administer and keep order. It was the Government's
acknowledged intention to lead these possessions also to inde-
pendence where possible, but they were not as prepared for
self-government nor was Great Britain in any rush to reach
this goal.
It was India where the first signs of strain appeared.
The inter-x^ar years were marked by continuing friction between
the Government and the various political movements which were
agitating for independence - primarily the Indian National
Congress and the Moslem League. British concessions were few,
and it took another world-wide holocaust to lay the groundwork
for the next big steps in the transition from Empire to
Commonwealth.
In 1939 the United Kingdom declared war only for India
and the Crown Colonies. Each of the Dominions acted on its own.
With the exception of Eire they threw their weight behind the
mother country. Unlike World War I this conflict brought a
number of the possessions under the direct threat of Japanese
conquest and served to point up British weakness in Asia. In
19^1 and early 1942 both the English and Americans suffered a
series of defeats in the Far East which destroyed an image of
invulnerability that had taken centuries to create. In addition
Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma and Malaya had sent the
bulk of their troops to the European theatre and when Japan
entered the war they were relatively defenseless. Britain, hard
pressed on all fronts, could send only limited aid. The United
States had to fill the void. With irresistible force it was
driven home to the peoples in that part of the world that Great
Britain was no longer the lion of old and that their links with
England could be a liability. The Indian nationalist movement
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refused to cooperate in the prosecution of the war and took
every advantage of Britain's newly demonstrated weakness to
accelerate the pace of independence. It was more than clear
that Indian nationally- v:ould present Britain with one of its
first and most pressing post-war problems. As the largest
colony it was also manifest that the Indian example would have
reverberations throughout the Empire.
The Japanese defeat left chaos in its wake and a new
brood of nationalist movements all over Southeastern Asia.
Communism had spread over half the globe, penetrated deeply into
China, and was threatening European hegemony in every sector of
the world. Britain severely weakened by its wartime exertions
faced a restless and demanding Empire. Throughout the colonies
the people's respect for traditional forms had been shaken, and
their ambitions for self-government ignited. These developments
signaled the beginning of a particularly trying period for the
Government. Here as in so many other areas the nation would
have to adjust to new realities and alter its traditional
perspectives.
Formal Decision-Making Structure
The preceding sections have attempted to give the reader
some background which will assist him in understanding why post-
war developments took the course they did. But these events
affected British policy only as they were perceived and inter-
preted by those responsible for steering the ship of state. In
order to understand the evolution of British naval policy it is
also essential to have at least some comprehension of the
political bodies involved and of the mechanics of defense
decision-making. It is the intention at this point to emphasize
the policy-making side of the defense establishment as opposed
to the arrangements for conducting military operations.
Prior to 1939 the Government relied on two major organs
for the development of military policy - the Committee of
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Imperial Defense and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The former
was organized to correct the defects in defense planning un-
earthed by the Esher Committee in 1904. This group complained
of the lack of means for coordinating defense matters with all
the interested sectors of the government and for dealing with
them as a whole. The remedy adopted was the Committee of
Imperial Defense. It was chaired by the Prime Minister and
composed of high level officials designated by him. Its
principal responsibilities were to formulate "the principles
to govern over defense" and to plan "the transition from peace
to war.' 1 Normally, the more "important Cabinet Ministers and
a few high ranking officers from each Service sat on this
committee. In order not to interfere with ministerial
responsibility it was established strictly as an advisory body
to the Cabinet. A small permanent secretariat was created to
order its affairs, keep its records, and provide continuity to
its proceedings.
The CID was not designed to take executive control in
war nor had it any responsibility for inter-service planning.
In fact in World War I it was temporarily suspended and direc-
tion of the combat effort was taken over by the War Cabinet.
It should be stressed that each Service remained separately
responsible for its own planning and operations. In 1919 the
Committee of Imperial Defense was reactivated. However, with
the establishment of the Royal Air Force as a separate Service
the need for inter-departmental coordination became more pressing
and to fill this void the Chiefs of Staff Committee was estab-
lished in 1924. 9 This was the first attempt to produce an
"overall military policy" among the three Services. The
Government had considered seriously establishing a Ministry
of Defense to coordinate the military departments, but decided
instead, in typically British style, to rely on a committee
which included the professional heads of each Service. They
were to have both an individual and collective responsibility
for advising the CID on "defense policy as a whole."' In
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effect this was a sub-committee charged with coordinating
military matters involving more than one Service and making
72
Joint recommendations to the GID. Staff support was to be
furnished by a number of joint bodies composed of planning
officers from all three branches who were to work out the
details on joint matters. Thus were the first foundations laid
for direct inter-Service cooperation.
In 1939 a War Cabinet, on the World War I pattern,
was established and it absorbed the machinery of the GID.
When Mr. Churchill assumed the reins of government he took the
title of Minister of Defense which confirmed his authority to
assume personal direction of the war effort. However, there
was no Ministry of Defense as such.- Ke worked primarily
through three groups. The Defense Committee (Operations), which
was composed of key Cabinet members and the Chiefs of Staff,
examined military plans and took operational decisions on
behalf of the War Cabinet. Production programs were super-
vised by the Defense Committee (Supply) which also acted for
the Cabinet. For inter-Service matters Mr. Churchill dealt
directly with the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This body acted
in its corporate capacity to give operational instructions and
strategic guidance to the armed forces. This was a considerable
improvement over previous war3 when there was very little author-
itative consultation between military departments. No Ministry
of Defense was created during this period. The responsibility
for administration and for carrying out the directives of the
CSC remained within the individual Service Departments. Under
the press of wartime and the influence of Mr. Churchill's force-
ful personality this arrangement proved more than satisfactory.
The three Services managed to work together effectively and in
harmony toward common ends.
In December 1946 the Labor Government initiated the
first post-war modifications in Britain's security machinery.
Its major provisions were to remain in effect for over a decade
after the armistice. Although this act introduced some new
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devices, it was primarily intended to formalize the successful
wartime decision-making structure which had grown up under the
stress of crisis. It was in no sense a "drastic break with the
past," lD but rather the type of evolutionary step which is
characteristic of the British governmental process. The follow-
ing paragraphs will summarize the more significant features of
these arrangements and then examine the Royal Navy's relation-
ship to this central structure.
The Government was convinced that there was a need for
more formal arrangements to unify defense policy. The two war-
time Cabinet committees were replaced by a Defense Committee.
This body was to be under the Chairmanship of the Prime
Minister and was to be responsible to the Cabinet "both for
the review of current strategy and the co-ordinating of depart-
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mental action in preparation for war. In addition to the
Prime Minister there wore nine regular members - the Minister
of Defense, the Lord President of the Council, the Foreign
Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Service
Ministers, the Ministers of Labor, and the Minister of Supply -
and the Chiefs of Staff would always be in attendance to proffer
military advice. To assure flexibility the Prime Minister was
given authority to invite other officials to attend as he felt
conditions warranted. In essence this group replaced the old
Committee of Imperial Defense and was authorized to deal with
top level defense matters for the Cabinet. In more practical
terms the Defense Committee would be responsible for integrating
the military effort with the Government's political objectives,
formulating overall strategical guidelines for the Services,
allotting resources to defense and reviewing Service estimates.
This was the broadest kind of mandate, and the Defense Committee
in actual practice dealt with the whole spectrum of policy
problems. It should be emphasized, however, that this Committee's
supervision was of a most general nature, and that like its pred-




In order to shift a major portion of th© defense
burden from the Prime Minister a new post, Minister of Defense,
was created. He was also to bo Deputy Chairman of the Defense
Committee, to preside over meetings of the Chiefs of Staff
whenever he or they so desired, to administer inter-Service
organizations, and to settle questions of general administra-
tion where a common policy for all three military departments
was thought desirable.-^ More important he was given responsi-
bility for "the apportionment, in broad outline, of available
resources between the three Services in accordance with the
strategic policy laid down by the Defense Committee."' This
was to include the framing of general policy to govern research
and development and the correlation of production programs. It
was hoped that this authority would result in a "unified defense
policy for all three Services."''
He was to head an independent Ministry of Defense, but
it was to include only a small staff of advisors and adminis-
trators. The bulk of his informational planning and organi-
zational support was to be furnished by committees and Joint
planning groups made up of elements from the three Services and
interested departments which conferred together periodically on
security problems. This meant that he lacked independent re-
sources and still had to rely heavily on the three departments
for staff support. In the long run this deficiency would
severely hamper his ability to control overall defense policy.
The Chiefs of Staff committee was left unchanged and
retained its responsibility for furnishing military advice to
the Government and the Defense Committee, for formulating
defense requirements, and for preparing strategic military
plans. At the same time they were directed to advise the
Minister of Defense on all military matters, so that he would
have ample information on which to base his decisions. However,
the right of the Chiefs of Staff to have direct access to the
Defense Committee was preserved. It was generally believed that




One completely novel and interesting wrinkle was grafted
on to this scheme which obviously stemmed from the military's
heavy reliance on scientists in World War II. A Defense Re-
search Policy Council was established "to secure the continued
and complete integration of military and scientific thought at
all levels, and to see that, in planning defense research as a
whole, account is taken of the scientific effort of the country
in other fields in order that our resources may be efficiently
and economically used."' This Committee was to be chaired by
the Chief Scientist of 'the Ministry of Defense. It was com-
posed of scientists and procurement officials from all three
Services and the Ministry of Supply. In practice this group
supervised the entire research program of the military estab-
lishment. No project could be undertaken without the approval
of this body, and it assigned priorities to each and every
development program. It was the major link between the Ministry
of Supply and the military. In turn it offered the Services
the only official organ (other than the Defense Committee or
Cabinet) through which they could influence policies of the
Ministry of Supply. This committee was to operate under the
general guidance of the Minister of Defense. He would have the
final voice in an Irreconcilable dispute, but it would be a rare
instance when he overruled the committee or its chairman. These
were the main features of the policy organization which passed
into law in 1946.
The reforms referred to above left the Royal Navy's
basic policy-making mechanisms unchanged. The Admiralty was a
unique organization rooted in the pervasive traditions of the
Royal Navy which had stood the country in good stead since the
late 1800 ! s. The First Lord of the Admiralty, as the political
head of the Royal Navy, was responsible to Parliament and the
Prime Minister for the general conduct of all Admiralty business.
He was supported by two other political appointees - the
Parliamentary and Financial Secretary and the Civil Lord - who
aided him in supervising and accounting for the expenditure of
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funds. His professional assistants were seven Sea Lords, who
were high ranking naval officers, and a top rank civil servant,
the Permanent Secretary. Each of these individuals had an
operational responsibility for ~c..o particular area of activity
under the authority of the First Lord.
It is not important to go into any detail here except
7Q
to illustrate the general nature of the organization. ^ The
First Sea Lord, the professional head of the Royal Navy, was
responsible "for general policy relating to naval strategy
and tactics, 'and to ships, aircraft and weapons, for war
80
planning, and for operational direction of the Fleet." In
addition to his responsibility to the First Lord, he was a
Chief of Staff and as such directly responsible to the Minister
of Defense and the Government. One of his most important re-
sponsibilities was to head the Naval Staff (this was only a
portion of the total staff of naval officers in the Admiralty).
On the one hand this important group initiated general policy
and material requirements of the Navy and on the other exercised
general direction over naval operations. In the same manner the
remaining Sea Lords each had a particular sphere of activity
which was his individual responsibility. The Second Sea Lord
was the head of personnel; the Third Sea Lord and Controller
was responsible for the building and maintenance of ships,
weapons and equipment; the Fourth Sea Lord handled all affairs
concerning supplies and transport; and the Fifth Sea Lord super-
vised general naval air policy. The Permanent Secretary was
charged with supervising the administration of the Admiralty
and coordinating Navy bu^_no.,e uiob. other Government departments.
In their capacity as supervisors responsible for implementing
directives, each of these professionals reported to the First
Lord of the Admiralty. At the same time they were to keep the
First Sea Lord informed, so that he could coordinate their
actions with the plans and operations of the Fleet.
However, each of these individuals also sat on the
Eoard of Admiralty in his capacity not so much as an
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c^ir-i^i-tor, but ac - policy-;—l:er. rJhis famou- institution
had developed over the years and had a history and significance
all its o\m. In an earlier day Lord Fisher referred to it as
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"that mysterious and awful body. " The membership of the
Board in 1946 was composed of the First Lord and his ten
assistants, and since 1872 it had had no official collective
responsibility for the conduct of war or for the business of
running the Royal Navy, but had retained its role as a general
council for advising the First Lord and First Sea Lord in
regard to their special responsibilities to the Government.
In actual practice, however, its influence far exceeded that
of merely a discussion group and advisory council. War oper-
ations were outside its scope, but every other type of major
policy problem was brought to the Board for a collective deter-
mination as to the Navy's position. If there were significant
differences of opinion within the Navy on a policy issue, they
were resolved within this body. It was here that the diverse
political and technical pressures generated within the Service
itself were brought to bear on the decision-making process and
reconciled.
Predictably, the First Lord and First Sea Lord carry a
major voice in the deliberations of this body, but it is a rare
3°
occasion when they flout the Board. Deeply ingrained tradi-
tion, the past success of the system, the complexity of modern
equipment and political forces similar to those in any large
organization have combined to preserve the Board's collective
responsibility and influence no matter what its legal mandate.
"The responsibility for Board decisions is shared by all
members" D and in actual fact its task is to "build, direct,
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maintain and administer the Royal Navy. The views put for-
ward by the Navy's leaders outside the walls of the Admiralty
are without exception hammered out, refined and approved by the
Board of Admiralty. It is the heart of the Royal Navy's policy
mechanism.
If a Sea Lord desired to initiate a major change which
would effect the nation's overall strategical policy in any
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manner, he would first bring it to the Board of Admiralty.
This body would possibly submit the matter to a study group and
ask for the advice of the interested departments. After an ex-
tended exchange of views, memoranda and reports the consensus of
the Board would be formalized and approved. The First Sea Lord
would then inject the Board's recommendation into the Chiefs of
Staff Committee machinery where it would undergo much the same
process it underwent in the Admiralty. The First Sea Lord
using the techniques of persuasion, negotiation and bargaining
would attempt to obtain the approval of the CSC for the Navy's
suggestion. Such an endorsement indicates that the Chiefs of
Staff have found it militarily desirable and recommend it for
the consideration of the political leaders.
Concurrently, the First Lord is laying the groundwork
with the political side of the Government. He alerts the
:._nieaer of Defease a^ to \iaaa -ono ..dmiraity h..£ in mind end
both formally and informally presents the Navy's case. This is
a crucial part of the process, for the Minister of Defense's
endorsement is tantamount to Defense Committee approval. Over
the years the Minister of Defense has become progressively more
important in the making of policy, and consequently this role of
the Navy's political head has become more crucial. If the decision
i: Important encash to occasion a lull fledged dob..a~ in aha
Defense Committee, the First Lord and his political assistants
prepare the way for it by attempting to insure that it will
receive the necessary support at that level.
That Committee reviews the recommendations of the Chiefs
of Staff Committee and solicits the views of the assembled mem-
bers. It is here that financial and partisan political con-
siderations are given an opportunity to exert their full influence,
and the Admiralty's suggestion is given its final test as to
vl.eeher it mechoB inao the overall _:ecnriey policy or" ana Govern-
ment* Actually political, diplomatic and financial considerations
are at work all through this process. Often the Navy is continu-
ally reshaping its original recommendation to make it more
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acceptable to all interests concerned. Nevertheless, the
Defense Committee is the final court of appeal, and it is in
this arena that opposing views which cannot "be modified at
lower levels must be reconciled.
This is necessarily an abbreviated description of an
administrative process which in actual practice is both lengthy
and involved. Hopefully it should suffice to enable the reader
to follow the evolution and intricacies of general post-war
naval policy.
* & #
This completes th© technical, economic, diplomatic and
administrative background. In summary Great Britain emerged
from six years of total war to confront a radically new world.
Two industrial giants, the United States and the U.S.S.R. , would
soon crowd the lesser players into the wings, and Britain would
enter an unprecedented period of decline as regards her economic
and political stature In the society of nations. These develop-
ments would inescapably require traumatic adjustments In British
perspectives and correspondingly In the British way of life.
The Royal Navy was to be no exception. The nation* s traditional
maritime strategy had been undermined hj technical developments
and radical changes in the international distribution of power.
In this altered milieu, the British nation would have to move
forward gradually and feel out the pressures which would in the
end determine the shape of a new defense policy. It would be
over a decade before the Government and the Admiralty would
arrive at a viable accommodation with the economic, technical
and international realities of the post-war era, and formulate
a revised naval policy that could meet the new conditions with
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CHAPTER III
WAR TO PEACE: 1945-1948
When Germany collapsed in 194-5 Great Britain had
i
5,100,000 men under arms. There was public clamor to return
to "normalcy" as soon as possible, and the Government made
every effort to satisfy this demand. However, this was not
an easy process. Great Britain along with its allies had
accumulated short term commitments as a result of the war which
would require troops and ships to fulfill. Even more important
it was not possible to formulate a long term defense policy
until the international scene had stabilized somewhat, and the
emerging patterns of power had begun to clarify. Consequently
the first few years after the war were transitional from the
military standpoint. Not until late 1948 did the British Navy
complete its post-war contractions. Though the transition was
by no means complete, the beginning of 1949 signified the
return of the Navy to a peacetime posture.
In surveying this period it is appropriate to begin
with the official image of the Navy's role. With this picture
in mind the inquiry can then move to a more practical level
and review how naval policy was implemented in terms of money
and men and what factors governed these dispositions. Then
a look at how the Admiralty chose to employ its resources






World War II had left the proponents of British sea
power in an uneasy position. The Fleet had played a major role
in preserving the United Kingdom and the Empire. Men and ships
had performed magnificently. Britain's senior Service could
look back with pride on its wartime contribution. On the other
hand the war had not been particularly kind to the Royal Navy,
At the signing of the Armistice the United States possessed
the world's largest fleet, and there was little question that
with her tremendous resources she was destined to retain that
predominance. This was the first time in several centuries
that Britannia had been outmatched at sea. Even more distres-
sing, the Royal Navy had had to surrender its pre-eminent
position within Britain's own defense heirarchy. During the
"battle of Britain" the home islands had been heavily attacked
from the air, and the Fleet had played no part in this crucial
struggle. As a result the Royal Air Force had established a
credible claim as "the first line of defense."
Just as the war ended an even more ominous shadow fell
across the military scene. It was cast by atomic weapons.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki made a profound impact on strategic
thinking. Professionals and laymen alike began reexamining
the traditional concepts of warfare and in some cases to ques-
tion the importance of warships and navies. These individuals,
operating on the basis of limited knowledge, were more than
eager to cast aside conventional forces or at least to reduce
2their roles. The proponents of sea power were Justifiably
apprehensive as to what lay ahead for the Royal Navy.
This, of course, was not the first time that the
British Fleet had faced difficult times. Professor Michael
•5
Lewis in The Navy of Britain^ revealed a repetitive pattern
in the way the English turn to their Navy in crisis, express
their thanks in victory and neglect it in peacetime. The
Admiralty was only too aware of the historical precedents, and
the Navy's leaders feared the rundown of forces that would
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inevitably follow the armistice. On the other hand World War II
had not shaken their faith in the need for a Navy, and even be-
fore the conclusion of hostilities they were arguing for a
strong peacetime Fleet both publicly and behind-the-scenes.
There was little doubt as to where the Admiralty was
to lay the emphasis in its post-war effort to keep attention
riveted on the Fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr.
A. V. Alexander, as early as March 1 <H5 described the U-boat
war in some detail to the House of Commons stressing Britain's
reliance on seaborne supplies. He expressed the fervent hope
that this fact would never be forgotten by "future First
Lords, Boards of Admiralty, Governments or by the people of this
ii4
country. Throughout the course of 1 <H5 It became increasingly
clear that the "protection of the nation's sea lanes"-5 was to
be the cornerstone of the Admiralty's case. The First Sea Lord
soon Joined the fray with a reference to the atom bomb. Speak-
ing at Manchester in December 19^5 he declared, "As long as
Britain's existence depends on the safe arrival of merchant
ships the need for a British navy will remain, atom or no atom."
While presenting the first post-war Navy Estimates Mr. Alexander
succinctly summed up the heart of the Navy's case:
Our experience in the last war demonstrated once more
that if we neglected the security of our communications
we should be at the mercy of any aggressor. He would
have no need to incur the hazards of using the atomic
bomb. Ho would simply, surely and swiftly destroy us
by cutting our arteries at sea.
7
These were the first salvos in the crucial campaign to
assure the Royal Navy a post-war role. In essence the Admiralty
was falling back on the age-old doctrine which had buttressed
the Navy over the centuries - control of the seas and protection
of the trade routes. Of course its arguments had been updated.
There were few references to the Fleet's ability to protect the
homeland or to carry offensive operations to the enemy. This
reflected the Royal Navy's wartime experience. It could no
longer single handedly protect the British isles; this had be-
come a mission shared with the Royal Air Force. In the same
vein amphibious operations were Joint ones carried out with
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the other two Services. On the other hand the hulk of the
Fleet's effort from 1939 to 1945 had been spent in keeping open
the Mediterranean to merchant ships, fighting convoys through
to America and Murmansk, and combatting the German U-boat and
surface raiders. This appeared to be the one task which the
British Navy could still claim as its own, and the Sea Lords
chose to lay the stress on it.
These arguments struck a responsive note in many a
British heart. Although a vocal minority insisted that atomic
weapons had made naval forces obsolete, there was a general
reluctance to abandon or modify a naval policy which had proved
so successful in the past. There were no calls for Great
Britain to overtake the United States or to recapture its
naval ascendancy, but there was considerable pressure exerted
in behalf of the Royal Navy. The first serious attempt to
formulate a long range peacetime defense policy was made by
a Chatham House Study Group formed in 1944. Its report was
published in the summer of 1946. While it dealt with the
whole spectrum of national security problems It heavily
emphasized the central role of naval forces. "The British
Empire has been built and maintained on the basis of sea power.
The whole position of this country In the world has depended
upon it and it will continue to be of vital importance in the
future. y Statements in the popular press and military journals
reiterated this conception. They stressed the theme that "as
long as the trade of the world is carried in ships the core of
the Empire's defensive strength must be its Navy." The House
of Commons debate on the Navy Estimates in 1946 evoked numerous
statements in a similar vein. Thus:
Our Navy should be represented in all the major oceans,
the smaller ccaa, throughout 'Cl^j British Ecplro ^nd in
every place where British lives and interests may be
endangered. 1
1
We must never again ask our merchant seamen to go to sea,
voyage after voyage, year after year, with the Inadequate
protection they had during the early years of the war. 12
The atomic bomb may change the type of ship, but it does not
alter the mission of the Navy in controlling the sea. If our
Navy were to be abandoned . . . all an enemy has to do is to
cut our arteries at sea and destroy us. 13
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These statements had a "pax Britannlca" ring about
them. While it was too early to foresee all the factors which
would shape post-war defense policy, it was obvious that the
Royal Navy still had many advocates and that World War II had
not materially altered their faith in sea power or their con-
ception of the Navy' 3 role. Essentially they envisioned a
fleet which would fulfill the traditional tasks of dominating
the narrow seas and insuring Great Britain's oceanic lifelines.
Though they granted that the Royal Air Forco would have a major
share in the defense of the home islands, they still insisted
"nothing has happened during the last year which in any way
diminishes the fact that the survival of England in war de-
pends as ever upon her ability to maintain her sea communi-
ng
cations and seaborne trade across oceans. They were think-
ing in "groat power" terms. Britain had world-wide responsi-
bilities, and in their eyes the Fleet was still the mortar which
held the Empire together.
The Whit© Paper on Defense in February 194-7 confirmed
the Government's faith in the Navy's reasoning. Britain's
peacetime military goals were described as: ^ (1) security of
the United Kingdom; (2) safeguarding of communications;
(3) adequate forces to meet the requirements of the United
Nations. It emphasized that the Navy would be instrumental
in attaining those ends. That same year the First Lord of the
Admiralty in his statement which accompanied the Navy Estimates
stressed the Fleet's fundamental mission as one of keeping "our
vital lines of supply" open. This theme was even more heavily
17pressed in the parliamentary debate. ' It was manifestly clear
that until further evidence was available the official role of
the British Navy with slight modifications was to remain sub-
stantially what it had always been - to dominate the narrow
seas and the ocean lanes vital to Britain. The Government had
apparently not altered its previous high opinion of sea power.
At least in the immediate future it was the nation's intention
to rely on its naval forces to a significant extent while it
digested the technical lessons of World War II. However, naval
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policy is neither totally made nor revealed by publis statements
in defense documents or on the floor of Parliament. It is
rather the resultant of converging forces, many of them non-
military, and it i3 now appropriate to examine the more
significant of the so factors.
Economic Pressures
It was the Government's announced policy to complete
demobilization and to stabilize the armed forces on a peacetime
footing at the earliest possible date. This course certainly
reflected the mood of the nation. It was reinforced by the
generally held belief that the international situation would
shortly level off and that the United Nations would assume
effective responsibility for maintaining the peace. In the
same vein the Government was confident that the commitments
acquired aa a result of the war would soon diminish and that
the "Big Three" could successfully lead the world in peace as
well 'as in war.' Although there was some controversy as to the
ultimate size and strength of the defense establishment there
was nevertheless a general consensus that the Services could
afford drastic reductions.
The demands for rapid demobilization were by no means
unique to the period of 1946 to 1948. Actually every previous
post-war British Government had had to operate in a similar
atmosphere. However, there was a new and crucial consider-
ation. Britain's post-war economic problems proved to be more
critical than anyone had foreseen. The strain of war had
severely taxed its industrial plant, depleted its capital
reserves, loosened its overseas ties and generally damaged its
competitive position. It was essential that the maximum
number of men be returned to civilian life to help in the
rehabilitation of the economy and that defense scientists and
workers be shifted to more productive areas. It was also
necessary to reduce to the bare minimum any expenditures
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which Injured the balance of payments position. In order to
revive the economy's health it was Important to divert Industry
from defense and to concentrate on products for sale abroad.
The requirement for exports would have been urgent
under any circumstances, but the war was followed by a
succession of economic crises which intensified the problem.
In August 1945 America terminated the wartime Lend-Lease
arrangements which was a sharp blow to Britain's prospects
for a quick post-war recovery. This void was later filled by
1
Q
a U. S. -Canadian loan, * on rather harsh terms. Almost
immediately an adverse balance of trade began to plague the
Government. In 1946 the deficit was £298,000,000, and in 1947
20
it increased sharply to £443,000,000. Conditions In many
respects were even worse than during the war. Food shortages
led to the rationing of bread and potatoes for the first time.
The 1946-47 winter was excessively cold, and due to the shortage
of trained miners Britain's fuel stocks dropped so low that
power stations were forced to reduce their generating hours.
Many factories manufacturing export goods had to discontinue
production or work part-time. In 1947 there were temporarily
2
1
1; 800, 000 unemployed in the United Kingdom.
At the armistice the country was heavily in debt to
non-sterling countries. There was a strong desire to achieve
full convertibility of sterling in order to facilitate free
trade and the liquidation of these debts. In fact one of the
conditions of the U. S. -Canadian loan in December 1945 was
that sterling should be made convertible by the summer of 1947.
Convertibility was attempted in mid-1 947 v "but the balances
held by countries outside the sterling area were switched into
dollars and gold at such a rapid rate that it was necessary
to suspend the privilege. " This demonstrated clearly the
sparseness of the country's gold and dollar reserves, and
precipitated a major financial crisis. It was essential that
these reserves be increased in order to buy from non-sterling
countries and to sustain foreign trade through normal trade
cycles. Again, this required increased exports.
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The Government was casting about in every direction
for ways to economize. The British military commitment in
Greece was passed to the United States in March 1947, Occupation
coots in Germany were reduced by negotiating an agreement with
America whereby the latter relieved Britain of all dollar expend-
itures in the Anglo-American zone and took over a large share
0-35
of the occupation expenses. ^ Attempts were made to cut down
imports and to negotiate with governments holding large sterling
balances, hoping to scale them doxra. These were striking indi-
cations of Britain's economic weakness. Predictably, the
Government came under increasing pressure to slash defense
expenditures.
This problem was reflected in the 1947 White Paper on
Defense which stressed "the urgent need of restoring a balanced
peace economy at the earliest moment. The 1948 Defense State-
ment mentioned balance of payments difficulties for the first
time and emphasized the need for "a strong and sound economy
i2S
with a flourishing industry. These were only the first of
a long series of references, in post-war White Papers, to
Britain's precarious economy. Hugh Dalton referred to the inter-
governmental arguments over the demands of defense and the
economy as "the Battle of the Balance of Payments." As
Chancellor of the Exchequer he led the fight to cut down defense
expenditures and succeeded in materially reducing the Services'
share of appropriations and manpower. In short, domestic
economic considerations were largely to shape the post-war
defense establishment.
This can best be illustrated by examining the actual
figures. In the last year of the war the military budget ran
approximately £3,400,000,000 , and by 1948 it had sunk to
£631,000,000. ' The total personnel in the Services had been
reduced from 5,100,000 to 800,000. The appropriation and man-
power situation of the Navy over those years is given in the
following table:
I945 1946 1947 1948
Estimates in millions of pounds 1,100 255 196* 1 5&
Personnel in thousands 781 493 191 167
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These figures indicate the drastic shrinkage of the
resources available to the Navy during this transitional
period. Comparatively, the Navy's budget was the lowest of
the three Services. However, it rose from 15$ of the total
defense budget in 1946 to 22% in 1948. By the end of this
period the Royal Air Force was drawing 2k% and the Army some
40/». * ihis can be explained by looking at the nature of the
nation's post-war military commitments.
On the conclusion of hostilities with Germany and Japan
the allies were presented with a myriad of short term military
obligations. These were mainly occupation and order-keeping
tasks, and Great Britain inherited a large number of them.
Throughout the 1946-48 period British forces were performing
occupation duties in Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria and
Venezia Guilia; at the same time they were helping to maintain
law and order in Indonesia, Palestine, Greece (withdrew in
1947) and throughout the Empire. These were primarily commit-
ments to be fulfilled by troops. The Navy had the task of
clearing the wartime minefields, and it maintained a blockade
of Palestine to prevent unauthorized aliens from entering
during the troubled months just before independence. In
addition it was responsible for supplying and supporting the
Crown's far flung garrisons. But all in all these were duties
which did not require large numbers of men or ships. As a
result the Army's demobilization schedule lagged behind both
of the other services and consistently throughout this period
it received the lion's share of appropriations.
One other consideration should be mentioned which
weighed heavily in the Admiralty's quest for funds and recog-
nition. The Royal Navy lacked a credible enemy. No major
naval powers remained outside of the United States and England.
Even the most diehard advocates of sea power had difficulties
in arguing around this simple fact. Admiral of the Fleet Lord
Chatfield, a former First Sea Lord, confessed unQver since
Trafalgar has there been a time when sea security, and all that
it means to our nation and Empire, seemed less endangered; never
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has it given strategists less anxiety."-5 No one suggested
that the United States was a likely or 'even possible threat.
In the face of heavy economic burdens the lack of an enemy
made it difficult to generate enthusiasm for naval appropria-
tions. References to "precedent," "vital sea lanes" and
"showing the flag" were not sufficient in themselves. Poli-
ticians need tangible and imminent threats to arouse them.
In the light of these circumstances it is not difficult to
understand the drastic rundown which the Royal Navy under-
went during the first few post-war years.
Interestingly enough this seems to have been a period
of relatively little inter-service bitterness even though
funds were scarce. Thora \;ere many disagreements on the
proper organisation of the military establishments, and the
Ghiefs of Staff Committee was unable "to reach agreement on
a coherent strategic plan ^ which meshed the roles of all
three services. Nevertheless, the bitter competition for
appropriations and primacy had not yet begun to accelerate.
There was general consensus that contraction was the order of
the day and that the Army must bear the brunt of the nation's
occupation responsibilities. At the same time it was hoped
that this was a temporary requirement which would soon dis-
appear, and there v/as little time or effort left for a bitter
contest between branches. The tasks of demobilization and
pacification had severely dislocated the Seryices, and the
painful adjustment to peacetime conditions fully occupied the
cr.^rj-LOo of all uhroo. This certainly co^o::'ilo^ the Royal
Navy. It had secured a place in the overall defense picture
and was devoting its entire attention to the very pressing
problems of forging a peacetime Fleet with the limited
resources available.
It is instructive to note that despite continuing
decreases in the defense budget, no attempt was made to rede-
fine the role of the military, or the Navy in particular, in
mora austere terms. On the contrary the 1948 defense White
Paper insisted that it was "the firm intention of His
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Majesty's Government to maintain the forces which are needed
to support it 3 international policy, to insure the security of
the United Kingdom , to maintain its interests throughout the
world and to enable it to play its full part in the preser-
vation of world peace. "^ In commenting on the Navy's contri-
bution to this effort &r. John Dugdale, Parliamentary and
Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, informed the House of
Commons in 1948 that "there is cause to be confident in the
It T^ •
state of the Navy. -^ In other words, despite the tremendous
contraction of funds and personnel, the Royal Navy was still
expected to carry out its traditional role. With this in mind
it is pertinent to examine the manner in which the Admiralty
employed its resources and the tasks which the Fleet was
actually prepared to perform.
Ships g.nd Eg" •-
It is manifest from the previous discussion that the
major determinant of the post-war rundown of military forces
-.o co tlio l.u^;o o- tl-.o economy and the need for exports.
In an effort to furnish the throe Services some kind of
planning guidelines the Labour Government in the winter of
1946 adopted a "Ten Year Rule" which directed the military to
"54
assume there would be no major war for a decade. Once before,
in 1919» the Government had embraced such an assumption, and
it governed defense planning until the early 1930's - with
rather disastorous results. It rationalized the Government's
policy of throttling down defense appropriations and stunted
the growth of weapons and tactics after World War I. In terms
of new developments the British services stood still until
1933 when this doctrine was discarded. Nevertheless, the
Government readopted this expedient in 1947.
This seems to have been strictly a political decision.
The Chiefs of Staff had no part in its adoption. ^-> in essence
it was a political ruse to reconcile military demands with an
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extremely confining economy rather than a strategical conclusion
logically deduced from a careful study of external affairs.
Actually, the Government ' s decision represented simply a recog-
nition of the post-war facts of life. Considering the problems
facing the Government in the period 1946-48 it was probably
inevitable that the armed forces would have to make maximum
use of wartime stocks and that there could be only minimum pro-
duction of new weapons and equipment until Britain's financial
position should improve or the international situation should
deteriorate again. Groat Britain was by no means unique in its
reluctance to write off its tremendous wartime investment, for
the United States likewise followed a policy of using wartime
equipment as long as possible.
The one area in which this policy may have had some
independent effect was research. The Government's scientists
initiated several projects after the war with the express
intention of utilizing a ten year development period. Even
here, however, money was extremely tight, and it is doubtful
that much more could have been accomplished no matter what the
Government's ground rules. In any case, with the "cold war"
intensification in the late 1940's the Ten Year Rule was for-
gotten. Nevertheless, this was the official doctrine govern-
ing military research and procurement during the 1946-48 period.
With this in mind, it is now appropriate to examine hov;
the Board of Admiralty employed Its slender resources and what
was the physical character of the peacetime Fleet which survived
the demobilisation. Although the Board's freedom of maneuver
had been severely restricted by political decisions, it still
had considerable control over the type of Navy which would
emerge. On it would fall the burden of shaping the Navy's
general approach, of selecting the ships to be retained, of
directing the Navy's limited research program, of training its
forces and of formulating strategical and tactical maritime
doctrine.
This can best be done by first examining the seagoing




man-power level contemplated for the next few years '"/w and was
at its planned peacetime strength. The emphasis was now to
be directed toward the "welding of the new Royal Navy, that has
now emerged, into an effective fighting instrument."-^' In
February 1949 the Fleet's composition and deployment could be
38
summarized as follows:
















































The Government's attempts to economize were certainly
reflected in the size and nature of the Fleet. In the first
three years after the war more than 1,250 ships of all descrip-
tions were decommissioned. Approximately 500 were placed in
reserve, 450 sold or transferred to other navies, and more
than 300 scrapped or destroyed in experiments. The last two
figures included 11 battleships, 10 carriers, 34 cruisers,
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over 200 destroyers and 90 submarines . ^ More meaningful is
a comparison with pre-war years. Although the total number
of ships is just slightly below the average of the inter-war
years, the number of major combatant types was considerably
less. In 1939 there \irere 12 battleships, 3 battle cruisers,
7 carriers and 60 cruisers available to the Admiralty. A
quick glance at the above table will indicate that the 1948
Fleet fell considerably below that figure. If just major
ships in active commission were compared (ignoring vessels in
reserve) the pre-war Fleet was one and one-half times the size
of the post-war Navy. Sheer numbers are not necessarily
accurate measures of power, but over the short time span of
1939 to 1948 they certainly indicate that reduced appropria-
tions and increased costs were forcing the Royal Navy to work
with considerably fewer ships than it was accustomed to or
desired.
Despite the references in White Papers to the "new"
Royal Navy, the most striking feature about the Fleet in 1948
was that it was in no sense new. Essentially the Fleet was a
small replica of the vast World War II Navy both in composition
and design. The ships themselves with few exceptions were of
World War II vintage. Of the major units only two had been
41
completed since 1945 - one battleship and one light fleet
42
carrier. However, they were of World War II design and had
not been altered radically from their predecessors. None of
the other capital ships had undergone modernization. All the
cruisers were hold-overs from the late war. Some twelve of
the destroyers were completed in 1946 and 1947, but these also,
from the standpoint of design, were essentially the same ships
which won the "battle of the Atlantic." Fifteen new submarines
joined the Fleet right after the armistice, but they included
no new developments such as snorkels or high capacity batteries.
Only three new frigates had been commissioned and no new mine-
sweepers.
The aircraft situation was comparable. By 1947 the
Fleet Air Arm had returned the bulk of the American planes which
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it had depended on during the latter part of the war and began
to phase British aircraft into the Fleet. Again, however, these
were models which had been put on the drawing board early in
World War II. They had not heen built sooner because other air-
craft projects had had a higher priority. The two main type3
were the Firefly fighter and a combined torpedo and anti-
submarine attack aircraft, the Sea Fury. Both of these were
conventional propellor driven planes with World War II type
performance. It was to be 3 950 before the Fleet Air Arm was
fully equipped with even these aircraft.
Needless to say this situation alarmed many of the
Navy's supporters and insoired a continuous stream of calls
for a larger peacetime Fleet. ^ However, the main difficulty
was not so much the lack of numbers in the standing forces.
Despite some embarrassing incidents which occurred during the
44
accelerated rundown right after the war the active fleet in
1948 was probably adequate for any of the tasks that might be
put to it. It had carried out the Palestine Blockade with
commendable proficiency. British minesweepers cleared over
4S6,000 mines in the first year after the war. ^ English occu-
pation forces both in Europe and the Far East were admirably
supported by Hoyal Navy units. In addition, many goodwill
cruises and courtesy visits were paid to the Commonwealth
countries and foreign nations. By 1948 most of its occupation
responsibilities had terminated and the Palestine Blockade was
complete. The Fleet had its post-war training program in hand
and was operating at its full authorized strength. It was
fully capable of showing the flag and handling the sort of
peacetime chores which characterized this brief period.
As to a full scale war, the Navy's ability was probably
greater than its critics would admit. The likelihood of con-
flict appeared genuinely remote and even more unlikely without
the U. S. as an ally. The only possible enemy was Russia, and
even she didn't seem a very likely prospect at that time. The
Soviets did not have atomic weapons, and their Navy was both
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small and inexperienced. In addition most of England's
communication lines were outside the range of Russian landbased
aircraft. These factors all enhanced the Royal Navy's cap-
abilities during the years of transition.
Despite its reduced size the Fleet was capable of
dealing with any seaborne threat (excluding the U. S. Navy).
There simply was no European or Asiatic Navy which could pose
an effective challenge. The Mediterranean which had proved so
vulnerable during the war still was a cause for concern, but
if necessary the Admiralty had five carriers in the active
forces which it could commit in this narrow sea, and they
carried approximately 250 aircraft, Z:. o. oricic -oho:-;- were
another seven available which could be activated. All-in-all
the Fleet in 1948 was more imposing than it was often given
credit for being and certainly adequate for meeting any
likely contingency.
This does not mean that the Admiralty had no serious
problems. The major concern was not in meeting current
commitments, but future ones. The cuts in the Navy Estimates
had virtually brought new construction to a standstill, and
there were no plans in hand for relieving the obsolescence
which would eventually overtake the Fleet with a rush. Only
a trickle of new aircraft were coming into the Fleet and there
were no plans for any large scale replacements. By 1950 the
Fleet Air Arm's first-line squadrons would be unable to com-
pc-ti vich many types ol L_..-..-b_~c. ~Lrc;rj.ft - pj.r-oiculj.rly '::.:
jets which were rapidly coming into service in both the United
States and the U.S.S.R. This was the beginning of a post-war
deficiency which had not been fully corrected in the 196o's.
It is one thing to put off committing a Navy to a definite
course of action until the strategical picture clears; it is
another not to replace or modernize ships and aircraft system-
atically. This means that when steps are taken to update the
Fleet immense expense and time will be required, and its
ability to respond or expand in the event of a crisis is
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correspondingly reduced. The slow down in ship construction
vitally effected the Fleet Air Arm. World War II carriers were
not capable of handling high-performance aircraft and before a
new generation of planes could be introduced either new or
modernized carriers would have to be built. There were few
signs that this discrepancy would be corrected. Due to the
long periods of time involved in planning and construction a
fore sighted navy must always be looking ahead and building for
tomorrow. In 1948 the Royal Navy was standing still as far as
its physical equipment was concerned. This policy was to exact
a high cost in coming years.
Strategy and Doctrine
Thus far the discussion has dealt only with the effect
of the post-war rundown on the physical equipment of the Fleet.
Certainly the bulk of the criticism leveled at the Government
concerned the rapid reduction of personnel and numbers of
ships. For this study, however, more important than the
material situation in this period is the trend of the
Admiralty *s strategical and tactical thinking. To a great
extent this would dominate the direction of future development
and the evolution of the Fleet's role. In other words it is
vital to consider what kind of war the Admiralty was preparing
to fight and what missions it expected the Fleet to perform
or not' to perform. These are extremely important elements of
overall naval policy.
The general organization of the Fleet outlined in the
chart on page is significant in itself. It is identical
to that of pre-war days. The heaviest concentrations were in
the British Isles and the Mediterranean, supplemented by small
squadrons on the outlying stations. The emphasis was on
control of the narrow seas with particular stress on the Suez
l 5lifeline to the Far East. Despite extensive cuts in appro-
priations and reductions in the number of active ships all the
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pre-war commands had been reconstituted. Each of the chief
overseas naval bases and dockyards had been reactivated. The
White Ensign was once again represented in every major ocean
of the world. There was little doubt that the Royal Navy
intended to take up its colonial duties where it had left off
in 1939. Not only the Government, but also the Admiralty was
thinking in traditional and Great Power terms. Lack of funds
was cutting drastically into the Fleet's available forces, but
nevertheless there seemed to be a built-in resistance to cutting
responsibilities. It would be several years before the Admiralty
would make any compromises in its far flung deployments or
command- structure in order to tailor the active forces to the
economic realities of the post-war era. The reluctance to match
resources and commitments has been one of the most striking
features of the general British reaction to the post-war decline
in world stature. The Royal Navy likewise exhibited this
characteristic for almost a decade after World War II.
The backbone of the fighting formations was to be the
carrier supported by cruisers and smaller combatant types. This
development reflected the one major departure from pre-war
doctrine. The Royal Navy starting in 1946 had steadily deem-
phasized the "battlewagon. *' The rise of the aircraft carrier
as the new capital ship excited more press comment than any
other post-war step taken by the Admiralty. Each decision to
decommission or scrap a battleship was reported with a great
deal of fanfare and greeted with cries of alarm or rejoicing
depending on the observer's perspective and sympathies.
In 1 939 when Britain declared war the Fleet was built
around the dreadnought. At that time the Navy had fifteen
capital ships and six aircraft carriers, only one of which had
47been built from the keel up as a carrier. In short order
both the British and American navies gained a new respect for
naval air power. Surface ships proved to be particularly vul-
nerable to air attack, and it was extremely hazardous for them
to operate without fighter protection. The shortage of British
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carriers made the Royal Navy rely strongly on its capital ships
particularly in the early stages of the war. But as the Fleet
Air Arm expanded it took over a progressively larger share of
i 48the Fleet s offensive and defensive duties. The rise of the
aircraft carrier as a naval weapon is too well known to repeat
at length. However, what is not generally realized is how
markedly the emphasis changed in the Royal Navy during the war.
In 194-5 the Admiralty had fifteen capital ships at sea and only
one on the ways. In contrast to this there were fifteen attack
and light carriers for work with the major fleets, and nine
building. In addition the Royal Navy had in commission forty
escort carriers (thirty-four of these were on loan from the
United states) which were engaged in convoy ana anti-suDmarine
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work. ^ World War II had very definitely turned the Royal Navy
to air power.
As the Admiralty entered the post-war era it was
inevitable that it was to lay increasing emphasis on the Fleet
Air Arm. Its wartime performance could hardly be denied, and
American experience likewise testified that the carrier had
replaced the battlewagon. Under the relentless pressure of
the Government's economies the Board of Admiralty had to make
a decision between the dreadnought and the carrier. It was
impossible to support a large number of both. Despite the
popular impression that the Royal Navy was reluctant to part
with the battleship, the shift to carriers was made with
remarkably little dissent. "As money got tighter no matter
how attached the senior officers were sentimentally to the
battleships we had little choice but to elect the ships that
had proved the most versatile and could give us the most
return for our money."-5 The fact that carriers are essen-
tially capital ships themselves made the new policy more
palatable to the "surface sailors" and gave it an air of
continuity with the past. It would be a mistake to under-
estimate the importance of this consideration in a Service
that had been built around the "ship-of-the-line" and then
the "dreadnought" for over 200 years.
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It is interesting to note that during this period there
:*a no aviators on the Board of Admiralty, although a number
d aviation units and carriers during the war. The
pre-war Fleet Air Arm had been a part of the Royal Air Force
,
and when it was transferred to the Admiralty in 1939 there were
only 200 pilots in the whole force, and they were practically
without exception junior officers. Of course, the aviation
branch underwent great expansion during the war, but it never-
theless was to be several years before any number of aviators
would make their way to flag rank and positions of high responsi-
bility. In the immediate post-war years there were a number of
competent younger fliers who had fought the war at sea and were
beginning to make their influence felt in the Navy's planning
circles, but it would, be some time before they moved into the
CO
senior posts. J In 1949 there were approximately 800 pilots
out of a total of over 10,000 officers in the Royal Navy, and
about a quarter of the Navy's personnel were involved directly
or indirectly with the Fleet Air Arm. ^ In recognition of the
increasing importance of aviation a new post had been created
on the Board in 194-5 - Fifth Sea Lord (Air) - to be responsible
for the general direction and coordination of naval air policy.
This appointment strengthened the Fleet Air Arm and gave it a
direct channel to the Sea Lords. Nevertheless, the Board was
dominated by "surface" Admirals, and it is to their credit
that they elected for'aireraft carriers as opposed to the
battleship in the immediate post-war period.
Still, the Board's turn to the Fleet Air Arm was
qualified by its experience. There was a general consensus
that the Navy must rely on carriers for its main strength, but
there was by no means the same agreement on how carriers were
to be employed. It was here that the traditional biases of the
senior Admirals showed their ugly heads. Just as World War II
equipment was still in use, the Admiralty's thinking on the
central purpose of the Fleet had likewise changed very little
from 1939. It was designed to fight other naval forces - air,
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surface, and submarine. As previously noted a number of
squadrons had received new planes, but they were World War II
type aircraft with very little versatility. The carrier's
main offensive punch was represented by the Sea Fury which
was capable of carrying torpedoes, depth charges and armor
piercing bombs. It was designed to strike surface ships and
submarines. The Fleet's newest fighter, the Firefly, was
intended to fend off attacking bombers, but was not designed
to counter land-based fighters nor to strike targets on its
own. A very limited amount of research was going into naval
aircraft. The Admiralty was putting some effort into develop-
ing a jet fighter in conjunction with the RAF. But what little
emphasis funds would alio-.; was being put on an experimental
aircraft designated the GR17/45 which would be configured to
perform reconnaissance, spot gunfire and attack surface ships
with bombs. It represented very little if any change in the
basic tactical thinking of the Admiralty since pre-war days.
Many of the younger officers, particularly pilots,
would like to have seen the Navy expand its offensive scope.
They cited the American experience in the Pacific where
carrier aircraft challenged land-based fighters for control
of the air over enemy territory, struck shore targets and
supported amphibious landings, but they had little success in
imposing their views on the Navy B s leaders. This can be best
explained by reference to the British naval experience in
World War II; it was considerably different than that of the
Americans.
54British carriers v/ere employed in three main theatres.
In the Mediterranean they were utilized primarily to protect
the Malta bound convoys originating in Gibraltar and Alexandria.
In these narrow waters the Fleet was constantly operating with-
in range of German and Italian land-based bombers, and fighter
air cover for the convoys was desperately needed. Due to the
shortage of carriers they were used almost exclusively in this
role and very sparingly to attack other forces on land. In the
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North Atlantic the carriers of the Home Fleet were used to
furnish air cover for convoys and warships operating off
Scandinavia and Iceland. Offensively they were employed to
harass the Scandinavian coastal trade and German pocket battle-
ships holed up in northern harbors and fiords. Y/hen a surface
raider broke out they often played a prime role in the search
and, weather permitting, in the attack. Their most famous
exploit of course was the finding and wounding of the Bismarck
in May 194-1 which was eventually destroyed by the combined
action of planes and surface craft. On the trade routes in
mid-Atlantic small carriers were utilized with telling effect
both in escorting convoys and as the main unit in hunter-killer
groups. They proved to be a particularly effective complement
to surface escorts in convoy work both against submarines and
air attack.
It should be clear that British naval aircraft were
employed almost exclusively in a defensive role or against other
seagoing forces. They maae remarkably few wartime sorties
against, land targets and were novel1 employed to support ground
troops. Due to the geography of the combat zones the large
European amphibious landings were covered by land-based planes.
Four of the Royal Navy's attack carriers were deployed to the
Western Pacific during the last two months of the war where
they operated with American task forces and witnessed seaborne
aircraft attack land targets with impunity. This exposure was
enough to whet the appetite of some individual aviators for
expanding the role of the Fleet Air Arm, but it was not suffi-
cient to divert the Admiralty to a new way of using its air
power. The Sea Lords still envisioned the carrier as a
glorified battleship whose primary purpose was to protect the
Fleet from air bombardment and attack other naval forces.
In much the same manner political pressures and history
led the Royal Navy to neglect amphibious warfare. Prior to
1933 the Admiralty had completely ignored the possibility of
having to make opposed amphibious landings. Ever since the
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Gallipoli Operation in 1916 there had been a general feeling
in the British military that such landings were not practical
in modern warfare. This belief was strong enough to prevent
any amphibious planning or training being undertaken in the
inter-war years. Only the imminence of a major war reversed
the trend and even then almost a year had to pass before a
serious organization evolved for studying, planning and imple-
menting joint operations involving all three Services. After
some halting starts a Combined Operations Headquarters was
established in 1940 which took over the prime responsibility
for these tasks, and it was out of this office that many of
the amphibious techniques and equipment employed later in the
war originated. ° The Royal Navy's experience with amphibious
landings during World War II differed from that of the U. S.
Navy in some significant respects, and this contributed in large
measure to the Admiralty's post-war wttitude toward its
amphibious responsibilities..
In the Pacific the U. S. Lravy was conducting a series
of amphibious landings in order to gain bases which would
allow it to project its naval power further into the Western
Pacific. It was basically a maritime operation conceived,
directed and implemented by the U* S. Navy. The major amphib-
ious efforts in which the Royal Navy participated, such as
Sicily, Anzio and Normandy were designed merely to transport
the Army from one place to another. In essence the Royal Navy
was merely supporting what was basically a land campaign. Its
ships put Army troops ashore and assisted them with gunfire.
Air support was furnished by land-based air forces, and once
the troops had a secure hold ashore the Navy no longer played
a significant part in the drama. This type of work was neither
glamorous nor attractive, and the Royal Navy never considered it
part of its basic mission. It was just an extracurricular
burden which it had assumed under the press of wartime demands,




In this regard the role played by the Royal Marines
should be quickly mentioned. Unlike the U. S. Marine Corps
the Royal Marines had never had a responsibility for amphibious
warfare. They had been employed in a variety of duties both
afloat and ashore but never in specific units organized to
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conduct opposed landings. As a result up until World War II
there was no military organization in Britain primarily con-
cerned with this problem. Once the Combined Operations Headquarters
commenced organizing forays against Continental Europe both
the Army and Marines furnished troops which were organized into
special "commando" units. Their exploits in raiding the
Continent became famous throughout the world, and their exper-
ience with amphibious operations formed the basis for the later
major operations in Europe. After the war the Combined Operations
Headquarters was retained, because it was believed that amphib-
ious operations involving all three Services could be better
looked after by a joint organization reporting to the Ministry
of Defense. However, it became merely a training organization
with only a skeleton staff of personnel assigned to it per-
manently. In the final analysis this meant that neither the
Army, Navy or Air Force had any special responsibility for
amphibious operations, and the office that was interested did
not have any means for extracting resources from any of the
three Services against their will.
On the conclusion of hostilities the Royal Marines
faced a particularly trying period. The Marine leadership hoped
to carve out an amphibious role for the Royal Marines on the
pattern of the U. S. Marine Corps, and thereby furnish the
organization with a firm and unique justification which would
assure its survival. However, the desperate need for troops
and the shortage of money postponed any serious moves in this
direction. In fact the future of the Royal Marines was in
serious doubt at least once due to the pressure to cut-back
the services. Organizationally the Marines were a part of




The Adjudant General^ did not sit on the Board of Admiralty,
nor was he represented on the Naval Staff which included the
First Sea Lord's close operational advisors. This put him in
a poor position to exert influence or to present his views.
The Admiralty has always kept firm control over the seagoing
soldiers, and the Marines have been more or less at the mercy
of their naval seniors. Traditionally the Marines have felt
that they were tolerated as long as they were "tame soldiers,
not costing too much, not having ideas above their station,
not quite soldiers." From a practical political standpoint
this meant that although the Royal Marines were eager to see
a strong amphibious capability developed, they could exert very
little effective pressure in this regard.
The net result was that the Navy's attitude toward
amphibious vessels was similar to the Royal Air Force's toward
air lift. Both Services considered these tasks as detracting
from their major missions and gave them the minimum of
attention. Once the Government throttled down on funds it
was inevitable that amphibious equipment, planning and train-
ing would suffer, because it was at the bottom of the Navy's
priority list. In order to assist the Combined Operations
Headquarters the Admiralty kept a skeleton training squadron
in commission which consisted of only 4 LST's, 5 LCT's and
7 LCA's. These ships were manned by reduced crews and would
require additional personnel and maintenance before they
could be deployed. They were stationed in England and the
sole purpose of this squadron "was to keep amphibious tech-
niques alive." There was no 'intention to provide a ready
amphibious capability. Once again here was an important area
of naval warfare which budget pressures and historical back-
ground were leading the Royal Navy to neglect.
In combination with carrier strike forces and highly
developed amphibious techniques V/orld War II had witnessed
noteworthy strides in naval logistics. American task forces
in the Pacific had been forced to operate for months at sea
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hundreds of miles from their supply bases. This was made
possible by an extensive and modern fleet train which could
operate at high speed and replenish warships underway in the
combat zone. Elaborate vessels, equipment and procedures
were developed for transferring fuel, supplies, ammunition,
food, repair parts and people at sea under varying conditions
of sea and weather. Complementing these replenishment task
forces were a variety of maintenance ships which could move
into newly acquired bases and without requiring any shore
support could offer the fleet extensive maintenance support.
In many respects these were the most important naval develop-
ments to come out of World War II, for they actually made it
possible for task forces to operate independent of shore
bases and dockyards for months on end. However, the Royal
Navy's wartime experience was again quite different.
Great Britain's enviable complex of bases had
traditionally facilitated the Royal Navy's world-wide deploy-
ment. At the same time, however, it had tied the seagoing
forces to shore bases. World War II generated little cnange
in this regard. The main British fleets in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean always were in close proximity of both operating
bases and repair facilities. Ships on convoy work were often
refueled at sea, but, aside from this one operation, British
warships were not trained in underway replenishment nor did
they have an extensive fleet train. In the same vein they
depended on shore support for repairs. In 1945 the Royal Navy
was still a "short legged" force. In the post-war era this was
to allow the Admiralty to concentrate its scarce funds on fight-
ing forces rather than supply ships. Unfortunately, it delayed
efforts to develop ships and techniques which make fleets
independent of close shore support.
By 1948 there were signs of change in the air. India,
Pakistan and Ceylon had received self-government and become
members of the Commonwealth. Burma had been granted full inde-
pendence, having chosen not to remain in the Empire. Although
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British forces had been withdrawn, the military bases in these
countries were still available to the Royal Navy. However,
their security and usefulness had been definitely impaired.
Moreover there were indications that these were only the first
breaks in the dam. How long would colonial bases be available
in a post-war world fired by nationalism? Nevertheless, the
Royal Navy was still thinking in traditional terms, and there
were few signs that its attitude toward logistics support
was changing.
The Admiralty's reluctance to cast aside its traditional
thinking was further evidenced by its insistence on maintaining
a large reserve fleet. In the face of harsh economies which
drastically reduced the active fleet, the Navy's leaders laid
considerable stress on this device. In the years 1946" to 1948
over 400 units were consigned to mothballs and over 300 of
these were combatant ships. This move was inspired by the
Navy's experience in the inter-war years. After World War I
hundreds of ships were scrapped or allowed to rot, yet in 1941
fifty overage destroyers obtained from the United States had
made a substantial difference in the battle against German
U-boats. The reserve fleet was considered by the Sea Lords
to be a counter to the post-war economy drive. It was fer-
vently believed that sheer numbers were a crucial item, and
with a minimum of routine maintenance the reserve fleet could
be kept available on short notice to supplement the active fleet.
This policy undoubtedly assumed another conventional war similar
to World War II where huge convoys would have to fight through
to Europe and large numbers of escorts would be required to
protect them.
Of course this policy consumed resources. By 1949 some
8,500 men were engaged in the reserve fleet upkeep, and it was
absorbing over £10,000,000 a year in funds. This was as much
as was going into research. The reserve fleet also seemed to
give the Navy a sense of comfort about its reduced size that
was scarcely Justified. It was impossible to keep these ships
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continually in serviceable condition, and the problems of
preventing deterioration were formidable. Before vessels could
be returned to active duty they inevitably required work and
expenditures as Korea was to prove. Similarly, the rapid
advance of technology was soon to make these ships obsolete
and a dubious asset. Perhaps more Important this rather expen-
sive policy turned the Navy's attention away from the new
military problems which were developing and gave it a vested
interest in a World War II type of conflict where the reserve
fleet would be useful. This could be dangerous in an era which
was chiefly characterized by rapid change.
In essence the Fleet was preparing to fight a general
war on the same pattern as it had fought World War II. The
Admiralty envisioned a protracted conflict at sea where the
objective was to keep open Britain's supply routes and communi-
cations with the Empire. The primary enemy would be other
naval forces - surface, air and submarines. Using its far
flung bases the Fleet's objective would be to deny the sea
to the enemy and to assure "the safe and timely arrival of
convoys. ' Just as its equipment was of World War II vintage,
the "Admiralty's doctrinal thinking had changed very little
since 1939." The emphasis on air power was a new wrinkle,
but otherwise the Fleet had a decisive pre-war character.
It should be emphasized that the Navy's planners were
suffering from the same handicap that its political advocates
were. They had no credible enemy. Only the United States
possessed a large navy, and it was not considered a likely
enemy. The cold war had not started in earnest yet, and Russia
was not considered a naval power. Great Britain's immediate
post-war tasks had not presented the Navy with any unusual tasks
or problems which would direct its attention away from the tra-
ditional practices. Military planning without tangible oppo-
nents is like navigating without a compass. "There is no more
frustrating experience than planning to fight 'a mythical
nation. " * The only real guidepost available was experience

83
and in that light it is easy to understand how British naval
planning, beset with crushing economic limitations took the
course it did.
One other area of endeavour bears examination. The
one item which stood to affect naval warfare profoundly was
the atomic bomb. Those critics who deprecated the value of
seaborne forces based their entire argument on the destructive
power of such weapons. The investigation will now look closely
at the Royal Navy's relationship to atomic research and
fission weapons.
Admiralty and the Bomb
Government leaders constantly attempted to cushion
the effect of the cut-back in forces by referring to the
immediate post-war period as a transitional one and stressing
the uncertainties which beset modern military science. They
insisted that . the lessons of the war must be digested before
firm policies could emerge and assured the country that a
concentrated effort must go into research looking to the
future rather than the present. Lord Chat field discussing
this policy in the House of Lords in 19^7 cautioned that "we
must be careful how the Government use that priority. It was
used in the peace years (inter-war years) as a means of pre-
venting anything being done for the Services." These were
words of wisdom. There is no question that the Government
was exaggerating the effort it was putting into research in
order to make defense reductions more palatable. The Govern-
ment was to discover that in the atomic era an extensive re-
search effort was to cost a great deal of money, and it was
impossible to conduct a broad and deep program on limited funds,
In fact the emphasis in the early post-war years was
to be more relative than absolute. In 19^8 the Navy was still
having difficulties inaugurating its post-war research program.
The First Lord in 1948 stressed that due to the shortage of
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trained scientists and technicians and problems in establishing
laboratories "progress in all branches of research and develop-
ment work continues under handicap. " ' The amounts spent on
research are difficult to determine 'with accuracy since they are
buried in the defense accounting system under several cate-
gories. The 19^8 Navy Estimates asked for about £9,000,000
to be spent on experimental work funded by the Admiralty.
This figure compared with approximately £700,000 spent annually
before the war. On the other hand it is less than a fourth
being spent today. The £9,000,000 covered all the Navy's
hydrographic work, its observatories, and the building of new
laboratories. This left approximately £4,000,000 for actual
research projects to improve Navy material. By post-war
standards this is a depressing figure for an organization the
size of the Royal Navy. This allowed the Admiralty to devote
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some attention to ship propulsion plants and hull design.
A part of this effort was the investigation of the effects of
radiation and atomic blast. Although these efforts were
modest they paved the way for the well designed frigates which
were built in the 1950's. In addition naval scientists did
some worx on submarine snorkels and high capacity batteries.
Anti-submarine equipment was likewise receiving some attention,
but it had no particular priority.
The Ministry of Supply funded all atomic, aircraft
and missile research for all three Services. The Supply Esti-
mates gave no hint as to how its research money was divided.
In 1948 the Ministry of Supply received an appropriation for
£61 million but this sum had to go a long way. There is
little question that missile and aircraft projects were like-
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wise operating on rather slender appropriations. This could
be attributed to several factors. In the first place atomic
research and housekeeping tasks took the great bulk of the
budget, and there was very little left for other research.
Secondly, work on missiles and supersonic aircraft was still
in its infancy, and early predictions of the resources required
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turned out to be vastly under-estimated. On top of this the
Defense Research Policy Committee controlled the priority of
all military experimental projects, and it was applying the
Ten Year Rule rigorously except in the area of nuclear weapons.
Despite the "highest priority" awarded to research it was being
throttled to meet a ten year development period, instead of
proceeding on a rush basis. "There was in fact very little
genuine weapon development other than that of the atomic bomb
during the forties."7
This was illustrated by the Navy's experience. Within
the Ministry of Supply the Admiralty was pushing for a new
general purpose jet aircraft. However, it was the mid-1 950'
s
before the Fleet Air Arm received jet aircraft. In 1947 work
began within the Ministry of Supply on what was later to be
called the Seaslug missile. This was a truly sophisticated
project which was to give surface ships protection against
supersonic aircraft. However, British scientists were just
beginning to discover the uncertainties of missile research,
and too few resources were devoted to the program. As a
result it would be over fourteen years before the Fleet received
this weapon. Surprisingly the emphasis here was solely on anti-
aircraft missiles and little interest was expressed in other
types of missiles for shipboard use. All in all this was a
rather restricted research effort which 'hardly promised to
keep the Royal Navy in the forefront of naval warfare. In all
fairness this can be attributed fundamentally not to the lack
of foresight but the lack of funds.
As previously mentioned there was one important excep-
tion to this general pattern and that was atomic weapons. The
Government was determined to join the "nuclear club" . The
Ten Year Rule had no application here. Because of the immense
significance of this effort It is pertinent to etch in some of
the historical background before discussing the Admiralty's
relationship to the program.
The atomic bombs which were dropped at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were the final result of a joint American-British-
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Canadian research effort which had been launched early in
Y/orld War II. However, the actual production of the bomb for
a number of reasons had taken place in the United States and
for all intents and purposes had become a solely American pro-
ject. 1 -^ For the first year after the war Prime Minister Attlee
attempted through a series of intricate negotiations to obtain
production information from the Americans, These efforts
collapsed with the passage of the McMahon Act in July 194-6
which forbade the dissemination of such information to any
foreign country. This was a bitter blow to the English, and
many of them considered it a gross betrayal of contracts made
74in the fullest faith and confidence.
'
There had never heen any doubt in the Government ' s mind
that Britain would establish its own atomic energy program
irrespective of U. S. cooperation. British scientists had been
urging the creation of an atomic research agency since 1943* and
as early as August 194-5 Mr. Attlee had launched Britain's post-
war effort by establishing an Advisory Committee on Atomic
7SEnergy. •* By the time the McMahon Act was passed Great Britain
had already established the nucleus of its future atomic energy
program. The lack of American knowledge was an imposing handi-
cap since the British had no production experience. Neverthe-
less, within the next few years they proceeded to build an
atomic industry which is impressive both in its size and
accomplishments.
Although the official determination to make an atomic
bomb was not taken until 1 948 "there can be little doubt that
the decision had been implicit in the atomic energy program
itself from the beginning."' Interestingly enough the de-
cision was made by the Defense Committee not the Cabinet, and
Alfred Goldberg makes the statement that there is no evidence
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of dissent.' It is unlikely that the Admiralty was consulted
in any detail since the Prime Minister kept the atomic program
under his close personal supervision. Still there is no doubt




to produce atomic weapons. It is true that there was some
apprehension as to the effect they would have on the future
of sea power, and there was little detailed knowledge within
the Navy of their workings or possibilities. Nevertheless
there was strong consensus that a Great Power must have a
modern military establishment and that this necessarily in-
cluded fission bombs.
It would be 1 952 before Great Britain exploded an
atomic weapon, but by 1948 it had made impressive strides
toward this goal. From the start this program had received
the highest priority. Although it was plagued with many of
the economic problems which beset all post-war British indus-
try, relative to all other projects it was prosecuted with
unusual purposefulness and vigour. It was also kept highly
secret. Considering the obstacles which inherently confront
the creation of an atomic industry and the restricted resources
available in post-war Britain, its entry into the atomic field
in such short order was a rather remarkable achievement.
Although there may be some doubt today as to whether Britain
has gained the military and political rewards it anticipated,
this in no \*ay dims the technical brilliance of its effort.
In order to employ atomic weapons it was necessary to
develop delivery systems and this requirement brought the
Services into the picture. All circumstances favored the choice
of the Royal Air Force as the delivery agent. Commencing with
79Lord Trenchard'^ in the days of World War I British airmen had
consistently preached the merits of strategic air bombardment,
and in the inter-war years the Royal Air Force adopted it as
its central rationale. World War II experience confirmed the
Air Council's belief in this creed, and the introduction of
the atomic bomb served to make the doctrine even more attrac-
tive. The Royal Air Force entered the post-war era determined
to fashion for itself a nuclear capability. There were some
compelling precedents strengthening its claim on the bomb. The
only atomic weapons employed in war had been dropped by aircraft
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on strategic targets. The size and cost of the first bombs
precluded their use on any but the biggest and most important
targets. The United States which had the only practicing
experience with these weapons was setting the pace with its
Strategic Air Command which had first call on American fission
weapons. Even more important there were no alternative delivery
systems in sight, and the role fell to aircraft by default.
Like all the British Services the RAF after the war
had oeen severely cut back and forced to make do with World
Y/ar II equipment. Still the Air Council had a clear and con-
si stent conception of what it wanted - an atomic jet bomber
and as early as 1946 laid down a requirement for a remarkably
advanced strategic aircraft. The year 1957 was set as the
target date for reequipping Bomber Command. By April 19^8 the
RAF had underway a long-range and imaginative research program
that called for the development of four medium Jet bombers -
this was the first step in the creation of the famous V-bomber
force. To fill the "bomber gap" which was expected to occur
between the phasing out of the large piston engine bombers and
the introduction of the V-bomber s a further requirement was
generated for a tactical jet bomber - the Canberra. It would
enter service at an early date, hopefully around 1952, and be
configured to carry conventional weapons and "small atomic
bombs." Due to its limited range and size it 'could not be
classified as a strategic bomber, but it would usher Bomber
Command into the jet age as early as 1952. It would be the
mid-1 950 ! s before the RAF would have a credible delivery force.
Nevertheless, in the late 1940*s all the Ingredients were
present for the eventual creation of a strategic deterrent.
The Admiralty never challenged the Royal Air Force's
pre-eminent claim. Needless to say atomic weapons caused
considerable apprehension in the higher circles of the Navy,
and their influence was discussed at great length. It should
be emphasized that the only information available was that
released by the United States, and this was disseminated only
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to a limited circle of senior officers. It was clearly
obvious that before the Royal Navy could make any definitive
estimates on the rolo of atomic bombs in sea warfare that
Great Britain would have to gain more knowledge of the weapons
and their effects. Nevertheless, the Admiralty's early
attitudes were governed by some general notions which were
shared throughout the Government and the military.
In Britain strategic bombing and the Royal Air Force
were inextricably linked in both the official and public minds.
It hardly occurred to anyone to question the RAF's first claim
on these weapons. While the Air Council was stressing strategic
bombing in the years before 1939 the Fleet Air Arm was training
solely to support the Fleet. During World War II it was Bomber
Command which first carried the war to the enemy and which in
cooperation with the USAF had mounted the massive strikes that
razed Germany. Naval aircraft had taken no part in the stra-
tegic bombing campaign, and Navy airmen had never considered it
a proper mission for seaborne planes. Offensive operations
(as already noted) were confined to tactical targets with a
strictly naval flavor. Actually the Admiralty could not see
any vital military reason for changing this pattern and cer-
tainly did not feel that it should do so for the soul politi-
cal purpose of injecting the Navy into the atomic field.
Just as the Royal Air Force looked at the atomic bomb
as a strategic weapon, so did the Sea Lords. The cost of
atomic research was immense and in the late 1940's there
seemed little likelihood of producing a "cheap bomb. " Physical
size alone was considered to be a limiting factor. The Ameri-
can bombs were known to be huge and could only be carried in
the largest aircraft. There was no reason to believe that a
British weapon might be any smaller - at least for many years.
Unlike the U. S. Navy which had acquired a large force of land
based planes for anti-submarine and transport work the Royal
Navy possessed no multi-engine aircraft. The equivalent force
in Great Britain was the "Coastal Command" which was part of
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the Royal Air Force. If the Navy was to enter the strategic
bomber business it would have required a new generation of
aircraft carriers and planes much larger than those in service
in 1945* Harbor depths and maintenance facilities precluded
a larger class of carrier without tremendous expenditures on
support facilities as well as new ships. The Board of
Admiralty was well aware that the country's financial state
would hardly allow this. All these factors combined to keep
the Royal Navy on the periphery of the atomic weapons program
Op
and to delay its entry into the field.
Essentially the Admiralty adopted a "wait and see"
attitude. It was following the course of the atomic energy
program and planned to take any advantage of future develop-
ments which showed promise for shipboard use. However, as
previously noted this appeared to the Sea Lords to be a dis-
tant prospect at best. In their minds atomic weapons were
costly, and heavy strategic weapons were not suitable for employ-
ment by the Fleet Air Arm or ships.
Their effect on the Admiralty's strategic thinking and
the deployment of the Fleet was another matter. The Board did
make some moves to discover the effects of atomic weapons on
ships. In 194-6 a nine man team was sent to the United States
Bikini trials. It was led by Captain S. W. Roskill and turned
out a full report on the results of those tests which was
eagerly consumed by the British Navy. ^ As a result the Royal
Navy's designers immediately commenced making efforts to
develop equipment and ships which could better withstand an
atomic attack. By the time of the Korean War the Royal Navy
was well along in the field of passive defense, and the new
ships authorized during the rearmament era reflected some of
these advances. However, these efforts had little effect on
the Naval Staff's strategical thinking.
It was clear that atomic bombs woula not be produced
in Britain for a number of years, and the Admiralty was entirely
at a loss as to exactly what effect they would have on sea
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warfare. Vice-Admiral P. W. Gretton, commenting on this
period, refers to the Navy's response as reflecting "a vacuum
of strategic thought." The Admiralty contended that atomic
weapons might change tactics and equipment but that they didn't
change the Fleet's basic mission. The Navy's leaders insisted
that in any general war there would still be a prolonged and
bitter battle for control of the sea lanes in the traditional
pattern and that it would require the same types of ships as
World Y/ar II. The general feeling prevailed among sea power
advocates that the atomic bomb was Just a "bigger and better"
bomb and that it could be countered by dispersal. ^ On top of
this they argued that such weapons would be too costly and
scarce to employ against most targets at sea. The First Lord,
Mr. A. V. Alexander, during the defense debate in March 1947,
alluding "co the bomb rc;-arl:cxl "'«hw."i curiously or.cu::h, it was
the least likely (of now developments) to affect naval design
radically."86
In essence the Navy's leaders had no intention of
making any radical changes in the Fleet or its strategic
rationale because of the atomic bomb until there was more
evidence in court. Frankly, in retrospect this seems to have
been the wisest course. In 1948 Great Britain didn't have the
bomb as yet, and it would be some years before it would. No
one could say with assurance what its final influence would
be - even the air power advocates or United States strategists
who had already had it for a number of years. The international
situation had yet to clarify itself or to stabilize, and limited
war as such had not entered the military thinking of the Great
Powers. Of course the Admiralty could have conceded that
atomic bombs had made navies obsolete and commenced to dis-
mantle the Fleet. Naturally the Sea Lords never considered
this alternative. No matter what the technical, political or
strategical considerations one of the major objectives of all




It will be even clearer as this study unfolds that the
Admiralty was slow to appreciate the long-range effects of
atomic weapons on military strategy. However, it was not
unique in this respect, and it would be quite a bit to ask of
a nation or Service to grasp fully the significance of these
weapons either before an enemy had them or it possessed them
itself. It should be pointed out in all fairness that con-
ventional weapons are still on the scene today and with a good
prospect of being around for sometime. The drastic predictions
which the proponents of atomic air power were making in the
late 1940's about the future of navies never came to pass.
Perhaps one can fault the Admiralty for its failure to adjust
to this new development, but it is difficult to criticize its
persistent faith in the inherent value of navies.
As far as the Royal Navy was concerned the transition
from war to peace was characterized not so much by change, as
by the lack of change. The Admiralty's approach to sea war-
fare had altered very little since pre-war days, and the 1 948
Fleet was remarkably akin to the forces that had fought World
War II. Undoubtedly the prime determinant of naval policy
had heen the nation's post-war economic problems which had
severely circumscribed the Government's freedom of maneuver
and forced the defense establishment to contract drastically.
Constantly plagued by the lack of funds the Admiralty had
been unable to expand its strategical or technical horizons
and to take full advantage of the naval lessons of World War
II. Despite the profound implications and promise of atomic
weapons they had yet to make a genuine impression on the
Royal Navy. It was relying on its traditional rationale of
protecting the sea lanes and preparing to counter other naval
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The period 1949-56 was to prove particularly-
significant in the development of the post-war Royal Navy.
The preceding chapter examined the Government's first con-
frontation with the post-war economic realities and their
influence on the general military picture. In regard to
naval policy the Admiralty found its freedom of maneuver
severely restricted. In response it had little choice but
to rely on World War II equipment. Strategically the Board
essentially adopted ita pre-war posture. The early 1950's were
to present the Navy's leadership with a series of challenges
which served to push the seaborne forces into the background -
even to raise serious misgivings about the very future of
British sea power. Nevertheless it was during this period
that events began to Jar the Admiralty's thinking out of its
World War II frame of reference, worked some important changes
in the nature of the Fleet, and demonstrated the continuing
value of mobile naval task forces. In these critical years
the seeds of Britain's present day naval policy were sown.
International Tension vs Economic Conditions
Britain's intention in the early post-war years was
to liquidate with all due speed her commitments incurred as
a result of World War II and in turn to reduce her armed forces
to a peacetime level that would allow a rapid and successful




prospect in 1 9^5« Great Britain had Just won the greatest
military victory in history. There were no enemies left. All
the surviving great powers were Albion's allies. Presumably
the United Nations offered a promising foundation on which to
establish a workable peace. To the free world's great distress
these hopes were shattered all too soon.
The armistice had hardly been signed when it became
clear that the Kremlin intended to dominate the countries of
Eastern Europe. Large numbers of Soviet troops were deployed
throughout the Satellites, evidently on a permanent basis.
These moves were accompanied by determined efforts to extend
Russian Influence in Persia, Turkey and Greece. At least in
these instances pressure was being exerted on areas adjacent
to the U.S.S.R., and where Russia had traditionally taken a
strong diplomatic Interest. However, It was soon feared that
Russian ambitions extended to Western Europe as the Kremlin
vigorously sponsored political infiltration and subversion
throughout this area. In three years the great and powerful
wartime ally, Soviet Russia, presented the "free world" with
its second grave challenge in a decade. Although economic
determinants had monopolized the military limelight in Great
Britain during the immediate post-war period, other consider-
ations now gradually assumed increased significance.
Throughout the late 1940's it was becoming painfully
clear to British statesmen that Europe's weakened condition
and their own country's fiscal troubles combined with the
Soviet threat called for unusual measures. The post-war era
was characterized by a steady succession of moves aligning Britain
with her allies. In June 1 <H7 General Marshal, the Secretary
of State, offered extensive United States financial assistance
to Europe. Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Minister, responded
enthusiastically to this American initiative and together with
Mr. Georges Bidault, the then French Foreign Minister, organ-
ized Europe to accept the Marshall Plan. The Organization
for European Economic Cooperation evolved from these efforts.
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Within Europe some old ties were very shortly renewed.
In March 1947 Britain and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty of
Alliance and Mutual Assistance. A year later this arrangement
was extended to include Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
by the Brussels Treaty. This grouping later became known as
the Western European Union. The Defense White Paper for 1949
for the first time expressed disillusionment with the United
Nations and described at some length the Joint military arrange-
ments being made within the Western European Union. This was
the initial post-war step toward collective defense and in many
ways it "provided a pattern for the North Atlantic Treaty"
which was soon to follow.
In the spring of 1948 the Communists' campaign was
highlighted by the disappearance of Csechoslovokia behind the
"iron curtain." In August Stalin initiated the Berlin blockade.
That in turn drew the United States closer to Europe and accel-
erated the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.
Militarily the parties undertook "to maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity - to resist armed attack."*^
The 1950 Defense White Paper declared that British policy was
"to seek security through the development of collective self-
defense ... in cooperation with the other members of the
Commonwealth, the United States of America and other like minded
h4
nations. There is little question that America had loomed
large in Britain's military thinking ever since the war, but it
wasn t until 1950 that it was officially acknowledged.
Despite the strong language of the North Atlantic Treaty
it seems clear that prior to Korea it was not primarily designed
to marshal military power, but rather "to provide political and
psychological reinforcement in the continuing political warfare
of the cold war. " Statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic
believed that the commitment of America's military potential
to the defense of Europe would both bolster Western European
resolution and deter further Soviet aggressions with a show
7
of trans-Atlantic solidarity. ' To Britain it seemed to offer
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the only means of insuring her security and "great power" status
while regaining her economic strength. This was reflected in
the Government's military budget. The NATO commitment and in-
creased tension, particularly during the Berlin airlift, had
caused slight increases in the annual appropriation for the
years 1949 and 1950, and the Government initiated some efforts
to improve Britain's air defenses which had been allowed to
deteriorate along with the rest of the military establishment.
However, the total manpower allowance continued to decrease,
and by 1950 the annual appropriation was still a rather slender
Q
£780 million. This was only £88 million more than in 1948.
In fact the increase was largely consumed by rising prices and
routine maintenance which had fallen behind during post-war
demobilization. This was hardly enough to indicate any serious
alarm on the part of the Government. Despite the threatening
international environment domestic economic and welfare programs
were still given priority over defense. Obviously Britain was
depending on America to buttress her sagging defenses.
However, the level of tension was not allowed to subside.
In August 1949 the Soviet Union exploded an atomic device, and
less than a year later the North Koreans drove south across the
thirty-eighth parallel. This event temporarily destroyed the
West's confidence in the United States Strategic Air Command's
ability to deter the Soviet Union from committing overt military
aggression. "Consequently, it precipitated the first - and only -
serious attempt to create the forces which the military had
prescribed for withstanding a Soviet attack in Europe. Great
Britain was quick to pledge support to the United Nations and
immediately offered troops and ships. Any further thought of
reducing the armed forces disappeared. Under pressure from the
United States the Labor Government undertook substantial remobil-
ization. On July 26, 1950 the House of Commons voted an addi-
tional £100 million for immediate defense needs. Both the
United States and Great Britain were seriously concerned that
Korea might be only one step in a larger design. Winston
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Churchill warned Great Britain in Cromwellian terms of the
Soviet danger and emphasized that the major threat lay in
Western Europe. On July 30 the Prime Minister announced the
Government's intention of undertaking large scale rearmament.
This was followed on August 3 "by a detailed program which called
for expenditure of £3 #4-00 million over the next three years.
By the end of August this figure was increased to £3,600 million.
In November 1950 the Chinese entered the Korean conflict.
The United States responded with a program which more than
doubled her military strength and quadrupled her defense ex-
penditure within three years. The NATO nations accelerated
their efforts to build a credible military counter in Western
Europe to the might of the Soviet Union. In January 1951 the
British Defense White Paper was addressed to the crisis created
by the Korean War. It stressed the "urgent need to strengthen
n1
1
the defenses of the free world and outlined an expanded
program of "as much as £4,700 million" in armaments over the
1951-54 period. This was more than double the previous rate
of expenditure although still less than half of the wartime
rate. Nevertheless, it was a heavy commitment for Great Britain
and was officially characterized as the "biggest the United
Kingdom could undertake without going over to a wartime economy.
"
C. M. Woodhouse summarized the Government's hopes as follows:
The intention was to meet the cost out of Income without
running into debt abroad or reducing the level of invest-
ment. The expansion of defense production required a
check on civilian demand and a switch in the engineering
industries, which would inevitably reduce their exports.
Some controls that had been relaxed would have to be
reimposed. There would have to be a system of allocation
of raw materials and a limitation on supplies to the home market
and on civil building. But there would be no overriding
priority for defense in all cases at the expense of
exports. The sacrifices called for were considered
bearable. In-
still these measures proved too strong for many Laborites.
Three members of the Party led by Aneurin Bevan ^ resigned from
the Government on the ground that this program would force a
continuation of tight controls and a cut in social services.
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Certainly the projected military-program aggravated Britain's chronic
economic difficulties. Rearmament in Europe and in the United
States caused a steep rise in the price of imported raw materials
in relation to a slower rise in the price of manufactured exports.
This adverse trend in Britain's terms of trade accentuated the
"balance of. payments difficulties. As Bevan had predicted the
Government was forced to tighten controls, increase income and
purchase taxes, and ration raw materials. In addition, the
shift to defense production caused industrial dislocation, and
it was several months before the re-distribution of manpower,
17
materials and machine tools could be worked out. As a result
funds allocated to many critical items, such as aircraft and
tanks, were underspent for the first two years. That there were
serious political hazards associated with rearmament was illus-
trated by the Labor Party's defeat at the polls in October 1951.
The new Conservative Government immediately began to
reassess the ambitious military program. Despite tighter con-
trols Great Britain in 1951 suffered a deficit of £403 million
In its balance of payments. In March 1952 Mr. Churchill informed
the House that even with some $300 million in American aid it
1 fi
was necessary to reduce and stretch out armaments expenditures.
He predicted that the Labor Party's rearmament program if carried
to fulfillment would now cost £5,100 million and insisted that
1 Q
policy be "governed by realities." These required more
emphasis on exports and less on defense. His concern was widely
shared. The Financial Times voiced the growing opinion that it
was no longer a matter of defense competing with "the national
standard of living, but with national solvency." As a result
the anticipated defense budget was reduced £120 million and the
Government announced that the total program would be stretched
out over a four or five year period. In December 1952 further
cuts were initiated in order to protect the balance of payments.
The progressive increases which Mr. Attlee's original rearma-
ment plans envisioned never took place. The defense budget rose
sharply up to 1954 and then tapered off as a result of Mr.




These steps and changes in the prices of imports served
to better Great Britain's position markedly. Both 1953 and 1954
witnessed improvement in the economy's international accounts,
and by the latter year the Government managed to discontinue
rationing and many controls. Nevertheless, there was no move
to intensify rearmament. The absolute cost of defense continued
to rise slightly, but expressed as a percentage of the ^ross
National Product it had declined from a high of 11.3$ in 1952
to 9*3^ in 1956. Moreover, the Government no longer rated the
Russian threat as dangerous as at the peak of the Korean crisis.
Even on assuming office in December 1951 Prime Minister Churchill
declared that the threat of a major war "has become more
unlikely." Thenceforth the Government began to think of
defense in terms of the "long pull" rather than early major
war. The Conservatives turned their attention to strengthening
the nation's financial position and to eliminating the onerous
controls which had been in effect since 1939, longer than in
any other Western country.
Nevertheless, the generally high level of defense
expenditures undertaken in 1951 was maintained up through 1956.
In comparison with most other states 9% of the Gross National
22Product was a most impressive level. After the lean years of
the late forties the Korean rearmament effort was a welcome relief
to the hard pressed Services, and set the tone of British defense
policy until Mr. Sandys' famous White Paper of 1957» It pulled
the British military establishment out of its post-war doldrums
and thrust it into the atomic era.
Military Emphasis
It should be clear from the preceding review that the
years following the Korean War were important ones for the
British Services, because of the increased stress placed upon
armaments. However, before investigating the Navy's specific
part in all this, it is desirable to examine Great Britain's
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general military response to the Soviet threat. Not only are
the resources available to the Navy limited by economic and
political parameters, but also by the shares of the total
military budget that go to the Army and Royal Air Force. The
Navy was by no means slated to play the pre-eminent peacetime
role in the military establishment that it had in pre-war days,
and it was during the period 194-9-56 that the Navy's fortunes
relative to the other Services reached their post-war nadir.
Institution of NATO signified the end of a British
dominated balance-of-power system in Europe and marked Britain's
official recognition that, in its reduced circumstances, it must
rely on the United States. An important aspect of this evolution
was the continuing peacetime commitment of British troops to the
Continent. This was a sharp break from traditional defense
doctrine, and one which is still viewed with some misgivings
today. •* Actually the commitment to Europe was perhaps less
a deliberate choice than a series of relatively isolated decisions
whose cumulative effect served to place, seemingly on a permanent
,24basis, British forces in Europe, After the Armistice of 19^5,
Great Britain left troops in Europe to perform occupation duties,
and sizeable units vrere still there when the first overtures
were made toward collective security. Although the British sent
a token force to Korea, their major interest was in strengthening
Europe's defenses.
The outbreak of the Korean V/ar transformed NATO from a
multi-lateral guaranty pact into a genuine effort to redress
the military balance on the Continent. In September 1950 the
North Atlantic Council explicitly adopted a strategy of "defend-
..OR
ing Europe as far eastward as possible; and agreed to establish
"an integrated force under centralized command. " In early 1951
SHAPE was formed, and in April it assumed control of the forces
assigned by member nations. British experts were convinced that
continued large-scale American involvement was essential if
Europe wa3 to be made secure and at the same time was to effect
economic recovery. Most British officials believed that the
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commitment of British troops to the Continent was necessary
not only to bolster its defenses, but to tie the United States
to NATO by demonstrating that an American military contribution
27
would be matched by Europe.
Again both military and political considerations were
intertwined. At the first meeting of the NATO Council after
the outbreak of Korea the United States had proposed the use
of German troops in the defense of Western Europe. Despite
strong anti-German sentiment it was clear that some kind of
German participation was necessary if the Allied Command was
to be effective militarily. In May 1952 the European Defense
Community Treaty was signed, providing for a German contri-
bution of twelve divisions to an international army corps under
the overall control of the Supreme Allied Command. After two
years of negotiation and controversy France refused to ratify
the Treaty and EDO collapsed. NAT0 f s stock temporarily plunged.
In a remarkable display of diplomatic skill, the British
Government quickly contrived an entirely new scheme - We stern
European Union - which was acceptable to the Germans and gave
the French the guarantees that they required to permit German
rearmament. To achieve the final result the Churchill Govern-
ment contracted to station in Europe for fifty years a ground
force of four divisions with supporting air power. Anthony
Eden describes this decision as inspired by the British interest
"in bringing in the Germans and French together and keeping
the Americans in Europe.
In 1954 this commitment did not appear to the British
to be unmanageable. They anticipated gradual reduction of
their overseas requirements. Troops deployed around the world
could become available for NATO. However, this hope proved
illusory. Despite the fact that their overseas base system was
beginning to disappear the need for troops did not diminish
greatly. The guerilla war in Malaya proved particularly burden-
some and wasn't concluded until 1957. Civil unrest broke out
in Kenya in 1952 and absorbed British forces until that country
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received its independence. In 1955 the four year war in Cyprus
began. All of these episodes pinned down British soldiers.
In addition the Government assumed that atomic weapons
and the policy of strategic deterrence which was slowly taking
shape would free troops from the overseas areas. This hope was
voiced in the 1954 White Paper which expressed confidence that
the "deterrent":
. . . should have an increasing effect upon the cold
war by making less likely such adventures on the part
of the Communist world a3 their aggression in Korea.
This should be of benefit to us by enabling us to
reduce the great dispersal of effort which the existing
international tension has hitherto imposed upon us. 30
This, of course, proved to be a miscalculation. "A strategic
retaliatory capability, besides being slow in creation, was
irrelevant to the internal security problems normal to the
overseas areas. "^ NATO and Britain's other overseas commit-
ments both required troops and were thus competitors for
manpower.
As a result the Government was committed to the largest
peacetime Army in its history and one that consumed a heavy
share of the defense budget throughout the 1950's. In 1951
the Army' 3 share of the total military appropriation was about
38% and in 1956 had decreased only to 33$. This restricted
severely the funds allotted to the Admiralty, and, in consequence,
the Navy's capabilities.
Coupled with this departure from traditional British
doctrine were some technical developments which likewise had
a profound impact on military policy. In 194-9 the Soviet Union
tested an atomic bomb, and it was soon clear that fission weapons
were being rapidly integrated into Russia's armed forces. This
could not fail to have significant implications for insular
Britain. This development came as somewhat of a shock to
British scientists who had predicted that the Russians would
require several more years to produce such a device. The immed-




Britain's atomic energy program. In 1952 Great Britain followed
with her own atomic explosion at Monte Bello.
The study has already described the close relationship
between air power and atomic energy and these events likewise
turned the Government's attention to modernizing the Royal Air
Force. Starting in 194-9 Fighter Command had begun to receive
jets and by 1951 its forces were doubled. That same year
Canberra jet bombers commenced coming into service. The onset
of Korea added further impetus to this effort, and the Minister
of Defense declared in the House of Commons that "air strength
has priority in our defense system, and it is my resolve to
ii
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ensure that it is developed with all possible speed. ^ This
sentiment was to strike the keynote of British defense policy
for the next decade.
Once the decision had been made to produce an atomic
bomb there was little question that Britain would develop a
strategic atomic capability. Goldberg says that the "sheer
momentum of the great scientific effort alone' * would have
assured this outcome, however, there were a number of other
incentives more compelling. The original political goal of
assuring Great Britain a special tie with the United States and
a voice at the council table of great powers would hardly have
been realized without a credible delivery capability. The
Services were in unanimous agreement that fission weapons were
a necessary component of modern military power. Even more
important , in 1 952 when the Churchill Government was beginning
to wrestle with Britain's incompatible military and economic
requirements it appeared that atomic bombs might offer a cheaper
form of defense than attempting to develop a large variety of
forces to meet every contingency in kind.
In the early part of that year the British Chiefs of
Staff were requested by the Prime Minister to conduct a thorough
review of the armed forces and the strategic situation with a
view toward working out a cheaper and more effective way of
meeting the Soviet threat. The CSC secluded themselves for
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several weeks, and "drew up an overall review of defense
resulting in a policy centered on nuclear deterrence."^ In
essence they concluded that atomic weapons offered the most
feasible means for the West to counter the tremendous manpower
advantage of the Soviets for the least money. The appeal of
such a policy was irresistible to a government beset with
economic problems. In early 1953 Churchill announced in the
House that
:
As a result of the Government's strategic review, the
types and quantities of weapons and ammunition to be
produced have been more precisely related to the kind
of wars which we might have to fight in various parts
of the world. This has enabled us to make considerable
economies in many directions. 35
Thus was laid the foundation for the deterrent policy which
Great Britain pursues today.
Both the Army and Navy concurred that the accumulation
of a nuclear stockpile was essential and that atomic weapons
and their delivery systems should receive priority for the
next few years. The First Sea Lord had the Admiralty's support
in this decision. However, it should be recalled that at this
time Britain had not tested its first weapon, had not begun to
produce bombs, nor had any experience with what this would
involve. There seems to be no doubt that when the Navy's
leaders approved this policy, they did not realize its full
36implications. The bills for bombs and bombers were just
beginning to come in. Conventional forces were still considered
important and the role of neither the Army nor Navy was under
assault. It was impossible to foresee the immensity of the
effort which such a program would require or the effect it
would have on conventional weapons. It is eminently fair to
say that the Admiralty had no intention of ascribing to the
deterrent the overriding priority which the Government subse-
quently awarded it. Nevertheless it should be clearly understood
that the Navy never opposed the concept of deterrence and partic-
ipated as well as concurred in its original formulation.
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This decision was translated into policy by assigning
priority to the building of a strategic bomber force. Although
the Government did not publicly adopt deterrence as policy until
1954 a number of previous steps indicated that the decision had
been made earlier. In 1952 Prime Minister Churchill elevated
the Canberra and Valiant bombers into his famous "super priority"
category, and by February 1953 they were joined by the Victor and
37Vulcan bombers. At the same time fighter production was cut
back reflecting the recognition that effective air defense of
the United Kingdom by fighters against atomic attack would soon
be infeasible. By 1953 aircraft production accounted "for a
-ZQ
little over half of the total production programm of the
armed forces. The 1954 White Paper announced that delivery of
39
atomic weapons to the forces had begun-^ and formally declared:
The primary deterrent, however, remains the atomic bomb
and the ability of the highly organized and trained
United States strategic air power to use it. From our
past experience and current knowledge we have a sig-
nificant contribution to make both to the technical
and to the tactical development of strategic air power.
We intend as soon as possible to build up in the Royal
Air Force a force of modern bombers capable of using
the atomic weapons to the fullest effect. 40
This same statement spelled out what this meant in more
practical terms, "With all these considerations in mind the
Government have concluded that a gradual change should be
brought about in the direction and balance of our defense effort.
Still greater emphasis will have to be placed on the Royal Air
«41Force because of the need to build up a strategic bomber force.
This policy was reinforced by the introduction of thermo-nuclear
weapons. The 1955 Defense Statement noted this development and
heralded the Government's decision to proceed with the manu-
facture of fusion bombs. While not disowning the need for con-
ventional weapons the Statement further stressed the horrors of
a major nuclear war and asserted that the threat of "overwhelming
nuclear retaliation" was the "surest guarantee" against it. The
Statement concluded that the nation in its allocation of resources
"must assign even higher priority to the deterrent, that is to
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say the production of nuclear weapons, and the means of their
delivery." Perhaps belatedly by U. S. standards, but never-
theless relentlessly, official faith in deterrence was shoulder-
ing its way to the forefront, and the shadow of nuclear war was
beginning to dominate all defense policy.
This philosophy was reflected in hardware and statistics.
By 1956 some Valiant bomber squadrons had entered service, and
the next generation of V-bombers were already in production.
The Air Council's cherished vision of a modern strategic strik-
ing force v/as rapidly becoming a reality. In 19^9 the RAF was
receiving some 27.3$ of the total defense estimates. By 1955
the "Junior Service" had surpassed both the Army and Navy and
its share of the defense budget had risen to 35$. This figure
didn't include the 9% allotted to the Ministry of Supply of
which the lion's share was devoted to deferring research and
development costs of land-based aircraft. Although deterrence
was not to reach its apogee until Mr. Sandys' famous 1957 White
Paper enthroned it as the predominant theme of British defense,,
it played a critical role during the "NATO to Suez" period. It
was during this era that the foundations of the strategic bomber
force were laid and that the RAF was ascending to a position of
ascendancy in the defense helrarchy. The airmen in light blue
had a modern, consistent and convincing strategical doctrine
which dominated the military stage and placed them in an ex-
cellent position to compete in the political arena. As a result
nuclear deterrence became one of the major parameters limiting
the Navy's expansion and progress. Inevitably this was to push
the Fleet into the background and restrict the resources avail-
able to it. The Admiralty was still searching for a viable role
in the atomic era and had no strategic rationale which could
match the Air Force's. Nevertheless, it was the Navy's experi-
ence during this most difficult period which eventually led the
Sea Lords to face up to the post-war realities and hammer out a




The preceding section investigated the general
international, economic and military parameters within which
the Royal Navy had to work from 1<H9 to 1956. The focus now
shifts to the responses of the Admiralty during this period and
to the specific part envisaged for the Fleet in the total
defense establishment.
Although the Soviet Union's immense land forces
appeared to represent the primary threat to the Western nations,
her military preparations likewise provided the Royal Navy with
its first tangible post-war challenge. Reliable information on
Russian naval development and policy was not available for a
number of years after World War II. However, in late 1948,
disturbing rumors began to filter out of the Baltic. These
described an intensive submarine construction program taking
place in the U.S.S.R. By 1949 both the United States and
Great Britain were convinced that the Soviet Union was building
a huge underwater fleet. On July 26, 1950 in a defense debate
in the House of Commons the Minister of Defense confirmed that
Russia possessed a large number of modern seagoing submarines
4-4
and was building more. By 195? estimates were as high as
4-6
350 to 400 boats. J Although Russia s surface forces were
still considered relatively weak and obsolete it was well known
that the naval element of Russia's land-based Air Force was
being modernized and supplied with strike aircraft configured
46to attack ships. By 1950 it was estimated that the naval
branch had over 2,000 planes at its command. Over the next few
years both the submarine fleet and naval air force were to grow
in quantity and quality. These developments were to have con-
siderable influence on the character of British sea power in
the 1950's.
Although Russia did not possess a formidable battle
fleet such as the Germans, Italians and Japanese had in World
War II, its. naval preparations were conceived to present a grave
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threat to Britain's sea lanes and to call for a positive
response on the part of the Royal Navy. In some respects the
Soviet preparations were rather comforting to the Admiralty.
Here at last was a real-life enemy to give direction and pur-
pose to Britain's naval planners. These measures required
no radical adjustment in the Admiralty's strategic thinking.
Obviously Russian submarines and naval aircraft were being
built for only one purpose - to attack and disrupt oceanic
communications. This was distinctly a naval challenge and one
which could only be adequately met at sea. In addition Russia's
naval program had to be predicated on the assumptions that any
war between the East and West would be protracted, that con-
ventional weapons would play an important part, and that the
high seas would be one of the vital battlegrounds much the
same as in World War II. This supported the very arguments
which the Sea Lords had been employing to rationalize their
post-war forces.
Manifestly, the new-found enemy would dictate some
adjustments in the British Navy's equipment. There was no
question that the Russian threat would accelerate the trend
away from large units - such as battleships and cruisers -
toward, destroyers and frigates which were better suited to
anti-submarine work. However, these changes were not wholly
unwelcome. Ever since the armistice in 1945 the Royal Navy
had been forced to operate under adverse economic restrictions.
This handicap promised to continue. Anti-submarine ships by
the very nature of their mission are small and relatively
inexpensive. Such ships do not present the design problems
of larger units, lend themselves to mass production, and can
be completed in a matter of months. In essence the Navy could
get more ships more quickly for a given amount of money. This
was bound to appeal to an Admiralty that was seriously con-
cerned about the very numbers of men-of-war in the Fleet and
the cost of every single unit.
At the same time the Russian threat left ample room
for the aircraft carrier - the Royal Navy's modern capital ship.
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During World War II the British employed carriers extensively
in ASW work both as escorts for convoys and in hunter-killer
47groups. ' Concurrently seaborne aircraft would be needed to
protect convoys and warships from Russian air attack. Conse-
quently the Soviet menace was to lend purpose and direction to
the Fleet Air Arm also. All in all there was little resistance
within the Navy to this new emphasis on anti-submarine and
anti-air warfare.
Perhaps even more important than any of these factors
was the general effect on the public and politicians of the
Russian submarine menace. It was the type of threat which the
British are most able to appreciate. In two great conflicts
German submarines had blockaded the United Kingdom and in each
instance had come close to paralyzing the British economy.
Anti-submarine warfare is a mission which, since 1917, the public
instinctively associates with the Fleet although the Navy shares
this task with the RAF 1 3 Coastal Command. This was the very
type of threat which the advocates of sea power had been citing
as the basic rationale for the Royal Navy. Inevitably the rise
of the Soviet submarine force was to furnish valuable support
to the Navy's drive for a share of the nation's resources.
Although Russia's land forces and later the deterrent were to
receive priority attention throughout this period, there was
never any serious questioning of the gravity of the Russian
naval threat. This was to assure the Admiralty a share of the
defense budget.
As early as 1949 the Navy reacted to this new challenge.
Funds were still restricted, and the personnel rundown was con-
tinuing t but the Admiralty gradually reoriented its research
and training effort to meet the problems associated with the
Soviet menace. "The development program for a high performance
general purpose carrier borne aircraft (the GR 17/45) was
revised to provide instead a plane configured for anti-submarine
warfare. " An effort was initiated to bring the reserve fleet
to a higher state of readiness, so that its smaller escort type

1 18
ships could be activated more quickly. The scientific effort
although modest was "directed to counter-measures against the
various forms of high-speed attack which may be expected in
the future" - jet aircraft, missiles, and especially "sub-
marines with underwater speed, submerged endurance and capac-
ity for deep diving greater than anything we have experienced
in the past." In the weapons field work was begun on




It was soon clear to the Navy 8 3 scientists and
designers that a serious response to Russia's submarines would
require escorts with higher speeds, and more sophisticated
equipment. The Russians were developing submarines with un-
precedented capabilities when submerged. The Royal Navy's
World War II destroyers and frigates were incapable of counter-
ing underwater craft with streamlined shapes, snorkels, high
capacity batteries, and submerged speeds -exceeding fifteen
knots. These characteristics required vessels especially con-
figured for ASW work against modern submarines. Due to the
lack of funds the first effort to transfer these desires into
hardware were modest. Two new ASW frigates were laid down in
1950. That same year a long term plan to convert World War II
51destroyers to ASW frigates was announced, and two were taken
in hand immediately. The intention was to gain valuable
experience in making such conversions before a crisis developed.
Vice-Admiral Denny, the Third Sea Lord, in a public address
given on June 14, 1950 indicated the tenor of the Navy's thinking
when he declared that apart from aircraft carriers the Navy's
future ship construction would be confined to "light fast ships
with immense hitting power whose prime adversary is the fast
,,52
submarine. Y This was the general picture when the Korean War
broke out.
'
The Western reaction to Korea has already been described.
The NATO powers were convinced that Russia was prepared to
resort to force to achieve its ends and that war might come to
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Europe within the next three years. The Government's general
reaction has already been described. In 1950 Britain had no
atomic weapons and did not expect to have any for at least two
years. All three of the British Services' were still relying
heavily on World War II equipment and were thinking largely
in terms of conventional weapons and protracted general war.
Anticipating a possible conflict in the near future they had
little choice but to expand their existing forces, modernize
the equipment then in use, and put into hurried production
whatever developments were on the drawing board at the time.
Certainly the Government would have preferred to delay until
atomic weapons should be available, and their implications for
doctrine and equipment estimated. But the situation was con-
sidered urgent. The main objective was immediate rearmament
to counter Russia's huge conventional establishment. This
posture set the tone for the Korean rearmament program.
From the outset there was no question that the Navy
would receive a large share of the increased appropriation,
although it was likewise obvious that both the Army and Air
Force would still take precedence. Prime Minister Attlee in
launching the rearmament effort made it clear that NATO's sea
communications were a prime concern of Great Britain and that
the Royal Navy in conjunction with other Allied navies would
be required to counter the submarine and mining threats from
Russia. J The Navy Estimates in 1951 sounded the key for the
next three years by announcing that the Admiralty's whole
building program was largely "directed against the underwater
menace. -' In 1952 the First Lord in his policy statement in
the Navy Estimates again emphasized that the Navy was con-
centrating on "anti-submarine and minesweeping forces and . .
expansion of naval aviation. ' ^ Following the change of
Government in 1951 » Churchill made it clear that the Conservatives
contemplated little change. He emphasized that the Royal Navy
has "three main threats to meet, each of which if successful,
would affect our survival in this island - the mine, the U-boat,
and the threat from the air. "^
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In order to meet these goals the Navy's appropriations
were sharply .increased and reached a peak of £367 million in
1954. 5^ This was almost double the 1950 figure. By 1952 the
annual funds for production and research alone exceeded the
comparable figure in 1950 by two and a half times. Although
the Royal Navy was still the junior Service in terms of abso-
lute funds its relative share of the defense budget remained
throughout this period between 23$ and 24$. Obviously the
traditional rationale of protecting the nation's sea lanes
still pulled political support, even if it was no longer the
pre-eminent military demand on the nation's resources.
In order to translate the Government's goals into
reality the Admiralty inaugurated a series of modernization
and new construction programs. In line with Admiral Denny's
prediction, the major emphasis i^as placed on ASW ships. Work
on eight "Daring class" destroyers, which had been discontinued
in 194-5* was accelerated in order to give the Fleet a new class
of destroyer for escorting carriers and cruisers. They were
configured with the latest anti-submarine equipment and at the
time were the most advanced destroyers in the world. An ex-
tensive modernization program was launched for the purpose of*
converting World War II destroyers from both the active and
reserve fleets to ASW frigates configured to deal with modern
submarines. These ships would be capable of escorting either
convoys or highspeed warships. The Admiralty was relying on
the so uwo programs to mi-ot its immodicto ^oodo and to bring
the active forces to a high state of readiness in a short time.
To supplement this effort a long-range new construction
program for smaller and more specialized frigates was commenced.
The World War II frigates were too slow to deal with modern
submarines, and even modernization could not cure this basic
defect. In line with its policy of preparing for a protracted
general war, the Admiralty desperately desired new escorts
which could furnish merchant convoys protection against sub-
marines and aircraft. The planners hoped to settle on just a
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few classes of standard design which would be relatively cheap
and would lend themselves to mass production in the event of
all-out war. In 1951 work commenced on four new classes of
frigates. The "Whitby" and "Blackwood" classes were configured
for ASW duties, the "Leopard" class as 'anti-aircraft escorts
for convoys, and the ' "Salisbury" class to furnish aircraft
direction facilities for fighters protecting convoys. The
numbers which could be built would depend on costs and the
available funds neither of which could b© firmly estimated in
1 951 • However, it was the Admiralty* s intention to lay heavy
emphasis on this program and progressively to replace all of
its World War II frigates in both the active and reserve fleets.
This was an ambitious scheme designed to give the Royal Navy a
meaningful capability for protecting Britain's supply lines.
However, it was a long-range program based on a number of
imponderables, and only time would tell if it was practical.
At the same time a Herculean effort was initiated to
improve the nation's mine defenses. Britain's World War II
minesweepers were all practically either unfit for service or
obsolete. The Russian's have a reputation for being addicted
to mine warfare, and the British Government, recalling the
Germans' highly successful efforts in World War II, were partic-
ularly apprehensive about the country's mine defenses. This
was one area where NATO would be of little help. The United
States had let its minesweeping capability lapse and had no
intention of expending large sums in this area. This was to be
a strictly national problem. As a consequence the Admiralty
inaugurated a large building program for minesi^eepers which was
to continue until 1956 and to give Great Britain the most
effective minesweeping capability in the world.
Just as the surface forces were concentrating on the
Russian menace, the Fleet Air Arm likewise turned its attention
to this new threat. Due to the lack of funds and the Govern-
ment ' s Ten Year Rule there had been very little aircraft pro-
duction since the war, and the Fleet's aircraft Just as the
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RAF's were sadly obsolete. Starting in 1 951 approximately
one-third of the naval appropriation was diverted to aviation. ^
The major emphasis was placed on anti-submarine warfare. Carrier
borne aircraft had proved themselves remarkably adept at killing
submarines in World War II, and the Admiralty intended to make
full use of this capability. As early as 1 9^9 some effort had
been devoted to developing a specially configured ASW plane.
This program was accelerated and the Sea Lords managed to get
this project placed in the super priority category. The
goal was to deliver this plane to the Fleet at the earliest date.
In addition steps were taken to reequip the Fleet Air
Arm with its first jet fighters - the "Sea Hawk", a day fighter,
and the "Sea Venom," an all weather interceptor. Due to the
urgency of the rearmament effort these aircraft were rushed
into production before their development program was completed,
and their performance was sub-par as compared to the most
modern aircraft of that date. This did not seem too serious
since the Admiralty contemplated using them only for defense
of the Fleet and convoys, not against land targets. Neverthe-
less, they were considered interim models and a long-range
program was put in hand to develop more modern replacements.
One of the Admiralty's most pressing aviation problems
was carriers. The five in the active fleet were all of World
War II vintage and not configured to handle the higher per-
formance planes which were soon to come off the production
line. Korea gave the Admiralty the opportunity it needed to
repair this deficiency. Today the Admiralty is often criticized
for not having built more new carriers during this period. How-
ever, in the context of the times the Navy's decision to mod-
ernize instead seems rather wise. Carriers are by far the
most expensive item in the Fleet's inventory, and a government
that is hard pressed financially inevitably views them with
suspicion. However, the onset of hostilities in Korea found
the Royal Navy in a unique position. Some six carriers com-
menced in World War II were still on the ways in 1950. While
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funds had been throttled down to a trickle the Admiralty had
nevertheless carried them as "under construction" and kept them
alive as going projects. As a practical political matter it
was much easier to "accelerate" than "commence" construction.
Even though the original plans had to be altered to incorporate
the latest developments this scheme was still considerably
63
cheaper than building new ones.
Militarily the Admiralty was more than satisfied. It
had an immediate requirement for modern carriers and this was
certainly the most expedient scheme for obtaining them. With
the appropriate modifications these ships could be configured
to handle any seaborne aircraft In sight at that time. Perhaps
most important, the Sea Lords were fully aware that they could
get more ships for the investment this way. As a result the
Korean rearmament program allowed the Admiralty to commence an
extensive carrier modernization program which was to assure the
post-war Fleet up-to-date carriers for over a decade.
Thus the Russian naval forces had a profound impact on
the Royal Navy in the early 1950's. The Russian submarine fleet
and naval air arm began to assume alarming proportions just at
the time that the Korean War made increased funds available, and
as a result they literally prescribed the direction which the
bulk of the Royal Navy's shipbuilding and research programs were
to take at a very critical time. The appearance of a tangible
threat to Britain's sea lanes made it possible for the Admiralty
to obtain a sizeable share of the nation's scarce resources.
In turn this relieved a great deal of the obsolescence that had
been fast developing in the Fleet since World War II. Both
modernization and building programs would furnish the seagoing
forces with up-to-date ships and planes which could better
operate in a modern environment.
On the other hand these developments did little to
advance the Admiralty's thinking beyond World War II. Unques-
tionably the preparations inspired by the Russian naval threat
were designed to fight a conventional general war which would
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last for several years. The Admiralty envisioned vast convoys
plying the ocean protected by an umbrella of carrier planes and
a ring of escorts flying the White Ensign. These arrangements
largely ignored atomic weapons and Britain's economic adver-
sities. Thus the trend inspired by the Russian naval threat
served to tie the Admiralty to its traditional strategy which
was due to become increasingly irrelevant in the coming years.
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The Fleet's Offensive Capabilities
Throughout the early 1 950 ' s when the Admiralty was
concentrating heavily on anti-submarine warfare there was some
talk both in lay and professional circles of the Royal Navy
becoming solely a "small ship" navy. Proponents of this scheme
argued that Great Britain no longer had the resources to support
a large variety of different type ships and that the Royal Navy
should specialize in an area where it could make the most profit-
able contribution to the Allied effort. With this as a starting
point they further reasoned that Britain's shipbuilding industry
and naval skills could best be employed by concentrating on
fast anti-submarine destroyers and frigates. It was in this
field that the naval threat to the United Kingdom was the
greatest, and NATO's- seagoing forces the weakest. By devoting
all of Britain's naval efforts to this one area it would pre-
sumably be possible to produce great numbers of escorts of high
quality. In turn it would be up to the United States Navy to
furnish any large ships which might be required such as cruisers,
carriers, and logistics ships.
This argument, at least on paper, had some limited
appeal in a nation constantly plagued with economic problems,
and at various times it was discussed informally by the Sea
Lords. However, "the Board of Admiralty never seriously enter-
tained it." ^ For centuries the Royal Navy had been a "big
ship" navy with strong traditions of independence, and the Sea
Lords were not about to reject that heritage just because money
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was scarce for a few years. They insisted that the country
needed and could support a large well balanced Fleet to guard
its sea communications. The carrier was now the new capital
ship, and the Admiralty was convinced that it had an important
part to play in meeting the Russian submarine and air threat.
Its ASW planes would assist the smaller ships in hunting for
submarines, and its fighters would furnish overhead protection
to warships and convoys alike.
However, these were essentially defensive missions.
The Navy's leaders were not ready to reject completely the
offensive tradition handed down from the past. Perhaps the
days of the "battle line" were gone, but many nations, includ-
ing the Soviet Union, still possessed powerful cruisers and
large numbers of destroyers. There was no assurance that they
would not present a future threat and in that event would have
to be dealt with in traditional style. The Navy's overlords
had given up the battleship, but they were determined that
the aircraft carrier should assume its offensive responsibilities.
For this reason, it was felt that along with fighters
and aircraft the Fleet Air Arm should always have a number of
first line strike aircraft configured to attack other naval
forces. This capability combined with the Fleet's small
cruiser force was intended to provide sufficient offensive
power to meet any surface threat. Consequently, the Admiralty's
aircraft replacement program in 195"i included the world's first
operational turbo-prop airplane, the "Wyvern. " It was to be
a naval strike aircraft configured to carry either bombs or
torpedoes. Like the other naval planes ordered in 1951 » it had
been in the design stage since 19^5» but due to the lack of
funds had never been fully proved. Nevertheless, it was put
into production. Because of technical difficulties it didn't
reach the Fleet until late 1955. By that time it was obsolete
as compared to other strike aircraft. Nevertheless, it demon-
strated the Admiralty's intention to retain a significant
offensive capability in the Fleet.
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Despite the effort which was to go into modernizing the
Fleet Air Arm it was clear that there had been no change in the
Admiralty's basic reasoning with regard to the employment of
aircraft. Fighters were still to be used to furnish the Fleet
air cover and strike aircraft to attack surface ships. The
same rationale which dominated the Sea Lords 1 thinking in the
late 1940's inspired the aircraft procurement program during
the rearmament period. However, these same years were to
witness the Fleet Air Arm expand its horizons, and in turn the
Admiralty modify its views considerably on the potential of
carrier borne aircraft. This alteration in attitude was to
have important implications for the future and therefore
deserves attention. It was more an evolution than a distinct
change and was brought about by an accumulation of pressures.
The first important event in this chain was further
naval construction on the part of the Russians. This time it
was surface ships. It was manifest by the outbreak of the
Korean War that the Soviets intended to build more than sub-
marines, and that they were modernizing their surface forces
as well. In 1951 the "Sverdlov," the first of a new class of
powerful cruisers, was launched, and it was to be followed by
a succession of sister ships.
Although the exact number planned was not known, it
was obvious that the Russian Navy intended eventually to renew
its cruiser fleet of about twenty vessels. As the emphasis
in the Royal Navy shifted to anti-submarine destroyers and
frigates, the Board of Admiralty became increasingly concerned
over this new surface threat. Its cruiser force was rapidly
deteriorating, and with its demise the Fleet would lose its
heavy guns. Operating on a tight budget the Sea Lords pre-
ferred to put their limited production funds available for
large ships into aircraft carriers. They were a great deal
more versatile than cruisers and appealed to the political




By late 1951 the nation's atomic research program was
reaching a critical stage and scientists were looking forward
to the first test explosion. With a view to the future,
building was commenced on a huge weapons research establishment
at Aldermaston. The Admiralty began to take a deeper interest
in the program and stationed a team of observers at this estab-
lishment to follow the program at first hand. It soon became
obvious that in a few years atomic weapons would not be as
expensive as originally estimated. This meant that it would
be possible to produce them in quantity and perhaps a number
of different types. Also there was some evidence that American
scientists had succeeded in miniaturizing the components of
atomic weapons. ' These developments would soon make tactical
A-bombs possible. It would be several years before such weapons
would be in production, but they appeared to the Admiralty to be
the answer to the Sverdlov cruiser. Somewhere around 1951 the
Admiralty submitted a requirement and received approval for a
tactical nuclear bomb to be delivered by carrier borne aircraft -
to counter the Russian cruiser threat which was developing.
Surprisingly enough this move generated little
opposition from the Royal Air Force. Although Britain had yet
to explode its first atomic device, the RAF was already looking
to the day of small atomic weapons and was trying to develop
support for such a project. The Navy's request added weight
to its case, and the two Services merged their request into a
"joint" requirement for a small tactical A-bomb. At the same
time, however, the Air Council insisted that strategic weapons
must have first priority. The Admiralty readily agreed. This
move served to dilute any Air Force opposition, and on the
Navy's part it was merely a recognition of the "facts of life."
This marked the Navy's rather inauspicious entry into the
nuclear weapons field.
The next step followed logically. The Fleet needed a
truly modern plane to carry this prospective weapon. The
Admiralty soon laid down a requirement for an advanced jet to
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carry an atomic weapon. Again there was relatively little
opposition voiced. The Admiralty insisted that it required
such an aircraft in order to protect the .Fleet from the Sverdlov
cruiser. This was in agreement with the Navy*s current doctrine
and was in line with the Royal Air Force's official view of the
function of naval aircraft. The RAF's advocates conceded that
carrier planes could be used profitably to furnish the Fleet
and convoys air cover outside the range of land-based air.
The Navy's initial requirement did not appear to threaten any
of the Air Force's basic tenets, and was put in train with
little fanfare. Nevertheless, this was a turning point in
the Navy's post-war thinking. Although this aircraft was
originally designed to counter surface warships, it would be a
versatile weapon system and would lend itself to a variety of
missions.
Concurrently with these developments the Fleet Air Arm
was in action in Korea and this experience was to have a pro-
found effect on the Navy's doctrinal thinking. It served to
impress upon many British naval officers the aircraft carrier's
considerable capability as an offensive weapons-system and to
excite the ambitions of the Fleet's aviators.
On June 15» 1950 when the North Korean Army stormed
across the 38th parallel the British Fleet was "1 ,000 miles
from its base doing a summer cruise." y Within five days it
was in action off the North Korean coast. This force consisted
of a light fleet carrier, two cruisers, two destroyers and
three frigates - "a force numerically as strong as that which
the United States Fleet could muster on the spot.' By
July 5 these ships had been reinforced to make a total of
seventeen British and Commonwealth units which were in action
within a fortnight.
Although the Royal Navy's contribution did not match
the U. S. Navy's in Korea, it nevertheless played a prominent
part in the naval activities of that war and acquitted itself
with distinction. Throughout the course of hostilities Kis
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Majesty's ships operated in close cooperation with the U. S.
Fleet and furnished support to the armies ashore. Its tasks
were varied, demanding, and covered practically the whole
spectrum of naval responsibilities.
However, its principal long term contribution in Korea
was the carrier borne air support which it furnished to the
troops operating ashore. A total of four light fleet carriers
71
served at one time or another in Korean waters. ' They flew
off nearly 30,000 operational sorties, fired 16,000 rockets,
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and dropped some A, 000 bombs. When hostilities commenced
sixty sorties in one day was considered exceptional for a light
fleet carrier. The Korean carriers very quickly pushed this
figure higher. H. M. S. Ocean in a remarkable display of skill
averaged 76.3 sorties a day for 79 days running. The highest
73for one day was 123* H. M. S. Theseus established an out-
standing safety record when it completed more than 1 ,300
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consecutive deck landings without a failure or an accident.'
These are only samples of the Fleet Air Arm's performance in
Korea, but they are indicative of the high standards which
characterized British operations.
While the operational record on the scene was a proud
one, the overall picture was not so bright. As already noted
the Admiralty had not envisioned troop support or inter-
diction work as one of the Fleet Air Arm's missions. Carriers
arriving off Korea had very little training in this type of
flying, nor did they have aircraft configured for such operations.
There was not a jet in an operational squadron of the Fleet Air
Arm. Korean carriers were employing Sea Furies for fighter
protection and Firefly II 's as strike aircraft. The Sea Fury
had a top speed of 400 knots and was grossly inferior to the
Russian Mia 15's used by the North Koreans. The Firefly II was
a general' purpose attack aircraft configured to carry anti-ship
bombs and torpedoes. By definition it v/as slower and less
maneuverable than the Sea Fury. Both planes were outmatched by
the opposition and neither was designed for support work ashore.
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Improvisation on the scene made up for many of these
deficiencies. Initially the MIG-'s (when they chose to fight)
took a rather startling toll. One carrier lost 25^ of its
aircraft in the first few days of action. 1 -^ However, by
adopting close formation tactics and hugging the ground
carrier aircraft were often able to baffle their opponents.
More important they selected tactical targets which were not
normally protected by MIG's. Ground support techniques were
learned on the scene through trial and error. It is a remark-
able tribute to the skill and innovative abilities of the Royal
Navy's pilots that they were able to make such a substantial
contribution to the Korean effort with so little preparation
and inferior aircraft. On the other hand the Korean War high-
lighted one of the most glaring voids in the Admiralty's
planning. World War II had demonstrated the value of fast
mobile carriers supporting certain types of land operations,
yet the Royal Navy had failed to exploit these lessons.
Operations in Korea were bound to enhance the status
of the Fleet Air Arm and influence the course of Admiralty
policy and thinking. Many naval officers, both senior and
junior, having witnessed or studied the Fleet's experience in
the Far Ea st were convinced that the Navy's Air Arm could
play a larger role in Britain's defense strategy than had pre-
viously been assigned to it, and they were determined to improve
its offensive capabilities. They believed that the Navy's
planes should be capable of attacking either land or maritime
targets and of penetrating to a target against land-based
fighter opposition.
Not all the elements in the Royal Navy agreed on this
philosophy and the next few years were to generate some dissension
over what the exact place of the carrier was. Nevertheless, by
the end of the Korean War the aviation branch had come into its
own. Many of the more responsible staff billets were held by
officers who had flown in combat in World War II. There were
several flag officers who were career aviators, and one of them
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was sitting on the Board of Admiralty. It was inevitable that
they would have an increasingly strong voice in the affairs of
the Navy, and Korea gave them an impressive precedent to cite
which confirmed their arguments for a stronger and offensively
minded Fleet Air Arm.
The Navy's major problem in Korea had been Communist
fighter opposition, mainly the Russian MIG- 15. Returning pilots
took up the cause for faster and better fighters. It was clear
that the jets due to come into service shortly (Sea Hawk and
Sea Venom) would be obsolete by Russian standards almost as
soon as they entered the Fleet. As a result new life was in-
jected into the Navy's fighter development program, and the
aviation branch of the Naval Staff turned its attention to the
next generation of aircraft. Two planes - the "Scimitar," a
day fighter, and the "Sea Vixen," an all weather Interceptor -
had been in development for sometime, but due to lack of money
work had been discontinued. These projects were revived. The
staff requirements were altered in order to make them competi-
tive with land-based aircraft and capable of penetrating enemy
territory. In addition the Scimitar was to be given an inter-
diction and ground support capability, and the Admiralty managed
to get it tagged as a super priority project. Unfortunately,
it would be some time before these aircraft would see service,
but this was a noteworthy step. The Admiralty was beginning
to think in terms of fighters which could penetrate enemy terri-
tory, and at the same time hit tactical targets and support
troops.
Korea had also indicated the need for a modern strike
plane capable of carrying a large bomb load. In that war the
Fleet Air Arm had depended on an aircraft which was originally
designed as a torpedo bomber, the Firefly. It had proved
grossly inadequate for hitting tactical targets ashore. The
Wyvern which was the scheduled replacement, due to come in
service around 1955> although configured to carry conventional
bombs as well as torpedoes did not offer the improved performance
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that was needed, nor was it capable of carrying the heavy
payloads required for ground support. However, the picture
was not so bleak. The atomic strike aircraft which the Admiralty
was developing promised to be fully capable of meeting these
needs. In essence the measures being taken to meet the Sverdlov
cruiser promised to correct one of the most serious deficiencies
spotlighted by Korea. It is interesting to note that many
aviators began to look on the forthcoming "Buccaneer" more as
an aircraft for striking land targets than as a counter to the
Sverdlov cruiser. Nevertheless, it would be some time before
the official justification for the Buccaneer was altered to
expand its mission. Certainly, there was no reason to offend
the Air Force unnecessarily.
Though the Sverdlov cruiser and the Korean War were
instrumental in laying the groundwork for expanding the Fleet
Air Arm's role, it was the Royal Navy's connection with NATO
which exercised the largest influence in this regard. In 1951
as part of the allied military effort an American Admiral was
appointed Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic with his headquarters
at Norfolk, Virginia. He was to head a staff composed of naval
officers from the North Atlantic countries, and his major task
was to draw up plans for the collective employment of the naval
forces available to NATO in the event of a general war. It was
no secret that one of the British Government's major political
objectives was to bind the United States to the defense of
Europe irrevocably, and the Royal Navy enthusiastically sup-
ported this reasoning. By 1951 the Admiralty had come to the
conclusion that in the event of a global war it must act in
conjunction with the United States Navy if it was to succeed
in securing Britain's sea communications.
Predictably the bulk of ships available to SACLANT were
to be American, and the U. S. Navy's strategic thinking inevit-
ably dominated NATO's naval planning. Starting in 19^6 the
U. S. Navy had gone to great efforts to develop a nuclear cap-
ability and after a series of clashes with the U. S. Air Force
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had succeeded In wresting for itself a share In America's
77
strategic deterrent. To this end the American Navy was build-
ing a number of huge attack carriers of over 60,000 tons and
planned to complement them with multi-engine bombers capable of
carrying large nuclear weapons. U. S. Navy planners envisioned
. carrier borne aircraft sharing in the initial strategic attacks
in a nuclear war, and strategic targets were eventually allotted
to the U. S. carriers. In the Atlantic the U. S. Second Fleet
based at Norfolk, Virginia was assigned to SACLANT. This gave
him a potent group of attack carriers around which to organize
his forces. In the event of a general war this Fleet was to be
redesignated as the NATO Strike Fleet. In accord with U. S.
thinking it was to deploy to the North Atlantic and attack tar-
gets in Northern Russia with atomic bombs and hopefully to support
landings in the Scandinavian area. This mission was given number
78
one priority among SACLANT's responsibilities.
The U. S. Navy which was concerned over its ovrn position
in America's defense heirarchy was encouraging the Admiralty to
commit its carriers to NATO Strike Fleet. Admirals in Washington
believed that this would strengthen their hand in the fight to
retain a share in the delivery of the American deterrent. The
British naval leaders for their part did not wish to antagonize
the U. S. Navy. On the contrary they were willing to go to great
lengths to cement the tie between the two Services, however, the
Board of Admiralty had never conceived of the Fleet as a vehicle
for delivering atomic weapons against land targets. For reasons
discussed earlier the general sentiment among the Sea Lords was
that the Fleet was not suited to such a task. In fact they had
never visualized the Royal Navy taking part in the initial nuclear
exchange at all. Even those officers who believed that the Fleet
should have an offensive capability against land targets were
thinking in conventional terms and had in mind actions such as
Korea.
However, there were some compelling reasons for
accepting the -American suggestion. Such a role would give the
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Fleet another important general war mission and further
emphasize its importance. Korea had illustrated that naval
aircraft could be effective against land targets and could
furnish effective support to troops. In addition, the Admiralty-
was making a vigorous effort to improve the calibre of its air-
craft and expected in the not too distant future to have a
tactical nuclear capability. This would vastly improve the
Fleet's ability to participate in the type of operations SACLANT
was planning. By 1952 this scheme did not appear as impractical
as it had originally.
From the political standpoint participation in SACLANT's
plans would give the Navy further justification for its carriers
and strengthen its case with the political overlords. "There
is no question that claims for funds to support NATO activities
v/ere less closely examined by the Government than those with
strictly national purposes in mind."'^ From a purely parochial
point of view this would facilitate 'obtaining new aircraft and
creating the offensive capability toward which the Admiralty
was beginning to work. By 1 952 the G-overnment had already
begun to cut back the rearmament program, and there was every
prospect that further reductions would be made in the future.
Also attention was beginning to shift to nuclear weapons, and
many naval officers reached the conclusion, with some justifi-
cation, that conventional arms would have to defer to nuclear
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weapons.
All these considerations encouraged the Admiralty to
accept the American doctrine and to pledge its carriers to the
Strike Fleet. This doctrine was publicly referred to in the
1955 Statement on Defense and the First Lord's White Paper
of that year, but the commitment was made much earlier. Start-
ing in 1952 the Fleet participated in NATO exercises with the
Strike Fleet. However, it should be emphasized that there was
considerable disagreement within the Navy over this strategy.
A large number of officers didn't believe that this was the
proper function of the Fleet, and they insisted that in an

135
atonic war an attacking naval force in close to an enemy coast
would be a high priority target and too vulnerable. ^ Never-
theless, for both military and political reasons the Board of
Admiralty chose to cooperate with SACLANI.
liven then the Admiralty never intended to acquire a
strategic capability in the technical sense of the term.
Britain's naval planes were not capable of carrying strategic
atomic weapons nor were its carriers big enough to handle
large bombers. The shortage of funds precluded any extensive
program for constructing larger aircraft carriers. The
„L_ir:.Lt;- \.„_ _uill convinced «L: cl.e Royal Navy should not
compete with the RAP's V-bombers. Instead it intended to
develop a tactical nuclear capability. This was much more in
line with the Navy's previous strategical thinking and re-
quired very little change in terms of equipment. Practically,
this meant that the Fleet Air Arm would eventually furnish
aircraft to the Strike Fleet which could carry small atomic
weapons and attack targets a few hundred miles from the parent
carrier. These' planes would strike specific tactical targets
near the coast where accuracy would be a requirement. They
were in no sense expected to penetrate the Russian heartland
or to participate in saturation bombing. The intention was
to give the NATO Strike Fleet an additional tactical atomic
capability, which would complement its overall offensive power.
From the perspective of the Royal Navy the NATO commit-
ment enlarged the Fleet's general war role and promised to
exploit the full potential of its carriers. During this period
Russia was consuming the bulk of the Government's attention.
The military effort was largely directed toward countering the
Soviet threat. The Admiralty hoped by this move to play a
larger part in those preparations and to insure the future of
the Fleet's carriers and offensive capability. It should be
remembered that at the time (1951 to 1954) the Royal Navy had
no atomic weapons. It would be a number of years before the
Fleet had even an effective conventional strike capability.
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Nevertheless, this commitment signified a marked change in the
Board of Admiralty's attitude. It was envisioning naval forces
carrying the war to enemy territory, attacking land targets, and
supporting troops.
It was this facet of the Admiralty's ambitions which
revived the RAF-Navy tension that had characterized the pre-
war years and was to mark the next decade. The Air Ministry
had never quarrelled with the Navy's basic mission of securing
the sea lanes and of escorting convoys. On the other hand it
insisted that the Fleet should have a very limited air role.
RAF leaders did not dispute the need for carriers to offer
air protection to convoys and to perform ASW missions at long
distances from land. However, they contended that all other
functions could and should be handled by land-based aircraft.
It was inevitable that they would object to the direction Navy
planning was taking.
The argument over the proper role of aircraft carriers
had continued for years. It was pushed with special vigour in
the professional journals in the middle 'fifties. It was brought
to the general public's attention "oj a spirited exchange of
correspondence in The Times in 1955. For several weeks a
number of very prestigious retired Air Marshal and Admirals
Qh.
carried on this verbal contest in the public press. As with
most such duels in the British press, it had little effect on
Government policy, nor did it change the minds of the pro-
fessionals on either side. On the other hand it accurately
reflected the controversy which was gradually mounting behind
Whitehall's public facade. As the Navy's plans became manifest,
RAF leaders began to complain about the money which was being
diverted to the carrier program and carrier aircraft, particu-
larly those designed for strike missions. Their arguments
reflected their own approach to problems of defense. They in-
sisted that the prime need was for strategic bombers and that
carrier aircraft did not lend themselves to this role and were
therefore a poor investment. For several reasons, however, the
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RAF attacks in the early 1 950 ' s had little effect on the Navy
carrier program.
First, the Air Force's semantic offensive was remark-
ably restrained. This can generally "be attributed to its rising
affluence and pre-eminence in 'the post-Korean period. It was
solely responsible for the deterrent and this was the priority
program in Britain's defense establishment. Certainly at that
point the Navy did not appear to threaten this position even
though the Fleet Air Arm was presumably infringing on the
RAF's area of operations. Actually, the Air Force was having
difficulty spending the money at its disposal. The Aircraft
industry could not handle the sudden demands which the Korean
rearmament had placed upon it. This made it doubtful that
diverting money from the Navy to the RAF would accelerate the
modernization of the Air Force.
Secondly, and perhaps even more important the very
nature of the defense organization before 1957 made it diffi-
cult for one Service to exert more than general pressure on
another. The Minister of Defense was more a coordinator than
a decision-maker. He possessed a very small staff and had to
depend on the individual ministries to supply him with infor-
mation and advice. It was certainly not customary for him to
tamper with the detailed programs of each Service, and it was
questionable whether he had the practical facilities to do so
wisely. He could set the overall guidelines and control the
broad allocation of resources, but he relied heavily on the
Chiefs of Staff for recommendations on any major changes in the
makeup or functions of the services. In this body the Navy had
as strong a voice as the Air Force. As a result, policies were
often compromises rather than logically coherent schemes, but
irrespective of that it made it difficult for the Air Force to
impose its unilateral views on the Fleet. Within the general
parameters set by the Government and the Chiefs of Staff




In essence this meant that up until 1957 the Navy was
never forced to justify its carriers or the way it intended to
employ them - except in very general terms. It was hampered
by its small total budget, but within that limitation it had
a relatively free hand to develop the Fleet Air Arm as it saw
fit - despite the Air Force's harassing and sniping. However,
that argument resurrected the pre-war tension between the
Admiralty and Air Council - of which more later. '
The Fruits of Rearmament
The Korean rearmament pr^ enabled the defense
establishment to tackle the obsolescence that was fast over-
taking its equipment. However, the picture was by no means all
bright, for it was during this same period that the post-war
technical and economic fact s-of-life were brought home forcibly
to the military Services.
In the case of the Navy this can perhaps best be
illustrated by briefly reviewing the Fleet's physical status.
By 1955 the modernization and building programs initiated
during the Korean crisis were having marked effects on the
go
Fleet. Five new or modernized carriers all capable of hand-
ling a new generation of aircraft had been commissioned, and one
89
more was still in progress. Eight new destroyers had joined
the seagoing forces, and practically all the remaining destroyers
which had been commissioned between 194-5 and 19^7 had been
refitted with improved ASW weapon systems. Some twenty-seven
World War II "tin cans" had been completely modernized and con-
verted to ASW frigates to assist with the escort of either the
Fleet or seaborne trade. Although no new frigates had joined
the active fleet as yet, some twenty-three were in various
stages of construction and were to start phasing into the active
forces in 1956. Six more were to be laid down in the coming
year. The bulk of the active submarine force had been modernized
to include snorkels and high capacity batteries. Some 175 new
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minesweepers had been completed allowing replacement of the
active forces' entire complement and the strengthening of the
reserve fleet in this category. These ships were configured
to clear both contact and magnetic mines. Some modernizing
had been accomplished on several cruisers, and a decision
taken in 1954- to complete three new cruisers which had been
on the stocks since 194-5.
All the modernized ships and those building included
extensive improvements allowing them to operate in the vicinity
of atomic detonations and radiation. Considerable advances had
been made in anti-submarine weaponry and sonar. Also the Royal
Navy had made remarkable progress in propulsion machinery. An
ambitious research program was being prosecuted to develop a
sophisticated anti-aircraft shipborne guided missile (Seaslug)
for combatting air attack. As to aircraft the Fleet Air Arm
now had all jets in its fighter squadrons, and the interim
replacement program initiated in 1951 had been practically
completed. The Gannet A3W plane was as good as any in the
world at that time. In many ways the British Fleet of 1956
was a rejuvenated force, and the next few years promised the
addition of a host of new frigates. The Fleet was composed
90
of the following units:
Operational Status Trials and Training
Aircraft Carriers 3 Aircraft Carriers (2 employed
9 Gruisers in non-flying training)
29 Destroyers 1 Cruiser
28 Frigates 1 Guided Weapons Trial Ship
44 Submarines 3 Destroyers
37 Minesweepers 24 Frigates
7 Landing Vessels 28 Minesweepers
1 Tank Landing Ship
Reserve Fleet Construction
6 Aircraft Carriers 2 Aircraft Carriers
.12 Gruisers 3 Cruisers
5 Battleships 23 Frigates
44 Destroyers 2 Submarines





However, the picture was not as bright as it
superficially appears. The Navy's share of the total budget
had been consistently smaller than either the Army or the Royal
Air Force. Despite the greater amounts of money going into the
naval program since 1951* it was still not sufficient. In this
regard it should be recalled that the original Korean rearma-
ment program was cut back twice in 1952. Also the years of
drought from 1946 to 1950 had severely intensified the problem
of obsolescence. On top of this, cost of equipment rose sharply
and steadily along with salaries. Modern ships as a result of
their complexity were much more elaborate and costly than their
predecessors. Before the ucr a destroyer cost some £400,000;
by 1955 it was £3,000,000. Pre-war submarines cost £300,000;
new ones in 1957 were approximately £2,500,000. "The two
Ark Royals most clearly demonstrate how naval costs have rocket-
ed. The 1937 Ark Royal cost £3,216,000 and the 1955 one
c
£21 ,500,000. UJ In addition modern ships require approximately
20% larger crews than their pre-war counterparts. Yet the
personnel of the Royal Navy was steadily decreased from 1952 to
,-92
195o. All this resulted in a marked reduction in the size of
93 tthe active fleet. . Many of the Navy s ships were newer, faster,
more powerful and better able to operate in a modern wartime
environment, but in 1955 the number of operational units at sea
was slightly less than in 1948. The reserve fleet had likewise
shrunk, particularly in the carrier and cruiser categories. In
addition, there had been no modernization of the reserve fleet
with the exception of the minesweepers and a few frigates.
An increasingly larger share of the naval estimates had
94to be allocated to research. ' Experimental and aircraft pro-
grams proved a great deal more expensive and complex than antic-
ipated. The Admiralty had hoped to commence a class of guided
missile cruisers or destroyers to follow the Daring class
destroyer, but the Seaslug missile program was delayed due
to development problems and was not available by 1956. Conse-
quently construction had heen postponed until the missile showed
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better prospects. This meant that the Fleet itfould have to
stretch the life of its destroyers for several years longer
than planned. Costs on this missile project greatly exceeded
the original estimates because of the scientists' unfamlliarity
with missile development problems. ^ The frigate replacement
program which commenced in 1951 showed promise of giving the
Fleet an extremely high calibre escort. However, by 1955 it
was clear that the most the Navy could expect was to replace
the frigates in the active forces, and it would take several
more years before that could be accomplished.
As to aircraft both research and procurement schedules
were delayed and stretched out over longer periods than orig-
inally anticipated. This was necessary because of various
factors, not the least of which was the priority awarded to
96the RAF's V-bomber force. As a result it would be several
years before the Fleet could get a fighter or strike aircraft
capable of meeting its land-based counterparts. The Fleet
still did not have atomic weapons despite the number of
references to them in White Papers. ' Also it did not have
an aircraft capable of carrying them in 1955* although it was
proceeding towards such a capability. Altogether, rapidly
advancing technology had worked some encouraging changes in
the Fleet's equipment, but economic conditions still severely
restricted its size and strength. Moreover, there was no sign
of relief. The Navy had passed through a period of emergency
in which vastly increased funds were made available. But there
was still insufficient money to create the type of Fleet which
the Admiralty desired, and as the emergency subsided so had the
funds. It was manifest that the Royal Navy would never again
dispose the resources of old, even in a crisis.
These developments presented a rather depressing picture
for the Admiralty in 1955. The Soviet Navy had taken giant
strides. The Communists continued to expand their submarine
force to some four hundred boats. Two hundred and fifty of
these were long range ocean-going types equipped with snorkels
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and high capacity batteries capable of ranging every oc~an of
99
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the world. This is an even more imposing number when it is
realized that in 1939 Germany had only 57 operational U-boats.
The formidable Soviet force was supported by 18 modern Sverdlov
type cruisers, over 120 first-line destroyers, and a shore-based
naval air force of 2,500 planes. The Soviets still had no
carriers, but in the early ?950's the Russian Fleet had become
the second largest in the world, and its ability to threaten
Great Britain's supply lines had become most Imposing.
The Royal Navy had by no means increased in the same
proportion. Technically it had done reasonably well in keeping
abreast of naval developments. British sonar, escort ships,
and anti-submarine tactics were among the world's foremost.
The major problem was one of quantity, not quality. When pitted
against a determined submarine effort 29 destroyers and 28 frigates
were too few. Of course the Admiralty counted heavily on the
reserve fleet in an emergency, but most of these ships had not
been modernized. They were rapidly becoming obsolete - with
the possible exception of the minesweepers which would play
little part in a war on the high seas.
Of course British naval planning envisioned a joint
Allied effort in protecting the sea lanes. This brightened
the picture, but it still left a great deal to be desired. It
is true that the other NATO navies had numerous escort type
ships which would go into the common defense effort. Again,
the bulk of these were in mothballs and would have to be acti-
vated and modernized. In a general war each of these countries
would have had its own defense problems, and each participant
would multiply the communication lines to be protected. Of all
the NATO countries Great Britain relied the most heavily on
1 02
sea transport and would be expected to contribute accordingly.
Yet, it seemed to be falling further behind in the numbers that
it could provide to NATO, despite the Korean rearmament effort.
As to the Royal Navy's other general war duties its
plans had yet to be implemented. Despite the ambitious claims
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of Defense White Papers, the Fleet, at least in 1956, could
not contribute to the NATO Strike Fleet's nuclear capability.
It had no atomic weapons, and its only responsibility in a
nuclear exchange would have been survival. This is typical of
White Papers - they talk in terms of the present about devices
and weapons that are still in the planning or development stage.
The Royal Navy had made a sincere effort to prepare its forces
to survive a nuclear war - within the funds available. Prac-
tically all of its ships were configured for defense against
atomic radiation and fall-out. The four operational carriers
were highly mobile and capable of keeping the seas for extended
periods. Each of these embarked about sixty aircraft divided
equally between fighters (also capable of carrying light bombs
and rockets), strike aircraft (light bombers), and anti-sub-
marine planes. They unquestionably represented an attack
potential with a relatively good probability of surviving an
_c oiiilau^lvi.
Nevertheless, the inferior quality of the British planes
when compared to th^ir -: :i ccuiv^rparts., ai.c z.:j L~g_: of
tactical atomic weapons would have reduced the Fleet's ability
to defend itself and to project its power against shore targets
even in a conventional conflict. The Admiralty's basic thinking
had changed and strenuous efforts were being made to correct
these deficiencies, but it would be several years before the
Fleet's offensive capabilities would fit it for the general war
role which the Admiralty envisioned for it. Again it should be
recognized that in any general war, British strategy envisioned
a union of the U. S. and Royal Navies. By 1955 the U. S. Sixth
Fleet had expanded considerably and was the largest naval force
1 "5in the Mediterranean. •* The English fleet was well suited to
complement America* s task forces. Although generally smaller
Britain's carriers and other units were equal to U. S. ships in
all other respects. This was one of the general war virtues of
the Royal Navy in 1956. It would have added materially to
NATO's naval strength. However, the Fleet's very size raised
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the question of whether this was a convincing rationale for its
existence. At full strength the British carriers could have put
a maximum of some two hundred fighter and strike planes into the
air, and it was unlikely that the Fleet would beat full strength
at the right time and place.
In essence, lack of funds had prevented the Royal Navy
from keeping pace with the naval threat arising in the East and
from implementing its own plans. Quite clearly, the official
view exaggerated the Royal Navy r s capabilities. Although its
efficiency ana quality had improved, the international military
configuration had changed so drastically that its ability to
fight a general war had seriously declined. It was still able
to make a significant contribution to the free world's navies
in a general war. However, in the mid-1 950' s still other de-
velopments were casting a shadow on the need for sea power and
threatening the Admiralty's basic strategical rationale for the
Fleet. It is appropriate now to look at these developments.
Thermo-Nuclear Weapons and Disillusionment
In the first few years after the war atomic v/eapons
exercised little influence on British defense thinking. However,
once the atomic energy program came to fruition and Britain
had exploded its own fission weapon, one discovers an increasing
sense of ambivalence about defense policy and an ever widening
rift between the views of the three Services. The fundamental
question at issue was: What type of war must the nation be
prepared to fight?
It is a relatively simple matter to piece together the
Admiralty's view. The Navy's Korean program emphasized anti-
submarine ships, weapons, and planes. These were intended not
only to protect the Fleet but also, just as important, cargo
convoys. In addition an impressive effort was devoted to mine
countermeasures and minesweepers. All these measures were tied
to a vision of a global war with Russia where conventional
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weapons would play a major role. This image justified a large
reserve fleet and a reserve personnel organization which could
be employed in times of crisis to expand the active forces and
to provide a continuous stream of replacements for battle
casualties.
These measures meshed comfortably with NATO's naval
strategy. Although SACLANT planned to use atomic weapons to
hit centers of Soviet maritime power, his plans "depended on
the assumption that another Battle of the Atlantic would be
fought, the object of which would be to bring supplies from
North America across the ocean in order to support the armies
and air forces operating in Europe and to feed the people of
the countries engaged." """ It was further intended to utilize
the reserve fleets of the Allied countries to carry out this
task. Essentially all of NATO's preparations were aimed towards
a protracted war with the Soviet Union on the general pattern
of World War II.
In 1950 when the Korean crisis broke out the Navy's
thinking was by no means unique. Korea was generally inter-
preted to increase the prospects of a general war, and all
three Services were still wedded to conventional war concepts.
This was manifest in the rearmament period. The Army expanded
and modernized it's conventional weapons and continued to rely
on its World War II organization. In addition it still depended
on a large reserve organization to expand in emergencies and
large numbers were called up for Korea. Concurrently the Air
Force, although giving priority to its bomber program, embarked
on ~ massive expansion in which all commands received a share.
It also relied heavily on a reserve organization which was
intended to be employed in a long global war.
However, with the British atomic explosion at Monte
Bello and the gradual shift to deterrence initiated in 1952,
the Air Council began to revise its views on the nature of a
general war. The airmen contended that atomic weapons made a
long war unlikely, and that victory would be decided hy the
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atomic onslaught, not by conventional weapons. Consequently
1 05
the overwhelming emphasis should be placed on fission weapons.
Although all three Services had concurred in the decision to
build up an atomic stockpile and strategic bomber force, the
Navy and Army still gave little indication that they had lost
faith in conventional weapons or that they detected any marked
changes in the type of war to be prepared for. The Admiralty
was convinced that the Fleet could operate in an atomic environ-
ment, and fission weapons would not in themselves decide the war.
All the new British ships incorporated design features to im-
prove their protection against fall out, radiation and blast
effects. In addition the Admiralty's strategists "believed
strongly that improved air defenses and dispersion would counter
the bomb at sea. " Atomic weapons would complicate the problem
of keeping Britain's supply lines open, but they would not
eliminate the need for seaborne forces. In essence naval planners
still viewed the atomic bomb as a "bigger and better bomb.
"
It should be emphasized that this concept was not too
difficult to sell in Britain in the early 1950's - politicians
and laymen alike sincerely believed that a general war would
I 07follow this pattern. ' The British had little experience with
or direct knowledge of atomic bombs. The thermo-nuclear weapon
had not entered the arena as yet. There was a general feeling
that although the atomic bomb had changed the scale of warfare,
it had by no means eliminated the need for conventional forces.
It would be several years even after Monte Bello before the
armed forces would have fission bombs in any numbers, and
radical changes should be made only as increased experience
dictated them. Despite the factual information available on
the devastating effects of such weapons, the patterns of V/orld
War II were deeply etched in British memories, and statesmen
were slow to grasp the full implications of these new develop-
ments. Moreover, the great bulk of Britain's forces were con-
ventional and it would have taken extraordinary courage and
confidence, even rashness, for the leadership to discard them
without a clearer picture of what the future held.
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Actually the Services had reached a compromise, or more
accurately a negotiated truce, among themselves in order to
reconcile their differing views. About the same time the
Chiefs of Staff Committee gave its approval to building up the
strategic bomber force, it adopted the concept of "broken-
backed" warfare. This theory postulated that in the event of
global 'war, if no decisive results were reached during the
initial nuclear exchange, "hostilities would decline in inten-
sity, though perhaps. less so at sea than elsewhere, and a
period of broken-backed warfare would follow, during which the
opposing sides would seek to recover their strength, carrying
on the struggle in the meantime as best they might."
Obviously this reasoning justified the retention of 'conventional
forces which could survive an atomic onslaught. In many ways
this was a straightforward deal to allow all three Services to
pursue their separate policies. This doctrine, although
formulated much earlier, did not appear publicly as official
policy until the 1954' Defense White Paper.
It is difficult to determine where the broken-backed
110
concept originated, but it is rather clear that the Navy had
the deepest Interest in it of the three Services. Obviously
deterrence offered the RAF a prime role. At the same time the
nation* s commitment to NATO in Europe, and cold war actions
such as lialaya and Palestine assured the Army a significant
place in the defense establishment. On the other hand the
Navy's major preparations had beer, made primarily to counter
the Russian submarine force in a conventional global war. If
this war was to be short then .the bulk of the Navy's efforts
were superfluous. The theory of broken-backed warfare ration-
alized and vindicated the Navy's preparations. Consequently,
the Admiralty throughout this period insisted that "deterrence"
must go hand in hand with broken-backed warfare.
However, the concept of broken-backed warfare was to
have a relatively short life, and it was never mentioned again
in a defense White Paper. This can be attributed to the

dramatic appearance of the hydrogen bomb. On November 1, 1952
the United States detonated a thermonuclear device at Eniwetok
atoll. Although this event was reported by witnesses, it was
not off .Lly confirmed for over a year. This history-making
experiment was followed "dj two R jian explosions in August 1953
and further American tests in March 1954 which precipitated the
ti 11 1famous Lucky Dragon incident. Although there was a great
deal of speculative information published on H-weapons it was
the summer of 1954 before the U. S. Government released an
official description of the stupendous area of destructive
blast, radiation, and fall out associated with thermonuclear
i to
detonations. ' ' This report dispelled all doubt as to the
comparative power of A-bombs and H-bombs. Thermo-nuclear
weapons were a quantum jump in destructive power. It was no
longer credible to talk as if nuclear weapons were just a
"bigger and better bomb"; the hydrogen bomb was a totally new
breed of monster which' required radically novel responses and
adjustments.
The revelations as to the unprecedented power of
thermo-nuclear weapons had a tremendous impact on the British
Government. Above all "it removed most of the remaining doubts
about the atomic revolution in warfare." D The British White
Paper on Defense in 1955 examined at great length the import of
hydrogen bombs and expressed the Government's decision to pro-
1 14
vide Britain with fusion weapons at the earliest possible date.
According to the document the brightest hope for peace lay with
Western nuclear superiority, and it committed Britain firmly
to a deterrent policy which would be pursued in conjunction with
the United States. The White Paper accelerated the Royal Air
Force's rise to ascendancy announcing that "increasing emphasis"
1 1 R
would be placed on the deterrent and strategic air power. p
Nevertheless, the Government was obviously uncertain
about the future of conventional forces. Just as it had done
when, introducing atomic bombs, it was deferring any radical
readjustments until its own hydrogen weapons were available, and
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the situation had developed further. This was clearly manifest
in the passage that solemnly declared "the development of
nuclear weapons does not mean that the 'use of naval and land
forces in a major war is now obsolete or outmoded. " It
went on to insist that the enemy would also have to be fought
at sea and on the ground in the traditional manner. Despite
these qualifying statements, however, the 1955 White Paper
opened a new era and heralded the beginning of a period of
deep and painful soul-searching within the British Navy.
Although it continued to present a brave and confident
countenance to the public the introduction of thermo-nuclear
weapons was to have a traumatic effect on the Royal Navy. This
new development literally threatened the Navy's most cherished
concepts, threw its strategical thinking into disarray, and
threatened its very survival. ' The root of the Admiralty's
discomfiture was the enormous destructive power of the hydro-
gen bomb, and the influence that it would have on the nature
of a global war. If it was employed in the early days of a
general war, as British strc .t that point seemed to
assume, there was little likelihood of a protracted conflict
or war of attrition. Perhaps large numbers of ships at sea
through dispersion, deception tactics, and passive defense
measures could survive the initial holocaust. But with Britain
and Europe razed, the likelihood of a long war would be remote
and, in turn, the need for convoys would disappear. Similarly,
super-bombs seemed to make mine warfare irrelevant. Mines
could hardly match hydrogen bombs for making a large port
unuseable. This struck at the very heart of the Royal Navy's
post-war doctrine. It had rested its strategic case on
Britain's reliance on exports and sea communications. Even if
the war continued and the Navy was required to keep the ocean
lanes open, the devastation of the initial exchange would make
it impossible to activate reserve fleet ships or to depend on
reserve personnel to step into the breach. In a general war
involving thermo-nuclear weapons the Fleet would have to fight
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with whatever was available and at sea before the first attack.
This reasoning undermined two of the principal pillars of naval
policy - the reserve fleet and the reserve personnel organization.
Thus far only the Fleet's defensive duties have been
mentioned. What 'effect would these radically new weapons have
on the offensive operations planned in conjunction with the
NATO Strike Fleet? A considerable number of the Royal Navy's
officers had been skeptical of this concept from the outset.
They contended that a large fleet had no business concentrating
in the early days of an atomic war and pushing in close to the
enemy's shore for the purpose of mounting strike operations.
It would be extremely vulnerable and invite destruction; the
damage it could inflict would not justify its losses. The
hydrogen bomb accentuated these arguments. Its astounding
radius of destruction threatened to make any kind of naval
concentration unduly hazardous and would, of course, severely
complicate the problem of air defense. The enemy did not have
to be accurate, he just had to drop his weapon in the vicinity
of the target. The Admiralty instituted a series of behind-
the-scenes studies to determine the effects of this new weapon
on the NATO strike strategy and "these all pointed to the de-
pressing conclusion that it was not viable if thermo-nuclear
1 1 ft
weapons were to be used against it with determination. " In
essence thermo-nuclear weapons threw a shadow over practically
all of the Royal Navy's basic concepts regarding the Fleet's
contribution to general war.
Obviously the great destructive power of thermo-nuclear
weapons added overwhelming weight to the Air Force's view of
the nature of a general war, and this implication t^as fully
appreciated outside the Navy. Both lay and professional mili-
tary men were digesting the implications of hydrogen weapons,
and many of them began questioning the general war rationale of
seagoing forces. Published articles both attacked and defended
110the need for a Fleet. There seemed to be little agreement
as to how the Navy could best be utilized or whether it should
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be employed at all In a general war. The most prestigious
British critic in this verbal battle was Field Marshal
Montgomery who in a speech before the Royal United Service
Institution in late 1954 predicted that the role of navies
would soon decline and that control of the seas would be exer-
i 20
cised by land-based air forces. From this date, it is
possible to detect a continuously rising concern among the
leadership for the Navy's future. This resulted in a campaign
to broaden its role and shore up its flagging future.
In many respects the Admiralty was hampered "oy the
very nature of its material problems. Ships that had commenced
building in 1951 were just coming into the Fleet in 1955, and
the physical character of these forces, at least for the immed-
iate future, was already determined. In turn, any new changes
would not be reflected at sea for several years. Nevertheless
the Sea Lords made strenuous efforts to update the Fleet's
public image and to tailor it to the demands of thermo-nuclear
war. Increasing emphasis was laid on the Admiralty's future
plans to exploit missiles, nuclear power, supersonic aircraft
and to modernize the Fleet's organizational arrangements. The
First Lord's Statement accompanying the Navy Estimates for 1955
was specifically devoted to the Royal Navy's role in the nuclear
age. It insisted that "the latest inventions may affect mari-
time warfare and alter the character of the forces needed to
wage it, but they do not diminish the need for navies." He
further envisioned "battle groups of carriers, guided missile
ships, and their escorts" to replace the fleets of past wars
and explained that they would act as mobile offensive forces
which could be quickly deployed wherever required. This expan-
sive document went on to describe in some detail the Admiralty's
plans to produce a new class of guided missile ships to support
its carriers, and modern aircraft to enhance the Fleet's offen-
sive capability. It also dealt briefly with the Royal Navy's
contribution to the NATO Strike Fleet, and mention was made of
the Fleet Air Arm's plans to develop an atomic capability.
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From that point on no opportunity was missed to emphasize that
the Fleet would soon have atomic bombs at sea. Within the year
the Admiralty had accelerated work on nuclear propulsion and
placed orders for the first two ships in a new class of
general purpose frigates which could operate with the Fleet
as well as merchant convoys.
In August 1955 the Admiralty initiated a comprehensive
review of its ships, weapons and equipment for the purpose of
determining how the Fleet could be given "maximum operational
efficiency under the new strategic conditions." ** Hopefully,
this study was to recommend ways in which the Navy could
better use the resources at its command and get more in terms
of effective equipment for its investment. One of the guide-
lines laid down for this study was that in a future general
war involving nuclear weapons the Fleet could not depend on
shore-based men and equipment after the nuclear exchange.
This study was supervised by a group of senior officers known
as the "VTay Ahead" committee and covered a wide range of sub-
jects, 'its recommendations were to be vitally important in
streamlining the naval establishment and ushering it into this
new era. The 1956 Navy Estimates reflected some of the more
important conclusions. It announced the Admiralty's intention
to reduce the size of the reserve fleet materially and to
retain only those ships "which can be rearmed quickly for
service on the outbreak of war. In addition it announced
the Admiralty's intention to cut back its dockyards and support
activities drastically. It also expressed confidence that this
could be done without injuring the Fleet's readiness. This
would presumably release funds which could be devoted to equip-
ment and projects more directly related to the Navy's operational
tasks. The Way Ahead committee also reached the conclusion that
the Royal Navy Reserve and Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve must be
cut back markedly. Again it reasoned that only personnel who
could be called to the colors at short notice with little train-
ing would be useful under the conditions of nuclear war. It
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further stressed that the Navy should begin to modernize its
afloat logistics support in order to make the Fleet more
independent of shore bases. This was an important recommendation
with vital implications for the Fleet's future. All of these
suggestions were well received and in the next few years imple-
mented. Certainly these efforts showed an increased sensitive-
ness to the demands of nuclear war and a willingness to progress
with changing conditions.
However, as radical as some of these changes were, they
did not fully meet the basic problem confronting the Admiralty.
The 1954, 1955 and 1956 Navy estimates continued tenaciously to
stress the Royal Navy's primary responsibilities vis-a-vis the
Russian Fleet, protecting seaborne trade, and projecting
Britain's power on the seas in a global war. Despite the will-
ingness of the Sea Lords to make some alterations in material
and personnel policies they had not altered the Fleet's basic
capabilities. There was still no intention of the Fleet deliver-
ing strategic weapons and the atomic capability which was being
emphasized was solely Intended as a tactical one. Moreover, the
Admiralty had lost faith in SACLANT's plan to use the Strike
Fleet in the first few days of nuclear war, yet it remained
officially wedded to this strategy and stressed it in public
pronouncements. Although the Admiralty was deemphasizing the
reserve fleet and post-attack expansion in a nuclear war it's
spokesmen continued to stress the Russian submarine threat.
Lack of funds accentuated the problem. By reducing the reserve
fleet the Admiralty was conceding that it must rely on active
ships, but it has already been noted how sparse these forces were.
Such inconsistency is characteristic of this whole period
and reflects the ambivalence which was wracking Navy strategists
behind-the-scenes. On one hand, the Admiralty was making pre-
parations to survive and operate in a thermo-nuclear environment;
on the other, it was planning to perform tasks that seemed to
have little relevance to a genuine nuclear bomb war. It was
becoming increasingly harder to envision an extended war at sea
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once a hydrogen exchange had taken place. Vice-Admiral G-retton
commenting on this period comments with great candor that:
Many naval officers often wondered, if the truth be known,
whether their airmen colleagues were not right and whether
the Admiralty's views were really reconcilable with reality.
. . . They played on, however, out of loyalty to their own
Service and also because of an instinct which they could
not support with sound logic that armies and navies were
- not out dated but were still essential for the security
and well being of the country. "^25
Although the Navy was seemingly convinced that it still
had a general war role, there were some signs that its thinking
was gradually shifting. In 1955 the Admiralty seems to have
inaugurated a vigorous campaign to remind the public that the
Fleet could fulfill a variety of roles. In a series of speeches
in 1955 the First Lord revived the Navy's Korean experience and
emphasized the carrier's suitability for such a role. In
addition he stressed the naval task force's potential for quel-
1 Pfi
ling brush fire wars, meeting civil unrest and showing the flag.
The 1955 Navy Estimates specifically recalled Korea where the
"sea and air power of the Royal Navy" was brought to bear "quickly
and effectively." It further listed 'one of the main functions of
the Fleet as the 'provision "of direct air support for operations
ashore and afloat in those areas where it cannot readily be
1 97
given by shore based aircraft." ' The 1956 Navy Estimates
continued to stress "how quickly and effectively the sea and
air power of the Royal Navy can be brought to bear in almost
any part of the world.
"
Slowly but surely under the pressures of technological
advance, tight funds, and inter-Service competition the Fleet's
strategical foundation was being shored up and widened. The
first references to the Navy's limited war importance had crept
on to the scene. At no time did the Navy's official statements
go into great detail, nor did they indicate that this might
possibly become the fundamental justification for the Fleet.
The Country's attention was still riveted on fusion weapons, and
the Admiralty still considered general war its primary concern.
It was manifest, however, that the Navy's leaders no longer
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considered the Fleet's general war functions sufficient in
themselves to keep the Navy firmly in the defense picture.
In concrete terms there was something. to be said for
this new trend in naval thinking. The one area in which the
Fleet was really capable of making a substantial contribution
in the middle 1950's was that of conventional limited war.
Korea had proved the Fleet Air Arm's ability to operate against
shore targets and in support of troops. Profiting from the
Korean experience the Board of Admiralty was making every
effort to maintain and improve these capabilities in the
succeeding years. Some of the specific steps taken have
already been mentioned. Naval officers believed strongly that
the Navy's mobility and flexibility were great advantages in
carrying out Britain's world-wide responsibilities. There is
no question that the Navy had never lost faith in its limited
war capability.
While the forces which the Royal Navy possessed looked
rather thin in regard to an East-West confrontation, they
possessed a more impressive potential when considered in terms
of a local action where only conventional weapons would be used.
The Fleet was perfectly capable of establishing control of the
sea in a specific area of limited size and of projecting its
air power over small areas of enemy territory. Unfortunately
many of the Admiralty's plans for increasing this capability had
yet to crystallize. For example both the Fleet Air Arm's fighter
and strike aircraft were lagging their land-based competitors.
In the same vein the Admiralty's preoccupation with general
war had led it to neglect seriously amphibious lift. A small
operational amphibious squadron had been formed in 1950 con-
sisting of some seven landing craft and moved to the
mediterranean. Its ships were slow and approaching obsoles-
cence, and as had been customary since the war "it was com-
pletely neglected by higher authorities. " * Nevertheless
there was considerable merit in the assertions that the Fleet
was ideal for meeting sudden brush fires and fighting limited
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wars. Certainly the Royal Navy of that day was a great deal
more suited for such a mission than it was for a general nuclear
war where the burden would presumably rest on strategic forces.
Just as the pressure of events was gradually forcing
the Admiralty to turn away from general war the Suez crisis
erupted, and the Fleet was required to mount a conventional
amphibious operation. This action was both to demonstrate the
Fleet's usefulness for such actions and to teach the Admiralty
some important lessons. Since this incident was to exert such
a strong influence on the Navy's role it should be briefly
examined.
Suez Crisis
From the conclusion of hostilities in Korea until the
Suez operations commenced the Royal Navy had not been in action.
Britain's overseas responsibilities had consumed a great deal
of the peacetime Fleet's fuel and energy, but generally these
operations had been showing the flag or providing logistic
support for deployed troops. The Army and Air Force both had
been actively engaged in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. All of
these actions had proved costly, vicious and protracted. But
they did make it clear that nationalist movements were beginning
to be a prime source of concern to the nation and that the British
would be withdrawing from many colonies much earlier than had
been anticipated. In the early 1950*s there were still ample
bases from which British troops could reach the troubled areas.
However, this situation was gradually changing, and as it did
the Government would be forced to adjust accordingly. The
Suez crisis brought these lessons home forcibly to the British,
and also reminded the Admiralty that its traditional overseas
responsibilities were still a vital part of its mission -
perhaps even the most important.
On July 26, 1956 President Nasser of Egypt nationalized
the Suez Canal and set in train a series of events which

157
culminated with the Anglo-Franco landing at Suez. The general
history of this period is well known, and it is only the
purpose of this study to trace those military events which
illuminate the Royal Navy's relationship to the crisis. The
British Cabinet was determined to reverse this decision and
examined the whole spectrum of alternatives open to it. If
at all possible it wished to act in league with its Allies and
to exhaust the resources of diplomacy before resorting to a
violent solution. Nevertheless, the services were alerted.
On July 30 both France and England began jointly preparing
"precautionary military measures. " J
Despite Egypt's small size and slender resources these
two countries discovered that their military position was a
disappointing one. A quick effective jab either at the canal
or Egypt would have been impossible. The Mediterranean Fleet
was less than a week away, but there was only one carrier avail-
able and its aircraft, mainly Seahawks and turboprop Wyverns,
were considered inferior to the Soviet Fighters, MIG 15's and
17's, possessed by Nasser's Air Force. Since Korea, the Fleet
Air Arm had been pressing hard for aircraft more capable of
competing with the Russian MIG, but their efforts had not
borne fruit by 1956. The two French carriers in the
Mediterranean had only propellor aircraft. The RAF had two
squadrons of Canberra bombers in the Middle East both based
in Arab countries which refused to allow Britain to use their
bases for an attack on Egypt. There were no long range fighters
stationed in the area, and it would take some ten days for them
to arrive and settle. The only base available which was free
of restrictions was Cyprus' some 500 miles from the scene.
Cyprus' airfields were not equipped to handle large operations.
Even more discouraging than these facts was the inability to
mount an invasion force. There were two battalions of army
parachutists, two Royal Marine Commandos, and eight infantry
battalions performing anti-terrorist duties in Cyprus. However,
their state of .readiness was hardly appropriate for this type
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of requirement. Colonel A. J. Barker in his book Suez The Seven
Dav War described it thusly
:
. . . the parachutists had done no parachute training
for months, the Commandos had not practiced amphibious
warfare or co-operation with tanks for over twelve months.
There were no transport aircraft and none of the base
organizations or specialists required for an amphibious
operation was readily available. There was in Malta an
Amphibious Warfare Squadron of only two tank-landing
ships (LST's) though both of these were equipped to carry
eight assault landing craft (LCA's) each and two tank-
landing craft (LCT's); this was totally inadequate for
the size of an assault force required for a seaborne
invasion of the magnitude necessary for an effective
invasion of Egypt. '31
It was painfully manifest that to apply effective
military pressure would require considerable preparation. How-
ever, both the British and French governments were determined
not to let Nasser's act go unchallenged and immediately turned
their attention to the problem of mounting an assault force.
A joint Anglo-Franco command organization was established and
by the end of August the planning for operation "Musketeer"
was well in hand. The proposed size of the Suez 'effort is'
usually not appreciated. An expeditionary force of some
80,000 men was planned with the accompanying air and sea support
that such an organization requires. J
Shortages of transport aircraft, airfields and of
parachute troops precluded a completely airborne operation
The Egyptians were equipped with Soviet tanks, and troops,
either airborne or seaborne, could not be left ashore for long
without armoured support. There was no way to avoid a seaborne
assault operation based on the World War II pattern. In this
regard operating bases became a perplexing problem. British
forces were stationed in Libya, but the Libyan Government would
not tolerate its territory being used to mount an attack on
another country. Cyprus could be prepared to handle aircraft,
but its port facilities were pitifully inadequate. It had no
harbours or beaches which could accommodate large ships. The
only alternative was Malta which was approximately six days
sailing from Suez for slow ships, and it was reluctantly
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designated as the operational base for the seaborne assault
force.
All these considerations, imposed heavy demands on the
Navy for amphibious lift and support ships. The first estimates
called for over fifty LST's. There were only two in commission.




)discovered to be unseaowrthy when they were reactivated.
After some effort sixteen LST's of the reserve fleet were made
ready for sea and took part in the Suez operation along with
the two LST's in the active fleet. Two light carriers were
withdrawn from the training squadron in home waters and con-
verted to troop carriers. In addition the Royal Navy was
forced to contract with civilian concerns for transports,
tankers, stores ships, reefers and other types to furnish the
mobile logistic support required. Obviously the Royal Navy
was in no sense prepared for the shipping and logistic problems
which such an operation presented.
Large numbers of supporting aircraft would be required.
Unfortunately Cyprus would be the main land base. This meant
that the RAF's fighters and tactical support-craft could spend
only ten to fifteen minutes over the target areas before their
1 34fuel supply would force them to return home. Heavy and
medium bombers would not be so handicapped, but they were not
suitable for close support. The assault would have to rely
heavily on carrier aircraft which would be deployed just a
few miles offshore. H. M. S. Eaa;le with approximately eighty
planes was already in the Mediterranean. H. M. S. Bulwark,
the Fleet Air Arm training ship in home waters, was deployed
to the Mediterranean and arrived on August 9. H. M. S. Albion
which was in overhaul was rushed to completion and dispatched
to Malta in mid-October. These three ships between them could
put over one hundred fifty planes in the air. This was three-
fifths of the air power available to the active fleet. There
were some misgivings about pitting the Navy's planes - Sea
Hawks, Sea Venoms and Wyverns - against Egyptian MIG's which
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were theoretically superior to anything in the Fleet. ^
Nevertheless, the Fleet Air Arm was confident that its high
state of training, its skilled pilots, and special tactics
would allow it to overcome any opposition. The very fact, how-
ever, that the Egyptians possessed high performance jets forced
the planners to take extra precautions, and this delayed the
landings. In the last analysis it is difficult to overemphasize
the value of up-to-date equipment. At any rate there was no
alternative to carrier aircraft, and the Fleet Air Arm was to
bear the main burden of the battle no matter what the handicap.
The preparatory stage had highlighted the voids in the
Admiralty's thinking and exposed those areas where the Fleet
was most deficient. However, once this period was past, the
Royal Navy in action was another story. Starting on November 31
the Fleet Air Arm, French carrier aircraft, RAF and French planes
from Cyprus launched a campaign to destroy the Egyptian Air Force.
In less than seventy-two hours it was completely neutralized.
The lack of effective opposition was due primarily to the poor
state of training of Nasser's pilots. D Still this should not
detract from the efficient and professional job which the French
and English airmen did. Subsequent operations analysis paid
special tribute to the Fleet Air Arm. RAF Canberras and Valiants
were used with some effect, but high altitude bombing did not
prove particularly suitable to a Suez type of operation. " The
object was to destroy or damage specific tactical targets and
to avoid hitting civilian installations. Strategic bombers
often have difficulty locating such targets and are too
inaccurate when they do.
On the other hand the tactical strike aircraft of both
the Navy and RAF enjoyed significant successes. It was pri-
marily their efforts which put the airfields out of commission,
destroyed most of Nasser's planes before they got in the air,
and razed the Egyptian Air Force's supply and ammunition dumps.
The long distance from Cyprus severely reduced the time RAF
strike-fighters could spend over the target, but they were very
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effective while on the scene. Individual naval aircraft, on
the other hand, were able to fly as many as four missions a
day. Once the troops were ashore these planes were constantly
on call and literally acted as artillery for the airborne troops
which had to spend the first twenty-four hours without armour or
artillery. The effectiveness of the seaborne aircraft exceeded
all expectations. In seven days of action the Fleet Air Arm
flew more than 2,000 sorties J and lost only one pilot. All
things considered it was a remarkable performance and fully
substantiated the claims which the carrier's advocates had been
making for years.
The landing was carried out on November 5 and 6. The
first day over two batallions of airborne troops parachuted in,
and the next day the remaining forces were put ashore across
the beaches.. The landing on November 6 was marked by an inno-
vation which was to change the character of amphibious warfare.
A unit of the Royal Marines, Commando 45 (some 600 men), was
put ashore by helicopters from H. M. S. Ocean and H. M. S.
Theseus . It was landed, as soon as the beach was cleared, in
1 39less than an hour and a half. ^ The U. S. Marines had already
begun to investigate the possibilities of "vertical assault,"
but Suez was the first time that helicopters had been employed
in such a manner in action. As far as the British were con-
cerned this was a makeshift development which had been conceived
and implemented after the Suez preparations began. Colonel
Barker labels it "without question the most outstanding feature
m1 40
of the operation. These same helicopters ferried supplies,
acted as messengers, carried out wounded, spotted artillery
fire, picked up downed aviators, and performed a myriad of
essential tasks. This was eloquent testimony to the Navy and
Marines 1 ability to improvise on short notice.
There are many reasons to criticize the Suez operation,
and in the public' 3 mind it was a failure. Certainly the mili-
tary, the Navy included, can be faulted for the lack of prepar-
ation for such an operation. Yet in view of military and
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political thinking in the early fifties this unpreparedness
is not so remarkable. Moreover, in the operations themselves
the major deficiencies were lack of firm political guidance and
some misjudgments at the high command level. It is difficult
to criticize the conduct of operations and the performance of
officers and men. The Navy performed extremely well. Without
the Fleet the landing would have been impossible. Actually few
realize how close the operation was to tactical success when it
was abruptly canceled. It has been contended that the entire
Canal Zone would have been secured in another thirty-six hours.
The inability of Britain to carry off, what some con-
sidered, a rather limited action against a third-rate military
power had a traumatic effect on all Britons. It has often been
referred to as the watershed for British affairs in the post-war
era. For the first time the public and the Government appeared
to realize fully the fundamental changes which post-war con-
ditions had wrought in Britain's status. It had a similar
effect on the Royal Navy. The Egyptian crisis highlighted
serious deficiencies in the seaborne forces, and the Navy was
to reap its share of criticism. Still the long range effects
were not all adverse. The episode occurred at a time when the
Navy's thinking was particularly confused, and when the Navy's
leaders were casting about for a new rationale for the Fleet.
Actually the Navy's combatant forces had performed rather well
and the whole operation had illustrated the value of mobility
and flexibility, a prime requisite of naval operations. More-
over, it accentuated the altered status of Britain's overseas
responsibilities and focused attention on the increasing proba-
bility of limited wars. In the long run Suez was to play a
vital part in assisting the Admiralty to find a viable post-war
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The year 1957 was critical in the post-war history of
the British defense establishment. Since the truce in Korea
(1953) & number of pressures had been slowly building which
called for a general reappraisal of military policy. The Suez
crisis, Eden's resignation, and the formation of a new Government
served as catalysts. In 1957 all three Services were subjected
to searching scrutiny, and a vigorous effort was initiated to
halt the steadily climbing defense appropriations. These events
set the stage for intense inter-Service and military-political
friction. In the Navy's case Governmental pressure forced the
Board of Admiralty to do soul searching previously neglected.
The result was a coherent, convincing and defensible rationale
around which the modern Fleet could be built and organized.
Though it still remained to implement this new policy, the Navy
had a clearer idea of its proper role than at any time since
World V.rar II.
The Sandys' White Paper
Mr. Duncan Sandys, the Minister of Defense in the first
Macmillan Government, is often given full credit for the radical
modifications made in 1957. However, the seeds of change were
planted in the previous administration. Anthony Eden came to
office as Prime Minister firmly convinced that the nation's
military posture was determined by the "annual exchange between
the Treasury and the fighting services" and that this procedure




to control the "vested interests" of the Services, the Minister
of Defense must take a more active part in policy-making. In
October 1955 he expanded the Minister's role directing him to
insure that the "composition and balance" of the Services con-
formed to the Government's policy. This move was accompanied
by the creation of an independent Chairman of the CSC who was to
be a senior military officer and to act as the Minister's main
contact with the heads of the individual Services. Although
the Government cited the demands on the CSC for representation
in international bodies as the chief justification for this step,
it was implied that this would improve the quality of the advice
which the Minister received.
Certain substantive changes accompanied these organizational
moves. Shortly after assuming office the Prime Minister directed
the Minister of Defense, Selwyn Lloyd, to draw up budget pro-
jections for the defense establishment for a five year period.
This study indicated that defense expenditures would rise approx-
imately 30/b by 1960. The Prime Minister was alarmed by this
report, and in 1956 he ordered a small Cabinet sub-committee to
undertake an elaborate examination of military policy. As a
result of this reassessment, the Government determined to reduce
gradually the share of the nation's resources being devoted to
defense and immediately announced a cut-back in the total size
of the armed forces from 800,000 to 700,000. "Privately the
review of 1956 led Eden to plan for reduction to about 450,000
by 1960 or 1961 accompanied by the abolition of conscription.
This was to be made possible by more wholehearted commitment to
n4
nuclear deterrence. The major incentive here was quite clearly
economic. The Government hinted at its behind-the-scenes thinking
in the 1956 White Paper by noting that "the maintenance of British
forces overseas involves heavy charges on the balance of payments"
and that "the burden of defense cannot be allowed to rise to a
level which would endanger our economic future. ^
The Egyptian crisis intervened before Eden could set in
train any further changes. The disillusionment and frustration
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following Suez evoked public clamor for defense retrenchment.
There had always been elements both Inside and outside the
Government who believed that less should be spent on defense,
and they took advantage of this propitious moment to press their
case. Suez had disillusioned many as to the state of the armed
forces and raised doubts as to whether the nation had received
full value for its defense Investment. Judging from the news-
paper reactions there was some consensus on the need for a cut-
back. The Financial Times contended that "the military budget
must come down, or Britain would be ruined. " On the right it
was Joined by the Dally Telegraph and on the Left by the Daily
Herald which demanded that "Britain needs a great transfer of
energy to the export drive, and a big saving ... on armaments."
It is impossible to say that this press campaign was the cause
of the Government's actions, because ministers had commenced to
think along these lines sometime before. On the other hand this
public sentiment certainly facilitated Mr. Macmillan's task when
he assumed office in late 1956 and decided to continue with
Eden's plans for revamping the defense program. At the same time
the public agitation made it appear that the new Prime Minister,
who was trying to revive the Conservative Party's prestige after
the Suez debacle, was departing radically from the policy of
previous Governments and was genuinely Innovating.
Mr. Macmlllan had served as Minister of Defense for
approximately six months in 1954 and had developed some definite
o
ideas of his own on military policy. He believed that defense
policy in the past had often been more a compromise among vested
interests than a conscious effort to tailor programs to the
country's needs. He was convinced that the Minister of Defense
needed more authority and the right to rule on details as well
as to set overall policy. With this in mind he chose Mr. Duncan
Sandys as Minister of Defense. Sandys, the son-in-law of Winston
Churchill, was regarded as an energetic, forceful and determined
"troubleshooter. " There was general consensus that he would not
be intimidated by the "brass. " In addition the Prime Minister
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announced to the House of Commons on January 24, 1957 that he
had taken steps to define the Minister of Defense's power more
broadly
:
I have entrusted the Minister of Defense with the task
of formulating, in the light of present strategic needs,
a defense policy which will receive a substantial reduction
in expenditure and in manpower and to prepare a plan for
reshaping and reorganizing the Armed Forces in accordance
therewith
. . .
Subject, as necessary, to consultation with
the Cabinet and the Defense Committee and the Treasury on
matters of finance, the Minister of Defense will have
authority to give decisions on all matters of policy
affecting the size, shape, organizations and disposition
of the Armed Forces and their equipment and supply, includ-
ing defense research and development, their pay and con-
ditions of service.
9
This was a strong mandate despite the fact no formal
legislation had been enacted changing the machinery. The Services
still had their own ministers and control of their own adminis-
tration. Nevertheless, it was manifest that the Prime Minister
had in mind a genuine alteration in procedure and policy. His
Minister of Defense was expected to effect that change and, in
turn, he would have Mr. Macmlllan's personal support. In the
actual event the Prime Minister was true to his word and backed
Mr. Sandys' decisions to the hilt. No matter what the legal
situation there was clearly a new organizational structure being
forged and one that was to cause much anguish among all three
Services before they were reconciled to this new order.
Sandys took office concurrently with Macmlllan and threw
himself into the task. In order to give him the needed time the
annual Defense White Paper, normally presented in February, was
delayed until April 4. It was no doubt the most anticipated
of post-war White Papers. On close analysis it was not quite the
"new look" that many had predicted, but nevertheless it was
"truly a bold one, for the fresh cuts carried some force levels
below the very minimum which the professional advisers would
recommend, even with nuclear weapons, and thus finally accepted
consequences which previous trends had only foreshadowed.
"
Essentially the Government argued that modern weapon developments
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had changed the fundamental nature of warfare and that this
called for a new approach to defense planning. This remarkable
1 2document laid down these basic premises:
(1) A shattering nuclear exchange would most likely-
initiate a major war.
(2) There is no practical defense against such an attack
and Britain probably would not survive it.
(3) "The overriding consideration . . . must be to pre-
vent war rather than prepare for it . . . The only safeguard
against major aggression is the power to threaten retaliation
with nuclear weapons."
(4) Aside from a general war role, Britain's forces still
must be prepared "to defend British colonies and protect
territories against local attack, and undertake limited
operations in overseas emergencies.
"
(5) Solid defense is built on a sound economic base and
military expenditures must not be allowed to erode the country's
financial strength.
From these premises the Government proposed to reduce
the total strength of the military by 50^ over the next five
years and abolish conscription in 1962. All three Services were
to suffer extensive reductions. The Royal Air Force's Fighter
Command was to be materially reduced. Ballistic missile research
was to be pressed, and the manned bomber was to be replaced
eventually with missiles. The Army would be gradually reduced
to 165,000 men, and British garrisons overseas would be cut back
markedly. To compensate for these withdrawals a "central
reserve" of troops would be established in Great Britain, ready
on short notice for airlift to trouble spots. The Navy was
likewise cut down on funds and personnel. It was to be reorganized
to better support limited operations. Its role in total war was
described as "uncertain." Overall, the estimates were £180,000,000
less than in 1 956. While the Government would not estimate the
amount, it predicted further savings in the future. The ultimate
goal was to reduce materially the percentage of the Gross
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National Product devoted to defense. This was the essence of
the 1957 White Paper which was intended to set the guidelines
for the coming five years.
The economic Justification for this radical change in
policy, however, requires a closer scrutiny. There is little
question that military demands were competing with the need for
exports; they always do. On the other hand, the 1957 Defense
Statement may have exaggerated the burden of defense on the
economy. It pointed out that in the preceding five years
defense had on the average absorbed \0% of Britain's GNP and
implied that this figure was more than the nation could bear.
What it did not indicate was that the Gross National product
during this period had increased some four times as fast as
British military expenditures and that the share of the GNP
devoted to the military had been going steadily downward from
10.4$ in 1952 to 8.5$ in 1956. 13 Actually when the effects of
Inflation were taken into account the real purchasing power
allocated to military purposes had possibly declined. This
would indicate that the Services were not quite the drain on the
economy that the Government contended.
Moreover, cutting the defense budget was not the only
way the Government could have strengthened Its balance of pay-
1 5
ments position or the general health of the economy. ^ By
1957 most controls had disappeared. The country was enjoying
a relatively new level of prosperity, and personal consumption
had risen to some 52$ of the nation's total goods and services.
A. C. L. Day points out that It would have been perfectly
possible from a purely economic standpoint to "raise taxes and/or
to reduce other government expenditures to an extent sufficient
to finance the defense effort without adding to the Inflation
1 f\
or imposing additional pressure on the balance of payments."
The Economist agreed when it remarked "that there was no economic
reason why, if people are willing, Britain should not adjust the
level of consumption to a defense budget of £1 ,700,000,000 or
1 7
more." ' The truth was that the choice of priorities was not
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merely that pointed out in the White Paper - between a strong
economy and a large military program. In essence the real
political priorities were public consumption and social services.
The Government did not feel it politically prudent to cut down
in either of these areas. Consequently, in order to stimulate
the economy, it turned its attention to reducing defense expend-
itures. It is interesting to note that in 1958 and 1959 the
extra resources made available by defense slashes were not
channeled into investment which would have strengthened the
1 ft
economy but into consumption.
The plain truth is that the politicians, and inferentlally
their constituents, after witnessing Suez did not consider the
price they were paying for defense to be worth the loss of the
amenities that they were having to forego. As a result the
amount of funds allotted to the Services was slashed accordingly.
In other words, the 1957 military program was dictated not so
much by economic necessity as by the priorities assigned to the
non-military sectors of the economy - in short, by political
expediency.
The Admiralty and the 1 957 White Paper
The Navy was to be drastically effected by Mr. Sandys 1
innovations. His appointment was viewed with apprehension in the
higher circles of the Navy, and these fears were founded on tang-
ible evidence. For example it was well known that he believed
strongly in the future of ballistic missiles and nuclear war-
heads. It was assumed that, under his direction, these two items
would assume a more important place in defense. Another subject
on which he held firm convictions was the aircraft carrier. He
had already gone on record as denying their usefulness in a
nuclear war and as questioning the wisdom of spending such large
amounts on a weapon system for any other purpose.
The Admiralty's fears soon materialized. Just before
taking office Mr. Sandys had hinted privately that the Navy would
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have to bear a large, If not the major, share of the impending
cuts and that the carrier would be his prime target. ^ Practi-
cally his first official act in regard to the Navy was to intimate
that he considered aircraft carriers excessively expensive, and
that he intended to phase them out of existence unless the Board
of Admiralty could convince him of their value. From the Navy's
standpoint this was a grave threat. For the first time a Minister
of Defense, one with newly Increased authority and an aggressive
temperament, was attacking the Fleet's cherished capital ships.
He seemed to accept all the arguments the Air Force had been
directing at the Fleet Air Arm for many years. Though the
Admiralty had annually had to justify its plans and programs,
never before had it been backed to the wall on this issue. This
was a fundamental challenge, and to the Admiralty it appeared
that the future of the Fleet rested on the outcome of this
struggle.
The Impact of therrao -nuclear weapons on the Navy's
planning has already been noted. The Sea Lords were conditioned
to believe in sea power and in naval airpower, but there were
sincere doubts within the Navy itself as to exactly what role
the Fleet should play in a Britain beset with economic problems
and in a world plagued with fusion weapons. These doubts were
no longer lingering in the background and merely cropping up in
discussions behind closed doors. They were now being expressed
openly by the highest political authority, and the Navy's
leaders could no longer avoid meeting them face-to-face. The
Board of Admiralty would have to scrutinize its doctrines and
decide what course to adopt in the face of this threat. More
specifically the problem was: How to save the carrier? For
the Navy's senior officers were convinced that if they lost their
capital ships the Fleet would eventually evolve into hardly more
than a British Coast Guard - or at best a "small navy" on the
Scandinavian pattern. This was an unthinkable prospect for a




In reviewing the alternatives open to it the Board of
Admiralty came to several fundamental conclusions. It was
manifest that the total amount of funds devoted to the military
would be drastically reduced, or at least contained, over the
next few years and that every Service would have to accept
unwelcome reductions. This was clearly implicit in the Prime
Minister's program, and there was no reasonable prospect of
thwarting this objective. Although the Admiralty was unhappy
with the prospect of reduced funds this in itself presented no
radical change from the past.
However, in 1957 the challenge went much deeper. For
the first time the Minister of Defense had authority to deter-
mine not only the allocation of resources, but also the missions
and equipment of each Service. The nuclear deterrent was clearly
to be the foundation of Sandys' defense policy, and the device
which presumably would make economies possible. The Admiralty
had never opposed deterrence, and in 1957 the overwhelming
majority of senior naval officers were still convinced that
Britain should have its own deterrent. They believed that
strategic nuclear weapons enhanced Britain's status militarily
and politically. They also appreciated that the Government was
irrevocably committed to the nuclear deterrent, and that the
Admiralty could scarcely alter this policy; on the other hand,
they opposed over-emphasizing nuclear retaliation and were con-
vinced that the nation should retain strong conventional forces -
particularly the Fleet. Wisely, the Navy's leaders took the
position that instead of criticizing the role of other Services
they must stress the Navy's positive values. This would be
difficult to do In the face of Mr. Sandys' declared opposition.
However, the Board of Admiralty is rooted in a long history of
bureaucratic in-fighting, and its members automatically profit
from this tradition. The outside observer cannot resist forming
the impression that it operates better under pressure. At any
rate the Admiralty rose to this new challenge, determined to
retain a general purpose Fleet.
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Mr. Sandys' main target was the carrier, and the
Admiralty concentrated its efforts on justifying it. This vessel
was the heart of the flexible and mobile task forces which it had
been advocating and represented the Navy's offensive power. The
most obvious Justification, and one of the most cogent, for re-
taining carriers was the fact that they were already in existence.
This is always a strong argument in a bureaucratic quarrel over
military equipment. Who is to say with conviction that conflict
will not break out tomorrow? In that case you must fight with
what you have. The Admiralty stressed that its carrier force
was at sea and had just been used extensively during the Suez
crisis. Strictly on economic grounds it would be wasteful to
phase out ships which represented such a large capital invest-
ment until they had reached the end of their useful lives.
Fortunately due to the Korean rearmament program that was
several years away. This argument was bound to carry weight
with a minister whose first interest was to get the most value
for the money spent. Nevertheless, the argument would not be
sufficient in Itself, and their Lordships set themselves the
task of defining the military role of aircraft carriers in a
manner more appealing to Mr. Sandys.
The new Minister had made it clear that he did not
consider seaborne aircraft suitable delivery vehicles for
strategic weapons nor their offensive power a significant com-
plement to the Air Force's thermo-nuclear striking power. He
believed strongly that the joint efforts of America's Strategic
Air Command and the British Bomber Command would be of such a
dimension as to make any other contribution inconsequential.
The Admiralty had never contemplated a genuine strategic role
for its strike aircraft. However, it had consistently stressed
that it was developing an atomic capability and had committed
its carriers to SACLANT ' s Strike Fleeto In line with NATO
doctrine, the naval aviators contended that the Fleet Air Arm
would offer a valuable support to the deterrent effort and play
an important part in the early phases of a war against Russia.
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Unofficially Sandys 1 views on this subject received a
more than sympathetic hearing among the Navy's leaders. As
already noted, the Admiralty had increasing doubts as to the
viability of SACLANT's doctrine, and many senior officers did
not really believe it practical in a thermo-nuclear war. If the
Royal Navy had possessed more carriers or a capability for making
a genuine contribution to the initial exchange then their atti-
tude might have been closer to the U. S. Navy's. However, they
had definite reservations about risking their few carriers close
into an enemy shore in the early days of a thermo-nuclear war.
In essence many of the Navy's leaders agreed with Mr. Sandys
regarding the Fleet's contribution to NATO. On the other hand
there was still reluctance to admit that the Navy's offensive
aircraft would have no significant general war role. There
seemed also to be political risk in such a course. It appeared
that the Government was going to stress the deterrent even more
than in the past, and those forces which could not contribute in
the early days of a general war would possibly suffer over the
long run from a lack of funds. In other words more than purely
military considerations were involved. The Admiralty was deter-
mined to retain its carriers and any course which seemingly re-
duced their role was viewed with suspicion.
Of course a vital factor in these calculations was the
expressed attitude of Mr. Sandys himself. It was clear that if
the Admiralty chose to fight for its atomic strike role in a
general war that it would meet heavy opposition. In the process
there would be every likelihood of alienating the Minister of
Defense and prejudicing him against other facets of the Navy's
case. After intense deliberation and discussion the Board of
Admiralty elected to deemphaslze the carrier's attack capabilities
in a nuclear war. In a sense the Admiralty had been forced to
recognize formally the change in thinking which had been gradually
developing in its own ranks. This was a momentous decision and




Having discarded the carrier's strike role in general
war the Sea Lords determined to emphasize two other functions of
the naval task force. The Admiralty insisted that the Fleet had
a critical place in the anti-submarine forces of SACLANT. This
was a shrewd plea tailored specifically to the political realities
which confronted Sandys, as well as to his personal views on the
nature of general war.
A large portion of the Navy's efforts over the preceding
years had been devoted to anti-submarine problems. New ASYJ ships
and aircraft were Joining the Fleet everyday as a result of the
building program initiated in 1951. Here was an area where the
Fleet could make a unique contribution, and one where there was
no question about the competence of its forces. However, there
were seeds of inconsistency in this argument. Just as there was
some question about the ability of aircraft carriers to contri-
bute in the midst of nuclear strikes, there were some misgivings
as to the possibility of subsequent operations at sea after a
thermo-nuclear exchange. It seemed possible that there would
be no need for convoys or ASV/ operations in a genuine nuclear
war. However, like every aspect of nuclear operations no one
could say with certainty.
The Admiralty found It convenient to ignore this incon-
sistency. Although the Minister of Defense was firmly opposed
to using naval aircraft in a strike role in nuclear war, it was
soon clear that he was much more sympathetic to the Navy's ASW
role. The Admiralty and Mr. Sandys agreed that it was impossible
at that stage- to predict with any accuracy what would happen at
sea. It was conceivable that a period of conventional war would
precede the nuclear strikes, or that the nuclear exchange might
not prove immediately decisive. In either case the communication
links with America would be vital, and there would be a need for
ASW forces - at least for a short period. In essence Mr. Sandys
was not willing to discard unequivocally the possibility of a war
at sea or to Ignore Britain's oceanic communications altogether.
The Admiralty took full advantage of this attitude.
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From the practical political standpoint the Admiralty
knew there were some pressures pushing the new Minister of
Defense to continue to emphasize ASW forces. In view of
Britain's past experiences no politician could afford to ignore
altogether the Soviet submarine menace. Sandys was no exception.
In addition there was the problem of NATO. One of SACLANT 's
prime missions had been to protect the Atlantic sea lanes, and
Britain had committed its ASW forces to NATO for this purpose.
Ever since SACLANT was organized Great Britain had pressed hard
to keep NATO's attention riveted on its ASW responsibilities.
The British had expected to be the major beneficiary of this
effort and had encouraged the Allies to contribute. Just as the
NATO Strike Fleet had been U. S. inspired, NATO's ASW forces had
been Britain's fond project. The Government could not suddenly
withdraw from this commitment which it had supported so vigor-
ously without dealing NATO a serious blow. Similarly it was
obvious that Sandys' plan to withdraw Britain's carriers from
the Strike Fleet would cause some resentment in the U. S. Navy.
This would call for some sort of gesture of continuing loyalty
to NATO. These pressures would be accentuated by the personnel
cuts which the Government planned to make in the troops committed
to SHAPE which were bound to irritate the other NATO countries.
Consequently, the Navy heavily emphasized its ASW capabilities
and responsibilities to SACLANT, all the while stressing the
value of carrier aircraft in carrying out these functions.
The second mission, and even more important than the
ASW argument, which the Admiralty chose to accent, was the
carrier's role in fighting limited wars and quelling brush fires
where strategic nuclear weapons would be largely ineffective.
Both Korea and Suez had illustrated the Fleet's potential for
conducting such operations. The increasing tendency of the
Navy's spokesmen to stress mobility and flexibility have already
been noted, however, this was to be the first time that the
Admiralty elevated its conventional limited war functions to a
position over and above its general war responsibilities.
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Perhaps the Navy would have moved in this direction anyway, but
there is little question that Sandys' relentless pressure on the
carriers forced the Board of Admiralty to move officially away
from a general war rationale more quickly than it otherwise
would have. Again the Navy's case was carefully shaped to take
advantage of the Minister's overall plans, and it was based on
rather shrewd estimates of what the future held in store.
In 1957 the Navy's views on the importance of conven-
tional limited wars in a nuclear era had by no means solidified.
Nevertheless, Suez had turned attention in this direction and
spotlighted a number of features of the British overseas position
which the Admiralty turned to good advantage. As a public
example Suez was a poor one, since the entire country wished to
repress it. As a military and foreign policy guidepost it was
more useful. It rather strikingly Indicated that even though a
government possesses nuclear weapons, limited conventional actions
were still possible, even probable in Britain's case, and that to
fight such actions properly the Government needed equipment
specially designed for the purpose. Moreover, immediate readi-
ness is crucial in dealing with such contingencies. Neville
Brown in his book Strategic Mobility , cited Suez's main lesson
as the need for mobile forces "constantly capable of being
o i
deployed with speed and flexibility. " The Admiralty argued
that naval task forces offered the most promising solution to
this problem and stressed the carrier's primary role in these
task forces.
Moreover, the Sea Lords pointed with telling effect to
the broader political lessons of Suez and their long term impli-
cations. "As nothing else had done since the days of World War
II, the outcome of the Suez operation focused the attention of
the nation upon defense policy and upon bases in particular.
"
It was painfully manifest that access to Suez was no longer
assured. During the crisis British bases in Libya, Jordan, and
Iraq had all proved unuseable for political reasons. Cyprus,
Aden and Malta were helpful, but their handicaps were manifold.
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In short, despite the nation's extensive chain of bases the
Crown had to rely on seaborne forces. The prospects for the
future were bleaker. Already the repercussions from Suez had
23
accelerated British withdrawal from Ceylon. "* There was no way
to estimate how long British forces would be allowed to operate
out of Kenya, Aden, or even Singapore. These same problems
affected overflying rights. The states in Africa and the
Middle East which would permit British warplanes to overfly
their soil in a crisis were bound to become progressively fewer.
At the same time it was argued that Britain would have
responsibilities East of Suez for many years to come. It was
obligated to many of the Commonwealth countries in the area, and
it seemed likely that the British government would insist on a
self-imposed responsibility to oversee peace and order in former
colonies, at least for a period. In addition the United Kingdom
had extensive commercial interests from Africa to Singapore.
The Admiralty argued that all these conditions enhanced the value
of mobile naval task forces, and that to phase out aircraft
carriers at that time would be a serious mistake.
It should be emphasized that these arguments meshed
neatly with some of Sandys' other plans. He intended to abolish
conscription and drastically decrease the Army's size. To do
this he planned to reduce the overseas garrisons and to depend
on a home-based strategic reserve which could be deployed to
trouble spots. The Admiralty never missed an opportunity to
point out that its task forces complemented this scheme. They
would provide mobile strength which could be moved from place to
place to show the flag in areas evacuated by the Army. At the
same time they would supplement the strategic reserve's employ-
ment in a crisis.
The Minister of Defense was not easily convinced and the
early weeks of 1957 were marked by a long series of tortuous dis-
24
cussions and papers. Laurence Martin comments that due to the
difficulty of getting the Services to agree to cuts the 1957
policy was "very much the personal achievement of the Minister"
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and that he relied primarily on his scientific advisors and
personal confidants. However, the Navy through persistence and
persuasion was at least partially able to divert Sandys from
his original intention. Over vigorous Navy protests he vetoed
the Admiralty's request to renew its cruiser force, accelerated
the cut-backs in the reserve fleet, insisted on drastic reductions
in the Navy's shore-support establishment, and initiated a re-
auction In the personnel reserve. On the other hand he agreed
to retain the five operational carriers in the Fleet - the most
important issue from the Navy's standpoint, while Sandys' was
by no means becoming a carrier advocate, he conceded that there
was a need for naval aircraft in the Far East to bolster Britain's
offensive potential and also for ASW aircraft in the Atlantic .
with NATO. These decisions were reflected in the Defense State-
ment for 1957 which stated that:
On account of its mobility, the Royal Navy, together with
the Royal Marines, provides another effective means of
bringing power rapidly to bear in peacetime, emergencies
or limited hostilities. In modern conditions the role of
the aircraft carrier, which is in effect a mobile air
station, becomes increasingly significant. 27
In another relevant paragraph it was stated that
:
There is the possibility that the nuclear battle might not
prove immediately decisive; and in that event it would be of
great importance to defend Atlantic communications against
submarine attack. It is therefore necessary for NATO to
maintain substantial maritime forces and maritime air units.
Britain must make her contribution, though, for the reasons
explained earlier, it will have to be on a somewhat reduced
scale. 2o
These passages accurately reflected the Admiralty's own inter-
pretation of the Navy's role. Considering the original threat,
this was considered a tactical victory.
Of course the victory was only relative. All three
Services were extremely dissatisfied. The Army was to halve
its strength in the coming five years and to withdraw from many
of its overseas posts. The Royal Air Force was to lose the bulk
of its fighters, and its manned bombers were to be replaced
eventually by ballistic missiles. These drastic steps threatened
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to change not only the size of the Army and Air Force but also
their character. These decisions were, to say the least,
bitterly received. The Navy likewise faced serious reductions.
Its budget was cut £35 million that year, and its total personnel
was to be reduced to 88,000 men by 1961, an unprecedented low for
the modern Navy. Nevertheless, the Admiralty "was less dissatis-
29fied than might have been expected, * for it had managed to
retain its carriers and had received approval for its mobile
task force concept. The Admiralty had successfully survived a
grave crisis and laid the foundation upon which to build a new
role for the British Fleet.
Deterrence vs Limited War 1957-1959
The above interpretation of the 1957 white Paper was not
shared by lay commentators. To them the great stress on deterrence
combined with the determination to slash expenses signaled the
decline of conventional forces. In the Navy's case this im-
pression was strengthened by a clause in the 1957 Command Paper
which pronounced "the role of naval forces in total war as some-
what uncertain." A great deal of newsprint was devoted to
lamenting the Navy's forthcoming demise and in some instances to
protesting against such a policy. However, only time would reveal
whether this interpretation was accurate.
The White Paper received a generally warm welcome, because
of the economies it heralded and the seemingly bold attempt it
made to fashion a policy appropriate to the times. However, as
the critics had time to digest its contents, increasing doubts
were expressed as to the wisdom of Britain maintaining and
emphasizing a nuclear deterrent at the expense of conventional
weapons. Essentially these observers contended that in an era
of nuclear parity between the Soviets and Americans, the United
Kingdom could better utilize its limited funds. They believed it
unlikely that Britain would participate in a nuclear war without
the United States. Moreover, they contended that the relative
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size of the British deterrent seriously detracted from its
31
value and credibility. On the other hand they further argued
that under the shelter of the nuclear umbrella the Government
with its world-wide responsibilities could make a more meaningful
contribution to Western defense by allocating its severely limited
resources to conventional weapons. A deterrent would be fine if
it could be had "on the cheap," but by 1957 it was apparent that
this was not so and that concentration on nuclear weapons would
consume a major portion of the defense budget. Without attempt-
ing to review this argument in detail - it is still raging today -
it is important here to note that the 1957 White Paper soon
excited non-governmental resistance which supported the Admiralty's
basic reasoning and strengthened its official case.
As a matter of fact the Admiralty was not overlooking any
channel for influencing the Minister of Defense. "it enlisted
in its cause two senior servants both in key positions in the
Ministry of Defense."-52 Foreign Office and Colonial Office back-
ing was solicited. These important departments concurred in the
need for strong naval forces East of Suez and threw their weight
33behind the Admiralty. ^ There is also some evidence that the
Navy enlisted the Commonwealth's assistance. During Sandys' tour
of the Far East in the summer of 1957 high ranking officials in a
number of Commonwealth countries submitted pleas in the Navy's
34behalf. Later in that same year Mr. Macmillan was urged by
several delegates to the Commonwealth prime minister's conference
i 3Sto reconsider the Government s plans for the Navy. ^
These tactics were paralleled by a subtle effort to widen
36the public arena of debate. The Observer reported in early 1957
that "for weeks now senior members of the silent Service have been
breaking their silence to remind journalists of the Russian sub-
marine menace and the folly of slashing navies."' Retired senior
officers bombarded the press with letters to the editor. Admirals
assigned to NATO took advantage of their unique position to speak
38their minds on the Navy cuts. Shortly after the 1957 White
Paper was published the Admiralty sponsored a one-day orientation
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conference at Greenwich for prominent industrialists and
39
non-governmental leaders. The object was to present the case
for a strong Fleet. It caused little fanfare, but was well re-
ceived judging from a letter to The Times by three industrialists
40
who attended. This step was bordering on the limits of propriety
and is an indication of the lengths the Admiralty was willing to
go in combatting Sandys' attack on the carriers.
There is no way to determine what influence these various
maneuvers had, however, it was soon evident that the Government
was not going to depend solely on nuclear weapons. The 1 958
Defense Statement reiterated the fundamentals of its predecessor.
It confirmed the nation's policy of deterrence, but likewise in-
sisted that a deterrent "does not obviate the need for maintaining
a substantial shield of land forces, with air and naval support,
to defend the frontiers of the free world . . . a high proportion
of Britain's military effort will therefore, of necessity, con-
h41tinue to go into forces of this kind. In this same statement,
the first mention is to be found of the "balancing fear of mutual
annihilation" and the implication that this stalemate would tempt
the Communist powers to concentrate on other methods than general
42
war. In addressing itself to the Royal Navy it set out three
43
main tasks for the Fleet: J
(1) In peacetime, to help carry out Britain's responsi-
bilities in colonies and protected territories, to
defend British shipping, and generally to contribute
by their presence to the maintenance of peace and
stability.
(2) In limited war, to protect sea communications, to
escort troops and supplies to the theatre of oper-
ations and to give them support in action.
(3) In global war, to make an effective contribution to
the combined naval forces of the Western Alliance.
These statements hardly indicate that the Government con-
templated abandoning its Navy. The terse and vague reference to
global war unmistakably suggested that the character of the
Fleet's role was changing. Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, in
sarcastically commenting on this facet of a defense policy which
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presumably was going to reduce conventional forces, remarked:
"Sea power is so bound up with our history that it has become
part of our national character, and it is no doubt too much to
expect that the Government would take the bold step of abandon-
ing this particular form of preparation to fight.
He was overlooking the fact that both technical and
political developments were accentuating the importance of sea
power after several years of neglect. During Mr. Sandys' short
tenure as Minister of Defense from 1957 to 1959 the Admiralty's
strategical case became visibly stronger. Not only had the
nuclear stalemate increased the likelihood of brush fires, but
economic and political problems were making Britain's military
position more difficult. Shortly after Suez, Ceylon insisted
on taking over the military bases on its soil. British forces
were withdrawn from Jordan, and those in Libya were drastically
reduced. The facilities in Cyprus were cut back. Malaya was
rapidly approaching independence, and Britain agreed to assist
in its external defense. In East Africa the Kenyan situation
was still unsettled, and the future of British bases there un-
certain. All of these developments were pressing the Government
to look for ways to modify its traditional military posture
overseas. The Navy's mobile task forces offered an attractive
alternative.
The 1959 Defense Statement indicated little change in
the Government's defense thinking. That same year Mr. Sandys
departed office with the Royal Navy still intact and playing a
vital part in defense strategy. The acid test, of course, is
the amount of funds which the Admiralty received under the
Sandys' administration. The absolute defense appropriation was
cut severely during his first year and then commenced to climb
very gradually. The amount of the Gross National Product de-
voted to defense dropped to around 7% by 1959. The Navy's
appropriations climbed from £31 6 million in 1957 to £370 million
in 1959* In absolute terms this was a gradual increase, but
it did not keep pace with the rise in prices. As a result the
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Admiralty's purchasing power steadily declined. However, this
was true of all the Services, and despite the supposedly in-
creased emphasis put on deterrence the Navy's relative share of
the defense budget rose from 23$ to 25$. The Army's likewise
climbed slightly to 29$. The Air Force's share and those in
other categories declined accordingly. This hardly suggests
that the Macmillan Government intended to scrap the conventional
forces. On the contrary, it indicates that the Admiralty, con-
sidering the obstacles confronting it, had made a rather shrewd
estimate of the overall political and military situation in
1957 and plotted a sound course.
The Transition to a Limited War Force
The Sandys era is always associated with retrenchment
and reductions. Undoubtedly the policies which he set in motion
allowed the Government to reduce the share of its total resources
which went to defense. Concurrently his economies worked some
impressive changes in the physical character of the Navy. From
1957 to 1959 the Navy's total manpower shrunk from 116,000 to
46101,000. Intense efforts were made to curtail the civilian
support establishment. In two years that was reduced by 30,000
47
to a new post-war low of 152,000 employees. The Royal Navy
Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve were combined, and
the air divisions of the reserve were disbanded. The total
number of personnel attached to reserve organizations shrunk from
48
approximately 40,000 in 1957 to 14,000 in 1959. Contrary to
previous practice these personnel were to be continuously trained
and available for Immediate service.
In addition to personnel reductions, extensive cut-backs
were made in naval equipment and installations. Dockyards in
Hong Kong and Malta were abolished, and two dockyards in England
decommissioned. Five air establishments were closed down and a
number of support facilities consolidated or cut back. These
measures were accompanied by a general command reorganization

195
which allowed reductions of shore-based personnel and support
49
establishments. The basic character of the reserve fleet was
altered to furnish not only ships for use in a crisis, but a
smaller number of vessels at a higher state of readiness to be
employed in peacetime "to replace those in the active fleet which
are damaged or withdrawn for refit or modernization. "3 During
the Sandys' tenure six aircraft carriers, four battleships, seven
cruisers, twelve destroyers, sixty-four frigates and numerous
51
smaller craft were scrapped or sold out of the reserve fleet.
The 1957 White Paper resulted in a smaller Navy, just as it
foreshadowed a smaller Army and Air Force. However, most of the
measures mentioned above concerned support activities, and this
is where the Navy could best afford to cut. Many of these
economies released funds which were plowed back into research
and operational forces. In fact new emphasis was put on the
active fleet and the missions which it was to perform. In evalu-
ating Mr. Sandys' influence on naval policy, it is this area that
must be examined most closely.
The Admiralty's post-Suez struggle was a critical episode
in the evolution of naval policy. For centuries England had
rested secure behind the bulwark of naval power. Just as Britons
in general were experiencing difficulty in accommodating to the
post-war era, it was not easy for the Navy's leaders to adjust
to the Fleet's decreasing importance, or rather its changing role.
However, in retrospect 1957 appears as the turning point. Once
the Admiralty brought itself to concede that thermo-nuclear
weapons were eroding the Fleet's usefulness in a general war, it
was like casting off a great psychological burden, and the Sea
Lords could turn their attention to other missions. Although the
Admiralty had insisted that it still had an ASW role to play in
the event of a general conflict, there is little question that
commencing in 1957 its main efforts were to focus more and more
on building up its conventional offensive capabilities for limited
war situations. Concurrently, it was to turn away from NATO and
Europe, and to concentrate on Britain's military problems in the
Middle and Far East,
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Unlike the case of the Army and Air Force the Admiralty
had a number of good reasons to welcome this basic change in
the character, if not the size, of the Fleet. Such a role called
for general purpose forces capable of performing the entire
spectrum of naval duties from minesweeping to attacking enemy
targets on both land and sea. It would allow the Royal Navy to
operate independently, and forestall the possibility that it
would become an interdependent part of a huge We stern navy.
This concurred with the Admiralty's view of what a British Fleet
should look like and do. Also, this new role would be more in
line with economic realities. It was painfully clear to the
Sea Lords that the limited resources available to the Royal Navy
would become progressively more inadequate, if a protracted
general war at sea was to be their main concern. On the other
hand there was a much better prospect of building an adequate
limited war force with the available funds. Of course only time
would reveal whether this was actually possible. However, the
Sea Lords intended to do their utmost to procure the modern
ships and planes which the annual Defense Statements envisaged.
It would require much ingenuity to achieve these goals in the
face of rising costs and the Government's determination to contain
expenditures. To this end major steps were taken during the
Sandys' regime to inaugurate this transformation.
The first step related to deployments. Previously the
Admiralty's general war strategy had dictated that the Navy's
strength be concentrated in the Home Fleet and the Mediterranean
Fleet. Control of the European seas was the main objective. In
line with its new thinking the Admiralty recommended that one
carrier task force be stationed permanently East of Suez. Once
Mr. Sandys had accepted the Navy's strategical justifications
for its task forces, this move followed logically and was con-
52firmed in the 1957 White Paper. This signaled a gradual build-
up of the Fleet's equipment and support facilities in the Far East.
It was the Admiralty's intention to keep another ready task force
in the Mediterranean fully prepared to exert influence in the

197
Near East or to deploy to the Indian Ocean if necessary. From
this point on, the Fleet's center of gravity was to shift stead-
ily Eastward.
One problem arose simultaneously with the 1957 White
Paper. The Minister of Defense informed the First Lord that
since Britain was continuing to stress the Fleet's ASW contri-
bution to SACLANT's forces the carriers assigned to NATO should
carry air groups composed of predominantly ASW aircraft. ^ Mr.
Sandys had several objectives here. Just after coming into
office he had visited the United States and among other officials
had called on Admiral Gerauld Wright, SACLANT, in Norfolk,
Virginia. He had expressed his belief that the NATO Strike Fleet
was not a viable concept. Predictably he made little impression
on the Americans. By emphasizing the ASW functions of Britain's
NATO carriers he hoped to make it clear that the Royal Navy
would not support these plans. Nevertheless, just as the
Admiralty had foreseen, he felt it necessary to make a positive
gesture to demonstrate the Government's continuing interest in
NATO. This decision was ostentatiously announced in the 1958
White Paper. There is little question that the Royal Navy
was moving away from SACLANT, but Mr. Sandys was determined to
cushion the blow. The Americans were scarcely deceived, and
Admiral Wright complained publicly about the British decision
to withdraw from the Strike Fleet.
The Minister of Defense also had an economic motive.
He reasoned that by concentrating on ASW in the West he could
put more naval effort into the Far East in terms of general
r
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purpose forces and hopefully "cut down on the total number of
aircraft which the Navy would have to purchase in the future.
This reasoning was certainly sound. It made it possible to con-
centrate certain types of aircraft in smaller geographical areas,
reduce training facilities and personnel rather than spreading
them in equal parts from Singapore to Spithead. Similarly, he
hoped to cut down the total number of planes needed, and later




However, this decision greatly disturbed the Naval
Staff. Despite their recognition of the Russian submarine
threat, the Sea Lords were beginning to think in terms of limited
war, and this move did not mesh with their view of the carrier as
a mobile weapon system available to respond quickly to any type
of emergency. Those carriers in the Atlantic and Mediterranean
would be tied to one mission. Before they could be used for
other purposes their air group would have to be rotated, and a
great deal of time expended in training and reorientation. From
a readiness standpoint it seemed to be unwise and certainly did
not accord with the balanced task force concept which the
Admiralty was nourishing.
In the same light the Board took unkindly to any scheme
that would specialize or unbalance its air stations ashore, its
aircraft logistics and support facilities. In its eyes this was
inviting future problems and degraded the ability of the supply
organization to respond to unforeseen emergencies. Lastly, and
perhaps even more significant, the Naval Staff opposed any plan
which would make it possible to reduce the number of operational
aircraft. The Navy believed these had already been cut to the
danger level and that further reductions particularly in strike
aircraft, would unduly endanger its capability.
Actually in the frantic rush to rescue the carriers the
Navy's leaders had overemphasized the Russian submarine menace
and had left themselves exposed to just such a maneuver.
Alastair Buchan, in the Observer , described the Navy as being
hoisted "with its own petard. "^ The Admiralty was in a weak
position 'when it chose to contest Sandys' decision after all the
stress it had previously laid on NATO s anti-submarine mission.
The Board of Admiralty was unable to get the decision
reversed, but the Naval Staff did succeed in foiling it tempo-
rarily. The Fleet Air Arm had already decided to replace its
fixed wing ASW aircraft with helicopters and proposed that the
shift in carrier complements be accomplished gradually as the
helicopters were phased into service. This suggestion was
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accepted. As a result when a new Minister of Defense assumed
office in 1959 the helicopters had still not come into service,
and the Navy's carriers were still carrying balanced aircraft
complements. This is an outstanding example of bureaucratic
"foot dragging. " The Navy had fought desperately to change the
decision and, when this failed, merely changed its tactics
instead of acquiescing. The new intention was to delay the
implementation of the decision as long as possible in the hope
that in the meantime there would be a change of policy or
,4 4. 60ministers.
Once this disagreement subsided the Admiralty turned
its attention to other matters. It was manifest that although
Mr. Sandys had agreed to retaining the carriers, he had done
so with reservations, and it would be folly to press for more
such ships. In fact the Admiralty made an informal, but never-
theless deliberate, decision to keep any further discussions of
the carrier on a low key so as not to revive this crucial issue.
The Board now wanted a period of relative calm in which to re-
trench and implement its plans for building balanced task forces,
The Sea Lords were hoping to concentrate on obtaining modern
equipment and vessels (other than carriers), which would im-
prove the Fleet's limited war capabilities and in turn buttress
the case for its new role.
The first significant step was taken in the area of
amphibious lift. On May 26, 1957, Major-General J e L. Moulton
of the Royal Marines announced in a speech at Portsmouth that
the Government was considering the conversion of an aircraft
carrier into a commando ship. This vessel was programmed to
carry a commando of marines and sufficient helicopters to put
them ashore wherever needed. The Tjroject was aoproved near the
6^
end of July 1957, and subsequently the H. M. S. Bulwark was
selected for the project. A number of forces had come together
in 1957 to reverse the Navy's traditional disdainful attitude
toward amphibious warfare. Bulwark '
s
conversion was to mark the




Pressure to review its amphibious responsibilities had
been rising within the Navy for some time. The deplorable state
of the Amphibious Warfare Squadron was well known throughout the
Fleet. Officers who had served in this squadron recurrently
agitated for the Admiralty to either dismantle or improve it.
Their complaints received little attention. In 1955 Lord
Mountbatten assumed the office of First Sea Lord, and he was
soon to become a rather effective spokesman for this small group.
Admiral Mountbatten had been Chief of Combined Operations Head-
quarters during World War II and had been one of the early pio-
neers in developing Britain's amphibious craft and techniques.
He later played a major role in the planning of the Dieppe land-
ings, and unlike the majority of the senior naval officers he had
developed a deep respect for amphibious operations.
Shortly after taking office he began to press for action
in this field and encouraged his staff to study U. S. experience.
After looking at the U* S. Marine Corps' new "vertical envelop-
ment" concept and the U. S. Navy's plan to land troops from
carriers by helicopter the Admiralty formulated in 1 956 the first
recommendation for a commando carrier. Before this could be
acted on, Suez intervened and demonstrated the continuing need
for an amphibious capability. Subsequently the Navy was submitted
to severe public criticism for its lack of ready amphibious ves-
sels during the Egyptian crisis. The Navy's leaders now saw an
amphibious capability as a complement to the limited war role
which they were fashioning for the Fleet. Also it was cogent
justification for fixed wing aircraft which would be required to
protect the commando carrier and to support troops. The exper-
ience of the Marines at Suez, who were put ashore by helicopter
from Ocean and Theseus , had proved the feasibility of this tech-
nique and demonstrated the carrier's value as an amphibious
vessel. It can transport a large number of men comfortably and
has high speed which gives it considerable mobility. This was a
decided advantage over the older type of landing craft. In
addition the concept of vertical envelopment allowed the
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assaulting troops a great deal more flexibility in choosing the
time and place of landing. It promised to revolutionize the art of
assaulting a hostile shore. All these considerations served to
modify the Navy's attitude toward its amphibious v/arfare respon-
sibilities, and there was little difficulty in getting the approval
of the Board of Admiralty in early 1957 for the conversion of
Bulwark .
However, after Mr. Sandys took office, all such projects
came under close review right up to the level of the Defense
Committee, and it was necessary to muster strong support for
radically new concepts. Fortunately, in the case of the commando
carrier there was an unusual degree of consensus. The Army was
being cut down drastically and looked favorably on any scheme
which would increase the nation's capability to lift troops. To
insure Army support the Amphibious V/arfare Headquarters, successor
to Combined Operations Headquarters, had recommended that the
Navy configure Bulwark to carry Army, as well as Marine, equip-
ment and troops. This proposal was readily accepted. In
addition, Army officers did not feel that the RAF had given enough
attention to helicopters for carrying troops and were happy to
see the Navy enter this field. Similarly, the RAF was not dis-
pleased because it would relieve some of the pressure to build
64transport helicopters and furnish airlift. This assured the
project strong support in the CSC.
From an economic perspective, the Navy by converting a
ship already in commission could keep the costs to below
£10 million. Considering the contribution it stood to make to
the Fleet this was impressive and quieted opposition in the
Ministry of Defense and Treasury. In the aftermath of Suez this
seemed like an excellent and economical investment. In addition
the ship was to be manned by Royal Marines and in a period of
shrinking personnel this was important, since the Marines, unlike
the Army, were oversubscribed and had no serious personnel prob-
lems. In addition, the Marines ever since World War II had been
trying to carve out an amphibious mission for themselves which
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would distinguish them from the Army, They were more than eager
to take on this assignment. When combined, all these factors
served to facilitate prompt approval of the first commando carrier
and to return the Navy to amphibious warfare.
Late in 1958 the Admiralty made another significant
gesture toward increasing the Fleet's amphibious capability.
It laid down a requirement for a 12,000 ton assault ship. This
was to be roughly similar to the U. S. Navy's 'Landing Ship Dock."
Since any landing craft which can carry a worthwhile load is too
heavy to be lifted on board ship by davits or a derrick, the
assault ship is designed with a large well deck aft, and the
ship can be trimmed down, much like a floating dry dock, in
order to float its landing craft. These small craft then lift
the heavy equipment from the ship to the beach. Actually it
offers the only practical method of carrying heavy equipment in
ships with fleet speed and then discharging that equipment
directly to shallow beaches where opposition may be expected.
The assault ship which the Naval Staff proposed was to accommo-
date up to half a battalion of infantry, together with all forms
of vehicles from tanks downward. In addition, it was to ooerate
four LCA's, four LCM's, and two helicopters. -* This would be a
significant complement to the commando carrier, and the Admiralty
hoped eventually to replace the Amphibious Warfare Squadron with
two of these ships.
Again the Admiralty designed these ships for Army as well
as Marine use and drew heavily on Army support in seeking approval
for this scheme. The ships costed-out at less than £7 million.
Considering their promise, this appeared to be a reasonable figure.
The first assault ship was authorized in 1959, with good prospects
of a second one being approved subsequently. This was another
significant step in reshaping the Fleet for its new role.
Concurrent with these developments the Naval Staff was
devoting considerable attention to other types of equipment.
Since 194-8 the Ministry of Supply and the Navy had been develop-
ing the surface-to-air Seaslug missile. It was the original
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intention of the Admiralty's planners to start building a class
of ships about 1954- to be armed with Seaslug and provide sophis-
ticated anti-aircraft protection for the Fleet's carriers. This
class would be radically new in design and gradually replace the
World War II destroyers. Unfortunately, development oroblems
exceeded expectations, and ship design was accordingly delayed.
It even appeared for a period as if the ships might have to be
of cruiser size, and considerable effort was made to reduce
the space requirements of the weapons system. The 1955 Navy
Estimates expressed the Navy's intention of proceeding with this
scheme, but the time schedule was still vague. Unpredictably,
the Seaslug program began to advance rapidly in late, 1955 and
by 1957 the dimensions of the missile and its supporting equip-
ment had been firmed up. It was clear by then that these weapons
could be accommodated in a 6,000 ton vessel, and a ship that
small could be technically classed as a destroyer. This was con-
sidered important from a practical standpoint. However irration-
ally, politicians are convinced that destroyers are more economi-
67
cal than cruisers, no matter what their characteristics. In
late 1957 the Admiralty received permission to start work on
plans for four such ships, and a year later was able to extract
final approval from the Defense Committee to proceed with this
class. Actually very little strife was involved in this decision,
but that was attributable to unusual circumstances.
Guided missile ships had been programmed for some time,
and the Government had been answering embarrassing questions in
Parliament about them for years. Certainly the Minister of
Defense had no intention of reneging on this promise, unless it
was manifestly a poor military investment. In this regard the
f>P>
Navy had put over £70 million into the development of Seaslug.
After the initial technical problems had been solved and an
administrative muddle had been straightened out, the Seaslug
program moved ahead rapidly, and the final product proved to be
extremely successful. It appeared to match or excel any foreign
seaborne surface-to-air medium-range missile and displayed an
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exceptional record of reliability. It promised the Fleet Just
what was needed - an effective defense against supersonic air-
craft. This would afford the carriers more protection and allow
them to devote more space to strike and ant 1- submarine aircraft.
Once the Minister of Defense had approved the requirement for
mobile carrier groups he could hardly turn down projects which
promised to enhance their effectiveness.
From a more personal standpoint, Mr. Sandys had been
the Minister of Supply during a rather crucial period in the
development of Seaslug. He had supported it strongly and had
had a part in ironing out its difficulties. The Navy was fully
aware of this and was assured a sympathetic hearing because of
his personal interest in missiles. Moreover, a few of the
Minister's scientific advisers had been associated with Seaslug
in the early days and put considerable effort into easing the
way for this new class both in the Ministry of Defense and with
the other services. These were important political factors dur-
ing an era when economy was a crucial parameter. All in all this
was the sort of project which meshed perfectly with the Navy's
new task force concept, offered value for the money, and at the
same time projected the image of a modern progressive Navy so
69dear to politicians. *
Another issue in this unusual period concerned atomic
bombs. The Admiralty had had a requirement on the books for a
small tactical weapon for some time and for a strike bomber to
carry it. This, of course, was an integral part of the Navy's
planning prior to 1957 when the Atlantic forces were slated to
participate in NATO's Strike Fleet. Now the question of atomic
weapons was reevaluated. The Admiralty desired to proceed with
the original plan and still pressed its need for such a weapon.
The Royal Air Force strongly questioned the Navy's requirement.
It argued that if naval aircraft were to be employed solely in
small "Suez type" actions that the demand for a naval atomic
weapon had disappeared. Their Lordship's argued that there were
no rules against using fission bombs in limited wars and that
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NATO strategy actually called for the use of atomic tactical
weapons in Europe. Certainly in 1957 the British Government
had not excluded such arms in local wars. Even more important
the Admiralty contended that the best way to prevent the
Communists from employing small atomic weapons in a local war
was to have fission bombs on the scene and a capability for
delivering them. The emphasis in all these discussions was
placed on the Far East and China. It was in this area that the
Fleet would be instrumental in meeting aggression, and the
Admiralty contended it would be a grave mistake to rule out any
use of atomic weapons. Finally the Board pointed out that the
requirement was a joint one with the RAF. Even if the Navy was
to opt out, the weapons would still be produced for the Royal
Air Force. Allowing the Navy to have them would not add a
great deal to the total cost, but it would increase the armed
forces 1 flexibility considerably. Mr. Sandys found these argu-
ments persuasive and decided to arm carriers with small fission
weapons.
This issue is related to the subject of aircraft. The
Sea Vixen, an all-weather fighter, was due to enter service
shortly after the Scimitar and would replace the Sea Venom. By
the time it was due to reach the Fleet it would soon become
obsolescent, and the Naval Staff had already generated a require-
ment for a successor. The Navy had two under development - the
SRI 77, an experimental fighter to replace the Sea Vixen and the
Buccaneer which was the long awaited supersonic atomic strike
aircraft. There were cogent military requirements for both,
but in this critical period research projects needed more than
just military rationalizations.
The Minister of Defense cancelled the SR1 77 on the theory
that it was in the early stages of development and the future of
aircraft carriers was not firm enough to justify such an expen-
70
sive project which would be in development for several years.
'
He insisted that the Fleet's current fighters could be stretched,
if better performance was required. This decision was to cause
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the Admiralty considerable distress in years to come. On the
other hand, the Buccaneer was given the "go ahead." It was de-
signed as a supersonic low level strike aircraft which would be
able to penetrate under the enemy's radar coverage. It was
expected to be ready in three to four years and would give the
Royal Navy the jump on the rest of the world in this particular
type of aircraft. It appeared to have some promise as an item
for export, always an important consideration in export-conscious
Britain. Not as important but still significant was the fact
that the Buccaneer development had been aided by American funds,
and there was a great reluctance to cancel out of a project on
which the United States had assisted. There were even some mis-
placed hopes that the United States would place a sizeable order
for it in Britain. In addition it had been designed for some
time to carry the Fleet's atomic weapons and there was consider-
able pressure to get the best possible airplane for this vital job.
The foregoing review covers the Navy's main controversies
with Mr. Sandys but, of course, does not include all the
Admiralty's achievements in this period. A number of programs
were continued or initiated which excited little opposition, yet
materially enhanced the Fleet's capabilities and pointed it
toward its new role. Prior to 1957 the Fleet Air Arm following
an American lead had been experimenting with helicopters for AS¥
work. They possess a tremendous advantage over fixed wing air-
craft in that they can hover and put a sonar transducer in the
water to search for the offending submarine. At the same time
they possess sufficient speed to cover large areas and counter
any evasive maneuvers made by undersea craft. It had already
been decided to replace the G-annets with helicopters in the late
1950' s, and once the Minister of Defense elected to emphasize the
Fleet's ASW role in NATO this plan was implemented without con-
troversy. The same type of helicopters were chosen for this
mission as were to be carried on the commando carriers. With
some minor modifications, which can be made at sea, the ASW and
troop carrying "whirlybirds" can be interchanged.
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The escort program which had been Initiated in 1951 was
continued, and a new class was inaugurated. As previously noted,
neither politicians nor the other Services seem to take the
interest in small ship programs that they do in requests for
larger ones or aircraft programs. This is an area where the
Navy's need is considered unique and legitimate. As long as
the general budgetary levels are not exceeded, little heat is
generated. As a matter of fact the fundamental limit on escorts
seems to derive not from external pressures but from the Navy's
own diverse ambitions which require a great many different types
of ships.
In this particular period the Navy was in an unusual
position. Since iCorea it had been constructing or modernizing
two types of escorts. The destroyer was to accompany the Fleet,
and the slower speed frigate was to protect merchant convoys.
As already stated, the Navy's planners in the middle 'fifties were
developing doubts about this policy. A new general purpose
frigate, the "Tribal" class, which was an improved and cheaper
version of the convoy escort had been on the drawing board for
some time, and the Navy went ahead with laying down the first
one in 1958. However, it was soon evident that what was needed
in the Navy's new limited war role were general purpose escorts
which could perform with the Fleet as well as with convoys. In
1956 the Type 12 ASW frigates, the "Whitby" class, began to
commission, and much to the Admiralty's amazement they exceeded
all expectations. Originally designed for twenty-six knots, they
could make from twenty-nine and one-half to thirty knots and
maintain top speed in practically any kind of weather. They were
well suited to operate with the new task forces and took over the
destroyer's old duties. More Type 12' s were ordered, and the
Tribal class program was cut back. To take further advantage of
the Type 12 's outstanding characteristics a requirement was gen-
71
erated for a new class to be built on this same basic hull form.
The steps taken during this period assured the British task forces
for some time into the future a modern complement of general
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purpose escorts. Combined with the guided missile destroyers due
to come into service in the early 1960's they stood to improve
substantially the overall effectiveness of the Fleet.
In addition the first of a new class of conventional
submarines, the 'jPorpoise" class, undertaken in 1955 began joining
the Fleet. These were the first submarines built since the war
and were configured primarily for ASW missions. Also during the
Sandys era the Admiralty initiated work on the Royal Navy's first
nuclear submarine. This will be discussed in some detail in the
next chapter. One other significant area was receiving attention -
afloat support. The Way Ahead Committee had strongly recommended
that steps be taken to improve the fleet train and its ability to
operate independent of fixed bases. The 1957 Navy Estimates
stressed the importance of these ships, and by 1958 three replen-
ishment ships were being modernized. Considering the size of the
task this was a rather halting step, but scarce funds prevented a
greater effort. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Admiralty
within the limits of available funds intended to complement its
task forces with improved logistics support.
Mr. Duncan Sandys left the Defense Ministry near the end
of 1959, and it is appropriate to assess briefly his influence on
the Royal Navy. He left a definite stamp on the Fleet just as he
had on all the Services. He willed his successor a smaller Navy.
The Admiralty, relatively speaking, was receiving as large a
share of the budget as it had before 1 957* More important he
left behind a different kind of Navy. With one exception every
naval officer and Admiralty civil servant interviewed by the
writer agreed that the reductions in the reserve fleet and
support installations resulting from the 1957 economies were
long overdue and eliminated unnecessary fat which tradition had
precluded trimming. Few agreed that the size of the active forces
was adequate, but this is a common complaint with professionals
in every country. It is interesting to note that the size of the
active fleet decreased only slightly from 1957 to 1959 and that
it was becoming more modern every day. In short, during this
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period many worthwhile projects were initiated which in time
would materially enhance the Fleet's capabilities.
Certainly Mr. Sandys left a great deal of animosity
behind him in the Navy's ranks, but this writer found a general
consensus that he had performed a particularly valuable service
for the Board of Admiralty. "He made it think about the Navy's
role harder than it ever had before, and face up to the unpleasant
realities of post-war British life. "^2 By 1959 the Navy's leaders
knew in their own minds what kind of role they wanted for the
Fleet and had put in train the initial steps to build the
necessary forces. Despite the economies forced on the Navy it
still had its core of carriers and had taken some vital steps
toward complementing these with modern planes, amphibious ships,
guided missile destroyers, and general purpose escorts. It would
be some time before the Fleet was actually composed of the truly
hard-hitting task forces which the White Papers glowingly described,
but the Admiralty had come to terms with the economic, political,
international and technical realities. In the span between 1957
and 1959 the Navy had acquired a more clearly defined role which
it was well suited to play, and was marching with some confidence
in a new direction. The Navy and its leaders deserve considerable
credit for this accomplishment, and likewise Mr. Duncan Sandys
deserves at least a share of praise for his part in this drama.
The Fleet's New Role Confirmed
In 1959 Mr. Harold Watkinson assumed office as Minister
of Defense. He was received with suppressed enthusiasm. His
predecessor's regime was marked by strife and turmoil as he strove
to contain defense costs and impose reduced manpower levels on
the three Services. Each branch was confident that a change would
be for the better. The new Minister commenced his tour with a
number of advantages. He inherited a vastly stronger control
structure than existed in 1957. The Minister of Defense's
position had been considerably strengthened in 1958 when the
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Prime Minister pushed through legislation confirming the powers
7 "3he had already bestowed on Mr. Sandys by administrative fiat.
From that point on he was literally the commander of the whole
defense establishment, rather than a political supervisor. In
addition, this legislation established a new post "Chief of
Defense Staff. " This was to be a high ranking professional
officer who would act as Chairman of the CSC and also as chief
military adviser to the Minister of Defense* He would be respon-
sible for communicating the views of the CSC on matters within
their cognizance to the Minister and also his own personal views
on these issues. In addition, the Joint Planning Staff was to
be directly responsible to the Chief of Defense Staff, and he,
in turn, was to assure that the three Services furnished the
74type of information and staff support that the Minister desired.
The object of these moves was essentially to strengthen the
Minister's hand and to give him a powerful top level professional,
who was divorced from his parent Service, to assist him. It has
already been noted what a strong personal part Mr. Sandys played
in detailed Service affairs, and this legislation guaranteed
that his successors would continue to be instrumental in shaping
the detailed policies of the individual branches.
Y/atkinson enjoyed another substantial advantage. By
1959 the Government had more or less arbitrarily decided that the
defense establishment should receive from 7 to 7.5$ of the Gross
7SNational Product, "' and the military was well aware that barring
crises this figure could not be raised. The main reductions
necessary to reach that level had been taken earlier, and this
took the pressure off the new Minister. Working within this
economic parameter he could devote his attention to tailoring
policy and forces to the new realities.
It was soon clear that the change in Defense Ministers
heralded no drastic or radical revision in overall military
policy. The 1960 Defense Statement indicated that although the
means of delivery were constantly being reevaluated there was no
intention to give up deterrent weapons. By this time deterrence
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had become an article of faith with the Conservative Party, and
it was manifest that the Administration did not intend any re-
treat in regard to nuclear weapons. Watkinson was hard pressed
throughout his administration on this issue, and probably his
most important single decision involved the deterrent - when he
recommended cancelling Blue Streak and opting for the American
Skybolt airborne ballistic missile. This will be discussed at
some length in the next chapter in which the Navy's role in the
strategy of deterrence is sketched.
The continued stress on nuclear weapons meant that a
sizeable portion of the budget would continue to be diverted
from conventional arms. There were nevertheless some subtle,
and in a sense significant, changes taking place in the Govern-
ment's attitudes toward limited war forces. Sandys' initial
emphasis on deterrence very definitely assigned conventional
forces a secondary role and awarded the highest priority to
nuclear weapons. Although conventional forces were retained with
a political flourish, the 1957 and 1958 White Papers had conveyed
the distinct impression that this was being done mainly as a
safety measure until the technical and strategical implications
of nuclear weapons were clearer, and further that the future of
conventional forces was definitely in doubt. This attitude had
begun to change in the latter months of Mr. Sandys' regime, and
it disappeared altogether in the early 1960's.
As early as 1958 Field Marshal Montgomery who had revised
his strategical thinking considerably since 1954- warned that the
nuclear stalemate "would be with us sooner than some of us think"
and that in the future the main threat from Communism was likely'
to come from limited wars and subversion. These sentiments
were widely echoed by lay strategists, journalists, professionals,
77
and Labor Party politicians. Watkinson, although he accepted
the need for the deterrent, subscribed to this philosophy, and
during his regime the role of conventional forces was consistently
upgraded.
It is worthwhile to trace this evolution very briefly.
The 1960 Report on Defense made no reference to priorities, but
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stressed that "because of the need to meet local emergencies
which could develop into a major conflict, conventionally armed
forces are a necessary complement to nuclear armaments."' A
year later the Defense White Paper emphasized that "many of our
most important responsibilities are not concerned with the direct
deterrence of global. war, but rather with the checking of small
outbreaks. ' This same statement emphasized that the Government
was proposing to meet the whole spectrum of possible aggression,
and actually discussed conventional forces ahead of nuclear ones.
The 1962 Defense Statement specifically put deterrence and con-
ventional forces on a par. It insisted that a balance between
the two must be maintained and that "neither element must be so
small as to encourage an aggressor to seek a quick advantage, or
80
to risk a provocative local incident escalating into a major war.
"
It was during this period that the nuclear stalemate was genu-
inely recognized for what it was and that conventional forces
again came into vogue, as a primary not secondary element of the
defense structure.
Paralleling this development was- a decided turn away from
NATO towards the Middle and Far East. Sandys' emphasis on deter-
rence and NATO had been inspired by the threat of a general war
with Russia. Now Britain's overseas responsibilities were again
asserting themselves. The 1957 V/hite Paper had expressed an
intention to cut back on colonial bases and hopefully to reduce
the nation's overseas responsibilities. This proposal had proved
difficult to implement. The Government had accumulated a number
of commitments and interests East of Suez which in the final
analysis it was reluctant to neglect. Not only its treaty obli-
gations as members of CENTO and SEATO, but also its ties with
Malaya, New Zealand, Australia and the African colonies were
compelling. Its commercial interests (primarily oil) in the
Persian Gulf and the Middle East, likewise demanded political
stability, and in turn military attention. On one occasion
Watkinson actually stated that in his view "Kuwait was more im-




It is always difficult to distinguish genuine motivations
from spurious verbalized ones, but there seems little doubt that
notions of national prestige and vanity have also played a signif-
icant part here. It was one thing to recognize the harsh economic
pressures which limited the Government's freedom of maneuver, but
it was another to withdraw from the overseas responsibilities
which Britain had shouldered for so many decades. Through its
Commonwealth and colonial ties Whitehall has exercised extensive
influence throughout the emerging areas of the world, especially
in Africa and South Asia. This relationship is highly valued
because it is a uniquely British phenomenon, and is not shared
with other nations. It "symbolizes an independent and prestigious
non-European leadership position" which the decision-making
elite is hesitant to relinquish. To withdraw completely from
these overseas areas and duties is to abdicate responsibility and
to forfeit an opportunity to exercise independent influence and
leadership. Britain's part in NATO is neither as prestigious nor
as distinguished as its role East of Suez. These are vital con-
siderations for a nation with Britain's past reputation for world
leadership.
By 1960 Britain was hardly in a position to pay full
homage to NATO and look after these interests too. The manpower
cuts instituted by Sandys were beginning to take full effect.
The bases East of Suez which the nation had depended on tradi-
tionally had been gradually cut back as a result both of the
pressures of nationalism and of the domestic economy. In addition,
the shelter of the nuclear umbrella enhanced the likelihood of
unrest, brush fire wars and Communist penetration in these areas.
Neither NATO nor the United States had interests similar to those
of Britain East of Suez. It was more than logical that if peace
was to be maintained there the lion's share of the burden would
fall on Britain. All these factors combined to increase the
importance of the Indian Ocean area in the Government's eyes and
to turn its attention at least partially away from the Atlantic.
With this background the study can examine how the Royal Navy
fared under these new circumstances.
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The new Minister of Defense was very receptive to the
Admiralty's plans to create balanced task forces which could
deploy both troops and air power on short notice. J The initial
steps taken in the late 1 950 ' s to configure the seagoing forces
for a policing role were beginning to bear fruit as V/atkinson
came into office and just as the Government was becoming genu-
inely concerned about its military posture East of Suez. The
Sea Lords promptly took advantage of his sympathies. A request,
previously prepared, asking for a reappraisal of the policy re-
quiring the aircraft carriers West of Suez to carry predominantly
ASW plane complements, was submitted soon after Watkinson's
installation. That decision was quietly reversed. It should be
stressed again that the Fleet Air Arm had delayed implementing
this policy with the express intention of seeking a review of
it. The appointment of a new Minister of Defense was just the
opportunity it had ^oeen awaiting - a graphic illustration of how
bureaucratic inertia can be utilized to frustrate a transient
political executive.
However, Watkinson took this move with full awareness
of the Fleet's new relationship to NATO. It had oeen clear to
the Americans for several months that the Admiralty was revising
its strategical posture and that the profile of the Fleet was
being altered. No longer were the Navy's leaders looking to
SACLANT requirements for their guidelines. Rather they had Lheir
eyes fixed on Britain's specific responsibilities outside the
NATO area. Although Sandys had gone to great lengths to demon-
strate continuing support for NATO's naval forces, Uatkinson
believed that SACLANT had become accustomed to the new order of
things and that the political circumstances no longer required
this rather thinly disguised gesture. This step more or less
formalized the Fleet's turnaway from NATO and made it clear that
other considerations would govern the future composition and
deployment of the British Fleet.
Actually, the Americans too were concerned about pros-
pective trouble spots on the periphery of the Indian Ocean and
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were not too averse to this new line of development. Watkins on
insisted that the best contribution the British Fleet could make
to Western security was to concentrate its efforts from Singapore
to Suez, and there is little question that he received implicit
if not explicit aoproval from his American counterparts in
84
assigning the Fleet this new priority of responsibilities. In
fact the British Fleet is occasionally referred to by Englishmen
who disagree with its policies as "McNamara's Navy," since they
consider that it carries out its oolicing mission with American
8S
encouragement. J American diplomats and military men voice
periodic objections about the failure of the British Navy to
meet its NATO commitments in terms of ships, but these are per-
functory complaints, and it is well understood on both sides of
the Atlantic that the Royal Navy's prime mission lies elsewhere.
It is also appreciated that all the western Allies benefit from
efforts to keep peace and order East of Suez.
It sould be emphasized that the Royal Navy still loyally
subscribes to NATO, and its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean
would be available to SACLANT in an emergency. However, the nature
of these forces is dictated by the Fleet's limited war role with
hardly a bow toward the Alliance. This does not mean that it
cannot make a fruitful contribution. The great advantage that
the Navy enjoys over the Army and Air Force is that most of its
ships and weapons can be deployed for a range of missions, from
showing the flag to atomic tactical strikes. Fortunately the
Royal Navy's balanced task forces include a great deal of equip-
ment which would complement SACLANT ' s forces and make them more
effective in the event they were required.
The official decision to carry balanced air groups demon-
strated the Minister of Defense's faith in the balanced task force.
In turn, it paved the way for the Fleet's final doctrinal conver-
sion to a limited war role. It is fair to say that by 1 960 there
was general consensus within both the Navy and the Government as
to the Fleet's role. White Papers are not always the best guide
in matters of this sort, but the first Lord's Explanatory Statement
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on the Navy Estimates 1961-62 devoted a lengthy paragraph to
limited wars and brushfires. It deserves quoting because it is
both an official declaration and an accurate representation of
the major strategic rationale of the modern Royal Navy:
As weapons become more and more destructive it is more
important than ever that local outbreaks of violence should
not be allowed to develop into full scale war, with the
attendant risks of nuclear conflict. Military power must
be deployed quickly and effectively when trouble occurs,
and this is a primary task of the Royal Navy. It may be
to escort troops and their heavy equipment to the scene
of action; it may be to give them air cover in operations
until air bases can be established ashore; it may be, under
the new commando carrier concept, to function as a fire
brigade and to avert or extinguish small conflagrations
unaided. In every case success depends on prompt inter-
vention, made by the Navy's power of rapid movement. 86
There has been no question since that declaration as to
what the Fleet's role is. This, of course, is not to say that
the Navy does not have other duties. The very nature of ships
makes them versatile instruments of statecraft. The Royal Navy
is still expected to show the flag, assist diplomatic missions,
and to perform missions of mercy. At the same time the bulk
of the Fleet is still committed to the NATO Alliance and would
be an integral part of any combined Western naval effort. Still,
the White Paper quoted above devoted only three lines to this
"global war" mission. Throughout White Papers, parliamentary
debates, press releases and official speeches, the trite refer-
ences to the "Russian submarine threat," "oceanic communication
lines," and "general war" have largely disappeared. In their
place, one reads of "mobile and flexible response," "tri-service
operations," and "brushfire war." The absence of exaggerated
assertions about 'the Royal Navy's ability to control the world's
sea routes is candid and realistic. There is a recognition of
the limited extent of the Fleet's power and a clear sense of
direction which was missing for ten or more years after World War
II. The Guardian caught the significance of this development when
it commented on the 1961 Defense Statement:

217
The period of cuts and uncertainties is past and those
o are giving their lives to the naval Service have a
much clearer idea about why they are there and the vital
importance of their mission. S3
Manifestly, setting a policy and implementing it are not
the same things. Funds available are still less than the
.'.d-iralty would lil:~. -l.i^ :..-.L-„y continuously infects ..11
three British Services, and there is no prospect of a cure in
the foreseeable future. The decision to keep the military
budget at 7i% of the Gross National Product severely limits
expansion. As long. as the Government chooses to retain a
nuclear weapons system the amount which can be allotted to
conventional forces will be further restricted. Nevertheless,
considering the circumstances, the Navy has received increasing
support from the Government in its new role. Its absolute appro-
priations rose steadily from £397 million in 1960 to £440 million
in 1963» Sharewise the Navy's percentage of the total defense
budget remained constant at 24$. However, this figure alone is
misleading. As the Navy's portion percentage-wise remained
constant, the Army and Air Force's shares were slowly decreasing,
so that by 1 963 the Army was receiving 26% and the Royal Air
Force 27$ of the total appropriated monies. Correspondingly the
share of the defense estimates devoted to other agencies had
been increasing steadily - Ministry of Defense, Ministry of
8QAviation, Ministry of Public Works, and Atomic Energy Authority. *
90In short the Navy was consistently improving its relative position.
This is an excellent indicator of the increased importance attached
to the Navy ' s newly formed role , although the Admiralty has con-
tinued to have difficulty reconciling its ambitions with the
available funds.
Another Carrier Fight
Mr. Sandys' successors created an environment more
sympathetic to the Royal Navy's plans to build modern and mobile
conventional task forces. However, the Admiralty must look not
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only to the present, but also to the future. Although the early
19o0's would witness fruition of many of the Sea Lords most
Important programs, they were already looking ahead to the
seventies and eighties with a view to taking timely steps to
keep the Navy actively in the defense picture. It was during
the 1959 to 1 963 period that the Admiralty fought a most crucial
political battle to insure the Fleet's future.
In early 1959 the Board of Admiralty convened a committee
to study the future of the Navy's carriers. At that time there
were four fixed-wing carriers in the active fleet, one under con-
91
struction, one being modernized and two in reserve. The keels
of every one of those ships had been laid before 1946. with the
exception of H. M. S. Eagle every one of those ships had undergone
at least one major modernization. This can perhaps add ten years
of life to a carrier, but there is a definite limit to this pro-
cedure. The study group concluded that the oldest, H. M. S.
Victorious , should be replaced about 1970-72, and that the re-
maining carriers should be systematically phased out and replaced
approximately one every two years. The final recommendation was
for five new carriers to join the Fleet by 1980. With this re-
port on the books the Admiralty turned its attention to launch-
op
ing a campaign for new carriers.
There is little reason to dwell on the Navy's case for
the carrier, it has already been considered at length. In the
Sea Lords' eyes carriers are the heart of balanced task forces
and vital to the Fleet. However, this was the first time since
World War II that the Navy had suggested building new carriers
from the keel up. For a variety of reasons this request was
bound to excite intense opposition. Arrayed against the
Admiralty would be two groups.
First, there were those who contended that carrier
aircraft cannot compete with land-based planes in either cost
or effectiveness. Leading this group was the Air Council which
had opposed aircraft carriers for years on these grounds. A new
generation, unlike a modernization program, of aircraft carriers
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would Involve great expense and a number of major decisions
involving the nation's military posture for several years in
the future. Inevitably so Important a request would offer the
RAF a number of opportunities to publicize its views and, if
possible, to slay this hated dragon.
Initially the RAF had not been too disturbed by the
Admiralty's turn towards limited war. However, the future of
the Air Force's deterrent role was becoming more precarious.
Although the Skybolt missile promised to extend the life of the
manned bomber, it was readily apparent that this project might
collapse. If so the RAF's importance would decline accordingly.
Obviously the Government was concentrating more attention on
conventional forces, and the Air Council, looking to its own
survival, was determined to carve out as large a role as possible
for its tactical and ground support aircraft. It was convinced
that it could best insure its own future by restricting the Fleet
Air Arm's capability.
Allied with the land-based airmen would be a second group
who oppose any single weapons system which involves large ex-
penditures. This group is not as well defined as the former, but
its spokesmen can be counted on to subordinate military arguments
to economic arguments. Leading exponents of this view include
Treasury officials. The carrier program naturally attracted
such opposition. The cost of each proposed ship was most im-
pressive. In 1960 designers were estimating £50 million without
aircraft, and with little doubt that the final cost would be
higher. The economisers opposed laying out so much in a single
piece of hardware that would be subject to the hazards of the
sea and possibly be outdated by the time it was built. This
group would have to be convinced of the long-term value of the
carrier and that the RAF had no suitable alternative.
In typical Admiralty style the initial overtures were
low pressure ones. The Sea Lords were convinced of the inherent
strength of their case and that with persistence and patience
94they would win their point. The first decision of the Board was

220
to ask for four carriers, instead of the five recommended by
the Admiralty committee, and even this number was implicitly a
bargaining figure. Actually the Navy's leaders were primarily
seeking approval in principle for a new generation of capital
ships rather than any specific number. In early i960 the
Admiralty submitted its plans to both the CSC and the Minister
of Defense. Predictably the RAF voiced its disapproval in the
Chiefs of Staff Committee. On the other hand Mr. Y/atkinson
appeared to be impressed and indicated that he was sympathetic
to the Navy's case. However, at this point a number of other
issues intervened to delay any further positive action.
Ever since Mr. Sandys had canceled the Navy's experi-
mental fighter, the SR177, early in his regime, the Fleet Air Arm
had been concerned about a successor to the Sea Vixen, the Fleet's
all-weather fighter, which was due to come into service in 1961.
It was clear that both the Russians and Americans were going to
supersonic fighters and that the Sea Vixen would be obsolete by
those standards in the mid-1 960's. Even more disturbing Russia
had distributed great numbers of its older models to other
95
countries such as Indonesia, Egypt, China and India. This made
it imperative that the Admiralty correct this deficiency at the
earliest, and the Naval staff began to agitate for a new fighter
shortly after Watkinson* s arrival. This campaign happened to
coincide with an RAF request for a successor to its current
tactical support aircraft, the Hunter. The Minister of Defense
saw an opportunity for major economies and instructed the two
Services to investigate the possibility of developing a single
type of aircraft that would meet their respective requirements.
He further informed the Admiralty that its carrier program might
well depend on its ability to meet this request. Essentially
this was a power play on the part of the Minister to bring the
requirements of the two Services together in the interests of
economy. A number of the Navy's aircraft had been developed
from basic RAF models, and the FAA had found this practice gen-
erally unsatisfactory. In each instance the seagoing version
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seemed to be inferior to its RAF counter-part, and slow in going
96into production. Only the Buccaneer had been developed from
the outset as a naval aircraft. It had set a precedent which
the Admiralty wished to continue. Consequently, the Navy's
designers were reluctant to enter a joint program with the RAF.
However, with the new carrier program in the balance, the Naval
Staff began to study seriously the possibilities of melding
their requirements with the RAF's.
As this stumbling block was being erected, the Air
Council was concurrently conjuring an ambitious future alter-
native to carrier air power. This plan was to become known as
the "island base scheme" and represented the RAF's major attempt
to cut into the limited war role which the Navy had carved out
for itself. Basically it was proposed to develop a chain of
strategically located island air bases throughout the Southern
hemisphere and to use them to deploy land-based air power as
needed. Some dozen islands were tentatively suggested among
which were Pltcairn, G-ough, Christmas, Ascension, Gan, Scotia,
Seychelles, Prince Edward, Trista da Cunha, and a number of
others. All were British, and each was selected for its stra-
tegic value, either as a staging base or because it was in the
vicinity of British interests. The Air Council argued that a
string of such bases would make it possible to exert varying
degrees of power and that in turn they would facilitate the rapid
airlift of the Army's strategic reserve in the United Kingdom to
any part of the world. Such a chain would solve the problem of
overflying rights and offer Britain a method for retreating
gracefully from its traditional colonial bases. This was a
rather belated recognition by the Air Force of the importance of
the' limited war role and of •••the fact- that defense emphasis had'
shifted from Europe to East of Suez. An important Implication
of this plan, of course, was that it would obviate the need for
aircraft carriers. This suggestion was pressed vigorously.
Certainly it had some appeal,' and it was considered at length by
the Minister of Defense.
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However, the plan had some major weaknesses, and the
Navy took pains to stress them. In essence it was merely chang-
ing "new bases for old" and would leave the Government with many
of the same problems it had before. If they weren't subject to
local political pressure, they would certainly be subject to
political pressure from adjacent countries which would not be
any fonder of British bases close off shore than ones on their
own territory. Even more significant was the projected cost.
While some of the recommended islands already had air install-
ations on them these would need considerable work to make them
effective bases rather than just air stations. Others would have
to be built from scratch. Manifestly large sums of money would
be required. Economy was one of the main Incentives for with-
drawing from Britain's traditional bases, but the Air Council
was now proposing to replace the old with even more costly
installations. Lastly, each base would serve only a specific
region, and if Britain's interests were to disappear in that
area the Investment there would correspondingly be degraded.
On the other hand carriers could be shifted about as required
without losing the benefits of the capital Investment.
This was the bitterest kind of political battle and
fully lived up to the popular version of inter-Service feuding
with both sides clandestinely lobbying frantically for their
views. The 1962 Defense Statement reflected the Government '
s
ambivalence when it stressed both air and sea mobility, but did
not come down squarely for either the island base scheme or air-
craft carriers. At the same time, however, the Minister of
Defense did allow design work (and only design work) on a new
go
carrier to go forward. * Before he left office in late 1962
Watkinson finally decided against the Air Force's proposal,
primarily on grounds of cost. A few selected island air bases
were to be improved, but nothing more.
During this period the ability of naval task forces to
support British policy was demonstrated convincingly. On June
19, 1961 the sheikdom of Kuwait became fully Independent and
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announced Its intention of joining the United Nations. Despite
the fact that neighboring Iraq had in the past negotiated with
the sheikdom on the basis of sovereign equality, Premier Kassem
within a week made a speech reviving a claim that Kuwait was part
of Iraq and implying that he Intended to annex its territory. On
the eve of its independence Kuwait had concluded a defense agree-
ment with Great Britain and now looked to Whitehall for protection.
This small sheikdom furnishes some 40$ of Britain's oil and is one
of the "interests" which Her Majesty's Government is constantly
concerned about in the Middle East, Iraq's warning was followed
by some warlike preparations. On June 29 the Chiefs of Staff
alerted British forces in the Indian Ocean, and on June 30 the
Ruler of Kuwait formally requested military assistance.
H. M. S. Bulwark, with No. 42 Commando embarked, was at Karachi,
Pakistan enroute to the Persian Gulf. She sailed immediately
for Kuwait and put her troops ashore on July 1 in order to secure
the local airfield. The next day No. 45 Commando was airlifted
from Aden and two squadrons of Hunters arrived to furnish ground
support. The Amphibious Warfare Squadron based at Bahrein was
soon on the scene with a squadron of tanks in LST's along with
artillery. H. M. S. Victorious and four escorts were off
Hongkong and steamed steadily at twenty-two knots to arrive off
1 02Kuwait on July 7. She had the only sophisticated radar on
the scene and immediately assumed control of both naval and land-
based aircraft. The British could not be assured of local air
superiority until she arrived. She was soon joined by H. M. S.
Centaur and her escorts.
The airlift which was set in motion on June 29 was
delayed by Turkey's refusal to grant overflying rights. This was
subsequently lifted and by July 6 there was a parachute battalion
from the United Kingdom on the scene. The build up continued for
nine days until over 5>700 men were in Kuwait from the United
Kingdom, Cyprus, Kenya, and Aden, This force was ashore for
over three weeks and was supported the whole time by an assortment
of naval landing craft, frigates, carriers, helicopters and planes.
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"Fueling, feeding and storing this force amounting to 3,500
sailors was the job of the underway replenishment ships, the
R F A ' s Tldereach , Reliant and Resurgent . who had to provide
over 600 tons of fuel, stores and provisions for each day of
the operation." ^ This was a remarkable demonstration of
mobility and the Navy received its share of the credit both in
public and behind the closed doors of Whitehall. A Daily Express
leader expressed the general feeling: "if anybody thinks that
the day of navies is over, Kuwait should make him change his
opinion. For this police operation has been launched mainly by
means of sea lift." 10
With Kuwait in the background the Navy's leaders were
optimistic in 1962 when the island-base proposal was finally
rejected by the Minister of Defense. It was well known that the
Navy's case would be closely examined probably at the Defense
Committee level and that there would be some dissident voices.
But the Admiralty was confident that it would receive authorization
to commence building carriers. Before Mr. Watkinson decided the
issue, a surprise shakeup in the Cabinet brought Mr. Peter
Thorneycroft to the Ministry of Defense in mid-1962. 5 This
presented the Navy with a completely new political situation.
There was now some urgency. Over two years had slipped
past since the carrier campaign had commenced, and the Admiralty
had very little to show for its effort except approval to proceed
with preliminary design work. In the Sandys tradition the new
Minister of Defense made it clear that he questioned the wisdom
of investing in carriers. The Royal Air Force took heart and
renewed the attack. The Air Council even revived the island-base
scheme. However, Thorneycroft did not act rashly. He appointed
a civilian committee of scientists and other experts to make a
study and report on the future role of the Navy with emphasis on
the need for carriers. This was known as the Lindrew Committee
and there were no military officers on it. The Board of Admiralty
was genuinely perturbed by this omission, though its objections
1 07had little effect. ' The Board had to stand aside while this
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group of civilian experts examined the Royal Navy's mission and
made recommendations concerning its future.
The committee's report was never made public, but much
to Thorneycroft ' s surprise and the Navy's pleasure it came down
solidly for the aircraft carrier. A naive observer might con-
clude that this was the end of the fight. In actual fact it was
merely the first salvo. Having passed that hurdle the Navy was
now allowed to pursue its case for the carrier a step further.
Again the RAF and the Navy Joined battle. The Chief of Air Staff
had consistently refused as a member of the CSC to sanction the
requirement for a new carrier, and the Navy was forced to carry
its case directly to the Ministry of Defense without CSC support.
Thorneycroft requested the Navy's views, and the Admiralty com-
plied with a staff paper reviewing the whole spectrum of the
Navy's requirements and illustrating how naval air power meshed
into this picture.
In regard to the carrier, the standard arguments stressing
mobility, lack of foreign bases, international political problems,
and inability to obtain overflying rights were resurrected. How-
ever, a new wrinkle was inserted. The major emphasis was laid
on the need for modern equipment. In the 1960's even some small
Powers were accumulating sophisticated missiles, aircraft and
submarines. Both the United States and Russia have gone to great
lengths to assist their allies in this regard. This is particu-
larly crucial in Southeast Asia where China, India, Pakistan and
Indonesia all have some relatively modern ships, submarines and
planes. For example, Indonesia has acquired some light Russian
patrol boats which mount a surface-to-surface missile with a
1 0Pi
fifteen to twenty mile range. Such a weapon can be a serious
menace to navai and merchant ships, and the Admiralty was con-
tending that it must be prepared to meet such threats in kind.
In the Admiralty's opinion there were two choices open to the
Navy if it was to be prepared to operate offensively against such
forces. It could develop a variety of sophisticated guided
missile ships or rely on carrier aircraft. In Britain's case
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the lack of funds precluded pursuing both courses, and the
Admiralty argued that carrier aircraft could be used for more
purposes and offered the best return for the investment. In
essence the Navy's leaders were asking for a modern general-
purpose Fleet that could meet and overcome any opposition.
Thorneycroft was manifestly impressed with the Navy's
1 09
case and indicated that he was Inclining toward its position.
However, there was still some pending business. He had to dis-
pose of the Air Force's island-base scheme and, after requesting
cost estimates, again vetoed it Just as his predecessor had done.
With this out of the way he turned to the question of a common
aircraft, Thorneycroft had Just come from the Ministry of
Aviation where he had concurred with Watkinson that the two
Services should meld their requirements for the next generation
of fighters. He now intended to pursue this project and asked
the Navy to make a real effort to match its specifications with
the RAF's.
This was asking a good deal. The Air Council was seeking
a supersonic ground support aircraft with a vertical take off
capability. This project was called the P1154, and the initial
research had showed considerable promise. Unfortunately, the
Navy wanted an interceptor aircraft which could patrol over the
Fleet for extended periods and seek out intruding bombers and
fighters. This required more fuel capacity and a great deal more
electronics, than were designed into the P1154-, In order to
operate the radar and intercept equipment the Naval Staff felt
that its plane must have a two man crew and for reasons of
safety had specified two engines. If the P1154 was altered to
include all these features, it would become a great deal heavier
with a corresponding loss of speed which was unacceptable to
both the RAF and Navy. One alternative which the FAA found accept-
able was to gain weight by eliminating the vertical take off
feature of the P1 154. This was the one feature which the RAF
could not give up. In essence the politicians were asking the




It had been obvious to the Navy for some time that there
was little likelihood of reaching agreement with the RAF. As
early as 1961 the Fleet Air Arm had begun to look for other
alternatives and had become Interested in the U. S. Navy's new
interceptor, the Phantom II. It was a mach-two fighter-strike
aircraft which the U. S. Navy was developing for carrier use and
promised to match any fighter in the world. It appeared to be
the ideal solution to the Fleet Air Arm's problem, if it could
be adapted to the Royal Navy's carriers. The Naval Staff pro-
ceeded to investigate these problems and to make some preliminary
soundings as to the availability of this aircraft. However,
when Thorneycroft indicated that he was preparing to take the
carrier question to the Defense Committee the Admiralty relaxed
its opposition to the P1154 and renewed its efforts to reach
agreement with the RAF. It was determined to do everything in
its power to improve the prospects of obtaining approval for new
carriers.
In the spring of 1 963 the Minister of Defense Informed
the Admiralty that he was prepared to back the carrier replacement
program, but that he was convinced he could never get the Defense
Committee to authorize four. It was well known that there was
considerable opposition in this body. The Treasury had indicated
that such a large commitment would be opposed. Sandys who was
then the Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Secretary also had
a voice on the Defense Committee, and the Navy anticipated his
opposition. The Air Minister too would be sitting, and was ex-
pected to resist the Navy's projected program with all the argu-
ments at his command. Considering the circumstances, the Board
of Admiralty reluctantly scaled down its request to two.
Before forcing the issue formally, the Defense Minister's
office entered into discussions with the Treasury in order to lay
the groundwork. Opposition in the Treasury Minister's office was
deeply rooted. On one hand, the Admiralty was quoting £60 million
for a new carrier; on the other hand, the Treasury was insisting
that with aircraft and associated equipment one carrier would
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cost over £100 million. The Treasury was reluctant to approve
hardware involving such large sums, which would commit the
defense establishment for the next twenty to thirty years. It
was a well known fact that the Royal Air Force was furnishing
anti-carrier material to the Treasury and to others. After a
series of heated exchanges the Minister of Defense reported to
the Board of Admiralty that the Chancellor of the Exchequer
would agree to one new carrier and two modernizations in the
late 'sixties in order to give the Navy a modern three carrier
Fleet in the 1970's. He further indicated that this was the
best political compromise the Navy could hope for at that time.
This was a severe set back for the Admiralty, and there
was sentiment among the Sea Lords to reject this offer and to
press the fight for two. After extended discussions, however,
the Board conceded. The Navy's leaders concluded that the prime
objective was approval for at least one new carrier. This would
tie the Government to the Navy's mobile task force concept and
Justify a new generation of aircraft. Their Lordships were con-
fident that the nation's foreign policy would continue to focus
East of Suez and Africa, and that time was on their side. As
Britain's overseas bases continued to disappear the requirement
for a strong Fleet would expand and in turn the need for more
than three carriers would become evident. Thus the immediate
objective was to get approval for at least one new carrier and
to commit the Government on a long-term basis to the Navy's
limited war doctrine. Both the First Lord and the First Sea Lord
were convinced that approval for one would be the wedge opening
1 1 2the door to a new generation of carriers. This view prevailed
and the Board of Admiralty threw its might behind Thorneycroft '
s
efforts to lay the groundwork with his political colleagues. In
the Defense Committee the Royal Air Force pressed a vigorous
dissent, but it fell on deaf ears. By this time both the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and, even more important, the Prime
1 1
"5
Minister had been converted. ' After normal argument and delay
Thorneycroft was authorized to announce approval of the Navy's
plans for a new carrier to Join the Fleet in the early 'seventies.
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The Minister of Defense informed the House of Commons
on July 30, 1963. This was a critical victory for the Navy
and its most crucial battle since 1957 when Sandys threatened
the carriers with extinction. It firmly reestablished the Navy
in Britain's future defense plans and offered the Admiralty the
vote of confidence which it had been seeking. Undoubtedly this
was a compromise which fell far short of the Board's desires.
On the other hand, there was general confidence that one new
carrier would in the end mean a new class of carriers. This
was not the first time the Board of Admiralty had compromised
with the express intention of continuing to press for its
original program, a technique that had proved very successful
over the years. This view was verbalized by the First Lord in
the House of Lords on July 31 when he stated that this decision
1 1 *5
was only a first step toward an eventual class of carriers. *
Such a step is always open to review and to political sniping
from opponents. Both the Treasury and the Royal Air Force have
continued to harass the carrier's progress. But the sounds of
forensic battle have receded, and the Admiralty now considers
1 1 f\
the Royal Navy's role assured for another decade.
At the same time the Minister of Defense announced
approval for a new carrier, he declared that "the Royal Navy and
the Royal Air Force had agreed on the characteristics of a
117
common aircraft to replace the Sea Vixen and the Hunter.
The main objective here was apparently to make the carrier
decision politically more palatable, but it was somewhat of an
exaggeration. The two Services were intensively studying the
problem and were making a sincere attempt to reach agreement.
However, their respective positions were some distance apart and
in fact were never reconciled. The Fleet Air Arm went so far as
to agree to a single engine, a single seat, and the reduction of
some electronic equipment, but weight was still too critical.
If the plane was to be a supersonic interceptor it could not
include the vertical take off and landing feature and still meet
the Fleet's needs. The Navy did not require this because carrier
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catapults and arresting gear make it unnecessary at sea. Once
the two Services had reached a final impasse, Thorneycroft was
again brought in for a decision, and he found the Navy's arguments
persuasive. After a careful review, the pressure for a common
aircraft was relaxed, and the Naval Staff was authorized to
negotiate for the purchase of American Phantom II 's.
The military arguments for this purchase were over-
whelming. Once the decision to extend the life of the carrier
was made there was an irrefutable need for a more modern inter-
ceptor. The Phantom II promised the British Navy its first truly
up-to-date plane since the 1930's and would give it a capability
of competing with any aircraft in the world. It has never been
able to make that claim. By 1963 this aircraft was in service
and could be available in two to three years rather than waiting
for the long development period which would confront a solely
British experimental project. The U. S. Navy was willing to
make it financially attractive "by offering it at practically
118
cost and including no development expenses."
Such a foreign purchase always meets opposition. The
aircraft industry objects to the Government going abroad. Purchase
of American products endanger Britain's precarious exchange posi-
tion. In addition, there is always a vocal group which deplores
British dependence on America. This has never bothered the Royal
Navy which has consistently argued for closer cooperation with
the U. S. military establishment. In order to ease Thorneycroft '
s
problem the Navy's Phantoms were to have Rolls Royce engines which
would partially mollify British industry (and also increase per-
formance).
When the purchase of American Phantoms was announced on
February 26, 1964 it brought the expected storm of protest. How-
ever, there was general agreement that due to the small number
1 1 9
which the Navy required it was on the whole a wise decision.
From a military perspective this decision cannot be faulted, and
the Minister of Defense deserves praise for his political courage.
There is always strong pressure in Britain for eoonomies and in
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turn for bringing the requirements of the RAF and Navy closer
together. This is a laudable objective, but in the case of the
P1154 it was sheer nonsense, since the two Services were trying
to satisfy totally different requirements. Thorneycroft proved
to be amenable to rational argument, and it is to his credit
1 20that he refused to yield to ill informed political pressure.
These two decisions confirmed the Government's confidence
in the mission which naval task forces are presently performing
and insured the Navy's place in future British defense planning.
Just as important they promise to correct the most glaring mili-
tary deficiencies in the seaborne forces and to improve materi-
ally the Fleet's ability to carry out its assigned functions.
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these two
political battles for they committed the country to a partial
maritime strategy for at least two decades and probably longer.
The Balanced Fleet
At the same time as the Sea Lords were fighting
desperately for a new generation of carriers they were making
steady progress toward the modern general purpose Fleet which
they desired. While the carrier dispute monopolized the debating
forum, the Admiralty's other plans excited little comment or
effective opposition. The Navy's leaders had a relatively free
hand as long as they remained within the general financial para-
meters Imposed by the Government. As a consequence the programs
initiated under Mr. Sandys were brought to fruition and in many
cases expanded. Altogether, the 1959-63 period witnessed a sub-
stantial strengthening of the Fleet in both quality and
versatility, if not quantity.
The most remarkable and vigorous steps were taken in the
area of amphibious lift. The first commando carrier, H. M. S.
Bulwark
.
Joined the seagoing forces in 1959. It was an immediate
success and demonstrated its value at Kuwait, In 1 960 a decision
was made to convert H„ M. S. Albion to a commando carrier. This
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vessel Included a number of Improvements over Bulwark and was
commissioned in 1962, These ships have materially increased
the Fleet's offensive capabilities and at least one of these
i pi
carriers is constantly deployed East of Suez.
The assault ship, H. M. S. Fearless, was contracted for
in 1 960 and a year later the Admiralty obtained approval for a
sister ship, H. M. S. Intrepid. Both of these ships were
scheduled to be operational and in the Fleet by 1 966. The
Amphibious Warfare Squadron will eventually be replaced by these
two 12,000 ton LSA's. Needless to say they will materially en-
hance the Fleet's ability to move troops and heavy equipment
rapidly.
In 1963 the Admiralty commenced drawing up plans for
converting its three cruisers to a new form of support ship.
They would be modified to carry approximately 450 troops and a
few helicopters for landing them. In addition they would fur-
nish the task group with heavy gunfire support in the event an
opposed landing was to be made. This is a typical example of
how a navy short of funds can make its existing ships go further
by performing a variety of duties. This project had not received
the final "go ahead" by the end of 1963» but there was every
1 22prospect it would be approved shortly.
These steps were complemented by one other interesting
development. The Army has always maintained a number of ships
under its own control for carrying and supplying its troops
overseas. In the late 1950's it was considering taking steps to
modernize this capability. The Joint Warfare Headquarters
(successor to the Amphibious Warfare Headquarters) which was
pushing enthusiastically for more amphibious lift recommended
that any new vessels the Army bought or built be configured not
only as regular transports, but also as amphibious vessels, much
like the older LST's but more up-to-date. Studies were initiated
to Investigate the feasibility of such a class, and in August i960
the Chiefs of Staff authorized the building of a new logistic
ship, Sir Lancelot , for the Ministry of Transport. "* It was
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designed primarily as a transport for troops and heavy equipment.
However, it was also configured as an amphibious assault craft
and can land some 350 troops and their equipment directly on to
a beach. Just as important, this ship can make seventeen knots
which is a vast improvement over older types of amphibious vessels.
A total of six of these craft were eventually ordered, and Sir
Lancelot was completed in January 1964. A few of these ships are
intended to be deployed in the same area as the Navy's Amphibious
Warfare Squadron in order to furnish support on short notice.
By 1966 the Admiralty plans to have a constantly ready
amphibious force East of Suez capable of putting approximately
two battalions, their tanks and artillery ashore. "With any
1 Oh.
warning time this capability could be expanded to brigade size."
If further troops were needed the RAF's airlift and the United
Kingdom's strategic reserve would be utilized to follow up the
initial landing. Thus, by 1963, the Admiralty was making con-
siderable strides in improving the Fleet's ability to respond to
crises which required British troops.
It was during this era that the Sea Lords began to deal
seriously with the problem of afloat support. From 1959 to 1963
seven maintenance and support ships were modernized and four new
high speed tankers were built. Concurrently plans were put in
hand for constructing a new helicopter support ship, two fleet
replenishment ships and three tankers all equipped with heli-
1 2S t
copters to Improve their capabilities. ^ It was the Admiralty s
expressed intention to renew progressively all the ships which
furnish stores, supplies, fuel and ammunition directly to the war-.
ships operating at sea, and by 1963 this program was well advanced.
As an indication of the Fleet's new mobility over half the fuel
used by the Royal Navy ships is now supplied at sea as opposed to
1 ?7\0% in 1 9^9* Kuwait was an excellent example of the Fleet's
new self-sufficiency. Some six hundred tons a day were supplied
to the task force in the Persian Gulf. Supporting the fast re-
plenishment ships are a train of depot and forward base repair
ships. Due to the lack of funds the Admiralty has been forced
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to rely primarily on modernizations to keep these ships updated.
Nevertheless by 1 963 the Fleet had more maintenance ships avail-
able than at any time since 19^5. There is little question that
the Fleet was developing a remarkable capability to shed its
1 0P1
traditional shore base support. The new Royal Navy is truly
a "long legged" one.
The Fleet's combat strength had likewise materially
improved in quality if not in quantity. In 1963 there were four
guided missile destroyers in the active forces and two more
1 29building. In addition there were some seventy-one smaller
escorts in service that year and forty-nine of them had been
built since World War II. They represented some of the most
advanced ASW ships in the world. Of the remaining twenty-two all
but two had been extensively modernized. At the same time there
were nine frigates on the stocks. Over half the Fleet's forty
submarines were less than ten years old, and there was one nuclear
attack submarine at sea. The nuclear submarine program will be
discussed at length in the next chapter.
By 1963 the Fleet's offensive potential was considerably
improved. The Scimitar Joined the seagoing forces in 1959. She
was configured primarily as a fighter-strike aircraft with a
capability for carrying conventional and small atomic bombs.
Shortly after that the Sea Vixen took over as the first-line all-
weather fighter and gave the Fleet an air-to-air missile capa-
bility. This aircraft likewise could carry small fission weapons.
In 1963 the long awaited supersonic Buccaneer went into service
furnishing the Fleet Air Arm a sophisticated low level attack
capability and a genuine atomic capability. It is important to
note, however, that by this time it had been decided to configure
the Buccaneer for a suit of conventional bombs and rockets. This
did not eliminate its capability for carrying nuclear weapons,
but substantially improved its ability to contribute to the Fleet's
conventional role. In i960 tactical atomic weapons were distri-
1 "50buted to the active carriers, ^ fulfilling an ambition the
Admiralty had nourished since the early 1950*8. Ironically
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enough, by that time it was very unlikely that the Fleet Air Arm
would ever use this enhanced capability. In addition the Royal
Navy had contracted to buy the U. S. Navy's standoff bomb,
Bullpup. This would make it possible for the Buccaneer to
launch its bombs some distance from the target and substantially
enhanced its effectiveness as a strike aircraft. This one move
corrected one of the most glaring deficiencies in the FAA's
inventory.
Despite these improvements, unquestionably the biggest
weakness in the Fleet's array of weapons was in the Fleet Air
Arm. Scimitar, Sea Vixen and, of course, Buccaneer all repre-
sented a respectable capability for attacking tactical targets,
both at sea and ashore, and supporting troops. However, in any
military situation where conventional weapons are to be employed
the crucial item is control of the air, and this rests solely on
fighters. Once a commander can either control the air completely
or furnish adequate protection for his attack aircraft he can then
draw on the full potential of air power. By the mid-1960's both
Scimitar and Sea Vixen would be obsolete by the most advanced
criteria. This weakness has plagued the Royal Navy off and on
since World War II. Once the Fleet Air Arm obtains the American
Phantom this deficiency will be corrected. However, until this
aircraft joins the Fleet it must operate under an umbrella of
obsolete fighters. Needless to say this depreciates its general
effectiveness and would detract from its ability to support the
U. S. Navy in any sort of altercation with the U.S.S.R.
All these steps were the fruition of many years of planning
and each was part of the overall scheme to create the balanced task
forces which were first mentioned in the 1955 Navy Estimates. They
testify to the Navy's considerable progress despite the financial
burdens imposed on the Admiralty, and to the serious efforts being
made to fulfill the new role deliniated for the Fleet. The
following is a tabulation of the combat forces available to the
Admiralty in 1963: 151

236






Aircraft Carriers 4 - 1
Commando Ships 2 - -
Cruisers 2 - 4
Guided Missile Destroyers 4 - -
Other Destroyers 13 1 22
Frigates 37 16 24
Submarines 36 2 11
Nuclear Submarines 1 - -
Minesweepers 37 24 108
Landing Vessels 7 6 6
The 1962 Explanatory Statement accompanying the Navy
Estimates dramatically portrayed the tactical roles which the
Admiralty envisioned for the various elements of the Fleet:
The commando ships and assault ships put ashore the
spearhead of the land forces with their guns, tanks and
vehicles. The aircraft carriers provide reconnaissance
and tactical strike ahead of the landing; air defense
for the seaborne force; and close support for the troops
ashore - especially when this cannot be done, either
adequately or at all, by land-based aircraft. Cruisers
and escorts reinforce the air and anti-submarine cover,
direct our aircraft and give warning of the enemy's, and
use their guns for bombardment if required. Submarines
provide additional protection against hostile submarines
and carry out reconnaissance and mlnelaylng. The mine-
sweepers clear a way to the land. The Royal Fleet
Auxiliary tankers and store ships keep the whole of the
seaborne force supplied. 132
Perhaps this statement slightly exaggerated the cap-
abilities of the 1962 Fleet, it did accurately describe the forces
which the Admiralty was fashioning. In turn there was little
question that vigorous efforts were being made to correct the
material deficiencies which remained. It is difficult not to be
impressed with the material strides which the Admiralty has made
since 1957 in the face of rather adverse economic circumstances.
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There is little question that the Fleet had been moulded into a
compact and versatile limited war force with an impressive cap-
ability for projecting military power rapidly and effectively to
a local trouble spot. Although the Navy's attention is now
centered on limited war, Its ships are still well suited to
work with those of the Allies and of supporting NATO within the
limit of its numbers. Although they could contribute only
marginally to a strategic nuclear effort, Britain's general
purpose task forces would be a welcome addition to any conven-
tional naval effort which SACLANT might be required to muster.
By 1963 it was clearly manifest that the Royal Navy would be
a major pillar supporting British policy as long as there was
a requirement for conventional weapons and limited war forces.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing aocount is no
more than an overview of the Navy's technical capabilities and
problems. The major focus of this study is on naval policy, and
it is not possible to treat in any depth the Fleet's material
condition. There has been some controversy over the efficiency
of the Royal Navy's research, management procedures, and equip-
ment choices. ^J However, this is true of every military organ-
ization. The choices and methods of the U. S. Navy are constantly
being diagnosed and criticized by a variety of commentators often
with considerable Justification. The Royal Navy is continuously
undergoing the same type of examination, and the professional
officer can no doubt find a number of areas for criticism of or
at least disagreement with the Admiralty's Judgments regarding
specific items of equipment. That is a separate subject and the
great bulk of the literature concerning the post-war Royal Navy
deals with Just this class of problems. However, irrespective
of such complaints there is a general professional consensus that
the quality of the Royal Navy's ships and equipment is high, well
suited to its limited war mission, and improving steadily. In
other words, within the financial limits Imposed upon it and with-
in the confines of Britain's industrial base the Admiralty has
made considerable progress in creating seagoing forces which can
fulfill the role the Royal Navy has assumed.
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In the final analysis, the prime military weakness of
the Royal Navy lies not in the quality of its ships, planes and
weapons but in its size. Often professional naval officers and
lay strategists compare the Fleet with that of former years and
denounce its reduced numbers. They claim that even in its new
limited war role the Fleet is dangerously small and that there
1 "54is a drastic need for more funds and ships. ' Certainly these
complaints have some merit. There is a definite limit to the
power which the modern Royal Navy can exert. By 1963 the
Admiralty could deploy a maximum of five fixed wing carriers
in an emergency, and it is unlikely that all five would be avail-
able simultaneously - three is a more realistic number. Its
amphibious capability from a readiness standpoint is restricted
in size. There is, of course, no guarantee that the Navy's task
forces will be in the right place at the right time, and the
distances East of Suez can be formidable. Crises in two locations
at once might be beyond the Fleet's capacity. Obviously in
policing the area from Capetown to Singapore size might easily
be the controlling factor.
However, a reasonable appraisal of the British Fleet must
take into account the whole picture of national interests. There
is no virtue in power or size for their own sake. They must be
related to tangible goals and enemies. This study has noted that
throughout the period 1945-63 Britain has been faced with adverse
economic conditions. In fact the Admiralty's turn to a limited
war role was largely dictated by the lack of funds. Considering
this it is not realistio to argue for a vast Fleet which can
cover any number of contingencies. The Admiralty must concen-
trate on forces which will give the most return for the money
and plan to utilize its ships to the limit - Just as it has been
doing for the last decade. There is some risk in operating on
the margin, but this is a fact of life in post-war Britain and
one that shows little prospect of changing. In this regard it
is instructive to note that since the Navy has turned its atten-




Moreover, it is essential to keep in mind the type of
challenge which the Navy is attempting to meet East of Suez. It
is acting as a police force to put troops and planes on the
scene before a local brush fire can spread. Britain's naval task
forces are fully capable of dealing with any naval or air opposi-
tion which might be mustered in this area, unless Russia or the
United States were to take a hand. In the same vein the Fleet's
mobility and modern equipment give its amphibious troops a
greater capability than their numbers suggest. If the threat
is more than a brush fire, the Navy must work in conjunction
with the Army and RAF, and its plans are drawn up on that basis.
Similarly, in the event of a genuine crisis which threatened
world peace there is every reason to believe that Britain
could count on the United States for assistance.
All factors considered, the Admiralty's plans for
keeping two carrier task forces East of Suez at all times and
for developing a ready amphibious lift for at least a brigade do
not appear too out of line with its declared role. This is not
to say that the Royal Navy could not use more ships and planes;
it could very well. Every increase in size would ease its task
and make it more formidable. However, this would require
additional appropriations which experience suggests is most
unlikely. In essence the Admiralty's present objectives admit
the real world and promise to give the nation a hearty return
on its investment. More disturbing than the Fleet's present
capabilities are the prospects for the future. There is some
question as to whether the Admiralty can maintain the Fleet at
its present strength in the coming years, however, this problem
will be deferred to a later chapter.
The last three chapters have dealt with the "mainstream
of naval thinking" ^ and traced the evolution of the Navy's role
in the overall military picture. However, simultaneously with
these events a number of political and technical pressures out-
side the mainstream were building up. These, in 1962, thrust
the responsibility for delivering the nation's deterrent on to

240
the Royal Navy's shoulders. Needless to say this would further
enhance the Navy's status and place it in a central position in
the defense heirarchy. It is now time to examine this develop-
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56. For elaboration of this theme see Alastair Buchan, Observer ,
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61. The Times , May 27, 1957.
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63. Manchester Guardian , August 3, 1 957«
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1772.
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72. Interview. For a similar analysis see the editoral section
of The Manchester Guardian
. February 24, 1959.
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:
Royal United Service Institution , Vol. CV, No. 617 (February
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Secretary of State for the Army admitted that he had approved
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78. Cmd. 952, "Report on Defense I960," February I960, p. 1.
79. Cmd. 1288, "Statement on Defense 1961," February 1961, p. 1.
80. Cmd. 1639, "Statement on Defense 1962," February 1962, p. 3.
81. "Compromise Likely Over Defense," Scotsman , February 10, 1962.
82. Snyder, Politics , 234.
83. Mr. Watkinson had served in the Navy during the war. However,
this by no means assures a Service a sympathetic minister.
It must be remembered that the closer a politician has been
to a specific Service the more he knows about its weaknesses
as well as its strengths.
84. This was mentioned in several interviews, but only in one did
the respondent talk specifics. Occasionally a Minister has
declared publicly that the Americans supported this policy.
For example see a statement by Mr. Thorneycroft , when he was
Minister of Defense: "Our commitments in the Far East are
at least as important as those in Europe ... an opinion
shared by the American Administration. The Times . September 9,
1962. For a report of Secretary McNamara expressing similar
views see The Times , February 16, 1962.
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86. Cmd. 1282, "Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates
1961-62," February 1961, p. 3.
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unofficial articles and commentaries. One still finds a
great many retired officers and laymen making exaggerated
references to the Fleet's responsibilities and capabilities.
This is one of the most impressive features of studying the
English bureaucratic scene - the large void that often exists
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88. The Guardian , February 24, 1961.
89. See Appendix II.
90. It should be emphasized that the 1963 estimates had not begun
to reflect the impact of the Polaris program. This is dis-
cussed in some detail in the next chapter, and no doubt the
Navy's share will continue to expand because of this new
commitment. Of course, how much it will increase is a
crucial question which only time can answer.
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.
In the active fleet Ark Royal , Hermes , Centaur and Albion -
under construction Eagle - being modernized Victorious -
in reserve Triumph and Magnificent .
92. The writer could discover no public references to this committee,
although starting in i960 there were numerous articles about
the Admiralty's plans for new carriers. It was mentioned in
several interviews.
93. The Times , October 26, 1960; Ibid , March 15, 1962.
94. It is interesting to note that the Sea Lords held off
inaugurating this drive until Mr. Sandys had departed. How-
ever, the writer could find no tangible evidence that there
was a direct connection here. One respondent did mention
that the Navy's leaders were dreading the prospect of having
to push new carriers by Sandys.
95. For detailed data on the air forces of these countries see
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (New York: McGraw Hill
Book Co. ) . This work is published annually.
96. The Navy's aircraft problems have been legion, and there is
little question that common development with the RAF has been
one of the sources of difficulty. For example the Sea Venom,
Sea Vixen, and Scimitar were all offshoots of RAF models and
were not perfected until the land-based version was first
wrung out. In each instance the naval version was slightly
inferior to its RAF cousin.
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"Defense Clearway Around the World," Dally Express , January 30,
1962; and The Times , August 22, 1961. Also for mention of the
scheme see statement by Lord Mountbatten, The Times ,
December 7, 1962.
98. For editorial comment see The Times , October 21, 1962.
99. Cmd. 1629, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty
Explanatory of the Navy Estimates 1962-63," February 1962, p. 4,
100. For a brief but excellent summary of the military facets of
this incident see Brown, 88-96.
101. Interestingly enough some LST's owned by the Ministry of
Transport and leased to the Army happened to be in the
Persian Gulf bringing relief equipment to the Amphibious
Warfare Squadron at Bahrein. They were diverted to Kuwait,
so both the Army and Navy had ships participating in the
Kuwait operation. Major-General J. L. Moulton, Mobility in
Amphibious Warfare," Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces
Yearbook 1962 (New York! The Macmillan Co., 1962), pp. 1 66-67.
102. Brown, 90.
103. Naval Review , December 1961
,
p. 399.
104. July 10, 1961.
105. In July 1962 the Conservative Party's fortunes were at a low
ebb due to overwhelming losses in a number of by-elections
and a slow moving economy. In a surprise move, Prime Minister
Macmillan purged his Cabinet and appointed a number of new
ministers, Mr. Thorneycroft being one.
106. See Chapman Pincher, Daily Express . July 25, 1962.
107. The Lindrew Committee was appointed as a confidential group,
and its existence was presumably an intra-governmental secret.
However, it was reported in the press as "a top level team of
scientists" along with some scathing criticism of the fact
that there -were no professional naval officers included in
its membership. See Hampshire Telegraph and Naval Chronicle ,
September 17, 1962. Reportedly Thorneycroft was furious at
this leak, but he himself publicly answered the charges,
admitting its existence and assuring the public "that no
decision on naval operational policy will be made by any
scientific committee without reference to, and full consul-
tation with, the Royal Navy." Hampshire Telegraph , October 3,
1962. He admitted that the committee's primary purpose was
to advise him on a new generation of carriers and the
advisability of building more nuclear submarines.
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108. These are "Komar" class torpedo boats sold to the
Indonesians by the U.S.S.R.
109. Interview. In this regard see "The Super Warships,"
Daily Express , February 11, 1963.
110. Surprisingly the writer found tens of articles written on
the Government's fight to get the RAF and RN to concur on
a common aircraft. The vast bulk of them spoke as if only
short sighted vested interests prevented an agreement, but
not a one discussed the technical problems involved. From
the military standpoint there were pressing reasons pre-
cluding a joint aircraft, but no journalist chose to
articulate them.
111. This rests solely on private information. The object here
was to study the Phantom without tipping the Admiralty's
hand. NATO operations were scheduled with U. S. carriers,
and aircraft were exchanged under the guise of improving
each Fleet's ability to operate with the other. However,
the main purpose was to get a Phantom on board a British
carrier in order to test its compatibility with British
equipment,
112. This statement rests on the confirmation of a number of
interviews.
113- In the final showdown even Sandys supported the carrier.
One respondent attributed this to Sandys' interest in Malaya.
As the Colonial Secretary he was in the process of negoti-
ating the formation of the Federation of Malaysia and was
interested in Britain being able to support its policies in
that area.
114. 682 H. C. Deb. 237o
115. 252 H. L. Deb. 1060-62.
116. The new carrier has just recently been reviewed by the new
Labor Government and approved. This was a substantial boost
to naval spirits. One very high placed respondent expressed
confidence that the Wilson G-overnment would soon approve at
least two more new carriers.
117. 682 H. C. Deb. 237.




119. The number to be bought was never actually released. During
the parliamentary discussion of the exchange the number fifty
was suggested as approximately the correct figure. As long
as no more than fifty were to be bought there seemed to be
little protest. Then the persevering Mr. Chapman Pincher of
the Daily Express reported the number as 14-0, December 14,
1964. This figure resurrected some opposition, but by then
the deal seemed to be firm and besides the Government refused
to confirm this number.
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It now looks as if the Government will buy Phantoms for the
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bility. The naval aviators are convinced that the RAF would
then get first call, and this would delay delivery to the
Fleet of its Phantoms. It will be Interesting to see if that
is actually the case.
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fixed wing carriers and one commando carrier or two commando
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The Times , March 30, 1964.
122. This scheme has subsequently been approved. 690 H. C. Deb. 935.
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Ministry of Transport for the benefit of the Army. For a
detailed discussion of these ships see D. Maclver Robinson,
"The Logistic Ship Lancelot," Brassey's Annual 1964 (New York:
Macmillan, 1964), pp. 165-71.
124. Interview. Also see Sampson, Brassey's 1964 , 164.
125. Cmd. 1170, "Statement on Defense 1964," February 1964, p. 14.
126. In this regard see remarks of Lord Mountbatten reported in
The Times , December 7, 1962.
127. Naval Review , January 1963, p. 83.
128. For detailed discussion of progress with afloat support see
Cmd. 1629, pp. 19-20.
129. Two more were ordered in 1964.
130. Daily Express , December 2, 1960.
131. Cmd. 2270, "Statement on Defense 1964," February 1964,
pp. 25-26. •
132. Cmd. 1629, p. 3.
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133* For example the Admiralty has often been criticized for not
developing surface-to-surface missiles, nuclear depth
charges, and less sophisticated aircraft carriers. Similarly,
it is often charged with not getting value for its money.
The Seaslug missile is cited In this regard. See Divine,
214-17. He also attacks the other two Services, In this
writer's opinion his complaints are neither documented or
well reasoned. For a general and bitter protest against
the amount of money being spent, presumably inefficiently,
see Fletcher, £60 a Second .
134. Some critics, of course, still complain about the inability
of the Navy to meet the Russian submarine threat, to con-
tribute to NATO, and to protect Britain's sea communications.
While they talk about the size of the Fleet they are
essentially quarreling with the role which has been carved
out for it.
135. This term was used by a number of respondents in referring





At the much publicized Nassau Conference, in December
1962, Great Britain acceded to the United States* request to
cancel the Skybolt missile and in turn extracted a promise from
President Kennedy to furnish Britain with Polaris missiles. As
noted in the previous chapters the Admiralty had shown very
little active interest in the deterrent. The Navy's leaders
had studiously followed the U. S. Navy's experience with Polaris,
but they never considered it an appropriate weapon system for the
Royal Navy. However, the ways of politios have little respect
for Admirals, and the Nassau Conference rudely thrust the Royal
Navy into the deterrent business - against the better Judgment
of many Navy leaders. Today the Admiralty is proceeding at full
steam on an extensive Polaris project. It plans to have the first
ballistic missile submarine at sea sometime in 1968. This chapter
will sketch the development of nuclear power in the Royal Navy and
the marrying of this propulsion plant to the Polaris missile.
These events, it should be remembered, were occuring simultaneously
with those which have been previously discussed* They are treated
separately here for two reasons. First, until very recently both
nuclear power and Polaris have been outside the mainstream of
British post-war naval thinking. Until about 1962, nuclear pro-
pulsion was still in the experimental stage in the Royal Navy.
Moreover, the Board of Admiralty had deliberately steered away
from participating in the deterrent. Secondly, treating nuclear
problems separately facilitates analysis and allows the reader





Despite the Royal Navy's late entry Into the nuclear
field it has had a long standing interest in the maritime poten-
tialities of reactors. As early as 1945 a paper was submitted to
the Board of Admiralty discussing atomic propulsion for ships.
In January 1946 the Navy assigned a scientist to the Atomic
Energy Authority's installation at Harwell where all reactor
p
research was to be conducted. In 1948 two engineering officers
were also assigned to work with the scientist. Their basic
mission was to study the problems associated with nuclear power
production and to determine the feasibility of applying this
form of power to ships. By 1950 this group had actually made
some sketchy design studies of various systems. These were very
tenuous, but nevertheless encouraged the Admiralty. In June 1950
the Ship Design Policy Committee formed a sub-committee to carry
out further studies.
This committee was successful in extracting an admission
from the Defense Research Policy Committee that a nuclear sub-
marine was an important project, but nothing more. The Navy was
unable to get its staff enlarged at Harwell, but by 1951 it had
managed through the DRPC to get a small sum from the Treasury for
research. A design study was then made as to the feasibility of
adapting a gas-cooled graphite-moderated low-enrichment reactor
to a submarine. This was the type of reactor which had first
been developed at Harwell by the Atomic Energy Agency, and it
offered several advantages. It had already demonstrated an
ability to produce power. Practically all of the AEA's research
efforts had been put into this type of reactor, and the results
of this work were available to the Navy. More important it used
low-enriched uranium as fuel which was more available at the time
as well as cheaper. The study unfortunately showed that such a
plant would require a huge submarine, of over 4,000 tons. This
presented formidable technical problems. The main objection was
4the weight and size of the plant. A shipboard installation
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would have to be much smaller and more tightly constructed than
was possible with a gas-cooled graphite-moderated plant. It was
soon obvious to the scientists, and in turn to the Admiralty,
that a feasible shipboard reactor would require a radically new
approach. Inevitably this would involve an extensive research
program oriented specifically toward a maritime reactor, a number
of scientists, and a great deal of money. Moreover, in order to
reduce the weight and size of the reactor the fuel would have to
be highly enriched uranium, and this was in extremely short supply
in Britain.
These factors combined to discourage the Admiralty. British
scientists working in the reactor program were quick to realize
the tremendous advantages which Britain could derive from power-
producing reactors. The United Kingdom had traditionally depended
on coal. But the easily accessible coal was rapidly disappearing.
British mines could no longer meet all the nation's demands at an
economic price. This was abundantly demonstrated in the fuel
crisis of 1949» Great Britain has had to rely increasingly on
imported oil. This makes the nation severely vulnerable to foreign
pressure. Nuclear power appeared to be a way out of this dilemma,
and from the very beginning Britain slanted its reactor research
program toward developing a practical reactor for producing
commercial electricity. Throughout the early fifties the Ministry
of Supply emphasized this aspect of the program and by 1953 prac-
tically the entire effort at Harwell was diverted into the design
of Britain's first power-producing pile. This emphasis had the
full support of the Government.
Just as vital was the lnavailability of enriched uranium.
It was well known that Admiral Rickover, after investigating a
number of approaches had gone to a reactor that employed highly
enriched uranium. The Royal Navy's scientists were confident
that future research would lead them in the same direction. How-
ever, there was only one plant producing this critical item. In
the early fifties Great Britain was still working toward its first
atomic bomb, and the entire output of enriched uranium was destined
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for the weapons program. The Royal Air Force had made it clear
that it would resist any attempt to divert this material. It was
heartily supported by Viscount Portal (a retired Air Marshal) who
was in charge of weapons production within the Ministry of Supply,
Needless to say this combination of political influences also
served to suppress the Admiralty 1 s enthusiasm.
Within the Admiralty itself there was a rather remarkable
apathy about overcoming these obstacles. The naval group at
Harwell continued to follow the course of reactor research. A
number of papers were generated at various points throughout the
Navy stressing the advantages of nuclear power, particularly for
submarines. However, the Admiralty, while generally endorsing
these views, never assigned nuclear research a particularly high
7priority, or pressed for it in the Defense Research Policy
Committee. The general attitude of the Board was "wait and see»"
Of course, there were other factors at work here. Money was by
far the most Important consideration. The Admiralty was fully
aware that this venture would be costly, and the Sea Lords were
hesitant to divert such a large sum into a submarine program.
Historically the British have looked with scorn at submarines.
This springs from Britain's bitter experience with German U-boats
in two great wars. The average Englishman has never considered
it quite "cricket" to sink ships without warning. Similarly the
Royal Navy has traditionally consigned the submarine to small
navies whose major aim is to destroy commerce instead of protecting
it. The Board of Admiralty believed that it could get more for
its money and better fulfill its post-war role by investing in
o
escort-type surface ships and aircraft. This attitude was
further reinforced by the hope that with the passage of time and
more experience with reactors the cost would come down. Also
there were some indications that the Admiralty planned eventually
to profit from U. S. experience.
The one element in the Royal Navy which was most interested
in the development of nuclear power was the submarine branch, all
submarine matters, both administrative and material, are handled
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by the Flag Officer Submarines who has his office in Portsmouth.
He has access to the Board of Admiralty, but does not sit on it
as a regular member. He is considered the number one represent-
ative of submarine interests, and his advice is respected in the
Admiralty. But his bargaining position is poor. There is not
even a section of the Naval Staff specifically responsible for
submarine matters through which he could exert daily influence
on the Sea Lords. In the early 'fifties there were no submariners
on the Board of Admiralty and "as a group they represented less
than 2% of the officer corps." All in all the submariners had
very little influence in the higher councils of the Navy, nor
were they in a position to organize an effective lobby. Although
they could keep the issue of nuclear power alive, they were no
match for the opposition.
In September 1954 the U. S. S. Nautilus was commissioned
and naval attention was quickly riveted on its remarkable
accomplishments. As has already been noted, it was about this
time that the Royal Navy was becoming deeply concerned over its
image and its place in British defense. The Admiralty began to
cast about for new concepts. At the same time it appeared that
enriched fissile material was becoming more available and that
the land-based reactor program was now well in hand. Concurrently
an exceptionally progressive First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbatten,
took office. Although he was not a submariner by trade he was
amenable to any scheme which stood to project the Fleet into the
future. He was deeply impressed by the Nautilus and became a
rallying point for those elements of the Navy which had been
unsuccessfully pressing for action. These events all served to
inject new life into the nuclear propulsion program.
In 1954 the Engineer in Chief of the Navy succeeded in
increasing the Navy's staff at Harwell to a total of thirteen.
In early 1955 a new Admiralty committee was formed to oversee
the research and development program. In June 1955 the Board of
Admiralty gave its blessing and authority to the development of
a nuclear reactor and the building of one nuclear attack
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submarine. A submarine was chosen for a number of reasons.
First, this type of craft stood to gain more militarily than a
surface ship. Second, it would only require a medium sized power
plant, and the Board reasoned that this would ease the research
problems. Third, a submarine reactor could be easily adapted to
surface ships while the reverse was not true. With surprisingly
little difficulty, the Navy was able to get Treasury approval for
a land-based prototype reactor and one submarine. The comparative
ease with which the project went through indicates to some degree
that one of the prime needs was a firm and persistent push from
the Navy's leader. Of course, the Admiralty still had to run
the gauntlet of the Atomic Energy Authority, but it would have
1 2
that problem no matter when the program was initiated.
In a matter of weeks the research group at Harwell was
working at fever pitch. Almost immediately a decision was made
to concentrate on a pressurized water reactor which was basically
the same type as employed in Nautilus . This appeared to be the
only feasible system in terms of compactness and completion within
a reasonable time schedule. The initial target date aimed at
achieving criticality of the submarine prototype plant by the
middle of 1961. This was later adjusted to January 1960. The
summer of 1962 was set as the target date for commissioning the
submarine. By mid-1956 arrangements had been made with Vickers
1
"5
Nuclear Limited * to assist the Admiralty in this project and work
was commenced at Harwell on a zero energy reactor called "Neptune"
which was to furnish research data on the use of highly enriched
14
uranium in reactor cores. At the same time a location for the
land-based prototype was selected at Dounreay, Scotland and work
commenced on readying the site. In February 1957 the First Sea
Lord approved the staff requirements for the first nuclear sub-
marine and announced that he intended to stress its anti-submarine
capabilities. He labeled it a "submarine killer." -* This was in
line with the submarine force's thinking which in'the mid-1950's
began to emphasize the submarine as the best counter to Russian
U-boats. Though this was the strategic rationale used for the
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nuclear program, there is little doubt that the First Sea Lord
was primarily interested in getting into the field because of
its potentialities for all naval ships. That same month Rear
Admiral G. A. M. Wilson was appointed to a new post as head of
the nuclear power program. Shortly thereafter the Queen approved
the name "Dreadnought" for this revolutionary man-of-war, and by
May the contracts for 'hull and machinery had been let. Progress
had been rapid up to this point, and the Royal Navy was firmly
committed to building its first nuclear ship.
However, as with so many of Britain's research projects
life was not to be easy for Dreadnought , On June 1 3» 1956 an
amendment was signed to the June 15, 1955 agreement between Great
Britain and the United States for cooperation on civil uses of
17
atomic energy. This was to allow a more detailed exchange of
information on atomic reactors. The Treasury immediately asked
the Navy to cut back its research program on the theory that it
could then get U. S. information and no longer need to go through
the lengthy process of experimentation. The Admiralty insisted
that to get research data it must give some in return and that
the research program was essential for this purpose. The Treasury
was satisfied, but only temporarily. With the installation of
Mr. Sandys in the Ministry of Defense all going projects came
under intensive review. It was inevitable that Dreadnought would
be scrutinized with care and by the fall of 1957 it was under
fire. In September Admiral Wilson had submitted the Navy's re-
quirements for enriched uranium fuel for the Neptune reactor,
the land-prototype, and for the first submarine. He met immediate
opposition. Although the supply of this material had steadily
Increased, it was still in great demand; the Atomic Energy
Authority was reluctant to divert such large amounts at that time
1
8
to a project which it did not consider vital. The Royal Air
Force was insisting that all this material should be channeled
into weapons and argued that the airborne deterrent should take .
precedence over Dreadnought . The pressure was compounded by the
Treasury which in the spirit of the Sandys era saw an excellent
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opportunity to cut-back the program. By this time the Navy was
estimating the cost from 1957 to 1964 as approximately £31 million.
This appalled the Treasury.
Adding to the confusion was considerable interest among
shippers and politicians in a nuclear merchant ship. On March 11,
1957, the Civil Lord was appointed head of a committee to study
the feasibility of nuclear propulsion for commercial shipping.
Both the Navy and British industry believed that tankers offered
the best prospects of employing a nuclear power plant commercially.
However, it was soon clear to the committee that considerable
research had yet to be done before a ship could be built which
would be economically competitive. The Admiralty had hoped to
stimulate the shipbuilding industry's Interest and inspire it
to contribute financially to the research program. This rather
ambitious scheme collapsed in late 1957 when the industry informed
the Civil Lord's committee that it was attracted but would not
place any money in the project. Ironically after this exchange
the Government asked the Admiralty to reconsider the wisdom of
building a submarine as opposed to a tanker.
By this time the Board of Admiralty was deeply committed
to Dreadnought t and became rather alarmed in October 1 957 when
the program appeared to be in danger. The Admiralty moved to
head off this threat, using techniques conspicuously resembling
American gamesmanship. It had been previously arranged for
U. S. S. Nautilus to visit the United Kingdom in October 1957.
A trip was laid on for the Minister of Defense. With the coop-
eration of the Americans every effort was made to impress him
with the phenomenal capabilities of this new ship. That same
fall Nautilus participated with the Royal Navy in two training
exercises with the colorful code names of "Strikeback" and
"Rum Tub." Nautilus ' extraordinary performance provided a cold-
water shock to British anti-submarine experts. These exercises
brought home the painful fact that nuclear submarines were vastly
superior to conventional ones and presented a threat of a com-
pletely different order of magnitude. Detailed reports of the
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exercises were circulated throughout the Ministry of Defense and
particularly to the members of the Defense Research Policy
i o
Committee. During this period the Russians launched Sputnik;
the Admiralty was quick to link Dreadnought to the public pressure
for more scientific efforts. However, these tactics had little
visible effect, and the Treasury continued to withhold funds
from the Dreadnought project. This was primarily due to a sepa-
rate series of events which had been occurring simultaneously and
which in the end avoided a direct interdepartmental clash between
20Treasury and Admiralty.
Once the Royal Navy had commenced its nuclear submarine
project in earnest, the U. S. Navy evidenced a desire to assist.
A close rapport has always existed between the two navies, and
with the formation of NATO the relationship has steadily continued
to grow stronger. A number of American naval officers doubted
the wisdom of the Royal Navy undertaking the Dreadnought research
project which would involve such tremendous costs and technical
problems. Nevertheless, when it was manifest that the Royal Navy
intended to pursue this line of development there was a general
feeling in the U. S. Navy that it should make some of the benefits
21
of its research available. In early 1957 when Mr. Duncan Sandys
was visiting the United States Admiral Rickover, the head of the
U. S. Navy's nuclear program, offered to release some information
on nuclear propulsion* In June Admiral Rickover visited the
United Kingdom and firmed up the arrangements for such an exchange.
In late June a full British technical mission visited the United
States. This was the beginning of a very profitable liaison,
and the Admiralty scientists derived some very useful information
from this initial visit. On October 5 (Just as the Dreadnought
program was coming under fire) the First Lord of the Admiralty
was visiting Washington. In a meeting with Admiral Rickover it
was hinted that the United States might be prepared to sell out-
right a nuclear submarine propulsion plant to the United Kingdom.
This came as an unexpected shock to the Royal Navy, but it fell
at a crucial time and cast the Dreadnought program in a new light.
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Interestingly enough this exchange would require an amendment
to the existing U. S. - U. K. Civil Bilateral Agreement and
"Admiral Rickover informed the Admiralty that he could arrange
U. S. agreement, if it could manage British approval."
This, of course, presented the Admiralty with "a completely
new picture and perhaps a way out from under Treasury pressure.
It would offer the United Kingdom a nuclear power plant several
years before the current development program would produce one -
a plant which was tried and tested. In addition it would assure
Dreadnought getting to sea at an earlier date. Presumably the
American reactor would supply British scientists with a great deal
of advanced know-how which would allow them to take a giant step
forward in their program. Not least important it would be an
outright purchase and a great deal cheaper than the projected
research program.
The case was not as one-sided as one might assume, and
some opposition developed within both the Admiralty and the
Government. A number of scientists and technicians were con-
vinced that the contemplated purchase would halt or at least set
back the Royal Navy's own reactor research program. They admitted
that Admiral Rickover 1 s offer would permit Dreadnought to commission
at an earlier date, but insisted that this was not the most impor-
23tant consideration. They argued that over the long term the
Admiralty would be better advised to conduct its own research.
In turn this effort would furnish the Navy a reservoir of know-
ledge and trained researchers. Presumably this would give the
Royal Navy a broader base for future experimentation and "allow
»24it to diverge from the American pattern and explore new areas.
The Navy's scientists at Harwell were developing some original
ideas which showed considerable promise. Understandably some of
them were concerned about losing their freedom of maneuver.
However, the Board of Admiralty was faced with more
practical considerations. In its opinion the most important goal
was an operational submarine in the shortest possible time. In
addition the Sea Lords believed that overall the research program
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would profit from American experience, although there was little
doubt that the Treasury would resist putting funds into further
research. A few professionals and politicians opposed this move
on the grounds that it would make Great Britain even more dependent
on the United States. The Royal Navy in general has never given
much credit to this line of argument. If the United States can
offer better equipment at a better price the professional British
naval officer normally is agreeable. In this instance, however,
there were a number of higher ranking officers who had come in
contact with Admiral Rickover and had been aroused by his abrasive
personality. It is difficult here to isolate the real reasons for
the opposition generated by this group, but it is obvious that a
number of highly placed persons were wary of this American Admiral
who carried so much political weight in his own country. They
argued that he would attempt to exert the same influence over the
British maritime reactor program that he had over the American
project. In their eyes the Royal Navy would be risking its free-
dom in a vital area. This was a tenuous argument at best, and
the detached observer can hardly resist the conclusion that it
was inspired by personal dislike rather than sober deliberation.
Nevertheless, it was seriously pressed in the higher councils of
the Government.
The majority of the Board and the Minister of Defense,
however, were convinced that the American offer was sincere and
that it would cut years off the Navy's entry into the nuclear
submarine field. With this kind of support acceptance was a fore-
drawn conclusion. Within a relatively short time the opposition
was pressed into the background. In February 1958 the Prime
Minister approved the purchase of a U. S. propulsion plant. This
assured the Navy a ready built reactor for Dreadnought and a
supply of enriched uranium for fuel. The Atomic Energy Authority
was no longer under pressure to supply fissile material. In turn
the Navy guaranteed the AEA that its rights would be protected in
the nuclear field. Predictably any opposition this office had to
the Dreadnought program disappeared. The Treasury was assured
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that the research program would be cut -back and that the rate of
expenditure on the whole program would be slowed down - if not
the total expenditure reduced. In essence a bitter intra-govern-
mental fight was avoided and the Dreadnought ' s future insured.
Mr. Macmillan's decision to purchase a reactor from the
United States signaled the start of protracted negotiations
between representatives of the United States and Great Britain
regarding this significant exchange. The arrangements to purchase
an American plant required an amendment to the United States 1
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Such an amendment was signed into law
on July 3, 1958 in Washington. -* This was followed by an Anglo-
American agreement confirming the exchange of a nuclear submarine
power plant. Concurrently representatives of the two navies
were meeting in order to iron out the details. The key figure
throughout this period was Admiral Rickover who had very definite
ideas on the manner in which this transaction should be consum-
mated. To begin with he insisted that Rolls Royce be designated
the prime contractor for the Royal Navy and that it deal directly
with V/estinghouse in the United States. This arrangement relieved
the U. S. Navy of any responsibility for inspection or for the
finished product. On the other hand it prevented the Admiralty
from choosing its own firm. Vickers-Armstrong, the Royal Navy's
principal contractor in the nuclear field, was heavily entrenched
in the Dreadnought program. Rickover* s choice of Rolls Royce
required some extensive rearranging and essentially froze Vickers-
Armstrong out of the important work on Dreadnought . Moreover
Rickover insisted that Rolls Royce handle the manufacturing of
all fuel elements connected with the reactor. By law the Atomic
Energy Authority had sole manufacturing rights for uranium fuel
elements in the United Kingdom. To accede to Rickover' s demands
would reverse government policy. For a while this issue threatened
to deadlock the negotiations. In the end the Atomic Energy
Authority conceded, and Rolls Royce was permitted to manufacture
fuel elements.
Even more vital from the Admiralty's standpoint was the
United States suggestion that the land-based prototype reactor
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and research program be canceled. The Americans believed that once
the United Kingdom had a complete U. S. reactor and accompanying
information there was no longer any need for an independent
British research program. The Royal Navy could make duplicates
of the Skipjack reactor and save a great deal of money and effort.
To the British representatives this seemed like a high-handed
demand which would preclude the development of future British
innovations. Moreover it would make the Royal Navy completely
reliant on U. S. knowledge. The Admiralty refused to accede to
this suggestion and made it clear that it intended to proceed
with the land-based reactor at Dounreay which would include a
number of purely British ideas.
Although the U. S„ did not press this issue further it
made one more important change which may have been connected with
British insistence on reserving the right to continue their own
research program. The Admiralty originally envisioned a contract
between V/estinghouse and Rolls Royce which would include a con-
tinuing exchange of information on reactor research and advances
over the coming ten years. Essentially it would be an agreement
licensing Rolls Royce to manufacture Westinghouse reactors and
the associated equipment. Such a provision would assure the
Admiralty of a continuing supply of U. S. information. The
American representatives, however, insisted that the laws regard-
ing the exchange of atomic energy information would not allow
such an arrangement. After some discussion these provisions were
deleted from the suggested agreement. This left only a contract
for the supply of one reactor, propulsion machinery, spare parts,
maintenance information, the necessary fissile material, and
replacement cores for ten years. In short the exchange was only
to be a single transaction involving one propulsion plant to be
installed in Dreadnought . This left the British free to derive
27
any benefits they could from the study of this one plant. But
it made no arrangements for a continuing transfer of information





It is rather clear that the Americans did attempt to gain
some measure of control over the British program. The United
Kingdom representatives were forced to accept a number of condi-
tions which they disliked, but nevertheless they accomplished
their main purpose of obtaining a complete propulsion unit for
Dreadnought . At the same time they retained their future freedom
of maneuver. In February 1959 the final contract was consummated
and by March 5 it had been fully approved by both governments.
Although a great many technical and legal problems remained, the
exchange moved forward from this date with relatively few serious
interruptions. The Admiralty bent every effort to complete the
exchange and to get its first nuclear submarine to sea. Dreadnought
involved a propulsion plant which was totally new to the British,
a hull form similar to the U. S. S. Skip.lack which was unprece-
dented in the Royal Navy's experience, and a number of advanced
sonar and weapons developments which had never been used in
British ships. Essentially this meant that all of the major de-
sign parameters of this ship were novel and varying at the same
time. The Royal Navy was trying to do in one step what the U. S.
Navy had taken some ten years and a number of ships to do„ This
presented the Royal Navy's constructors with a unique set of
problems and tested their skill to the limit. It is a genuine
tribute to their ability that they were able to complete
Dreadnought in a relatively short period. It was launched on
October 20, 1960, and its commissioning two years later marked
the Royal Navy's entry into the field of nuclear power.
Before leaving this subject, one may note certain other
aspects of the program. In order to free funds for the purchase
of the U. S. reactor the Treasury insisted that the Navy "go slow"
with its other nuclear plans. As many of the scientists feared
the research program at Harwell was virtually discontinued. The
land-based prototype reactor at Dounreay was still to go forward,
but at a reduced rate. There were a number of reasons for this.
Not only was the Navy forced to reduce the rate of expenditure on
research, but it hoped to build a totally new type of plant based
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on experience with the American reactor in Dreadnought , It took
some time to acquire this experience. The Dounreay reactor was
to be more powerful and matched to British designed propulsion
machinery rather than the American equipment in Dreadnought . It
was soon obvious that before Dounreay could be completed a great
deal more research would have to be done, and the Admiralty had
to reactivate its research effort. This time Rolls Royce was
asked to initiate the program since this company was also to
operate the reactor at Dounreay. There is little question that
in the final analysis both time and money were wasted by closing
down the Harwell team and then within two years building up a new
research effort in a different location with different -people.
This is an excellent example of how Treasury pressure, which often
does not take into account the whole technical picture, may result
in short term economies and long range waste. The Dounreay reactor
is now operating and is a mixture of both American and British
know-how. It is the prototype plant for all the nuclear submarines
which are to succeed Dreadnought . There is little question that
it includes a number of improvements over the plant in the first
submarine. Moreover, the continuing research which is going into
Dounreay will allow the Royal Navy to make independent contri-
butions which would never have seen the light of day, if the Royal
Navy had decided in 1959 to rely wholly on American research
information.
Once the Dreadnought program had survived the 1957 crisis
and the contract for the American reactor had been implemented,
the Sea Lords made plans to expand the program. The Board of
Admiralty approved plans for four nuclear hunter-killer submarines
which would be designed to work with carrier task forces in an
anti-submarine role. It was planned to complete Dreadnought '
s
successor in late 1964, another near the end of 1966 and the last
one in 1967. The First Lord's Statement for i960 announced the
2Qdecision to build the second submarine. * In August of that year
a contract was concluded with Vickers-Armstrong Limited for the
"50
construction of H. M. S. Valiant. It would have the same hull
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design as Dreadnought , but a British designed propulsion plant
would be installed, presumably identical to the Dounreay installa-
tion. The 1964 Statement on Defense announced that work had
already commenced on the third which was to be H. M. S. Warspite .
Thus by 1 963 the Royal Navy was well into the nuclear propulsion
field and on its way to building a small but sophisticated force
of nuclear hunter-killer submarines. It was primarily these
developments which made it possible for the Royal Navy in 1962
to commence assuming responsibility for Great Britain's deterrent.
The Evolution of Polaris
The Sea Lords' attitude toward atomic weapons and their
willingness to leave strategic bombing to the Royal Air Force
has already been discussed. In essence they acknowledged the
Air Force's monopoly on the delivery of strategic nuclear weapons.
In turn the Admiralty's voice in regard to the deterrent was to
be correspondingly reduced. The Navy's abdication was formalized
in 1957 when the Board consciously diverted its attention to the
problems of limited war and began to deemphasize its role in the
NATO Strike Fleet. However, technological advance is no respec-
tor of organizations, even ones as august as the Board of Admiralty,
It was to be only a matter of time until the developments of
nuclear propulsion and solid fuel missiles were to thrust the Navy
into the deterrence arena. The Admiralty's response to this chain
of events is a fascinating story and in many respects the most
difficult to comprehend of all its post-war actions.
As long as deterrent weapons were scheduled to be delivered
by manned aircraft the Navy's position was logical and understand-
able. However, the introduction of ballistic missiles as delivery
vehicles for nuclear weapons threatened the manned aircraft ' s pre-
dominance and opened up other possibilities. Though British
scientists had been working on guided missiles since World War II,
it was not until 1954 that they commenced serious research on bal-
32listic missiles. The United States and the U.S.S.R. had expended
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considerable effort In this area. It was rapidly becoming clear
that both of these governments intended to develop ballistic
missiles as the primary delivery system for their deterrent weapons.
Not to be outstripped the British Government decided to develop an
"intermediate range ballistic missile, •* and in 1955 commenced
the project which was later to become 'known as "Blue Streak."
The project was mentioned publicly for the first time in the 1956
Defense Statement which requested funds specifically for this
54
work. Missile research was carried out under the auspices of
the Ministry of Supply, and the Minister at that time was Mr.
Duncan Sandys. It is well known that he was captivated by the
potentialities of ballistic missiles and a prime supporter of
the Blue Streak program. He was joined in his enthusiasm by a
number of scientists within the Ministry of Supply and the
Ministry of Defense. When Sandys took over as the Defense Minister
it was widely assumed that one of his chief aims would be to lnte-
grade ballistic missiles into the Services 1 strategic plans.
Experience fully confirmed these predictions.
As Minister of Supply Sandys In May 1954- had negotiated
an agreement with the United States for cooperation in missile
development. The British, having started late in the ballistic
missile field, relied heavily on U. S. information. This was
carried further in March 1957 when President Eisenhower and Prime
Minister Macmillan met at Bermuda to concert their post-Suez
views. Out of this meeting came a U. S. offer to furnish Great
Britain with American missiles when they became operational.
Presumably these were to be the medium-range Thors. They were
expected to come into service in the late 1950' s and to fill any
missile gap which the British might have as opposed to the Russians.
In addition the 1957 White Paper claimed that this agreement should
"result in savings of time and money, and will enable work to be
concentrated upon more advanced types." ' This same statement
indicated the Government's intention to rely on the ballistic
missile as the primary delivery system of the future. In turn
further development of manned bombers and fighters was to be
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discontinued. Manifestly the Government were determined to maintain
an independent deterrent and if possible to match the technological
efforts of the other nuclear powers.
The 1958 Defense Statement announced the imminent con-
clusion of an agreement with the United States for intermediate-
range ballistic missiles. It further stated that "a British
ballistic rocket of a more advanced type is being developed on
zQ
the highest priority, in close cooperation with the United States.
This missile was to be liquid fuelled and have a range in excess
of 2,000 miles in contrast to the 1,500 miles of the Thor. It
was to be fired from underground sites, thereby making it less
vulnerable to attack than the American missile, which was to be
launched from sheltered surface pads. The bulk of the country's
missile development efforts were to be concentrated on the Blue
40
Streak program. y By 1958 it was clear that the Government was
heavily committed to this program as a successor to the V-bombers.
No matter how logical militarily this policy might have been it
was destined to arouse controversy and opposition from the outset.
To begin, with, the basic decision to convert from bombers
to ballistic missiles brought the whole concept of an independent
British deterrent under scrutiny. Fundamentally Blue Streak was
to be the next generation of delivery vehicle, designed to keep
the deterrent modern. It was painfully obvious that any such
program would be extremely expensive in terms of money, talent and
effort. Increasing pressure had been building up for some years
against the policy of deterrence. Blue Streak gave these dissident
elements a rallying point for voicing their doubts. Originally
there had been little dispute about the building of atomic weapons
and aircraft for delivering them. In fact the program was launched
in a Labor Administration. Subsequently many professionals and
laymen alike had begun to have second thoughts about the wisdom
of Britain's deterrent policy. Nevertheless, once the aircraft
and weapons were in existence and the initial capital expense had




The announcement of Blue Streak changed the whole picture.
The Government was not only planning to maintain the deterrent,
but to spend a great deal more on a more advanced delivery system.
In essence another tremendous capital investment was to be made
in the deterrent. This led many to question whether Britain should
not reject nuclear weapons, leaving the field to the United States
and Russia, Although the left wing of the Labor Party has been
in the vanguard of this anti-nuclear weapons campaign, it never-
theless cuts across party lines. Advocates for discarding stra-
tegic nuclear arms can be found in all sectors of British society.
This controversy has raged ever since the 1957 Defense White
Paper. It has become the most significant defense dispute in
recent British politics. The Conservative Party has steadfastly
refused to surrender the nation's nuclear independence. Deterrence
has literally become an article of faith within that party.
Especially interesting here is the controversy which that
posture evoked within the Conservative Government itself, "As
early as January 1958, the cost of developing the Blue Streak
«4lhad become a matter of concern to officials of the Government.
Members of both parties were sounding warnings of the accelerat-
ing costs. By I960 when the project was finally canceled Defense
Minister Watklnson estimated that the project had already con-
sumed £100 million and that to finish it would cost between
42£500 million and £600 million. However, cost was not the only
objection. After the first Russian sputnik was launched in late
1957t fears grew that the accuracy of long range Russian missilery
had advanced to the point that static missile sites would be
fatally vulnerable to attack. Critics stressed the virtues of
mobility and dispersion and in turn questioned Blue Streak's
viability under these new circumstances. Certainly to protect
Blue Streak would have required huge sums to be spent on harden-
ing launching sites and fire control systems. All these criticisms




However, just as important as the technical arguments were
the vested interests and political pressures which swirled around
Blue Streak. Although considerable political heat was generated
by the Conservative Party's insistence on maintaining a deterrent
posture, this was not the major issue within the Government. For
the Minister of Defense and the Services the decision to have a
deterrent was a given fact. The problem which concerned them
was how best to meet this requirement. Sandys and his chief
scientific advisers were convinced that a ballistic missile, and
the Blue Streak in particular, was the best answer to keeping
Britain's deterrent up to date and credible. With the new powers
bestowed by the Prime Minister, Sandys was able to impose the
development of the Blue Streak on the defense establishment. How-
ever, there was considerable resistance from the start. In the
final analysis the Minister of Defense was never able to generate
sufficient intra-governmental support for this decision, and it
was destined to be reversed. At this point it is pertinent to
examine the nature of the opposition and, of course, the Admiralty's
stand on this crucial item.
Although the Royal Air Force was designated to take over
the operation of land-based strategic missiles it was widely
4*3
known to oppose a rapid transition to missiles. ^ The 1957
Defense Statement came as quite a shock to the old line air
officers who could not accept the phasing out of manned aircraft.
This image did not appeal to their deeply engrained "cavalry"
instincts, and the Air Ministry fought Sandys' policy every inch
of the way. This campaign was waged not only behind closed doors,
but also in the public media as well. The most notable official
attempts to influence opinion were "Conference and Exercise
Prospect." This was a three day briefing session for a selected
group of RAF officers and Air Ministry civil servants followed by
a one-day performance held in the Royal Empire Society Hall on
/- r> 44May 6, 1958 for selected correspondents and civilians. Among
other things these briefings stressed the importance of manned
aircraft. "a second generation of strategic bombers, of tactical
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bombers and of fighters were all held essential, A call was
also issued for an airborne cruise missile to improve bomber
45
effectiveness and to avoid reliance on fixed bases. The
obvious conclusion, which the popular press easily drew, was
that the Royal Air Force disagreed with the policy laid down in
Government White Papers. This was certainly an accurate infer-
ence from the Air Force's attitude and maneuvers behind-the-
scenes.
Allied with the Air Ministry in its struggle to obtain
another generation of manned bombers and fighters was the aircraft
industry. The day the 1957 Defense Statement was published, Sir
Frank Spriggs, managing director of Hawker Siddeley Group, con-
tended on the BBC that the envisioned changeover to missiles was
much too rapid. He argued that there should be one more gener-
ation of fighters and bombers or otherwise "this country is com-
pletely written off for a supersonic civil aircraft for the rest
48
of its days." This was to set the pattern of the industry's
case against 'the Government. Aircraft manufacturers Insisted
that the future of British aviation depended on continuing govern-
mental support in one form or another for aircraft research and
AQ
development. * Defense contracts had always been an effective
way of offering such assistance. The industry contended that to
cut off military production would do irreparable harm at this
crucial juncture. Strong backing for another generation of air-
craft soon developed in the House of Lords, and in the semi-
official Advisory Committee on Scientific Policy. This latter
body reported that a too rapid shift to missiles instead of
facilitating the shift of manpower to the civil sector of indus-
try would cause dislocation and possibly "exacerbate the already
sizeable emigration of scientists and engineers to the United
States and Canada. "^
At this point the industry was operating from a position
of some strength. It was enjoying record levels of output and
employment, and was contributing a large portion of its product
to exports. There were strong reasons for insuring the industry's
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continued prosperity, and there is little question "that the
British aircraft industry successfully influenced government
policy decisions"^ during this period. In May 1958 the Govern-
ment announced that it intended to support the industry both
through defense research and direct contributions to research
in "the expanding field of civil transport.
"
52 All this activity
culminated in a Government order for three new military aircraft
in early 1959. The Government's decision not to order more
manned aircraft had been effectively reversed. It is not the
object here to determine exactly how much weight the industry
wielded in this decision, but rather to illustrate the political
environment which was building up around Blue Streak. Certainly
the industry was not so interested in defeating ballistic missiles
as in assuring the continued ordering of aircraft. However, in
the process it was bound to prejudice the prospects of any pro-
ject which threatened the industry, and Blue Streak was definitely
in that category. In short, some powerful groups were actively
opposing the conversion to land-based missiles.
What was the Admiralty's stand on this issue? The Sea
Lords had concurred wholeheartedly in the development of atomic
weapons, but at the same time had made no attempt to participate
in the delivery of the deterrent. Tradition, experience and lack
of funds all predisposed the Admiralty against seriously attempting
to claim a strategic bombing role for the Fleet Air Arm. Conse-
quently, efforts had been concentrated in other areas, and the
deterrent had been consigned to the Royal Air Force. This atti-
tude evolved in the immediate post-war years when strategists were
.
still thinking in terms of free falling bombs. But it was to con-
dition the Board of Admiralty's approach to the deterrent through-
out the 1950's and delay the Royal Navy' entry into the ballistic
missile field.
Actually the Royal Navy had taken an interest in guided
missiles as early as 1943 and shortly after the war had generated
a requirement for a shipboard surface-to-air missile to counter
the high-performance aircraft which were coming into service
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throughout the world. This project soon became known as "Seaslug"
and was to be developed under the joint auspices of the Royal Navy
and the Ministry of Supply. ^ In addition the Fleet Air Arm had
taken a deep interest in the air-to-air missiles being developed
by the Ministry of Supply and had high hopes of arming carrier
borne aircraft with these weapons when they were perfected. In
both of these instances the work done in the Ministry of Supply
was in response to a specific Navy requirement and was in the
nature of development rather than basic research. The Navy
followed these projects closely and eventually seconded officers
and scientists to the Ministry of Supply to assist with them.
However, basic research, as opposed to development
intended to meet specific requirements, was handled solely with-
in the Ministry of Supply without assistance from the Services.
Predictably it was more or less controlled by the scientists
within that ministry. The Ministry of Supply endeavored to tailor
its efforts to the needs of the military and through the Defense
Research Policy Council each Service could express its views on
various projects. Nevertheless, in matters of fundamental re-
search, the Ministry of Supply had the predominant voice. If a
particular Service disagreed with the MOS's views on basic
research, the only recourse it had was to appeal the issue to
the DRPC and to fight it out at that high level. As a practical
matter vital interests had to be at stake to Justify this pro-
cedure. Manifestly, this drastically reduced the power of the
Army, Navy and Air Force to Influence the direction of funda-
mental research.
In the case of ballistic missiles the Admiralty took
very little interest. In the general view of the Navy's leaders
the responsibility for development rested with the Ministry of
Supply. Militarily this appeared to be a matter between the Air
Ministry and the MOS. It was automatically assumed that these
missiles would be assigned to the Royal Air Force and that the
operational details concerned that Service, not the Fleet. In
line with this attitude the Admiralty took no position in 1957
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when Sandys announced the planned replacement of manned bombers
with MRBM's. The Board of Admiralty did not consider delivery
of the deterrent a naval function. The Board was concentrating
on the problems of limited and brushfire wars, and ballistic
missiles seemed to have little place in such operations.
During this same period, however, another factor
appeared on the scene. Unlike the Royal Navy, the U. S. Navy had
fought since World War II to participate in the delivery of
deterrent vreapons and in the middle 1 950 ' s was hotly engaged in
an inter-Service battle to obtain a ballistic missile capability.
In late 1955 after a number of false starts the U. S. Navy re-
ceived Administration approval to proceed with the development
54
of a shipborne ballistic missile. A separate organization,
known as the Special Projects Office, was created for the specific
purpose of developing a suitable naval missile. Rear Admiral
W. F. Raborn was given complete responsibility for this task.
After a year of trying to adapt the U. S. Army's liquid-fueled
Jupiter missile to shipboard use, Admiral Raborn convinced the
Administration that solid fuel would be much more effective, and
that his office could develop such a missile despite formidable
technical obstacles. He received permission to proceed on
December 8, 1956. This was the birth of the Polaris missile and
the Fleet Ballistic Missile submarine. Admiral Raborn' s staff
had conceived an exciting new concept which would revolutionize
the role of seapower in the nuclear age. They proposed to marry
the nuclear submarine to a solid-fuel medium-range ballistic
missile and to create a radically new nuclear weapons system.
The U. S. S. Nautilus was already in operation and had demon-
strated the feasibility of nuclear propulsion. Admiral Raborn 1 s
engineers were well aware of the remaining obstacles. Although
missile research in the United States was well advanced, a
submarine borne missile presented a host of unsolved problems.
The most imposing was that presented by solid fuel which had never
been successfully employed in a large missile. In addition new
methods of launching, guidance and navigation would have to be
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perfected. Still, the U. S. Navy strongly believed that none
of these hurdles was insurmountable. If successful, the rewards
promised to be extraordinary. A nuclear submarine constantly
submerged and continually changing position would be practically
invulnerable to detection and destruction. It could roam huge
areas of the ocean and still remain within range of its targets.
There would be no entanglements with foreign governments or
agreements over bases. Moreover, counter attacks would fall at
sea not on the American continent. It was an exciting concept
which offered its creator the nearest thing possible to the
perfect deterrent weapons system. The U. S. Navy was firmly
convinced that the potentialities of this project Justified any
amount of effort and went ahead at full steam.
In line with its customary practice the U. S. Navy soon
informed the British Navy of its plans and invited it to station
liaison officers in the Special Projects Office in Washington.
By the middle of 1957 the Royal Navy's representatives in
Washington were receiving a constant flow of information on the
progress of the Polaris program. The Admiralty's original atti-
tude was one of "wait and see." As yet the Royal Navy did not
have a nuclear submarine, and this obstacle would have to be
overcome first. In addition some of the leaders of the U. S.
Navy were advising their British counterparts to avoid Polaris
EC
until the more difficult technical problems had been solved. •*
On the other hand, the American Admirals were at least by impli-
cation offering their support to a British request for Polaris
S6if and when it came. However, the British Sea Lords had yet
to be convinced that their Fleet should be in the strategic
missile business at all.
This ambivalence was forcefully manifested in 1958. By
then the design parameters of the Blue Streak missile had been
firmed up and a definite decision to proceed with liquid fuel
was made. Research on solid fuel was virtually closed down; all
effort was concentrated on liquid propellants. The Royal
Navy's scientists were well aware that liquid fuel was extremely
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dangerous and unsuitable for shipboard use. However, the Navy
S8did not register a complaint or officially question this policy.
It is true that the Minister of Defense was determined to press
ahead with Blue Streak, and that an Admiralty objection might
CO
have been futile. y It is nevertheless clear that the Navy s
leaders, who did not consider long-range missile research their'
affair, were not too disturbed by a decision which threatened to
tie the British deterrent exclusively to land-bases.
Over the next few months reports from the United States
on Polaris were increasingly optimistic. The American program
became widely publicized. There is little doubt that a number
of high ranking British officers, who were impressed with the
potentialities of Polaris, would like to have seen the Royal
Navy adopt it. Professional literature and the public press
carried numerous references to the American missile. A number
of retired officers went to the point of criticizing Blue Streak
as well as lauding Polaris. During this period the Board of
Admiralty began to discuss Polaris frequently and seriously.
From currently available information, it is impossible
to reconstruct the exact sequence of events, or to determine
precisely when the Sea Lords* views crystallized. On the other
hand it is possible to infer approximately what those views were.
The majority of members of the Board of Admiralty were convinced
that Polaris would be an extremely expensive undertaking, and no
matter how militarily attractive it might be the Navy would not
be allotted any additional funds to finance it. Presumably if
the Royal Navy was to succeed in obtaining Polaris this would
deny sorely needed funds to the remaining Navy programs; thereby
Jeopardizing the mobile carrier task groups which the Admiralty
had pressed for so hard. To the Navy's leaders it was primarily
a question of priorities. They believed that top precedence
t 61
should be awarded to the Royal Navy s limited war role.
Although one can perhaps question the order of priorities
here, it is easy to follow the Board's reasoning. For over
fifteen years the Navy had received between 23-25^ of the military
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budget and had found this figure grossly inadequate. The senior
officers and civil servants contended that this figure would not
be expanded materially to accommodate this one program. On the
other hand j the Navy's leaders were ignoring some of the evidence.
When the Royal Air Force took over responsibility for the atomic
deterrent in the early 1950's its proportion of the budget had
gradually increased largely at the Army's expense, and certainly
there were no obvious reasons why a similar shift of funds could
not be engineered if the Admiralty took over the responsibility
for the deterrent. At any rate, the Board of Admiralty was not
willing to gamble on Polaris at the risk of injuring what it
believed to be the Navy's more important interests.
Reinforcing this fundamental fear were some lesser
considerations. The Admiralty was naturally hesitant to involve
itself in an expensive scheme which had yet to be proved practical.
It could always fall back on the logical assumption that the United
States would make these missiles available once they were opera-
tional and when the British had nuclear submarines. Just as when
the introduction of nuclear power was being discussed, the outside
observer detects a streak of "cavalry traditionalism" which pre-
fers carriers to submarines as the backbone of the Fleet. Again,
the fact that the submarine element in the Navy was not directly repre-
sented on the Naval Staff or the Board may have been crucial to
these deliberations. However, in this instance even many sub-
mariners were lukewarm toward Polaris. Dreadnought was well along,
and there were good prospects for more attack nuclear submarines.
The submariners were also confident that the adoption of Polaris
would monopolize the available funds thereby sidetracking the
planned ASW boats. Many preferred to forego Polaris rather than
62
confront this prospect. The overall result was to destroy any
effective support for Polaris in the higher circles of the Royal
Navy.
In late 1959 escalating costs and increasing doubts about
Blue Streak's immobility forced the Ministry of Defense to review
its missile program. By that time there were two alternatives to
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land-based missiles. The United States was producing Polaris
missiles and in February i960 decided to proceed with the develop-
ment of Skybolt, an air-to-surface ballistic missile. The
I-iinis-er of Defense in the ;^60 ~D~^^zo s^tcmoiit no-cod that
both of these oossibilities were being investigated for British
use. •' The latter was favored by the Royal Air Force and air-
craft industry for rather obvious reasons. Skybolt, a 1 ,000
mile solid fuel ballistic missile to be launched from aircraft,
64
would hopefully be ready by H964. The Air Ministry proposed
to mount it on the later models of V-bombers. This offered the
Government considerable savings since the air bases and aircraft
were already in existence. The missiles themselves, since they
were relatively short ranged and launched from great height,
would presumably be much cheaper than either Blue Streak or
Polaris. From the Royal Air Force's standpoint this scheme
offered the manned bombers a new lease on life. There was little
doubt that if this proposal proved successful there would be
further generations of Skybolts and correspondingly advanced
6 C5
versions of the delivery aircraft. ^ In addition the airmen con-
tended that these bombers would always be available for convention-
al tasks as well as nuclear ones. These were telling arguments.
The disadvantages of Skybolt were significant. There
were formidable technical hurdles to overcome. Methods for
launching from an airborne platform which is pitching and yawing
had yet to be worked out. Fire control and navigational problems,
just as with Polaris, were imposing. In order to fire a ballistic
missile properly the operator must know the exact location of the
launching platform. In i960 aircraft navigation left something
to be desired in this regard. However, the RAF was confident
that time and U. S. money would find solutions' to these diffi-
culties. Even more damaging was the fact that aircraft just like
fixed-site missiles are tied to land bases which can be pinpointed
and attacked by enemy missiles with very little warning. The air-
men discounted this argument insisting that radar warning and a
high state of readiness would allow the aircraft to become
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airborne before they could be neutralized. In periods of tension
a certain number of planes could be kept in the air at all times
making them virtually invulnerable to enemy missiles. Despite
these objections the RAF's case, from a British perspective, was
impressive. The financial advantages offered by Skybolt were
particularly attractive to a Government which was continually
pressed for funds.
In the United States the USAF was likewise very concerned
over the life of its manned aircraft and had thrown all its weight
behind Skybolt. In order to bolster its case, it was very eager
for the British to adopt Skybolt. In turn it initiated a sus-
tained campaign to involve the Royal Air Force in this new
missile. In fact the USAF was not only furnishing the Air
Ministry with encouraging data on Skybolt, but also with skeptical
assessments of Polaris which could be used in defeating any Royal
Navy bid to promote seaborne missiles. In essence the two air
forces were mutually supporting the political objectives of each
other much in the same manner as the U. S. Navy and Royal Navy
had attempted to do with the NATO Strike Fleet.
The Admiralty was now forced to take a formal stand on
Polaris. It was increasingly obvious that Blue Streak's days
were numbered. The Admiralty would soon be asked for assessment
of a seaborne successor to Blue Streak. About 1959 the Board of
Admiralty ordered a short study done on Polaris with the intention
of firming up its views. Three major findings emerged. ' First,
there was every prospect that Polaris would be carried to a
successful conclusion by the American Navy. Second, from a
purely military perspective it would be the best deterrent weapon
available. This conclusion was based primarily on its mobility
and the protection offered by underwater concealment. Third, it
would undoubtedly be very expensive. These findings generally
confirmed the Board's instinctive feelings about Polaris. There
was still general agreement that if the Navy took on Polaris it
would draw critical funds away from the rest of the Fleet and
68divert the Navy from its more important conventional mission.
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By this time a number of senior officers in the Navy
were developing serious doubts about the wisdom of Great Britain
attempting to maintain an independent deterrent. This doctrinal
conversion seemed to correspond very closely to the Navy's shift
to a limited war rationale. In their eyes the cost of nuclear
weapons and modern delivery systems was putting deterrence out
of Britain's price range. They also considered Britain's
"contribution to the Western deterrent insignificant alongside
America's." J They could not conceive of an instance where the
United Kingdom would engage in a nuclear war without the United
States and did not share the politicians fear of being deserted
by the Americans. These naval officers considered Britain's
conventional forces a more meaningful contribution to the
Western Alliance and hence a more effective use of the limited
defense funds available. They were coming more and more to look
at nuclear arms as a "political gimmick and not proper military
weapons"' for Great Britain. Though the Board of Admiralty
never took an official position against deterrence, this opinion
was widely held, and many individual officers made their views
known behind closed doors. These opinions inevitably conditioned
the Royal Navy's approach to Polaris.
Sometime in 1959 the Ministry of Defense began to reassess
the missile program. In the process of this review Mr. Sandys
was succeeded by Mr. Watkinson. With Sandys' departure Blue
Streak lost its most influential advocate. The Royal Air Force
responded with a high pressure campaign for Skybolt. It was clear
that the Air Ministry felt the very character of its future hinged
on the outcome of this argument. In contrast to this fanatical
line, the Admiralty chose a very restrained course. The Board
clearly was unenthusiastic about Polaris, but at the same time
recognized its responsibility to assess realistically the character-
istics of the seaborne system. The' results of the Admiralty study
were communicated to the Defense Committee and the Cabinet. The
First Lord fully informed these bodies of the reports which the
Admiralty was receiving from the United States on Polaris and
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recommended that it be considered seriously as a successor to
Blue Streak. The Royal Navy "did its duty and nothing more."'
No pressure was applied and the Admiralty made no attempt to
push the case for Polaris or to point out the weaknesses in
Skybolt. Unofficially, of course, the politicians were well
aware of the Navy's reservations about Polaris. In fact many of
them concurred that deterrence fell outside of the Navy's proper
role.
Unlike Skybolt which was pressed enthusiastically by
the aircraft industry, Polaris enjoyed no tangible outside
support. The shipbuilding industry, an ineffective lobby at best in
Britain, was confident in this case that a contract for ballis-
tic missile submarines would merely replace one for nuclear
hunter-killer boats. In terms of overall business there would
be no change. As to the Polaris missiles, they would no doubt
be manufactured in the United States. The lay strategists who
saw in Polaris the only truly invulnerable delivery system for
72
strategic weapons were its only enthusiastic advocates. Yet
they could hardly supply the political strength necessary to
carry a program involving such heavy capital investment and
long range strategical commitment.
In the end it was primarily a matter of weighing the
political support.. Solely as a missile, Blue Streak demonstrated
every prospect of being successful. However as a liquid fuel
missile it was immobile and considerable cost was going to be
involved in preparing underground launching sites, which would
still be vulnerable to a direct hit. Even so, it might still
have won out, if backed by any influential group. However, Blue
Streak's main advocates, Mr. Sandys and Sir Frederick Brundrett,
the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Defense, had moved to
other departments and their successors took a neutral stand. At
the same time, Polaris too had few active advocates in the Govern-
ment. The Admiralty, which would normally be expected to press
for this system, gave it only token approval. On the other hand,
Skybolt enjoyed powerful and sustained support. The Guard Ian
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commented that, from the day. Mr. Sandys announced Blue Streak
would replace manned bombers, "its days were numbered.' The
result was foreordained.
In the early spring of I960 the Minister of Defense made
a trip to the United States and conferred with Secretary of
74Defense Gates. He went to look at both Polaris and Skybolt.
He was assured that Britain could participate in the development
of Skybolt and share the operational missile with the United
States. On April 13, 1960, the British Government abandoned the
Blue Streak project and announced its intention to rely on
Skybolt. Mr. Watkinson justified this decision on the ground
that the Blue Streak's launching sites would be vulnerable to
attack by highly accurate Russian missiles and that mobile
76
systems were more appropriate to modern conditions. This
choice involved the United Kingdom in an expensive and question-
able development program which never came to fruition. More
, .^ ._:':g^:.':1v, it delayed for ovci- z::^ ycar^ the cvontual adoption
of Polaris. Certainly the Board of Admiralty must accept some of
the blame for this decision which wasted both time and money.
However, Polaris did not fade into the background. The
Government was forced to keep a weather eye on it. Skybolt was
still experimental. The Ministry of Defense was clearly appre-
hensive over its future. In addition, this airborne missile
was expected to be adequate only for a short period. By 1970 a
more sophisticated system would be required. Reinforcing these
considerations, the first operational Polaris was fired from a
submerged submarine in July I960. This event enabled its pro-
ponents to bombard the Government with reminders of the many
advantages of seaborne missiles. During the parliamentary debate
on the Skybolt decision, Mr. Watkinson told the House of Commons
that "he had asked the Admiralty to put in hand an urgent study
of the requirements for British-built submarines capable of carry-
76ing the Polaris type missile."' Later in the year a committee
composed primarily of scientists and representing all three Services
was formed within the Ministry of Defense to look at "deterrent
weapons systems for the 1970- 1 s."''
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Meanwhile, the Admiralty's attitude toward Polaris was
gradually changing. « It was rather clear that irrespective of
the feeling of professional officers the Government was determined
to maintain an independent deterrent. In the opinion of many of
the Navy's scientists the technical problems confronting Skybolt
were immense and the probabilities of failure were excellent.
They were convinced that Skybolt was too vulnerable to compare
with Polaris militarily. They were convinced too that Skybolt
had been adopted primarily to extend the life of the V-bomber
force. This did not impress the Admiralty as a tenable reason
for expending so much money on a second rate system. Also in the
process of justifying the Skybolt decision a great many misleading
7ft
statements had been made both in the press and in Parliament
which discredited Polaris and in turn annoyed the Sea Lords. Even
though they had not pressed for Polaris, they disliked seeing the
capabilities of seapower undersold. All these considerations led
the Admiralty to change its position. Although their Lordships
still disliked assuming responsibility for building a missile
submarine force, they determined to keep the record straight as
to the virtues of Polaris. If the politicians insisted on further
modernizing the deterrent, the Admiralty would press on them the
superiority of a seaborne system over an airborne one. It is
difficult for the outside observer to grasp why the Admiralty was
79
so long in coming to this posture.'^
The committee appointed to study future delivery systems
was to experience the results of this new approach. For the first
time the Navy's representatives took a firm stand, pressing hard
for the abandonment of Skybolt and the adoption of Polaris if the
Government was determined to continue the deterrent into the 1970 f s.
The Committee, due to basic disagreement between Air Force and
Navy, was unable to concur on any weapon. Nevertheless, it did
draw two significant conclusions. Whatever system was adopted
the committee insisted that It should be mobile and constantly
ready to fire. The report then stated that only two systems
presently in sight would meet these criteria - Polaris or an
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improved version of Skybolt carried on a new generation of
V-bombers which would be deployed in a continual airborne alert.
This was the first time that the Admiralty had openly and
directly disagreed itfith the Royal Air Force on the issue of deter-
rent weapon:;. It was not the last. This was only the first
salvo in a bitter argument which was to stretch over a number of
moiitlio '..w'll into 1962, Using the above recommendations as a
guide, the Minister of Defense appointed another study group to
make comparative cost analyses of Polaris and an advanced version
of Skybolt. This group was composed of civil servants from the
81
Air Ministry and the Admiralty. Its deliberations were based
on a complex set of assumptions concerning the number of targets
to be covered, reliability of equipment, strategy, and a variety
of other considerations. Neither these assumptions nor the
group rs exact estimates have ever been published. Again, however,
the general frame of the controversy can be sketched. The RAF
estimated that its system would require about 10,000 men, a
reasonably low capital expenditure on a small force of bombers,
and rather high operating costs. The Navy estimated it would
need some 2,500 men, a large capital investment in ballistic
missile submarines and missiles, and much smaller amounts for
operating costs. Actually any direct financial comparison was
inconclusive. The group was presumably to look at the ten year
period of the 1970*8* Stay-iij solely witnin tln-t fi^ne of rofor-
ence the Air Force's estimates appeared to be much lower. On the
other hand the Navy contended that once the submarines were built
they would have a useful life of twenty years and on that basis
a shipborne system would be cheaper since its running costs were
Lot _•_'•. Tli^. .-ir l/one^ countered anaa twenty year 3 was, too far
ahead to plan. ___. _ aalt \,tg an iupaeeo. Again no c.wi_n_ta
conclusions were reached and the group merely submitted the
opposing cost estimates without interpretation. Although the
Admiralty was still not enthusiastic for Polaris, it was now
determined to defend the Polaris concept and to insure that the
Q-overnment received an accurate portrayal of its potentialities.
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No action was taken on the basis of this report for it was
overtaken by events out of the control of the Ministry of Defense.
Sometime around the middle of 1962 the British Government
was informed that the United States was considering canceling the
Skybolt project. The prospects of success did not appear to
justify the escalating cost. Needless to say the reaction was
_. - .-ic •--11-, Cw-no aa r.o duc^l: to : ny Individuals w'ao dcuba^u
all along that it would succeed. The Royal Navy's liaison officers
in Washington had been sending back pessimistic reports on the
progress of Skybolt, so the Admiralty was not taken by surprise.
After recovering from the initial shock and conferring with the
Royal Air Force, the Minister of Defense asked the Board of
Admiralty for advice on the proper course. The First Lord out-
lined three alternatives to the Board* First, it could recommend
that the Government discard the nuclear deterrent - advice that
the Prime Minister was not interested in receiving. Second, the
_
:
-d_Lr„luy could propose a forco o_' uv/orid uucio^r- submarines which
would carry six to eigne r^lb-riu uiasiles aau uiso po„ac: an
anti-submarine warfare capability. Third, it could suggest that
the Government adopt the U. S. Polaris submarine design intact.
This ship would mount sixteen Polaris and be assigned solely to
a missile carrying role. The days of being reluctant were over.
The Fleet was being thrust into a deterrent role by forces beyond
its control. The object now was to carry out this mission with
competence and elan.
The Board of Admiralty had confidence in Polaris as a
deterrent weapons system even if it perhaps did not fully share
the Government's affection for the concept of deterrence. It
was more difficult to decide how Polaris should be integrated
into the Royal Navy. The "hybrid" submarine had been suggested
"as early as 1958 and due to the Royal Navy's lukewarm attitude
toward Polaris was never given serious consideration. " ^ Now
it became more attractive. By combining the ASW and deterrent
roles, the Admiralty could hope to obtain more nuclear submarines
and to insure the future of its anti-submarine forces. Otherwise
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there was little doubt that the nuclear "hunter-killer" program
would be pushed back until the Polaris submarines were 'completed,
and the Admiralty wished to circumvent that outcome.
On the other hand, there was a serious question about
the wisdom of combining the two functions in one submarine.
Certainly a hybrid boat, because of its size alone, would lose
speed and maneuverability. In turn this would reduce its effec-
tiveness as an ASW vessel. At the same time it would carry a
smaller cluster of missiles. This meant that it would sacrifice
performance in both roles, and probably do neither well. Economy
also dictated against this alternative. The more missiles in a
single ship the smaller the cost of placing a specific number of
missiles on station. This was a vital consideration, since the
capital cost of nuclear submarines is high. In the end the Board
of Admiralty deferred choosing between the two schemes. It ad-
vised the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister that Polaris
would be an eminently satisfactory weapons system and that the
Royal Navy could carry it off. It further reported the two
schemes it was considering, but suggested that a final decision
be delayed until after further negotiations with the United States.
By late fall 1962 it was public knowledge that the Skybolt
84program was likely to be canceled. In December Prime Minister
Macmillan and President Kennedy met at Nassau. At this well
publicized conference Her Majesty's Government concurred in the
cancellation of Skybolt, and the United States offered the Prime
Minister Polaris in its stead. The Nassau agreement has been
discussed at great length, and it would add little here to resur-
rect the political pros and cons. From the standpoint of the
British Navy it was a momentous decision which envisaged an
entirely new role for the Fleet. Although the Admiralty adopted
Polaris with reluctance, Nassau was the turning point. Thereafter,
all those charged with implementing this decision devoted them-
selves to this new task with determination and dedication.
Once the public clamor died down and the Board examined
the Nassau agreement it was clear that the hybrid submarine was
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ruled out. The Admiralty felt that the clause in the agreement
committing the Polaris submarines to NATO, except in cases of
"grave national emergency" ° would preclude the use of such
ships for practically any 'duties other than carrying deterrent
missiles.
The Board then addressed itself to alleviating the costs,
for years the root of the Admiralty's reluctance to accept Polaris.
The Board argued that the Navy was assuming a new and distinctive
task which justified increased funds. It even urged for a time
the establishment of a new and separate category of defense funds
86
for deterrent weapons. It reasoned that the Air Force had
been originally responsible for the deterrent and now the Navy
was. There was no way to predict which Service would take it
over in the future. The best way to avoid disruption and to
facilitate the transferring of this function was to appropriate
specific funds for deterrent weapons. This was a rather ingenious
argument designed to assure the Admiralty a large portion of the
Air Force appropriation. It was clearly so recognized, and was
soon dropped. However, after some urging the Ministry of Defense
took up the matter of additional funds with the Treasury. The
latter abruptly responded that the shift to Polaris would not
justify raising the defense budget. If the Minister of Defense
wished to transfer funds between the Services that was his affair.
Thereupon the Minister of Defense made an executive decision that
the costs of Polaris would be equally shared by all three Services.
It is too early to determine how fully that directive will be
obeyed and exactly what effect the Polaris program will have on
the rest of the Navy. But certainly this decision has modified
the Admiralty's original fears. There is general consensus that
this i/as a rather remarkable victory under the circumstances.
On April 6, 1963 a sales agreement for the exchange of
Polaris missiles and accompanying information was signed between
the U. S. Navy and the Royal Navy. ' Concurrently the British
Naval Ballistic Missile System Program was created, along the
lines of the U. S. Navy's Special Projects Office, to supervise
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all the details of getting British Polaris submarines to sea,
88
Four such submarines have been authorized. An ambitious build-
ing program has been scheduled. The first two boats were laid
down in January 1964, two more in early 1965. The first is
scheduled to be deployed on station by June 1968; the next three
are due to join her in six month intervals. The Royal Navy is
promoting this program with vigor. There i3 every prospect that
the projected target dates will be met. But the program is an
extremely demanding one, generating serious personnel problems
throughout the Fleet. The difficulty is not so much the total
number as the number of high calibre people required to man
ballistic missile submarines. The capital expenses are estl-
89
mated at approximately £300 million. ' Thus far the funds laid
out have not gravely hurt the remainder of the Navy. But the
peak of this expenditure will fall about 1 967-68. It will be
impossible to predict the long range effects of Polaris on the
rest of the Fleet until the program is further along. Unfortu-
nately, the cost promises to escalate, and a number of authorities
believe that, true to the Admiralty's original predictions, it
will detract in the end from the Fleet's conventional mission.
Irrespective of this, the Nassau agreement has restored
the Royal Navy to a pivotal position in the British defense
picture somewhat similar to that of earlier years. It is now
engaged in assuming the prime responsibility for the British
deterrent and in building up a small but sophisticated force of
nuclear submarines. At the same time the Admiralty is fiercely
determined to retain and strengthen the Fleet's conventional
limited war capabilities. For nothing has happened to downgrade
the importance of that mission in the eyes of the Navy's leaders.
One can legitimately ask whether the available resources will per-
mit the implementation of such an ambitious scheme. Nevertheless,
in 1963 the future of the Royal Navy was brighter than it had been
at any point since World War II. There is little question that it
has assured itself a position of prominence for some years to come






Much of the data in this section came from three extensive
interviews with individuals who were connected with the
early days of this program and unfortunately cannot be
confirmed in public documents. In addition the writer was
given access to some notes taken in an unclassified lecture
by a scientist who was at Harwell in the middle 1950*s which
described in some detail the historical development of the
nuclear propulsion effort. Again the writer was asked not
to cite the source. For a very brief historical treatment
of the early effort see R. V. Moore and J. Goodlet, "Harwell
Design Study," The Journal of Briti sh Nuclear Energy
•
Conference , VolTTl, No. 2 (April" 1950, PP. 58-59; Christopher
Hinton and R. V. Moore, "The Nuclear Propulsion of Shins,"
Ibid, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January 1959), pp. 39-50. In view of
all that has been published on nuclear reactors it is shocking
that there is so little available on the history of the naval
reactor effort in Britain.
2. There is an interesting official account published describing
the establishment at Harwell • Harwell: The British Atomic
Energy Research Establishment ( London : H.M.S.O., 1952).
3. For the reader who would like some technical, but at the same
time understandable, background on these type of reactors, see
Hinton and Moore, Nuclear Energy Conference .
4. Its large size and the graphite core would have also made it
peculiarly vulnerable to shock. This is an important con-
sideration in a submarine where every item must be built to
withstand depth charge attack. In the same vein helium would
be more difficult to contain than a liquid coolant.
5. For general information on Britain's extensive power program
see Cmd. 9389, "A Programme of Nuclear Power," February 1955»
(London: H.M.S«0.); Britain's Atomic Factories (London:
H.M.S.O., 1954); John~Cockeroft , ""•The" United Kingdom Atomic
Energy Authority and its Functions," The Journal of British
Nuclear Energy Conference 8 Vol. I, No. 1 (January 195^77""
pp. 3-12; "Britain's' Third Fuel," The G-uardian , December 2, 1964,
pp. 11-18.
.
6. Calder Hall was the first commercial nuclear power station
built in Britain, and it went into operation in 1956. For




7. In 1953 the Ship Design Policy Committee assigned it a
Glass II priority - this was the lowest available category.
Theoretically this meant that the program should receive
resources to match the rate of progress expected, but to
give way to more urgent demands. Practically the DRPC
only considered Class I projects. This lack of support
meant that the Defense Research Policy Committee asigned
it no priority at all. In turn it was impossible to con-
vince the AEA s scientists at Harwell to devote time, money
or energy to a maritime program.
8. This attitude of the British people was mentioned in several
interviews. It should be mentioned that the Royal Navy
employed submarines in both world wars, and several com-
piled remarkable records. However, the British submarine
effort in neither case was extensive enough to draw attention
from the German U-boats or to make submarine warfare in
general respectable.
9. There were naturally some dissident views on this subject.
However, the bulk of the senior officers were in agreement
that submarines did not offer the return on the investment
to justify the huge expense that a reactor research program
seemed to involve. This was before the Royal Navy came to
the U. S. view that submarines were ideal for combatting
other submarines.
10. Interview.
11. The British scientists foresaw a 15,000 to 20,000 shaft horse
power installation. The Nautilus had a 15,000 SHP plant.
12. Many senior officers are rather sensitive on the question of
whether the Admiralty was apathetic about nuclear power.
Inevitably professionals justify the delay by stressing the
emphasis put on land-based power producing reactors. For
example see speech by Rear-Admiral G. A. M. Wilson reported
in Naval Review, April 1953, p. 225; and speech by First Sea
Lord, Admiral Mountbatten, reported in The Times, January 18,
1957. Nevertheless, In every interview where this subject was
discussed at length the respondent agreed that one of the
prime reasons for the Navy*s late entry into the field was the
failure of the leaders to push for nuclear power earlier.
13* This was a special company formed specifically for this job.
It included elements from Viekers Armstrong, Rolls Royce and
Foster Wheeler.
14. A zero energy reactor is built specifically for research and
not to furnish power or produce fissionable material. For an
excellent description of Neptune see Journal of the Royal




16. Contracts were signed with Viekers-Arm strong Ltd. (Barrow)
for the hull and with Vickers-Armstrong (Engineers) Ltd. for
the machinery.
17. Cmd. 9789, "Agreement between United Kingdom and United States
for Cooperation on Civil Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual
Defense," June 1955. For details of amendment see The Times ,
June 15, -1956.
18. Both the Atomic Energy Authority scientists and production
people were constantly lukewarm to the Navy program. The
reactor scientists disliked seeing any money or manpov/er
diverted from land-based reactor research, and also it
meant that their control over the experimental program
would be fractured to a certain extent. The production
group was heavily oriented towards the weapons program and
Just could not generate any sympathy for what it considered
a secondary requirement.
19. It is by no means customary for the Admiralty to circulate
reports which throw its own equipment in a bad light.
However, the Minister of Defense had just accepted the
Navy's contention that the Fleet's anti-submarine capa-
bility was vital to SACLANT, and the Admiralty felt it
more important to save Dreadnought than to keep its ASW
image unblemished.
20. For newspaper articles published during this period on the
threat to Dreadnought see "Atomic Sub Plan May be Scrapped,"
Evening News, October 23, 1957; Dally Telegraph, October 26 t
1957; "Check to British A-Ship PlansTTH3unday Times ,
December 1, 1957; "Navy to Lose its A-Sub," Dally Express ,
October 25 , 1957. •
21. Translating this general feeling into positive action was
rather difficult since the U. S. Navy's nuclear propulsion
program is under the control of Vice-Admiral H. G. Rickover.
Until he personally was convinced that information should be
given to Britain, it was unlikely that an exchange could be
arranged. For reasons yet unknown and speculated on at
great length in Britain, Admiral Rickover eventually reversed
his earlier stand and in 1957 decided that the time had come





23* It was interesting to note the different estimates which
respondents gave as to the time the American reactor saved
the British in commissioning Dreadnought . They no doubt
correlated with the interviewee * s perspective. The minimum
estimate was six months given by a scientist in the British
program. The maximum was five years given by a high rankinng
officer who was on the Board of Admiralty at the time and
instrumental in driving through the exchange.
24. Interview.
25. Obviously Admiral Rickover made good on his word.
26. For summary see The. Times, July 9, 1958. For the verbatim
agreement see- Cmd. 470, United States, No. 2 (1953).
27. Although the British preferred a continuing exchange there
were some compensatory advantages to this arrangement. They
did not have to pay royalties on any future work based on
knowledge derived from the American plant. The initial
contract would have required continuous royalties.
28. A number of respondents suggested that this change in the
arrangements, which the British had originally hoped to
formalize, was inspired by the Admiralty's refusal to cut
back its research program* However, there is certainly
no tangible evidence of this. Despite the tension and
difficulties associated with the negotiations the writer
detected nothing but gratefulness for the reactor exchange,
although several people interviewed who actually participated
in the negotiations were visibly guarded in their comments.
The writer was able to discover only two references in the
press to any tension between the Royal Navy and Admiral
Rickover. See New York Times , October 21, 1960 and Daily
Telegraph , October 22, 19o07~
29. Cmd. 949, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty




30. Daily Telegraph , September 1, 1960,
31. Cmd. 2270, "Statement on Defense 1964," February 1964, p. 16.
32. Thomas P. Field, "Blue Streak Missile," NATO Journal . February-
March 1962, p. 27-
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33. Mr. Duncan Sandys has claimed that the British decision to
proceed independently was taken only after the Americans had
refused to supply ballistic missiles to Britain. This- is
extremely difficult to credit. The United States in March
1955 offered to supply Corporal missiles to the British
Army and in the late 'fifties the medium range Thor. In
addition there was close collaboration with the U. S. on
the development of Blue Streak. The sense of the interviews
conducted by the writer was that Britain did not want to
abandon this field to the Americans and decided to concen-
trate on the one weapon which seemed the most important
under the circumstances.
34. Cmd. 9691 , p. 15.
35. For public references to Mr. Sandys' deep personal interest
in Blue Streak see "Sandys Faces his Vital Battle," Daily
Express. February 12, 196O; "Nearly £100 Million On Blue
Streak," The Guardian, April -14, 1960; Comment of Mr.
George Brown in 622" H. C. Deb 211-14 and 215-18.
36. Field, 27.
37. Cmd. 124, p. 9.
38. Cmd. 363* p. 7.
39. Field, 280 It was certainly not as advanced as implied.
Actually it was modeled after the U. S. Atlas and was
essentially a copy of U. S. hardware, although It was hoped
to stretch out the performance to exceed the Thor.
40. For a fervent defense of Blue Streak by Mr. Sandys see
622 H. C. Deb. 240-96 and 330-42.
41. Field, 31.
42. 621 H. C. Deb. 1267.
43. For a strong view by a highly placed official see remarks
of the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot
Boyle in Flight
. February 22, 1957? p. 229.
44. See Air Power, Summer 1958, pp. 283ff. This was very similar
to the Navy's Fairlead Conference held at Greenwich in early
1957. However, it was much more elaborate and highly
publicized.
45. Martin, 32.
46. This was not Skybolt but a subsonic predecessor.
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47. The Times , April 9, 1957.
48. Flight , April 19, 1957, p. 501.
49. For articles and comments on this issue see Flight , April 12,
1957, p. 462; Flight , March 22 , 1957, p. 355; The Times ,
August 15, 1957. The best overall review of the pressure
exerted by the aircraft industry in this fight is found in
Snyder, "Dissertation," 329-68.
50. Flight , :.V/__-^- -.5, 1957, p. 786*
51. Snyder, "Dissertation," 346.
52. Ibid . , 357.
53. For the only account the writer could locate on the early
development history of Seaslug see E.M.E.L., "The Start of
Guided Weapons in the United Kingdom," Naval Review , XLII,
No. 1 (February 1954), pp. 9-10. See -p. 85 above.
54. The following comments on the background of the Polaris
program rest largely on James Baer and William E. Howard,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, I960).
55. Martin, 28.
56. There is no public confirmation of actual offers, but it is
more than clear from interviews that the close rapport
established between the Royal Navy and U. S. Navy regarding
Polaris carried with it the full backing of the Navy section
of the Pentagon, if and when the British chose to adopt this
weapon system.
57* Field, 28. For perhaps the most authoritative account of the
thinking that went on behind the scenes see Sir Frederick
Brundrett's remarkably frank comments before the Royal United
Service Institution. He was the Chief Scientist in the
Ministry of Defense and a strong supporter of Blue Streak.
In fact it is generally assumed that he left MOD because of
strong differences of opinion over Blue Streak. Journal
;
Royal United Service Institution, Vol. CV, No. 610,
TAugust i960l, pp. 332-43.
58. On. the other hand the American Navy took a vigorous interest
in the course of basic missile research and fought determined-
ly for solid fuel. See Baer and Howard, 18-76.
59. This was mentioned in a number of interviews as one of the
main reasons the Admiralty shied clear of this issue.
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60. The most interesting exchange during this period occurred
in the Observer . Two articles appeared under the pseudonym
"Nucleus" criticizing airborne missiles and generally decrying
the need- for a British deterrent. He went on to contend that
if a deterrent was essential then Polaris was the only viable
answer. See Observer December 7 and 28, 1958. It was widely
rumored that ^Nucleus" was a recently retired high ranking
naval officer who had -the full backing of the Admiralty in
this effort. For the reaction see letters to the editor in
Observer , December 21, 1958. For the best discussion of the
trend 6T strategic thinking outside the Government regarding
Polaris see Armstrong, 253-57.
61. There is little doubt that the bias of the professional
officers toward carriers and surface ships played a part here.
An early shift to Polaris might have torpedoed the carrier.
Snyder makes quite an issue of this, see Politics , 128-29.
However, this writer is convinced that Snyder overrates the
fervor of this controversy within the Admiralty. There were
some ardent individual advocates within the Navy for an all
submarine Fleet, but they never received much of a hearing,
and the Board never considered seriously downgrading surface
ships.
62. Comparing an ASW attack submarine with a Polaris boat is
much like contrasting a fighter and a bomber. Attack boats
are considered much more glamorous by the men who man themA Polaris submarine is tied closely to the chain of command
and its first responsibility is to avoid enemy forces, solo does not hold the appeal for aggressive submariners thattne smaller ships do.
63. Cmd. 952, p. 5.
64. Financial Times
, March 1 , 1 960
65. For an excellent discussion of the implications of this pro-gram see The guardian
. April 1, i960.
66. Martin, 28.





them? was constantly reiterated by respondents bothwithin and without the Royal Navy. One of the arguments
employed against the adoption of Polaris was that it wouldnecessitate the formation of a small elite /-rouo within th*
theY^ thaVhis ^ ^ desirable. Th2 8fproponents citedS^L s » nuclear program which has beer handled* in such s
Politics
. 129.




70. Interview, The writer found this attitude widely shared by




72. There is little question that the bulk of the journalists,
lay strategists, and politicians who seemed to have no
allegiance to any particular Service favored Polaris. This
was manifest both from the popular press and interviews.
On this see Armstrong, 253-57*
73. The Guardian , April 14, 1960.
74. For description of this trip see Daily Telegraph , March 18,
1960. A number of respondents thought that possibly the
United States actually offered Polaris to Great Britain
during this visit, but this writer could find no one who
professed actually to know or any tangible evidence to this
75. 621 H. C. Deb. 12655 622 H. C. Deb. 243-47.
76. Ibid.
77. Interview. For a very general reference to this study see
"Rocket Subs Only," Daily Herald , October 13, I960.
78. In the debate on the Skybolt decision Polaris was mentioned
a number of times and a number of speakers attacked its
effectiveness. For example see speeches by Mr. Woodrow
Wyatt (Bosworth) 622 H. C. Deb. 290-91 and Sir A. V. Howey
(Macclessfield) Ibid . 303-04. Interestingly enough no one
in the Government saw fit to rise to Polaris 8 defense.
79. A number of interviewees who had participated in the Navy's
higher councils during this period frankly admitted that in
retrospect they considered the Navy's failure to get behind
Polaris a mistake - from the perspective of national, not
Navy, interest.
80. Two interviewees mentioned that the Royal Air Force fought
desperately to keep this report confined within the defense
establishment. Evidently the Air Council did not consider
it favorable to the Air Force's case.




82. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Government was informed
considerably in advance of the Nassau Conference of Sky-bolt's im-
minent demise despite the outcries of righteous indignation
at the time. Interestingly enough when the Government was
asked by the U. S. what its reaction would be to the Skybolt
cancellation it did not inform the Admiralty for several
weeks while it first sounded out the Air Force reaction.
The Admiralty knew full well what was going on and bided
its time until it was notified formally.
83. Personal correspondence with a high ranking retired naval
officer.
84. For example see Sunday Times , December 9, 1962; Guardian ,
December 7, 1962; Dg.iiy. Telegraph , November 16, 1963T"
85. For the text of the agreement reached at Nassau see
New York Times , December 22, 1962.
86. See the letter to The Times from Sir Frederick Brundrett,
the former Chief Scientist at the Admiralty and, later, at
the Ministry of Defense,' on January 15, 1963.
87. "Agreement Between the United States o_ rica and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Norther Ireland,"
Defense Polaris Seles (Wash: Supt. of Documents, 1 963)
.
88. This program was reviewed with care by the new Labor
Government and despite its strong campaign talk about can-
celing ^nis program a decision was made to go ahead with





The preceding chapters record the impressions of an
... __ ./„ :-..--/al officer, with regard to the evolution of the
British Navy and of its supporting structure of ideas and
doctrines since 194-5* In essence, this has "been the story of
-.'.:_ pressures of fo_-^_ .i ^ivairs, dome^ivj politic- and
technical advances all acting through the nation's governmental
machinery have continuously and inexorably reshaped naval think-
ing and policy. However, to better understand these forces and
their consequences, on^ needs to investigate with some care the
decision-making process as opposed to the substantive product.
There are two reasons for doing so.
First, the political groups which participate in the
formation of policy and the administrative arrangements govern-
ing the relationships bw«\/v-:: \,-~.e groups often inject an
autonomous input into the process which in itself influences
the outcome. To appreciate the course of post-war defense
policies it is essential to examine how officials working within
the organization interpret events and translate their desires
into action. Secondly, an analysis of the policy-making machinery
will serve both to test the hypotheses of other political studies
of the British system and perhaps to suggest new generalizations.
Political structure is central to a political community's ability
to exploit opportunities and to overcome obstacles present in its
•ailiv/j.. Economic trends, tccV^isai dv;vclop::o:vi^, _~r-i ior'o_j^.
pressures may be beyond a government's power to manipulate. On
the other hand a national community may have wider effective




policy and the people who conduct Its affairs. In this area
meaningful generalizations can perhaps be drawn and applied in
the future.
With this in mind, it is the intention in this chapter
to look critically at the overall political milieu within which
the Admiralty operates and to examine how the structural arrange-
ments, both political and administrative, influence the final
product. One© that is completed the next chapter will then focus
on the Admiralty itself as the governmental structure most specif'
ically concerned with n_y^L ^..'i^irs, v.^d o^pccidly to examine
its role in the policy process.
The Focus of Power
One striking feature of British defense policy is how
removed it is from everyday political pressures. At least an
American, familiar with his own pluralistic government, is apt
to be impressed with the strong position of the Cabinet and
.
_...__ ,1-iej vis-a-vis P^rli .nt ...:d other groups external to
the executive structure. This is especially evident in the
area of defense. Military policy is largely the result of a
dialogue between the politicians in the Government and the
involved departments. The many outside elements which are
presumably interested in defense matters can exercise at most
only an indirect influence on policy. This feature of British
rule is well known to students of comparative politics. The
intent here is to examine it in the specific context of the
Royal Navy, for it is basic to understanding the formulation of
naval policy*
The essential nature of the British political system
normally assures the Government a tight control over a wide
range of policy. Parliament lacks the independent role played
i
by the U. S. Congress. The Prime Minister dominates the House
of Commons primarily by means of the harsh weapon of party dis-
cipline. He is not only Chief Executive, but also a member of
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Parliament and leader of the majority party. Hi a ministers are
likewise chosen from the predominant Party in the House of
Commons. The Prime Minister sponsors all major legislation, and
an adverse vote on one of his bills is likely to evoke a disso-
lution of the House of Commons, and a general election. The
spectre of dissolution combined with other facts of British
politics give the Government great influence over most of their
party colleagues in Parliament, and operates as a powerful deter-
rent against defection. Dissolution is a two edged sword, but
generally the "back-bencher" stands to lose a great deal more
than the leaders themselves. Not only does a defector injure
the party's political reputation which inevitably reflects on
him, but if he insists on flaunting the leadership he risks
losing the support of his party. This may entail the loss of
campaign funds, organizational support and endorsement by the
party's leaders. In Britain which is much more nationally
oriented than the United States, this is practically tantamount
to defeat. The casualties in an election are normally concen-
trated among the back-benchers. Needless to say, most Members
of Parliament desire to retain their seats, thereby tightening
the Government's control of their voting behavior. As a result
"normally it is certain that any Bill introduced by the Govern-
ment will pass, substantially in the form in which first sub-
mitted, whatever splendid oratory, indisputable facts, and
tight logic may be advanced against it in the Chamber. " In
essence the focus of political power lies not in the legislature
but in the Cabinet.
Buttressing this pattern are both cultural and adminis-
trative considerations which enhance the Government's power.
The Cabinet enjoys a great deal of authority and autonomy partly
because of the widespread British belief that once leaders are
chosen it is their business to govern and they should be given
the latitude to do so. This is characteristic of British pol-
itical behavior in general. From a practical standpoint, the
parliamentary time available is severely limited, and the
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legislative schedule must be carefully coordinated in order to
get the necessary business done. This function logically falls
to the leadership and no matter where public Bills originate
they are normally sponsored by ministers. Thus the Government
controls the substance of legislation and the time that is de-
voted to it. Ministers together with leaders of the Opposition
even determine who is to speak and how much time is allowed to
each. It should be stressed that this authority is rarely used
to stifle criticism, but nevertheless it gives the Government
far more control over the deliberative process than is the case
in Washington. Just as important, the rules require that the
House cannot amend Government Bills without ministerial approval
in principle. This device, by preventing significant changes,
further tightens the Government s control. In essence Parliament
deliberates and debates, but it does not truly legislate, at least
not in any sense familiar to Americans.
Although Bills are often debated at great length,
Parliament has never developed an investigative function at all
comparable to that of the American Congress. Individual members
outside the Government both in the Majority and in the Opposition,
are deprived of one of the most important means of obtaining
information about the administration of government. They are
isolated from the non-political members (i.e. civil servants,
military officers, etc.) of the Government by custom. Similarly,
they are not entitled to classified data unless the Government
chooses to release it. MP's do have the privilege of addressing
queries directly to Ministers about matters for which they are
responsible. The first hour of every sitting day (except Friday)
is set aside for this purpose, and these questions cover a wide
range of governmental activity. Unquestionably, this device is
helpful in exposing missteps in the executive branch, and keeps
the Government on their toes. However, the questions must be
submitted ahead of time, and Ministers are still not required
to divulge any information which they choose to withhold. Obvi-
ously this device is not designed to probe deeply into administrative
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matters or to substitute for investigating committees. Needless
to say lack of essential information drastically reduces the
individual legislator's opportunities to exercise his initiative
or to originate policy. This is particularly the case with
regard to such matters as the military defense budget, broad
strategic concepts, force deployments, etc. where the issues
are without exception complex and in many cases involve classi-
fied information. Only the Government is in a position to amass
the necessary data, to weigh it, and to initiate an overall
program. These are regarded as essentially executive functions
unsuitable for Parliamentary determination, and, in any case,
beyond the average MP's probable range of information.
This asymmetrical distribution of influence is demon-
strated annually when the House of Commons and House of Lords
consider the defense estimates. Early in each calendar year
the Government submits a Statement on Defense (popularly called
the Defense White Paper) which outlines its strategic thinking,
the suggested size and composition of forces, proposed budgetary
levels and some general commentary on the state of each Service,
It is formally debated at some length and then humbly approved
without modification.
The defense debate is characteristic of the way in which
Parliament is largely excluded from direct participation in the
policy-making process. The Government may take major strategical
decisions without even informing, much less consulting, the House
of Commons. Parliament was not consulted on the commitment of
forces to NATO, on the building of a nuclear deterrent force, or
on the acceptance of Polaris. Perhaps the most significant
example was the decision to build atomic weapons, a decision
ne^er referred to the House of Commons for approval. In the
United States, Congress can and does make independent Judgments
on the manpower and money requirements of the Services. The House
and Senate often alter the Government's recommendations. To a
rather large degree, they serve as power centers which can oppose
the executive branch's decisions and even legislate in defiance
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of the President's stated policies. This simply cannot happen
in Great Britain. Policy-making is a virtual monopoly of the
Government
.
However, to contend that most MP's do not centrally
participate in policy formulation is not to argue that they are
unimportant or that they have no voice in public affairs.
"Parliament is both a source of influence, which is frequently
accommodated by a Government, and a part of the network of
intellectual activities by which an articulate public external
to the Government attempts to influence policy decisions through
commentary and criticism."' Although the Cabinet may be able
to assure itself the necessary votes on a division, at the same
time it cannot afford too hostile and sustained criticism from
its own rank and file. The Government operating in a context of
political consent must always concern themselves about the
acceptability of their actions. For this purpose, Parliament
is one of the prime indicators of the nation's political pulse.
Parliamentary action is primarily limited to debate of major
policies, but this device serves to publicize the views of the
parties, to criticize governmental policies and to illuminate
areas of disagreement. Debates reveal the strength of the
Government's support and lay the groundwork for the public re-
ception of the legislation under discussion. Needless to say
the Prime Minister and his Cabinet are always interested in
reducing criticism within Parliament and in tailoring their
policies to the majority consensus. It is from this source
that Parliament derives its strength. Nevertheless, this is an
indirect type of influence which relegates parliamentarians to
the role of an important critic. In essence Parliament is only
"one force in a great complex of forces that press upon and
limit those who do govern.
"
The same factors that inhibit Parliament's participation
in the policy process apply to other groups interested in defense -
only more so. The primary difficulty is the "lack of access to




situation, most especially with respect to technology. One
problem here is the complexity of the technological information,
and the other is the secrecy which necessarily surrounds sensi-
tive areas. Moreover, the same ethics which restrict contacts
between Parliament and the professional, both officers and civil
servants, apply to other groups as Well. As a result of these
restrictions few private organizations in Britain study security
problems. There are no equivalents to the Rand Corporation and
to the similar private and semi-private organizations in America,
which concentrate on the analysis of current military policy.
The closest analogues are a number of non-governmental Institutions,
such as the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the
Royal United Service Institution. However, these have practi-
cally ignored contemporary politico-military matters. The
Institute of Strategic Studies was founded in 1958 as a private
research organization for the purpose of studying current defense
problems, but its efforts thus far have been confined mainly to
international relations. There are no university centers
specializing in the study of military policy and very few
university courses dealing with current defense problems,
"individual scholars with an interest in security problems are
only slightly more numerous; the fifteen or so books dealing
with current security policy, published in Britain between 1946
and 1960, were the product of half that many authors." The fact
is that the intellectual community dealing with military problems
is very small and includes even fewer "individuals competent in
the technical aspects of military policy."
There is fairly broad press coverage of defense problems,
but it seems to be generally agreed that the press has very little
influence on military planners and administration. Again, lack
of essential information is the key factor. Thus the press can
do little more than comment on policy after it is made, not during
the process. Furthermore, most press commentary is polemical.
This type of advice can hardly carry great weight with the
official strategist who has wider information and heavier
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responsibilities. There is a strong tendency for both the
intellectuals and the press to address themselves to generalities
and easily comprehended principles and to neglect the crucial
issues - such as the technical details of various alternatives,
the concrete benefits each offers, and above all detailed cost
13
comparisons.
Again, as in the case of Parliament, this is not to say
that the views of intellectuals and the reporting of the press
are not important - they are. Such commentary is both a source
of some information and a forum for extending the type of
criticisms which are voiced in Parliament. Many individuals
Interested in defense affairs have to rely solely on the press
for information. There is little question that the press plays
some role in shaping attitudes. Even MP's and civil servants,
who are not directly concerned with defense affairs, depend on
newspapers for their basic information and impressions of the
public mood. That the press does play a significant role is
best evidenced by the effort which the Government puts into
influencing reporting and into rebutting the criticism of
commentators. Again, however, this acknowledges the press' power
to shape opinion, not its ability to influence policy-making
directly. Undoubtedly, an occasional suggestion made by a
strategist outside the Government wends its way into official
policy, but this does not refute the basic thesis that outside
commentators are primarily important as critics and not as
policy initiators.
In illustrating the Government's powerful position in the
policy-making process perhaps another source of influence should
be mentioned - pressure groups. Undoubtedly pressure groups are
an important feature of the British political scene, and in many
14
areas of public policy they exercise a potent influence. There
are several organizations and groups outside the formal structure
of government which lobby on issues related to defense. However,
the nature of the channels of influence and of military problems
furnishes the Government, at least by U. S. standards, considerable
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control over, and immunity from, those particular groups
interested in defense policy.
There are three ways that a pressure group may seek to
sway policy decisions. •* It may:
. (1; concentrate on creating
public attitudes favorable to the group's interests hoping that
political leaders will in turn be influenced; (2) lobby in
Parliament in the expectation that sympathetic MP's can influence
ministers; and (3) consult directly with the appropriate govern-
mental departments. The first two channels are at best ineffi-
cient. As already noted, the individual member has little
opportunity to influence policy formulation. This fact alone
places any pressure group working through public opinion or
directly on Parliament several stages away from the actual
decision-makers. This does not deter pressure groups from
attempting both to create favorable public images and to gain
support in Parliament. However, organizations relying solely
on these channels can rarely exercise a strong influence on
policy.
Compared to the American system, this arrangement reduces
the impact of pressure groups. In the United States government,
where power is more diffused, pressure groups enjoy numerous
alternative channels for making their presence felt. By gaining
a firm foothold in a political party, a Congressional committee,
or in Congress itself, they can sometimes secure decisions
opposed to the Administration's desires. Since these channels
in Britain offer such poor prospects, the quickest and most
effective method of swaying decision-making is to consult directly
with the appropriate government agency. To say the least, this
puts the Government in an excellent position to deal with and
assess the outside organization's influence before acceding to
its demands.
Nevertheless, in some areas there are pressure groups
which exert effective pressure directly on the Government and
are deeply involved in the policy process. But the principal
private organizations interested in strategic policy do not
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enjoy these advantages. Perhaps the most prominent groups
concerned with defense are the Service associations - the Navy-
League, Army League, Royal Air Force Association and the Air
League of the British Empire. These organizations are composed
of retired officers, civilians interested in military affairs,
a few politicians and some active officers. They have nothing
to offer in the way of expertise or information which is not
otherwise available to the Government. Nor does the Government
have to depend on them to build public support for its policies.
Consequently, their influence is generally slight, and they con-
centrate their efforts primarily on the public and Parliament,
One respondent, a member of the Navy League, was most candid
about it:
Around the turn of the century we could actually shape
policy when some of our adherents were influential members
of the aristocracy and carried great weight in the
Government's higher councils. That is no longer the
case. We reflect policy, not make it. Our primary
function is to keep the Navy image before the public
and Parliament, and to see that they are properly
informed about the Royal Navy. 1 7
This opinion was more or less echoed by officials interviewed
in the Admiralty. M Y/e don't pay too much attention to the Navy
League, unless there is a crucial fight in progress. In that
case we make sure that it adopts the right line, but there is
no evidence whatsoever that this has actually helped us.
"
In short the service associations are in no position to exert
significant pressure.
A number of economic groups are concerned with defense
policies. The most prominent are those representing industries
which produce military equipment. However, their influence on
policy is likewise limited. In the great majority of cases
strategic policy is not at issue, but they are lobbying for one
system as opposed to another both of which perform the same
tactical function. In other instances, groups are pressing for
contracts to be let in one area as opposed to another, because
of the economic benefits to local residents. Perhaps the aircraft
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industry is interested in changing the specifications on a
military plane to make its design compatible with civilian
requirements. This may alter performance characteristics, but
it seldom changes the basic strategical policy. Again industry
has very little expertise that is not available within the
government, and the competition between industrial concerns
likewise weakens their position.
It is very possible that the aircraft industry, in its
campaign to convince the Government to continue building manned
military aircraft, heavily Influenced the decision to cancel
Blue Streak and in turn shaped the nation's strategic policy.
"However, even this is controversial and cannot be documented.
"
In this instance the aircraft industry was in a particularly
strong position, because of its size, affluence and importance
to the economy as a whole. Also it was one of the few times
that the aircraft companies could reach any agreement among
themselves on a common goal.
As to the Navy specifically, industrial groups have had
little Impact. Guns, armor, and ammunition are produced in
government-owned Royal Ordnance Factories. This bypasses private
lobbyists altogether. Until 1957» the shipbuilding industry was
oversubscribed and had a continuous backlog of orders. Naval
work has never been more than a fraction of the total output,
and since World War II it has remained fairly constant. As a
result the industry in general has taken relatively little
interest in pushing Navy programs. The few yards which cater
to the Navy have been kept occupied. Since i960 shipbuilding
orders have tapered off and there is some evidence that the
picture is changing. However, the shipbuilders have never taken
Government subsidies, nor "have they been as involved in politics
a3 the aircraft industry; consequently they have little voice
where it counts. ' Aircraft manufacturers, due to a small
number of planes which the Navy buys, have been more concerned
with the Royal Air Force and on occasion have supported the RAF
in arguments against the Navy. For example they opposed the
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Admiralty in its fight for the American Phantom. In essence the
Admiralty has neither found economic groups of great assistance
in promoting its programs nor has it been subject to a great
deal of pressure from them.
In summary it would appear that pressure groups are less
important in defense matters than they are in most other areas
of British public policy, and that this is particularly true
in the case of the Royal Navy. Like both Parliament and com-
mentators outside the Government they are important factors
which must always be taken into account, but they are in no
sense a direct participant, and rarely an important one, in the
decision-making structure.
Finally, it is appropriate to say a brief word about the
role of unorganized public opinion. In most political systems,
but especially in those with democratic processes, public atti-
tudes if firmly enough held can significantly influence govern-
ment decisions. Illustrative of this is the frequently heard
statement that politicians are limited by "what the public will
stand." How much of a factor has this been in British naval
policy-making?
The British public has been polled regularly since World
War II on the major defense issues such as conscription, nuclear
weapons, disarmament and the magnitude of the defense effort.
In general, these opinion surveys indicate that public attitudes
21place few limitations on defense decision-makers. For example
throughout the Korean rearmament period the public decisively
supported the Government's large expenditures on defense. In
Sep^c-e^r 1950 at- the outset of Korea 78$ "agreed" with the
Government's increased spending. A year later 64% indicated
that they favored continuing the program even if the Korean War
ended. As the Government began to advocate defense cut-backs
public opinion responded accordingly. In 1955 32$ of those
polled favored reductions in defense. By 1957 this figure had
risen to 50$, and by 1959 an overwhelming consensus (71$) had
developed for the existing level of expenditures. Public
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attitudes in these instances corresponded closely to Government
policy and seemed to be little effected by the counter currents
of criticism.
The pattern was generally the same on the question of
conscription. In September 1950 a majority of 55$ approved an
extension of National Service from eighteen months to two years,
and only 33$ objected. Public attitudes generally continued to
approve this policy throughout the early 1950's. In 1954 59$
indicated that they favored retaining conscription while 35%
disagreed. By 1956 when leaders of both parties were calling
for an end to conscription a minority of 38$ supported it in
a British Gallup poll.
Attitudes on- nuclear weapons likewise indicate that the
Government plays a heavy role in shaping opinion. Polling
commenced in 1955 and since that date support for unilateralism
has ranged from 19$ to a short time high of 33$ in mid-1960.
This figure soon receded to around 20$. At no time have the
polls suggested heavy or sustained opposition to the possession
of nuclear weapons. The evidence is not as complete as one
would like, but it strongly suggests that public attitudes
toward defense policy are "weakly held, and mass opinion tends
to shift rapidly following changes of policy to support govern-
ment decisions. '
There have been no questions posed in polls relating
to strictly naval questions. This is to some extent unfortunate,
because there is a widely held belief that the Royal Navy enjoys
a special position in the hearts of Englishmen, which protects
it from the vagaries of politics. Lacking objective data, I
have had to rely strictly on subjective opinions elicited in
interviews. Perhaps such evidence is unreliable, but at least
it has been consistent. There was complete unanimity among
respondents both in and outside the Admiralty that since World
War II public attitudes had not effected the Navy's fortunes
one way or the other. Some attributed this to a decline in the
i 23Navy s general reputation and status within the nation, but
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the great majority insisted that although Britons by nature were
sympathetic to the Navy this did' not have anything to do with
defense policy. That was a matter for politicians and the
Government, and sentiment played no part in the process. This
was reiterated by the practical professionals in the Admiralty.
They could not cite one instance of public affection helping the
Navy in its post-war struggles. On Admiralty civil servant put
it bluntly:
I have always been taught that the public favors the Royal
Navy,but it is not obvious at the policy-making level. In
the hard-headed world of British politics it is impossible
to translate sentiment into achievement. Not once has the
public objected in any strength to post-war cuts in the
Navy nor has there been any noticeable public support for
the Navy in its fight with the Air Force. I am confident
that the public would raise its voice if the Government
was to put us out of business, but for no other reason.
When we advertise our case outside Whitehall, we are
really hoping that it will influence a minister or impor-
tant advisers, not the public.^
Looking at the policy process as a whole, it appears to
be largely isolated from the criticisms and pressures of domestic
politics. The Government as opposed to the non-official groups
and individuals, enjoys considerable independence In making
strategic judgments and, formulating defense policy. To an
American observer the decision-making structure in this area
seems relatively autonomous.
Nature of the Policy Dialogue
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the
Government and its supporting administrative organization enjoy
considerable autonomy, at least by American standards, in fashion-
ing strategic policy and in shaping the basic roles of the three
Services* However, this is not to say that political chiefs are
the sole originators of policy or that decisions are made by an
immaculate heirarchical process where ministers direct and the
pieces fall into place. It is manifest from the preceding
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chapters that strategic decision-making although taking place
within the confines of Whitehall is nevertheless the resultant
of a continually varying set of pressures which may reinforce
or contradict each other and are brought together through
various channels within the administrative structure. Now, let
us look more closely at this process.
From certain perspectives the administrative structure
of a government appears as a corporate entity with power
relationships carefully delineated and authority flowing in
one direction from top to bottom. At first look, the British
25defense structure seems to fit this image. * At the top of the
hierarchy stand the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, collectively
responsible for the conduct of governmental affairs and the choice
of a national strategy. At the next level is the Minister of
Defense who oversees the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Defense
Research Policy Committee and the political Ministers of the
three military departments.
This structure furnishes the organizational framework
for conducting military operations, administering the Services
and formulating strategic policy. The first two functions lend
themselves to a heirarchical arrangement, for the flow of author-
ity is strictly in one direction. The Cabinet, often represented
by the Defense Committee, sets policy guidelines which control
the budget, composition, and deployment of the armed forces. It
is the duty of the Minister of Defense to translate these direc-
tives into hardware and ready forces which are at the right place
at the right time. Operationally he acts through the CSC which
issues operations orders, directs strategic deployments, and is
responsible for the conduct of combat operations. In adminis-
trative matters the chain of command runs from the Minister of
Defense to the appropriate Service department where they are
handled through regular military routines. This sketch applies
only to operational and administrative affairs. In these cases
the general guidelines have already been decided and the remain-
ing problem is to implement the policy. A heirarchical structure
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is well suited to these tasks, and in essence they dictate the
form of the organization.
However, the focus of this study is neither operational
or administrative on the main, but rather the evolution and
making of policy. Although the same structural framework is
employed for formulating policy, the process itself is basically
different than that which applies to operational and administra-
tive matters. In fact it is more legislative in character than
executive. Samuel P. Huntington in discussing American policy-
making comments:
Legislative and executive processes of policy-making do
not necessarily correspond to the legislative and executive
branches of government. A policy-making process is legis-
lative in character to the extent that: (1) the units
participating in the process are relatively equal in power;
(2) important disagreements exist concerning the goals of
policy; and (3) there are many possible alternatives. 2°
This summary also well characterizes the British policy-making
machinery. We have noted that Parliament does not legislate
national strategy. This process is a function of the Govern-
ment. National goals are by no means fixed and immutable. They
are constantly changing and are determined by officials and
groups with different amounts of influence, different interests,
and different perspectives. In the British Government the
number of groups and officials concerned with defense policy
include the three military Services, the Treasury, the Foreign
Office, the Ministry of Aviation, and various groups pushing
competing programs. Conflict is inevitable, and the practical
range of choice may be narrow or wide. The result is shaped by
persuasion, bargaining, and political pressures on the interested
parties.
The Prime Minister and his Cabinet are responsible for
shaping strategic programs. As previously emphasized, this is
one of the principal differences between the British and American
systems. Final executive authority rests not in one man but in
a body which is comprised of the Government's leading ministers.
As the head of the Government, the Prime Minister admittedly
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exerts more authority than his colleagues. He even has the
final word in the appointment of ministers and determines which
ones vrlll sit in the Cabinet. In its deliberations his voice
carries the heaviest weight, but this may vary considerably with
2*7
different personalities. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister's.
primacy is by no means absolute - Cabinet decisions are taken
jointly and responsibility for them is shared collectively.
Constitutionally, the Cabinet is the locus where the
many strands - economic, political, international, military -
which form the woof and warp of major policies, are brought to-
gether and woven into the final product. Cabinet ministers
legally have the final say on policy matters. In practice, they
actually participate in many of the major strategic decisions.
But the complexity of modern government requires delegated and
diffused authority. Many of the same factors that have eroded
Parliament's power over the Government have likewise diminished
the Cabinet's control over the bureaucracy.
A century ago the Government was concerned almost solely
with collecting and expending revenues, keeping the peace, waging
war if necessary, and conducting diplomacy. Cabinet members were
knowledgeable on practically all aspects of governmental activity.
It was possible for them to make policy on the basis of their
own knowledge, to supervise and coordinate governmental affairs
closely and to make all of the important decisions. This state
of affairs has changed dramatically. Today the Cabinet sits at
the apex of a huge pyramid. The Cabinet presides over thirty
government departments and a number of public corporations that
2Qperform a wide range of functions. ' The civil service grew from
20,000 in 1832 to over 700,000 in 1950.-50 Today the Cabinet has
neither the time nor the specialized expertise to supervise the
details of administration, to coordinate closely the activities
between departments and to settle all disputes. It has been
gradually forced to delegate more and more of its authority to
lesser bodies. Unlike the United States where political
appointees occupy many of the top posts, a British department has
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relatively fewer political appointees, normally only a single
minister, and one or two parliamentary secretaries. Increasing-
ly, responsibility for supervision and administrative guidelines
has overflowed from ministers to civil servants or high ranking
military officers. Likewise, responsibility for coordinating
departmental activities has come to rest on the departments
themselves. This accounts for the many inter-departmental
committees, boards, councils and study groups throughout tha
British government. The Cabinet's role has been effectively
narrowed to laying down "high policy" and acting as "a high court
of appeal settling such disputes as are brought to it."^
The complexity of modern political government has like-
wise altered the Cabinet^ character and attenuated its authority.
Members have neither the time nor the ability to research issues
personally and to become expert on all the varied activities of
the Government. They must look to sub-committees, statisticians,
economists, scientists, and other experts for detailed infor-
mation and technical advice. This inevitably means that the
questions which they decide are normally initiated, researched,
and framed at the departmental level, and then refined as they
proceed through inter-departmental coordinating groups and
Cabinet sub-committees on their way to the highest level. The
final decision is normally no more than approving what has been
agreed to and recommended by the subordinate groups which possess
the technical expertise. In some instances, when the interested
departments develop major differences of opinion which they can-
not settle among themselves, the problem is taken to the Cabinet
for resolution. Even in these cases though, it does not really
initiate policy, but chooses among alternatives on the basis of
data developed at the lower echelons.
Choice is further limited by the administrative dependence
of ministers on other professionals. Policies are implemented
not by politicians, but by civil servants and military officers
acting with minimal political supervision. If they are to be
executed effectively a high degree of consensus within the
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government is required. The Cabinet's programs must not only
have the desired content, but also demand the respect and
support of the bureaucracy. This considerably enhances the
influence of the departments and the non-political administrators.
Though ultimate responsibility rests with the Cabinet,
this diffusion of function results in a decision-making process
that is a multi-faceted political dialogue between competing
departments, groupings, and officials, all pressing their
particular ideas of policy. Each participant seeks support
for his case among the other parties, and ultimately the Cabinet.
The more allies he can muster, the more the final product is
likely to reflect his views. This process involves bargaining,
compromise, persuasion. In this manner the many pressures
which forge strategic policy make their presence felt, and the
consensus which is necessary to assure effective implementation
is reached.
The nature of this dialogue is well illustrated by the
Admiralty's post-war maneuvers. The Royal Navy is one of many
organizations within the Government constantly pressing for
attention, enhanced prestige, and above all funds. The Fleet
both performs a service for the Government and makes demands on
it. The Navy's advocate in Whitehall and the focus of all its
efforts to manipulate events in favor of the seagoing forces
is the Admiralty. It is the only group within the executive
heirarchy with a primary interest in naval affairs. Certainly
Admiralty civil servants and professional officers have an over-
riding loyalty to the country and Government, but even a cursory
look at its post-war activities suggests that the one fundamental
and unvarying policy objective of the Admiralty is to insure the
Navy's survival. J It is manifest from the foregoing chapters
that every, problem is approached in that frame of mind. This
was illustrated most dramatically during the 1954-57 period when
many Navy leaders were developing genuine personal doubts about
the Fleet's future usefulness. However, "we never put the question
that way. Instead we were constantly asking: What must be done
so that the Navy can make a major contribution to defense?"^
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In turn the Admiralty plays a central role In stimulating
and shaping naval policy. It has been the Sea Lords who have
continuously evaluated technical developments, foreign threats,
and the domestic political parameters. It is the Sea Lords who
have initiated changes in the Fleet's strategic rationale. Only
rarely have outsiders directed the Navy to fulfill a certain role.
Instead it has been a key function of the Admiralty to prove the
:;^';'. usefulness and so taller it to w^o demands of "oho times.
The general war role which the Admiralty was striving to fulfill
in the early 1950's was fashioned by the Navy's professional
leaders and not the political chiefs or the Cabinet. Even after
1957 when the Minister of Defense took a greater interest and a
stronger hand in the details of Service policy, the Admiralty's
basic function did not change. Mr. Sandys did not direct the
Royal Navy to alter its thinking. Instead he informed the Sea
Lords that economy was the order of the day and subjected their
demands and arguments to searching scrutiny. If the Navy was to
survive it was incumbent upon the Admiralty to reorient its
thinking and to evolve a revised role for the Fleet in the light
of these realities. In short, it is the Navy's own professional
leaders who carry primary responsibility for delineating naval
policy, and no one else.
The concept of mobile task forces which could project
both land and air power and which were Ideally suited to meet the
threat of brushfire actions and local outbreaks was injected into
strategic policy by the Admiralty. All the appurtenances for
making these task forces effective entered the British defense
picture via the Admiralty. These developments were not initiated
to meet a specific national requirement. The process was more
involved than that. They were evolved by an Admiralty that was
striving to keep the Navy in the defense picture, and they in
turn helped alert the nation to the problems of limited war.
There was considerable controversy over the proper balance
between nuclear and conventional forces. This issue involved
many considerations - national prestige, the intentions of the
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Communist powers, the money and manpower costs involved, the
state of nuclear weaponry, and others. The Sea Lords* recommenda-
tions were an important element in convincing the Government not
to discard conventional forces and to retain a military posture
East of Suez. This is an excellent example of the Admiralty's
role in defining national goals as well as in providing means
for achieving them.
In only one instance in the period covered was a signif-
icant naval project initiated outside the Admiralty. That was
Polaris. In this case the political leadership believed that
its future rested on the continuance of the deterrent and that
it had a clear mandate for this policy. Even so the Government
looks to the Admiralty to initiate naval programs and the lack
of support among the Sea Lords unduly delayed the turn to Polaris.
By the time of the Nassau Conference the Navy's leaders had altered
their position on this weapon system, a change that facilitated
its adoption. Undoubtedly the Government could have forced
Polaris on the Fleet against its will, but it is an Indication
of the way the policy process functions that without Admiralty
support the other alternatives were tried first. Without the
Sea Lord's change in attitude it seems unlikely that the Polaris
program could have been implemented as successfully as it has been.
Initiating ideas, projects and strategic concepts is only
part of the Admiralty's function. If it is to r^ppaiaat the Navy
effectively, the Admiralty must shepherd its projects through the
political labyrinth and convert them into approved national
policy. At this point the Navy's leaders assume the role of
lev! wickers. They aust cultivate sufficiaat ^upto^t anions the
concerned departments and ministers to convince the Cabinet that
their recommendations should be adopted as policy. The techni-
ques employed and the point of focus vary with each case. De-
pending on the gravity of the issue, efforts may be concentrated
at any one of a number of levels - the CSC, the Ministry of
Defense, the Defense Committee. Likewise, a variety of political
techniques ranging from mere persuasion to bargaining may be
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employed. Nevertheless the objective is always the same - to
build an effective consensus within the executive structure.
The groundwork for less controversial programs can
normally be laid at the CSC level and more often than not it
Is only a matter of seeking agreement. Throughout the post-war
era, as previously noted, the Navy has experienced little diffi-
culty in pushing through ASW frigates and destroyer programs.
There was general concurrence among all three Services that
this was a vital function and one unique to the Navy. As long
as the projects did not require an increase in Navy appropriations,
the CSC has approved these requests with little dissent. In most
cases the support of the three military departments has been more
than sufficient to make the approval of the Minister of Defense
and the Defense Committee a mere formality.
In other areas the Navy has had to bargain and compromise
to insure the support of the CSC In the case of the commando
carrier and assault ships the Navy changed a number of the orig-
inal specifications to insure that these ships would be suitable
for transporting army troops and thereby met the Army's desires.
As a result CSC support was soon forthcoming. Often the CSC is
the scene of hard bargaining as well as mild negotiation. Perhaps
the clearest example was the Navy's insistence on approval of the
concept of broken-backed warfare before it x^ould give its blessing
to deterrence. In both of the above cases the approval of the
CSC was the crucial step in creating the necessary support.
Of course, the more dramatic examples are those where
the Admiralty cannot achieve consensus at the Chiefs of Staff
level and must carry its case further up the chain. Perhaps the
most Illustrative was the carrier fight of the early 1960's. The
Royal Air Force refused to endorse the need for a new carrier.
It rejected the Admiralty's case on both military and economic
grounds. The Navy's leaders were then forced to appeal to the
Minister of Defense for support, and once this was won to seek
additional allies on the Defense Committee. This is an excellent
example of the political technique of asking for more than one
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can expect so that there is room to bargain. The Board's original
request for four carriers was steadily pared in return for wider
support. In the end it was the Treasury which proved to be the
critical stumbling block. In order to get that vital support,
the Admiralty settled for one ship.
Throughout this long struggle, the Admiralty used every
technique available. The emphasis was on the logic of the Navy's
case. Meanwhile, however, the Navy's leaders were carrying on
private campaigns presenting arguments to their contacts in the
Foreign Office, Treasury and Commonwealth Relations Office in
the hope of gaining the support of these departments. Several
scientists in the Ministry of Defense were enlisted in the
Navy's cause and used as "impartial" ambassadors. Discreet
attempts were made to build a favorable case for the carrier
in Parliament and the press. Each of these steps was designed
to woo the Defense Committee's approval. In the end the
Admiralty's "legislators" were successful in pushing through
• 35tneir program.
These examples suffice to indicate the nature and
importance of the Admiralty's role in the governmental structure.
In addition to their many duties concerned with operating and
administering the seagoing forces the Navy's leaders - political,
professional, civil servants - also play an essential role as
legislators in the national policy process. They consider them-
selves the custodians of the Navy's future, and in this capacity
they bear the responsibility not only for originating new policies
involving the Fleet, but for legislating them into being. Their
success in this endeavor rests not only on the logic of their
arguments and their skill in presenting them, but also on their
political influence and their ability to muster meaningful




The security structure has been the object 02"
considerable criticism since 1945. Even today this controversy
shows few signs of abating. Both policy-makers and non-
governmental commentators have consistently decried the lack of
a unified policy. Normally they blame this on the lack of
inter-Service consensus. Although one is led to suspect that
most of this criticism reflects more a disagreement with the
policy itself than with the machinery, it has struck a responsive
chord among lay and professional strategists who seem to share
the belief that any problem can be solved by rearranging an
organization's structure. This fetish has been reflected in
the Government's continual puttering with the defense machinery.
The first significant post-war step was taken in 1946 when
the new post of Minister of Defense was established and the Defense
Committee was created to act on or at least screen policy matters
for the Cabinet. The formal objective was a unified defense
policy for all" three services."^' This arrangement did not live
up to the hopes of its designers, and it was only a matter of
months before the machinery was under fire. Field Marshal
Montgomery in writing of his experience as Chief of the Imperial
General Staff between 1946 and 1948 insisted that he could recall
"only one case of real unanimous agreement in the Chiefs of
Staff Committee ... in all other cases agreement was reached
by compromise. This was just the type of comment that stimu-
lated critics. ' They called for a reappraisal of the structure
citing both failure of the Services to agree and resort to
solution-by-compromise as evidence of the system's failure.
With the onset of Korea and the increased availability
of funds, attention was diverted from organizational matters.
However, by the itid-l 950*8 these voi-o bach in the cc^'oc? of the
arena. The progressive cuts that Churchill made in Labor's
rearmament program h-h Ltiiealat^d Service opposition. The
explosion of a British atomic bomb had generated some basic
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differences among the military planners as to the character of
another major war. It was well-known that the broken-backed
concept was the result of a significant compromise between the
Services and that the. introduction of fusion weapons had aggra-
vated inter-Service tension. In the 1955 defense debates no
less than seven speakers saw fit to criticize the administrative
structure. Even one of the Navy's own, Vice-Admiral Hugher-
Hallett, speaking as a Conservative backbencher denounced the
inter-Service competition and advocated unification of the
Services as the only means of ending the "interminable and
sterile arguments that have gone on so many years between the
h 39
champions of the Navy and the champions of the Royal Air Force.
There was almost a consensus that firmer political control of
the decision-making process was needed.
Starting with Mr. Eden and culminating with the 1958
reorganization a number of steps were taken to strengthen further
the position of the Minister of Defense and to expand his role
40in the policy process. These steps have been described earlier.
Again the objective was to increase the control of the political
chiefs over Service relationships. It is well known that the
military departments considered these changes a grave threat to
41their autonomy and bitterly resisted them. It was heralded by
others as a great stride towards eliminating inter-Service rivalry
42
and policy-making by compromise.
However, these organizational changes did not eliminate
the discontent. Under Mr. Sandys, defense policy evoked just as
much if not more criticism than that of his predecessors and
precipitated the first genuine post-war split on defense issues
between Labor and Conservative parties - the controversy regard-
ing the relative balance between nuclear and conventional forces.
Fuel was added to the flames by the cancellation of Blue Streak,
the subsequent abandonment of Skybolt, the argument over a
common fighter aircraft and the Navy's struggle for a new
carrier. Predictably the defense critics turned their attention
once again to security organization. By the early 1960's their
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demands ranged along the usual scale from more power for the
43
Minister of Defense to complete unification of the Services.
Throughout the entire period 194-5 to 1963 there was a tendency
among commentators to blame policy weaknesses on either organi-
zational structure or Service rivalry, and to advocate more
centralized control as the remedy. These views were shared to
a great extent by the policy-makers themselves as witnessed by
the consistent trend within the Government toward tightening
political control of the military.
However, the organizational changes effected have yet to
eliminate the symptoms, which suggests more profound structural
weaknesses. One is moved to query whether the cure fits the
disease. It is my Intention to select the two major criticisms
normally leveled at the policy process and to examine them In
the light of the data in the preceding chapters in an effort
to test their validity. Such an analysis should help to indi-
cate the limitations of organizational reform.
(1 ) Service self-interest and Service rivalry are the
basic causes of policy inadequacies. In one interview with a
prominent British journalist and author, the Royal Navy was
castigated at great length for its partisan approach to defense
policy. This respondent said in substance:
The Admiralty always begins by asking what is the
Navy's role in the defense picture. This is a misguided
question. The basic query should always be: what does
the country need for its defense? If the answer leaves
the Fleet with nothing to do, that is too bad, but every
problem should still be approached in that fashion.
Unfortunately, if you ask the wrong questions, you are
bound to get. the wrong answers.
This comment, in my experience, rather accurately represents
a large sector of informed opinion in Great Britain. There are,
of course, other ways of putting the same point. One critic will
condemn "vested interests" and another the "inter-Service compe-
tition."' Looking at the Navy's post-war experience, what can
be said 'about this issue?
First and foremost it is true that the Admiralty is
primarily motivated by self-interest. It is the Navy's official
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advocate and the Fleet's guardian. Its every thought and
action is designed to promote the Royal Navy. In this sense
the Admiralty is a vested interest. It has all the character-
istics of any large organization dedicated to staying in busi-
ness, and these are intensified by the emphasis which is placed
on loyalty, tradition and discipline. Correspondingly this
means that the Admiralty will use all the devices available to
it in advancing its projects, recommendations and ideas. The
political and legislative character of the policy process in
the British Government has already been noted at some length.
Decisions and policies are the product of compromise, and
there are unquestionably instances of the Navy's influence and
intransigence injecting ill advised elements into British
policy. However, this does not necessarily validate the critics'
claims. The crucial question is whether organizational self-interest
makes for a better or worse overall defense policy.
The Navy's experience is most emphatic in this regard.
There is no question whatsoever that the inter-Service com-
petition and self-interest have improved the quality of the
Admiralty's contribution, and in turn the final policy product.
The most illustrative example is the conversion which took place
in the Admiralty's thinking from 1954 to 1957. The introduction
of hydrogen weapons, the emphasis on the deterrent, and the Air
Force's ascendancy stimulated a serious reappraisal which had
several beneficial results. The Navy's rather desperate search
for a new and meaningful role led to its conversion to a limited-
war philosophy and the subsequent tailoring of the Fleet to ful.-
fill this role, A number of noteworthy individual developments
followed - the commando carrier, assault ships, guided missile
ships, aircraft configured for troop support, afloat logistic
support. All these were progressive naval steps inspired by the
Navy's interest in surviving as an important element of British
defense.
Irrefutably the Navy benefited; did the nation too profit
from this chain of events? The Navy's search for a new role was
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one of the Important pressures calling attention to the nation's
overseas responsibilities, the problems of limited war and the
need for conventional forces. In this respect its arguments
played a vital part in the fight over the balance between con-
ventional and nuclear forces and contributed to the shaping of a
vital political goal - the decision not to withdraw from the
responsibilities East of Suez, Similarly, the Admiralty's
initiative offered the Government a choice of instruments for
carrying out this policy. Combined with the strategic reserve
the concept of mobile task forces was to make this policy feas-
ible. No matter how strongly the Government desired to play a
role In the Middle and Far East the traditional methods were no
longer practical, and It could not carry out such a policy with-
out new military concepts. The Admiralty's mobile task forces
made it possible for the Government to retain a military presence
in the area and at the same time to reduce its reliance on fixed
bases. There are those who no doubt contest the wisdom of
Britain's commitment East of Suez, but the fact remains that it
has grown steadily among British priorities and is today supported
by both parties, the public, and by most lay strategists. The
Admiralty played a key role here. Although the primary incentive
was self-interest the nation benefited.
For purposes of Illustration it is instructive to approach
this train of events from another perspective. The analysts who
were condemning the Admiralty's obstinacy in 1954 had in mind
primarily the problem of general nuclear war. They were criticiz-
ing the Fleet's ability to contribute in such a conflict. They
argued either explicitly or implicitly that if the Admiralty
would view the problem from a national perspective it would leave
the field to the Royal Air Force and Bomber Command. What would
have been the result if the Admiralty had heeded this advice?
No doubt the carriers would have been phased out of commission,
and the Fleet Air Arm most likely eliminated. There would have
been no naval planes available for Suez and very little incentive
for the sweeping review of Admiralty thinking which took place
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in the middle 1950's. Perhaps Suez or other events would
nevertheless have demonstrated the need for amphibious craft,
aircraft carriers and conventional naval forces. However, to
rebuild such forces from scratch and to recruit and train the
necessary personnel would be prohibitively expensive and
would require years of effort.
This is an excellent example of vested interests
counter-balancing in some degree uncertainty of national think-
ing, and preventing a sudden change of policy which might have
been harmful in the long run. Certainly nuclear weapons were
significant and destined to assume an important place in
British defense, but there were too many unknowns in the
situation to Justify a total commitment to deterrence as later
events have demonstrated. Yet the only thing that prevented
such a decision was the combined resistance of those elements
of the government that, for whatever reasons, did not believe
in it. If by a coherent or unified policy the critics mean a
single minded policy which allows all the effort to be channel-
ed toward one goal and implies full agreement among the inter-
ested parties, then Britain did not have one, and the Navy was
partly responsible. On the other hand the nation did have a
policy which acknowledged that the way ahead was not altogether
clear, and left some freedom of maneuver if nuclear weapons did
not prove to be the sole answer.
In retrospect, a number of Admiralty projects can be
justly criticized. The vast expenditures during Korean rearm-
ament on minesweepers, the insistence on retaining a huge
reserve fleet into the late 1950's, and the failure to pare down
the shore installations are the most prominent. However, these
were rarely the object of criticism, and the first two projects
had a great deal of support throughout the executive among
political leaders. Perhaps the Admiralty's most serious errors
were ones of omission not commission. The Navy was late in
entering the nuclear propulsion field, in pressing for high per-
formance aircraft to attack land targets and, of course, Polaris.
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Hguovoi', these mistakes can bo L.ttributed tc tj.o failure of the
Sea Lords' to appreciate their importance and not to the
Admiralty's unprincipled drive for self-enhancement. In fact it
was the Admiralty's fear for its future that did push it into
the nuclear propulsion "field eventually - again primarily a
question of self interest - and this development subsequently
made the adoption of Polaris possible.
Polaris deserves separate mention. As pointed out in
Chapter VI the Ministry of Aviation was responsible for ballistic
missile research, for which the Navy took no responsibility and
exhibited little interest. About 1958 a crucial decision was
made to discontinue research on solid fuel propellants and to
concentrate on the liquid fuel Blue Streak. This decision,
closing out any possibility of developing a British shipborne
missile, proved to be a costly mistake. It is interesting to
speculate what would have happened if the Royal Navy's scientists
had t>een more closely identified with this research or if the
Admiralty had had its own ballistic missile program. Great
Britain might possibly have had a seaborne missile much earlier
and have avoided the Blue Streak and Skybolt fiascoes. The
United States gove_- nt went through much the same evolution,
and only the persistence of the U« S. Navy avoided a similar
mistake. The only persons with a deep concern in making a solid
fuel missile work were those interested in sending missiles to
sea - U. S, Navy scientists and technicians. Under their guid-
ance the problems were overcome and the result was Polaris. This
was a clear-cut case of self-interest working in America's
national interest.
A balanced appraisal seems to indicate that Service
rivalry may facilitate adjustment and improve the quality of
policy hy injecting into the decision-making process a degree
of competition and diversity. Separatism assures that problems
will be looked at from varying perspectives. It likewise pro-
motes full discussion and criticism within the defense establish-
ment. In addition, it encourages the individual Services to seek
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continually for new roles and methods. This in turn offers the
Government a wider range of alternatives and Increases its
freedom of action in formulating policy. At this point it
should be strongly emphasized that these comments apply only
to the policy-making aspects of the security establishment. To
say that the inter-Service competition improves the quality of
security policy is not to say that there are no valid reasons
for encouraging an amalgamation or closer coordination of the
three Services. It could perhaps be argued with some justifi-
cation that operationally and administratively there is a great
deal to be gained by further unification. However, this study
has not concerned itself with those aspects of the military
picture. The major interest here is in policy formulation, and
from that perspective there is something to be said for Service
rivalry.
Before proceeding to the next subject I shall comment
briefly on a subsidiary assertion that always goes hand-in-hand
with the criticism of vested military interests. This is the
argument that centralized control will eliminate rivalries
within the defense establishment. Experience refutes this pro-
position. Since Mr. Sandys first asserted his newly-granted
authority in 1957 the focus of the defense dialogue has shifted
from the CSC to the Minister of Defense, but this has not moder-
ated the inter-Service conflict. On the contrary both the
amount and intensity of wrangling has increased. In 1957 the
Air Force went to great efforts to undermine the Navy's case for
naval aviation and to encourage Mr. Sandys in his threat to phase
out the carriers. As long as the CSC was the major arena, the
Air Force was never able to exert the pressure it desired and,
despite its well known hostility to Navy carriers, never pressed
its case to the limit. However, Sandys offered it another lever,
and the campaign was vigorously accelerated.
On the Navy's part there is clearly no evidence that the
Minister's increased supervisory powers attenuated its partisan-
ship. Finding its channel through the CSC less effective, the
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Admiralty not only made every effort to persuade Sandys with
logic and persistence; it went to great lengths to enlarge the
debating forum and to put outside pressure on the Minister -
even to the point of violating the time honored taboos prohibit-
ing professionals from going outside the heirarchy. The Fairlead
Conference held at Greenwich to brief industrialists on the Navy's
future plans was a thinly disguised attempt to enlist civilian
support. During the Sandys regime there is little doubt that the
Sea Lords used Commonwealth governments
,
press leaks, the prestige
of retired officers, and a variety of techniques to bolster their
44
case. Here was a Service fighting for its own interests harder
than it ever had before.
The Navy was by no means unique. The Sandys era was
characterized by intense bickering. All three branches cast
aside many of their traditional inhibitions in order to promote
their own self-interest. George Brown, Labor's chief spokesman
on defense at the time, commented: "We • . . have had almost
every member of the Services' team making quite sure that their
particular angle on what was happening was well known and well
..Ac
publicised. 3 A few years later, referring to this period,
Brown observed that "the Service Chiefs spoke in public, against
all traditions, taking that risk in order to get around the
Ministers whom they could not persuade in private. " Not all
this activity was provoked solely by the Minister of Defense's
increased power or intended to obstruct him. No doubt some could
bo w-*w.coc. ec ^ecidC'ir-ts, personal r-o„eo:*_j end even bo -^:.j Go-vcrr-mant
which launched an occasional trial balloon. However, there is
practically unanimous agreement that this period was marked by
extreme partisanship.
It was a time of cut-backs and retrenchment that no doubt
contributed to the competition. Still, that in itself is not a
sufficient explanation. Starting about 1959> the proportion of
the GNP allotted to defense has remained relatively fixed, but
there has been no significant reduction in inter-Service tension.
In fact two of the bitterest policy struggles since World War II
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were those concerning Polaris and the Navy's new carrier. There
are no doubt a number of factors which contribute to the inten-
sity of the policy-making process, but one conclusion seems
irrefutable - increased executive control neither eliminates
such bickering nor does it convert Service leaders into docile
non-parti sans
•
This conclusion is reinforced by a quick glance at the
Navy itself. Even with its deeply rooted traditions of loyalty
and heirarchical discipline, there are strong divisions of
opinion within the Admiralty, and continued struggles take
place between these element s. Conflict is just as character-
istic of the Admiralty as it is of the structure as a whole. .
For the first few years after the war the aviators waged an
intense fight for a stronger voice in the Navy's affairs.
Despite the fact that the Admiralty was late in entering the
nuclear propulsion i'ield there were nevertheless a number of
individuals within the Navy pressing hard for atonic submarines.
The same was true of Polaris. Today the situation is reversed;
there are a number of individuals who would prefer to have the
Navy withdraw from Polaris. The Admiralty is admittedly more
successful at keeping its struggles within the confines of its
own organization. But this does not rebut the fact that there
are contradictory vested interests within the Navy which compete
with each other constantly. As strong as the command structure
is it has not eliminated such in-fighting. Moreover, it has not
been as concerned over it and has chosen instead, as far as
policy-making goes, to give voice to the various interests in
the Navy through the device of collective leadership. It would
be folly to contend that the Navy structure is as loose as the
Government's. It is just as foolish, however, to argue that
centralized control will successfully repress vested interests
and eliminate inter-Service competition. Experience suggests
that conflicts of this nature will be present no matter what the
form of the organization.
(2) Compromise is an unsatisfactory way to make policy
and should ba replaced by heirarchical control. To argue that
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self-interest and competition play a positive role in the policy
process is not necessarily to condone unrestricted bargaining.
Needless to say this has been one of the major complaints of
outside observers, John Strachey, Labor MP and a former
Secretary of State for War, expressed it succinctly: "if we
divide up those limited resources fundamentally in such a way
that no admiral 9 general, or air marshal is offended, we shall
..47
not get a very happy result, ' Strachey was primarily directing
his attack at inter-Service rivalry, but the above statement
refers not to the interests themselves, but the manner in which
they are translated into policy. He is objecting to a policy-
making system that depends purely on compromise and bargaining
between the three Services for its military inputs.
Does the Navy's post-war experience affirm or disaffirm
Strachey' s charges? It is more difficult to evaluate this
aspect of the policy process than the proposition discussed above,
because the evidence is not so clear cut. Nevertheless, it is
possible to make certain fruitful observations. The first few
years after World War II are not very instructive in this re-
gard. All three Services continued to rely on wartime equipment
for several years. Strict economy was the order of the day and
precluded any significant ch u Moreover the energies of
all three branches of the military were absorbed by demobili-
zation and the conversion to a peacetime status. Surprisingly
it was a period of little controversy. However, with the re-
lease of funds in the early 1950's and the introduction of
atomic weapons the military was presented with difficult policy
choices. In turn Service friction increased. It is useful to
examine the Navy's maneuvers in this period.
The defense reorganization in 1946 was intended to
provide an additional level of political control for the three
Services as a whole in the person of the Minister of Defense.
He was assigned three main responsibilities: (1) administration
of inter-Service organizations; (2) resolution of questions of
general administration on which a common policy for the three
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Services was desirable; and (3) "apportionment in broad outline,
of available resources between the three Services in accordance
with the strategic policy laid "down by the Defense Committee. M
On paper this mandate appeared more than adequate; in practice,
it proved somewhat illusive* The Minister had a very small staff
and no planning or information gathering services of his own.
He was forced to rely almost entirely on the combined advice of
Service minister and Chiefs of Staff, each of whom had his own
organisational and information resources. Outside of very general
guidelines or a specific decision on a particularly significant
issue the Minister had little control over policy. His authority
was exercised mainly by laying down budgetary restrictions. Due
to the lack of detailed information his decisions tended to be
arbitrary with little consi :ion for the dovetailing of
Service programs. For example fiscal cut-backs would be split
equally across the board without attempting to determine what
this would do to each department or if one branch could afford
49it more than another*
The result was that the focus of the decision-making
was the CSC. It was there that projects were debated; facts
compared; and the overall strategy formulated. Its decisions and
advice with rare exceptions were approved by the Minister and
formed the military basis for Defense Committee decisions. The
Minister's mandate did not permit detailed interference in the
affairs of the individual Services, and his own facilities did
not allow him to compete with those of the CSC. The result was
foreordained. The great bulk of decisions were the result of
bai-,j^l:-_iL'.j, :.-
-
_.y._,^:o„, v._-_i eomprcL_iio 1'._.il_o_-cc gu"c within the
CSC* Throughout the early 1950 8 s considerable criticism was
leveled at this procedure, usually by individuals who were dissat-
isfied with policy content and preferred to direct their complaints
at the machinery* Those who agreed with the nation's defense
policy, and there were a great many, could find little wrong with
the mechanisms* However, in examining the Navy's experience it
becomes obvious that there was some merit in these criticisms,
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and there was a pressing need for stronger political leadership
at the inter-Service level*
This is graphically illustrated by the Navy's approach
to the NATO Strike Fleet and subsequent conversion to a limited
war strategy. When NATO was formed, the Admiralty was in full
accord with its objectives and eager to cooperate In every way.
Once SACLANT began to organize his forces the Royal Navy contrib-
uted enthusiastically. Although there was considerable debate in
the Admiralty over SACLANT ' s plans for developing a strike fleet
to participate in the initial nuclear attacks, the Sea Lords con-
cluded that on balance it was a viable scheme and committed their
forces to it. This decision was approved by the CSC and in due
course became national policy. From that date the Admiralty was
beset with ever increasing doubts as to the wisdom of a large
seaborne force closing the ,9 s coast in the early days of a
nuclear war. Many of the Navy c s planners believed that the
Fleet would be running an undue risk, considering that it could
make only a marginal contribution to the nuclear exchange. They
contended that the Fleet should be saved for broken-backed
operations and the protection of the sea lanes. With the Intro-
duction of the hydrogen bomb this thinking soon became predomi-
nant. By H955 there were few senior officers in the Royal Navy
u._c cuboori-L^d ,: '.. :j0 " ... -sy.-1'.ij philosophy,
A feeling of uneasiness pervaded the Admiralty and, as
proyiou.-ly noted, \h.o Ic^ci^r .---_p b-^^n a vigorous search i'c? a
new role. As early as 1954 and 1955* the Navy's operations
analysts were encouraging the planners to turn toward limited
war and to deemphasize the Fleet's general war role. By Suez
there was considerable sympathy within the Navy for this view.
In retrospect it seems probable that the Admiralty would
eventually have adopted these recommendations whether Mr. Sandys
had appeared or not. Still the crucial question is: when would
the Admiralty have acted? Due to the strong position it held
in the CSC it was able to avoid any penetrating criticism of its
carriers and was never forced to justify them in any detail.
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Ironically , the Admiralty was extremely concerned over its
future, but no other element in the Government, not even the RAF*
was evidently able to lay bare these problems and to force the
Admiralty to defend its position. Despite doubts about NATO,
the Admiralty made no move to withdraw from the Strike Fleet
nor did it suggest that the nation change its policy. In the
same vein, it did not stress the limited war potential of naval
forces until it was backed to the wall in 1957* In essence the
Admiralty was content to go along with the accepted policy as
long as it offered the Navy an important role, although the
Admiralty was developing grave doubts about that policy. As
one respondent put it: "We had no intention of rocking the
boat until the future was clearer, and we could initiate changes
with some confidence that they wouldn't hurt the Navy. "^
Of course, this was only possible because the Navy held
a strong bargaining position, and policy was being decided by
negotiation between the three military departments with little
interference or stimulation from the outside. Sandys* ascendancy
to power in 1957 altered this situation substantially. He forced
.".. v ee ratify its progi-c-s- _~ d^s^il, to review its
-::;:... ~-.:.-j,o of activitLo.-:, .:.- ee adjust :o tlve r.^^icr, J z new
political goal of Increased economy* A surprising number of the
persons interviewed admitted that "Sandys made the Navy do the
thinking it had neglected to do since World War II and to relate
itself to the i.w'W os:'___eie:'.s sL_:.e prev^LL-^-d* s0i Buttressed by
increased authority, the Minister of Defense was the catalyst
which accelerated the Navy's turn away from NATO and its general
war role. Moreover, the reduction of the reserve fleet, the
streamlining of the naval reserve organization, and the cut-back
in logistics facilities were all moves which the Admiralty had
been contemplating, but found it difficult to take. Under
pressure from Sandys the Navy carried out these reforms, and the
writer found complete unanimity among interviewees that in retro-
spect these steps were both wise and long overdue.
The conclusion is obvious • A policy -process which was
virtually controlled by lnter-Servlce bargaining; was slow to
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respond to change and hampered by Inertia * This is not a
complete condemnation. As the previous discussion has illus-
trated competition has numerous benefits, and the alterations
wrought under Sandys were already in process. Even after 1957
the original thinking was still done by the individual branches.
What was needed, however, was some outside catalyst which was
concerned with the overall military picture rather than just
that of an individual Service, and with sufficient authority to
overcome the strong tendency of the individual departments to
rest on their oars. Certainly Parliament was in no position to
supply this impetus nor was any group outside the Government.
Mr. Macmillan's grant of increased authority to the
Minister of Defense and the reorganization of 1958 went a long
ways in meeting this need. There is certainly little question
: il-zq 1957* '---- ^ :.--!'.' ' and originality of oi.j Navy's
53thinking and of the general policy dialogue has Improved.
One Admiralty civil l._ -.-o of this new
development when he remarked that "no longer will vague gener-
alities about the "island 8 and the merits of ' seapower*
suffice, the Navy now has to build its case on facts and log-
-_. ;.:. .._- „o vj-i-vL oo compete i.'ioo o-.~ „oo- ool-oo on oocoooio
grounds. ^
--o „_•., it _l_ould be emphasized that the experience
under Sandys was by no means an endorsement for unqualified
centralized supervision. In the surge to assert his new-found
power and to impose economies the Minister of Defense demon-
strated the limits as well as the advantages of heirarchical
control in the policy process.
The Minister of Defense's main tasks were to cut down
the national resources consumed by defense and to oversee the
end of conscription. These policies had strong implications for
i military forces, but nevertheless were basically political
decisions. They were taken with the full support of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet. In turn they received the approval of
both parties oo-.d olio oLcoooo^oe, ^lolooujli or.oy '..^ro vigorously
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opposed by the Services* However, these were the type of
decisions which are considered the rightful business of the
political leadership. As a result neither of these policies
has been strongly denounced although certain elements criticized
the end of conscription.
On the other hand it .is well known that a number of
decisions regarding primarily military matters were taken by
Sandys on his own initiative with little consultation among the
: _•/_.. . .... c.^i/ti-co the strenuous objections of ti.«j ^ll_tary»
For example, it was his original goal to orient British defense
policy firmly towards deterrence and gradually to deemphasize
the conventional forces. This line was taken without extensive
interchange of views among military departments and with very
little real study of its implications. •* Sandys intentions
sparked a genuine controv. within the Government over the
balance between nuclear and conventional forces. The 1957
White Paper, which outlined the Sandys approach with some reser-
vations, stimulated a public deb* ; hich paralleled the contro-
versy within Whitehall. . The Army and Navy brought all the
pressure to bear which they could muster. They were joined by
both politicians and .cr-tato:^ in their criticism of too
heavy a reliance on nuclear s. The next two years wit-
nessed Sandys' gradual retreat from deterrence and a turn back
toward conventional forces.
An integral part of this plan had been the Blue Streak
missile which was to replace manned aircraft. Again the basic
decision was not the result of a policy dialogue among the
interested groups so much as a decision made by Sandys and his
personal advisers. In the end it proved Impossible to imple-
ment Blue Streak, since it did not have the support of the very
organization which was to be responsible for it, the Royal Air
Force. Similarly, his stress on nuclear weapons implied a
licy oriented toward NATO and the deemphasis of Britain's
overseas responsibilities. Again this did not suit the temper
of the nation or the majority of participants in the policy
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process, and the Minister was eventually forced to adjust his
policy accordingly. In essence Sandys had not read the political
and international signs correctly and made a number of politically
untenable decisions. As Laurence Martin describes it, a "less
wholehearted plunge into strategic nuclear weapons would have
been more consonant with the probable future development of
British defense policy. 8°°
A number of conclusions would appear in order. This
chain of events indicates the main weakness in policy-making by
one man. The decision-maker may be wrong. Anthony Head, a former
Minister of Defense, in commenting on these decisions phrased
it well:
My right honorable friend (Sandys) has great qualities
of strength of character and d -/Germination. He is known
for it inside and outside the House. They are fine
qualities in a Minister provided he is right. If, however,
he introduces a policy which may lead into danger, such
qualities can be calamaitous»57
In operational matters a single commander is essential
and often a decision, even t xg lot the wisest, may be prefer-
able to further delay and consideration.. At higher policy levels
this may not be so. The variables are greater and strategic
programs involve tremendous expenditures of talent, time and
money. The results of error can be disastrous and long con-
tinued. It is often better to go with a compromise until the
situation clarifies than to put all of the nation's effort into
a possibly wrong channel. In 1957? there seems no doubt that, if
the Minister of Defense had elicited further exchange of views
and given more weight to the arguments of the Army and Navy, he
would have put more stress on conventional weapons. This in the
end was the policy adopted after several years of heated contro-
versy. A number of respondents expressed the opinion that Sandys
soon learned these lessons and that the longer he was in office
i more receptive he became to Service views. Similarly, the
re he compromised in order t< Ssi a consensus among the
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One of the main problems here was the staff and
facilities available to the Minister of Defense. It soon became
painfully clear that if the Minister was to inject himself into
the "nuts and bolts" of defense policy, he would require inde-
pendent information services and a greater number of personal
advisers with technical expertise. The reorganization of 1958
attempted to achieve this by enlarging his staff, upgrading
the role of scientists and putting the Chief of Defense Staff
in charge of the Joint planning groups. These actions put the
CDS in a better position to obtain the information the
Minister required.
The Blue Streak incident reemphasized the politicians'
reliance on the cooperation of the professionals. The leader-
ship can lnjeot political considerations and in the end has the
final responsibility for national strategy. Nevertheless, it
must depend on the military to implement those decisions and to
support the Government. This puts very definite limits on the
politicians' s freedom. It is not solely a matter of superior
and subordinate. The Services themselves command a certain
amount of political support both within and outside the Govern-
ment. Their desires are very definitely one of the factors
that must be considered in policy calculations. A minimum
amount of consensus is essential to the successful consummation
of any decision, and the minister who ignores this does so at
his own risk. This was certainly the situation with Blue Streak.
Moreover, it was demonstrated that although the Minister
of Defense wielded increased powers he was still forced to rely
on the skill and originality of the military departments for the
bulk of his policy ideas. He could lay down the guidelines, but
he was in no position to prescribe the details. It was an
Administration goal to economize and if the Services did not
respond with ways and means Sandys could threaten to make cuts
arbitrarily. Facing this threat It was the Sea Lords who sug-
gested reductions in the reserve fleet, logistic facilities and
reserve personnel forces. By careful study and planning these
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steps were effected without materially reducing the strength of
the operational fleet. In the same manner it was the Admiralty
which most forcefully called the lessons of Suez to Sandys
attention and recommended that mobile task forces would allow
withdrawal from many of the overseas bases. In fact the
Admiralty played a major part in changing Sandys' mind about the
importance of limited war forces. In the final analysis firm
executive control cannot eliminate the need for skillful and
dedicated professionals in the military departments, nor can
it exclude them from the policy process.
This suggests another serious problem which overzealous
political heads can create. The morale of the Services and
their willingness to participate in the process is linked to
the general policy-making pattern. If there is a free flow of
ideas and the military leaders are convinced that their views
are receiving full consideration, they are more likely to con-
tribute their best efforts. On the other hand, over-control
and arbitrary decision-making will encourage apathy and inertia.
It has been noted that when the process rests solely on bargain-
ing it tends to be too slow. The same may be true in the reverse
situation. The political leader's dogmatism can make "for undue
rO
rigidity in reacting to later information and ideas. ttD There
is some evidence that this was occurring under Sandys. Many
individuals interviewed who had served in the Admiralty from
1957 to i960 were frank to admit that the Navy wished to avoid
requesting a new carrier under Sandys. If at all possible this
campaign was to be delayed until his departure - and it was.
Perhaps more illustrative was the question of Polaris. The Sea
Lords were convinced that if the Admiralty accepted responsibility
for Polaris it would not receive additional funds. In their
minds, the political leadership had decided the share of the
available resources which each Service would receive and was
too inflexible to change its position, no matter what the evi-
dence or how important Polaris was. There was general agreement
among naval respondents that Sandys' dogmatic attitude toward

341
carriers and Blue Streak had been one of the major factors in
generating this attitude. This was an Instance where the
Admiralty's reluctance to participate in the policy process
worked against the nation's best interests. There is certainly
no question that throughout the Sandys era there was a general
distrust of the Minister of Defense and a consequent reluctance
to make recommendations or argue with him unless forced to.
This attitude was bound to have an adverse influence on the
policy process.
These conclusions are borne out by the conduct of
subsequent Ministers of Defense. Although centralized planning
seems to have become a permanent part of the policy process, both
Mr. Watkinson and Mr. Thorneycroft have made genuine efforts to
increase consultation among all three Services and to solicit
their views. In addition more civilian experts, both scientists
and civil servants, have widened the base of the policy process,
furnishing the Minister of Defense with necessary data and advice
to evaluate military recommendations and in turn to make meaning-
ful suggestions. This was evidenced by the Navy's carrier and
fighter plane struggle. The Admiralty was forced to put a tre-
mendous effort into this controversy, but it was given full and
fair consideration and in the end its case prevailed. These
decisions were in no sense arbitrary and were made after intense
study and a full exchange of views between all the parties in-
volved. It should be noted here that the Air Force carried its
opposition right up to the Defense Committee, although the
Minister of Defense had already indicated that he favored a new
carrier. Laurence Martin believes as a result of these organi-
zational changes and new attitudes that "there is a freer flow
of ideas, a more trustful atmosphere and a better blend of a
variety of views and interests than at any time since 1 9^5.
In examining defense organization as a whole it would
seem that the main problem is to reach a proper balance between
heirarchical control and diffused authority . Every effort should
be made to take advantage of inter-Service rivalry rather than
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to try to stamp it out. In fact it is unlikely that it could
be eliminated. On the other hand, there is a definite need for
political leadership which evaluates each department's contri-
butions in terms of overall military policy. The Minister of
Defense should act first as a stimulant requiring each department
to justify fully its concepts and prodding them to originate
alternate solutions to military problems. At the same time he
must not stifle the initiative or morale of the subordinate
departments, because it is from these sources that policy truly
originates. The ultimate objective is to harness the driving
force of the political leaders without losing the benefits of the
professional staff.
It should be stressed that administrative arrangements
can never eliminate the need for wise and competent leadership,
nor can they overcome the basic problems which confront the
policy-maker. Post-war Britain has been faced with heavy com-
mitments, dwindling resources, rapid technological advance, and
a drastically altered international milieu, which have required
major adjustments both psychological and material. Under rush
conditions national goals and policies are likely to become
blurred and vacillating. No amount of tampering with the govern-
ment's administrative structure could have altered the essential
conditions of Britain's altered world position. Nevertheless,
it may be contended that the shape of the decision-making
structure can play a significant part in the way these new
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The previous chapter dealt with the governmental
decision-making milieu. It was evident there that the Admiralty
plays a central role in formulating strategic programs. The
Navy's leaders are not only expected to command and administer
the naval forces, but they also are responsible for initiating
and, in effect, legislating naval contributions to the nation's
military posture. In this capacity they have borne the primary
responsibility for shaping the Fleet's role and relating it to
the nation's strategic requirements. Early in the study, I pro-
vided a brief sketch of the Admiralty organization, the patterns
of collective responsibility within the Board of Admiralty and
the routines of policy formulation. I now return to the
Admiralty organization, to investigate it not so much as a formal
body, but as a participant in the policy process. This entails
an examination of the leadership's skill in foreseeing techno-
logical trends, in interpreting the strategical environment,
and in translating its recommendations into action. Hopefully,
this diagnosis will highlight some of the more significant
conclusions to be drawn from the Admiralty's post-war participation
in the political arena.
Decision-Makers
Before discussing substantive policy it is pertinent to
look briefly at the Admiralty's decision-makers and the respec-
tive roles they play in the policy process. Three separate pro-




servants - staff the key policy posts. Each group will be
considered briefly.
Political Leaders
Unlike the United States, where political officials
perform a large share of the decision-making duties, the average
British governmental department has only a single minister who
is chosen from the majority party and sits either in the House
of Commons or House of Lords. He may have one or two assistants,
parliamentary undersecretaries, who are politicians, but they are
normally outside the heirarchical ohain. The minister assumes
responsibility for all the activities of the department. He is
solely accountable to his political superiors, ultimately the
Cabinet. In keeping with the Government's collective character
the Cabinet in turn assumes responsibility before Parliament and
the people for the activities of the minister and his department.
During the period under investigation the Navy Minister,
2 "5
the First Lord of the Admiralty, did not sit in the Cabinet.
He reported instead to the Minister of Defense who represented
all three Services. On the other hand the First Lord sat on
the Defense Committee, and in addition had direct access to the
Prime Minister if he so desired. For the first few years after
the war there were two other political appointees in the
Admiralty organization - the Parliamentary and Financial
Secretary, and the Civil Lord. The former acted as advisor to
the First Lord on financial matters and as a coordinator in com-
piling the Navy's annual estimates. The Civil Lord supervised
the Navy Works Department (erection, maintenance and repair of
Admiralty buildings) and the Admiralty's responsibilities for
A
merchant shipbuilding. Both of these subordinate ministers
sat on the Board of Admiralty in their capacity as advisors to
the First Lord, but neither was in the chain of command between
the Minister and his professional assistants. In 1959 the
Navy's responsibilities for merchant shipbuilding were trans-
ferred to the Ministry of Transport, and the Civil Lord absorbed
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the Parliamentary Secretary's duties leaving only two political
ministers in the Admiralty.
As the above discussion would indicate, Britons unlike
Americans, do not consider political control of the armed
Services a serious problem. Military officers stand in the
same position to the Minister as civil servants. They are ex-
pected to advise forthrightly and, in turn, to support the
Minister's decisions. Also, custom dictates that they remain
anonymous in the process. The long-standing tradition of civil
control is reinforced by the essential similarity of social
background among political leaders and military officers. Al-
though they may disagree on specific decisions they share more
or less the consensus on basic Issues which has long characterized
the British elite. Not since Cromwell's day has the military been
considered a serious threat to the Government.
Nevertheless, the practical result of this system where
politicians occupy so few posts is to limit their impact on
policy-making and to enhance the influence of professionals -
military and civil. It is not a question of legal or political
authority. The minister can accept, qualify or reject the
recommendations of his advisors; he does, and his authority to
do so is carefully respected. Still there are important con-
straints on the political leaders. This is particularly true in
the military departments. Many of the issues before the Admiralty
turn on technical matters of which the First Lord may have little
or no authoritative knowledge. He can hardly be expected to be
as familiar with warships and tactics as senior naval officers,
or with the intricacies of cost analysis as civil servants
specializing in this area. The permanent departmental staff is
experienced, able, and numerous. Normally every problem is
worked over by experts who are familiar with both the technical
and bureaucratic environment. To overrule their advice is to
risk a poor decision; to disregard their views repeatedly may
generate resentment, discourage initiative and lower morale.
In addition the Minister's political duties as a member of
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Parliament and the Government restrict the time he has to
devote to departmental affairs and correspondingly increase his
dependence on his senior advisors.
In the final analysis the First Lord finds that his
freedom of action is severely circumscribed and that he must
share decision-making with others. The Board of Admiralty is
tangible, if tacit, acknowledgment of this state of affairs.
The Admiralty's policy recommendations are hammered out in
that body and decisions taken collectively. Formally the power
of decision rests with the First Lord, but over the years the
political ministers have seen the utility and wisdom of this
system which brings the resources of the whole Navy to bear on
a policy problem. The First Lord plays an important role in
these proceedings; in many Instances his is no doubt the pre-
dominant voice. The Board looks to him for a crucial political
input into its deliberations. He is expected to consider every
question in terms of its impact on his political colleagues and
to temper the demands of the professionals in the light of what
the political market will bear. Likewise, it is the First Lord
who leads the assault on the political battlements when the
Admiralty is pressing for a policy change. This fact alone
strengthens his hand in the Board and assures him a respectful
hearing. In short the First Lord plays an important role in
the Admiralty's policy deliberations, but he is only one of the
many decision-makers who shape Admiralty policy.
During the years 1946 to 1963 there were five First
7Lords - one Laborite and four Conservatives. ' A few notes about
their background will give the reader a clearer picture of the
type of political leadership the Navy has enjoyed. In every
case since 194-5 this was the first ministerial post held by the
individual, which reflects the fact that the First Lord did not
sit in the Cabinet, and that the post has come to be considered
Q
a relatively Junior one. Nevertheless, every incumbent had
previously held several lesser offices in the Government. Two
had served in the Admiralty as Civil Lord. They all shared one
characteristic - considerable experience in public affairs.
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Viscount Hall who served as First Lord from 1946 to
1951 - an unusually long period for a political minister - was
in many respects unique. He was sixty-five years old when he
assumed office and at that time had been in Parliament since
1922. He came from a working class background with an elemen-
tary school education. He had worked his way up the Labor Party
ladder, serving as Civil Lord in 1929 to 1931 and in the Govern-
ment throughout the war. On the other hand, the four Tory
ministers who succeeded him follow more closely the stereotype
of a British political leader. All four came from the upper
class or aristocracy, three holding hereditary peerages and
entering the Government through the House of Lords. The fourth
was a member of Parliament for twenty years before assuming the
leadership of the Admiralty. Their educational background was
relatively uniform - three from Eton and one from Rugby. All
four had received prestigious higher education - three at Oxford
and one at Sandhurst. The university group had studied liberal
arts, and two had achieved first-class honors. These same two
had subsequently entered the practice of law. It is note-
worthy that none of the four had any formal engineering or
technical training. All four served in the armed forces during
the war, but only one in the Navy. Their average age on appoint-
ment as First Lord was forty-seven, and they held the office for
an average of three years which is considerably longer than is
normal for senior ministers.
The general pattern suggests that the typical First Lord
is chosen for his political, and possibly social, connections and
for his general knowledge of public affairs. There is no indi-
cation that he is selected because of abilities that particularly
fit him to deal with the Navy. The consistent Tory tendency to
choose younger men and often non-parliamentarians reflects the
fact that the Admiralty's prestige has steadily declined as the
Minister of Defense has gradually monopolized the political spot-
light. The predominance of peers also suggests that the Admiralty





Undoubtedly, the senior officers in the Admiralty wield
the strongest influence on policy of any of the three groups of
decision-makers. Their strength stems from a variety of sources.
They are professional seamen, and as such are considered the
exports on the training, equipping and deployment of seagoing
forces. As a rule these officers come directly from operational
duties and are expected to bring to the Admiralty a fresh view-
point and an up-to-date knowledge of the needs of the Fleet.
They represent a vital type of experience and expertise that
neither the politicians nor the civil servants possess. "No
matter how much formal authority the minister has in the
Service departments, practically every policy recommendation
rests on a host of military and technical Judgments which only
the professional is qualified to make." This belief is
mirrored in the composition of the Board of Admiralty. From
1
1
1945 to 1957, seven, and since that date six, of its members
were senior naval officers drawn from the key administrative
posts in the Admiralty.
The naval membership of the Board illustrates the
12influence of the senior naval officers. The First Sea Lord
is the professional head of the Royal Navy and is specifically
charged with the duty of furnishing not only the First Lord, but
H. M. Government, advice on naval aspects of security policy.
He heads the Naval Staff which is composed primarily of naval
officers and is responsible for strategic planning, drafting
the Fleet's requirements, developing tactical doctrine, and
1
"3
issuing operational orders. ^ He is assisted by a Vice Chief
of Naval Staff and a Deputy Chief of Naval Staff both of whom
sit on the Board, These three officers, by virtue of the nature
of their duties and their position in the heirarchy, wield a
strong influence in policy deliberations.
The other three Sea Lords are not concerned with the
Fleet's operations and deployment, but direct the three main
14divisions of the Admiralty - personnel, material, and supply.
These divisions provide the men, ships, aircraft, bases and
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supplies required by the Royal Navy. They employ by far the
largest staff within the Department, including naval officers
of each specialization, naval constructors, scientists, civilian
engineers, civilian Stores officers and technical grades.
Obviously these organizations encompass a vast range of activities.
It is their major function to bring the many available skills to
bear on the needs of the operating forces. More Important to
this study it is through the heads of these divisions that
scientific, technical, material, and logistical considerations
wend their way into the policy councils of the Navy. In these
ways the Admiralty's senior naval officers filter and, in
essence, control many important inputs into the policy process.
In view of the important role senior officers play in
the Admiralty, it is important to analyze the characteristics
of this group of decision-makers. Unlike the United States
there have been no extensive sociological studies on the career
military officer in Great Britain. * The object at this point
is not to fill this void, but simply to record certain impressions
regarding the background of the average senior officer serving in
1 &
the Admiralty during the post-war years. It should be contin-
ually borne in mind that post-war decision-makers are largely
the product of the pre-war era, and that the many changes in
recruiting and education procedures since 1945 have had very
little effect as yet in the higher councils of the Navy.
The first feature which impresses the observer is that
most of the Navy's senior officers have much in common with the
leaders in other sectors of public life. Prior to World War I
military commissions went mainly to members of established upper
17
and middle-class families. ' The Great War altered this pattern
somewhat and opened up commissions to a larger group, but this
was a slow process and most naval officers continued to come
from the traditional sources. In general the same social strata
that provided the bulk of the political leaders and civil servants
furnished the Fleet its leaders. The fact is that even though
entrance requirements were liberalized after 1918, and most of
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the Navy's post-war leaders entered the Service between 1910 and
1930, social position and an outside income were still definite
assets to a professional naval officer. Colonel Armstrong
writing in 1 960 stated that "during the next decade there will
be extremely few officers in 'senior and responsible positions
who were born in families in the lower 95% of the nation, on
1 P>
the socio-economic scale, " This accurately describes the
post-war naval leadership.'
In essence this means that most of the senior officers
brought with them into the Service many of the attitudes and
connections that characterize the civilian leadership in Britain.
From an early age, he was indoctrinated with a deep sense of
loyalty for things British and equipped with a built-in respect
toward service to the nation - usually in the direction of public
affairs. By American standards public service carries high
prestige in Great Britain, and "for members of a status-conscious
class within a status-conscious 'society, this is another force of
ti 1
9
some power in the same direction. As a member of the leader-
ship group he has always identified his own interests with those
of the nation and has been taught to revere his nationality above
all else. He inherited the sense of history which is so typical
of educated Englishmen, and he believes that the past is the
best guide for the future. In many instances it is this quality
which has attracted him to the Royal Navy for there is no Insti-
tution in Britain which has played a greater part in the nation's
"heroic" epic. Certainly to his father the Royal Navy was a
symbol of Britain's imperial grandeur, and the leadership group
has been traditionally indoctrinated with the importance of the
Fleet to the "island race. "
He normally has relatives who are in the professional
world. Very likely he will have one or more close family con-
tacts in the foreign service, in the administrative civil service,
or in politics. The writer's sample indicated that almost 80$ of
the senior naval officers were so connected, a statistic that
might vary considerably with different samples. Unquestionably
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these relationships benefit him socially and increase his
opportunities for asserting and exchanging opinions. In turn,
they may very well give him access to other groups, possibly
influencing his professional promotions at the higher rungs of
the ladder. These general characteristics derive from the
British social environment and, as previously noted, are widely
observed throughout the leadership group no matter what the
individual's profession. More significant for this study are
the characteristics which distinguish naval leaders from their
contemporaries in other walks of life.
Practically without exception the naval officer has less
formal education. In line with the traditional practice of the
early 1900*s every officer in the sample entered the Service
before the age of fifteen. Thus they missed the "public"
school and university experience so dear to the upper class
20
Englishman. Instead they underwent training at Dartmouth and
Osborne - the Royal Navy's equivalent to the U. S. Naval Academy.
The curriculum consisted of alternate periods of classroom work
and service at sea, where the midshipman was brought face to
face with the realities of shipboard life. Their education was
more practical than theoretical. The aspiring officer was intro-
duced to the fundamentals of seamanship, gunnery, naval tactics
and those skills needed to make him a competent shipboard admin-
istrator. Above all he was indoctrinated with the fighting
heritage and traditions of the senior Service. One officer inter*
viewed referred to British midshipmen as "acolytes" preparing to
take on a "way of life." This is perhaps exaggerated, but never-
theless it 'captures the spirit of the process. Numerous times
the writer heard senior officers refer with pride to the Navy's
training system. In a similar manner several criticized civilian
21
universities and the over-emphasis put on degrees. They did
not take issue with the quality of the education so much as the
attitudes which they believe civilian institutions cultivate.
As one respondent candidly put it, "we teach them to decide; a
civilian university teaches them to 'discuss."
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Irrespective of the merits of these opinions, there is
little question that the Navy's training system instills in its
officers a deep rooted belief in the Royal Navy and the merits
of sea power. The fledgling is taught that Britain must live by
the sea in order to survive and that the requirement for a strong
Fleet transcends individual types of ships and tactics for their
use. Methods may change but the basic need is constant. This
gives him an Intense Service loyalty which, it is generally
23
agreed, is stronger than in the other two Services.
Career patterns up to World War II were likewise
stereotyped. The emphasis was placed on service afloat and
"line" duties. Even engineering was a specialized branch whose
officers could not aspire to command. "Never let an engineer
on the bridge was a standard joke among line officers. It
expressed their disdain for those who perform duties of a sup-
porting or administrative nature. The road to success lay through
combat commands, and every young officer strove to prepare him-
self for this responsibility. This does not mean that he re-
ceived no technical training. Pre-war line officers were
expected to combine seamanship with fighting skills. They were
encouraged to develop expertise in any one of a number of fields -
gunnery, torpedoes, communications or navigation. Aviation was
not recommended since it came under the auspices of the Royal
OR
Air Force. J Officers following this pattern received additional
training in Navy schools and obviously acquired some technical
expertise. Again the orientation here was more operational than
theoretical. The individual was expected to ply his skills at
sea rather than in the laboratory, on the drawing board, or at
the factory. Approximately 25$ of the writer's sample listed
such specialities in their press biographies. It is only fair
to note, however, that even the non-specialist due to the very
nature of naval armaments and ships was likely to acquire a
modicum of engineering knowledge; and it would appear that British
naval officers of the pre-1939 period were generally much better
of*
grounded technically than their counterparts in other Services.
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A3 the officer advanced In grade, tours at sea were
increasingly broken by short spells on staffs and possibly a
period at a senior war college. A few officers attended the
Imperial Defense College where they had the advantage of meeting
and working \tfith officers and civil servants from other sectors
27
of the government. ' However, it has only been in the last few
years that this training has begun to tell at the higher ranks.
Prior to 1950 very few senior officers had any cross-Service
experience; similarly only a small number had had any tour of
duty outside the naval establishment. While staff tours may
have been profitable, the prime objective was always to return
to sea, preferably in a command billet.
The typical senior officer serving in the Admiralty
after 1945 was about fifty-five years of age and on his second
or third Whitehall assignment, each tour being two or three
years. The bulk of his early career had been spent at sea. He
had had considerable combat duty due to World War II and more
command experience, either of ships or task forces, than his
pre-war antecedents. Needless to say, he had survived an excep-
tionally rigorous promotion system and represented the cream of
the crop within the officer corps. Very likely at one time he
had acquired a technical specialty and might possibly have served
in a staff billet requiring his specialized skills. Generally,
however, by the time he reached senior rank his attention had
turned away from strictly technical matters; he was more con-
cerned with the administrative, strategical and political prob-
lems which confront high command. At the same time he had an
abiding faith in England's need for seapower and was thoroughly
dedicated to the Royal Navy's past and future.
It i3 not a novel observation that military men tend to
be conservative. The British naval officer is no exception.
However, he is still admired by Englishmen in general. Practically
without exception respondents characterized him as courageous,
staunch, reliable, honest - the ideal type to lead men into
battle. At the same time he was inevitably pictured as
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"traditionalist," "hidebound," "conservative." There is some
question as to whether this is an accurate image. The following
discussion will subject this charge to careful scrutiny, but
there is little question that it prevails throughout the British
political community.
Civil Servants
Working shoulder-to-shoulder with naval officers in the
Admiralty are the civil servants. In a sense they are the mortar
that joins the military officer and the politician together. Of
the three professional groups this is the only one that is not
transient. The civil servants remain permanently in Whitehall
and contribute heavily to the Admiralty's stability and continuity.
There are three classes of civil servants - the administrative
class, executive class and clerical class. The focus here is on
the administrative class officials. The members of this class
hold the posts of higher responsibility. In general the senior
civil servants specialize in budgetary, costing and other admin-
istrative functions. In the Admiralty's case, the Permanent
Under-Secretary has always been the Accounting Officer of the
Navy. As such he has an important concern in practically every
phase of the Navy's operations. In addition he is responsible
for the general coordination of Admiralty business on behalf of
the Board and administers the entire civil staff of the head-
quarters organization. On policy matters he is expected to advise
the department "from the aspects of continuity and Government
policy as a whole and in the light of the interests of other
Government departments. * To accomplish this he is assisted by
a Secretariat which is an integral part of the Admiralty and
staffed by civilians.
The senior civil servants do not hold as many strategic
positions or impressive titles as their military colleagues,
and at the higher rungs of the ladder they are greatly out-
numbered. Nevertheless, their importance and influence is con-
siderable. The civil servant's skill as an advocate, his
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knowledge of the bureaucratic labyrinth, and connections
throughout the other departments of the Government are essential
to the Admiralty. These qualities greatly enhance his position
vis-a-vis the naval officers who are stationed only temporarily
in Whitehall, Policies must be meshed with past decisions,
coordinated with other departments, articulated in a form
acceptable to bureaucrats, and sold in the political forum. It
is here that the civil servants make a vital contribution. In-
evitably military officers rely heavily on their advice and
assistance. Similarly, the increasing interdependence of military
policy, economic conditions, international relations and domestic
political considerations has made the seagoing officers even more
dependent on civilians, for the bulk of the Navy's expertise in
these areas rests with the civil servants. The reinforcing
effect of all these factors has been to upgrade the civil servant's
position in the Admiralty heirarchy. As one observer expressed
it: "Although the Service Officer's influence may be more in
evidence, it is more fleeting and in the long run only secondary."
What can be said about the Admiralty's civil servants as
a group?-' Just as with tho professional officers, the great
majority of them come from upper-middle or middle class back-
grounds. On the other hand, about 20$ could be classed as
coming from working class families, which suggests some slight
variation from their military counterparts. This may be accounted
for by the fact that over one-fifth of the Admiralty's adminis-
trative class entered the civil service as executive or clerical
class employees and were promoted after several years of service.
Both the executive class and clerical class take entrants at a
younger age and with less academic background than the more
32prestigious administrative class. Over half claim fathers who
were university educated and members of a profession. Despite
the slightly greater range in background it is eminently fair to
say that the large majority were raised in the environment of
the nation's leadership group and acquired many of the same
attitudes which characterized the early life of the senior naval
officers of that period.
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The educational pattern of the typical civil servant
reflects both his socio-economic background and the high regard
in which public service is held. The vast majority are university
graduates. In the writer's small sample over half had attended
Oxford or Cambridge, and three the University of London. Prac-
tically without exception those with university degrees had made
impressive academic records. In the sample, ten listed first-
class honors and seven won double firsts. In general the
University graduates were those who had attended a public school.
Two of the non-university graduates were products of Service-
academy education and the remainder were promotees from the
33
executive or clerical class. •'*' This rough profile seems to con-
firm the basis for the popular public-school-university-honor
stereotype of the civil servant, but it also indicates that there
are other inputs as well. However, there is general agreement
that the performance criteria are shaped primarily by the uni-
versity entrants, and those outside this group have had to con-
form to these standards. "Unquestionably, the small public
school group absorbs those who come Into Important posts from
other sources and successfully transmits its attitudes, values
ii 34
and fashions to them. -*
The high calibre of the civil service, as suggested by
the educational pattern, is beyond dispute. Armstrong mentions
that in his research several respondents credited the civil
service as including "the best men in Britain. "^ Although this
writer interviewed some who would disagree with this, the overall
consensus among respondents was that they were an exceptional
group. Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughry in describing the
civil service pays tribute to its high level of intelligence but
insists that its major strength lies in its character:
It is suave, prone to moderate or under- statement,
unruffled, thorough, reliable, of great integrity, content
to wait Its time and to allow other people to think they
may claim the credit while it works very much with the
same precision as a machine. This characteristic in the
conduct of things is neither written nor recorded any-
where. It results from a genius of the English which In
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tine evolves from breeding over many years a belief of
superiority in themselves. It is no coincidence that
this is the very quality which is built into character
at the English public schools, 36
There is little to query here. The English system has
awarded public service a status that it has in no other country.
As a result it attracts highly intelligent, perceptive, broad
minded and honest civil servants who are genuinely dedicated
to the nation's welfare. These qualities combined with a
tradition of anonymity have made them probably as apolitical as
a governmental group can be. Although the writer heard some
strong views voiced by civil servants on a number of issues, he
was unable at any time to detect a political motivation for these
views. On one hand respondents outside the Admiralty consistently
attributed political bias to naval officers, but not a one sug-
gested that the Navy's civil servants were guilty of this vice. '
This is not to say that the civil servant does not advise on
political decisions; he does constantly. It is to say that he
is prepared to serve with equal skill and devotion under either
political party.
On the debit side, the homogeneity of the civil servant's
educational and social background may very well inhibit change
(or as some would say, progress). Just as with the Navy's
officer crops it is a cohesive group with a strong tendency to
perpetuate its manners and values. The standard complaint that
the civil service is hampered by the strong Oxbridge emphasis on
the classics and amateurism is not just an academic criticism.
An American observer can scarcely fail to sense the civil servant's
stereotypical references to mythology, history, literature, and
Victorian England. It appears almost impossible for him to answer
any question, no matter how simple, without painfully tracing its
historical origins. He seems to respect precedent even more than
does the tradition-oriented culture as a whole. Moreover, the
civil servant is often inclined to look down on the engineer or
scientist. To the typical Oxbridge mind government seems to be
concerned primarily with personal relationships, and what is needed
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most is an administrator with a "sense of the complexity of
human affairs,""' rather than technical knowledge. It is un-
doubtedly true that the civil service In the past has exhibited
this bias, and it came through in numerous interviews. On the
other hand, it is Just as true that this perspective is weaken-
ing. The tremendous importance of research and technology in
this modern age has been graphically impressed on the British
civil service just as it has on other professional groups.
Admiralty Performance
Keeping in mind the role and general profile of each of
the significant policy-making groups within the Admiralty, it is
pertinent to attempt a broad assessment of their post-war per-
formance. It should be stressed that the underlying objective
here is not merely to judge a specific case, but to draw appro-
priate generalizations from the record of performance which might
cast light on either the Royal Navy as a whole or on military
organizations in general.
In order to facilitate analysis I have chosen to examine
the Admiralty's activities from three different perspectives -
from that of a bureaucrat, a scientist and technician, and a
strategist. ^ Hopefully this approach will accurately convey
some sense of the complexity of the Admiralty's policy-making
role, but at the same time make the subject manageable.
As a Bureaucrat
This facet is examined first intentionally. It is in
this area that all three groups of decision-makers work most
effectively together and that the strengths of the Admiralty
system are displayed to best advantage. The writer found a
number of respondents who criticized various aspects of the
Navy's performance, but there was an Impressive consensus that
the Admiralty was the most successful of the three Service
40departments in getting its proposals adopted in Whitehall.
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It is widely respected as a skillful advocate, a clever
negotiator and a tough opponent. This opinion was forcefully
supported by Emanuel Shinwell, a former Minister of Defense, in
a speech before the House:
The trouble with the Navy, the Silent Service, is that
it gets away with murder. I remember when I was Minister
of Defense and had to preside over the Defense Council
the Navy hardly said a word. It always got its own way
without saying anything, whereas the Army and the Royal
Air Force had to fight for what they wanted. There the
Navy's representatives sat, with all the gold braid at
their command. Even the present supreme authority at
the Ministry of Defense, Lord Mountbatten, never said
a word, but the Navy always got what it wanted.
The Navy is like the Russians. It does not have to
go to war because it always gets what it wants without
a struggle. A
1
In a system so addicted to secrecy it is difficult to
substantiate the Navy's superiority with concrete evidence.
Nevertheless, the Navy's post-war experience testifies to the
Admiralty's skill in discerning the direction and force of the
political winds. Perhaps the most obvious indicator of the
Admiralty's strength has been the constant proportion of the
42budget which has been allocated to the Navy. The division
of the expenditures of the Ministry of Aviation among the three
Services is unknown, and this makes an exact comparison im-
possible. Nevertheless, throughout the period 19^5-63 the Navy
continuously managed to capture about one-quarter of the defense
appropriation. Admiralty "expenditures have held closely around
2h% of the total defense budget, with the maximum variation only
\\% either way." ^ At the same time, the shares of both the
Army and Air Force have fluctuated with alterations in defense
emphasis.
It is true that the Navy's portion throughout this period
has been smaller than the other two Services. Some observers
might interpret this as suggesting less rather than more skill
than its competitors. On the other hand, when one considers
the traumatic changes that have been wrought in British defense
thinking, it is rather remarkable that the Navy has managed to
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retain consistently a stable proportion of the budget. This was
the general sense of the interviews. Most respondents stressed
that in view of the heavy commitments made to SHAPE and deterrence
it required considerable political acumen to keep the Navy firmly
entrenched in the defense picture throughout the early post-war
44 iyears. They further pointed to the Navy s current importance
and to the fact that today the Army and Air Force claim only a
Ac;
slightly larger share of the budget. ^ This latter view appears
to be sound and certainly a further look at the Navy's achieve-
ments supports the thesis that it is rather adroit politically.
The first major post-war challenge to the Navy
developed with the introduction of the hydrogen bomb and the
Government's turn to deterrence. Not only was the emphasis
shifting dramatically to the Air Force, but in the three years
from 1 95^ to 1 957 many people within the Navy were developing
serious doubts about the Fleet's future. From the Navy's
perspective this was a period of genuine crisis. It is in such
periods that the Admiralty seems to function best. Behind
closed doors an intensive re-examination of the Navy's posture
and doctrine commenced, but there were no outward Indications
of this disarray. The leadership presented a united front to
Government and nation alike. In fact the rethinking process
was successfully represented as a sign of progressiveness rather
than frustration or concern. Long before the Navy had refashioned
its strategical doctrines, its public advocates took the offensive
and began to talk of modern task forces powered by nuclear re-
actors and armed with sophisticated guided missiles. These
descriptions were inevitably vague, and the developments they
46pictured a long ways off. Nevertheless they portrayed a Fleet
moving with the times and concealed the confusion in the Navy's
own ranks. It is illuminating to note that during those three
years the Navy was probably more vulnerable to criticism and
47
attack than at any time during the post-war period. Yet none
of its detractors were successful in seriously impairing its
image or reducing its appropriations. This was an instance
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where skill in the political environment gained the Admiralty
the time necessary to rethink its position.
Perhaps the acid test of the Admiralty's competence in
this area was the challenge offered by the Macmillan Government
starting in 1957. Here the Navy leadership was able to navigate
safely through rather formidable political shoals. The Admiralty's
case rested not only on new strategical concepts, but also on
rather shrewd estimates of Mr. Sandys' personal views and the
political pressures that were impinging on the Minister of Defense.
Throughout this difficult period the Admiralty was able to present
a unified front to the Minister and Government. There were few
outward signs of any internal conflict or confusion. In retro-
spect this was a rather amazing administrative achievement,
because there was considerable wrangling within the Navy as to
the proper approach to Sandys and more than a few doubts about
the new stress on limited war.
Concurrently the Navy's spokesmen, primarily its civil
servants, were developing support in the other departments for
the Navy's case and bringing indirect pressure to bear on the
Minister of Defense. Both the Foreign Office and Colonial
Office backed up the Admiralty's plea for limited war forces
East of Suez. There is some evidence that the Navy also en-
listed the Commonwealth Governments in its campaign. During
Sandys' tour of Asia in the summer of 1957 a number of his hosts
i 48
stressed the Navy s importance to Commonwealth defense. In
August 19^7 at a Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference Mr.
Macmillan was likewise urged by a number of visiting politicians
40to reconsider the reductions planned for the Fleet. * The
Admiralty was overlooking no channel for bringing influence to
bear.
Another mark of the Admiralty's skill in this environment
is the manner in which it widened the arena of debate. By
custom the professional military in Britain is expected to con-
fine its campaigns for policy changes to government channels.
Appeals to groups outside the Government are considered improper
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and unethical. However, In early 1957 when the fight with
Sandys was at its peak, it is common knowledge that all three
en
Services were straining against these limitations. They
resorted to a variety of devices ranging from subtle news leaks
to sponsored conferences. In this game "Pendennis" in The
Observer labeled the Navy "as the most cunning propagandist of
the three Services. J Perhaps the best example was a one-day
orientation conference held by the Admiralty at Greenwich for
a number of influential industrialists. A "Madison Avenue type"
presentation was made of the Navy's case for a strong Fleet. It
was well received and drew a letter to The Times from three
prominent men, who attended, complimenting the effectiveness of
the presentation. A year later the RAF held a similar affair,
the Prospect Conference, which lasted three days and was consider-
ably more elaborate. It drew extensive press coverage and, In
turn, loud Parliamentary and public criticism for exceeding the
bounds of propriety. This Is rather typical of the Navy's more
subdued but more effective approach.
One cannot help but be impressed with the Navy's
performance during this period. There is little question that
Sandys entered office determined to downgrade naval air power
and to deemphasize the seagoing forces. In the end the Admiralty
was able to preserve its carriers and to delineate an important
role for the Fleet, There is little question that the Navy was
more successful than the other two Services in weathering the
1957 onslaught. Time and Tide referred to this as "The Battle
of Storey's Gate" and suggested that the Sea Lords should be
awarded the highest "battle honors" for their victory. ^ This
was due in no small measure to the Admiralty ' s competence as a
bureaucrat.
This same feel for the bureaucratic environment was
witnessed in the fight for the new carrier from 11 960 to 1963.
The Navy's approach was controlled and low pressure, but every
obstacle was met with a combination of logic, tenacity and com-
promise. The Navy's leaders were always confident that in the
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end their arguments would prevail. However, eventual success
Just as in 1957 depended on a carefully waged campaign to develop
support throughout the government. This entailed the Navy-
scaling down its demands - eventually to only one carrier - and
careful management of the negotiations with the Air Force over
a common aircraft. At the same time it was necessary for the
Admiralty to defeat the Air Force's "island-base" proposal.
"Throughout this battle the Admiralty always seemed to know
just when to push and when to lay back. "^ Again the Navy dis-
played a remarkable ability to thread its way through the
Whitehall labyrinth.
These are only a feu examples, but they illustrate the
Admiralty's talent as a bureaucratic legislator. It has been
consistently responsive to change in the political environment
and eminently successful in shaping the Navy's policy recommen-
dations to take account of those shifts. It is its performance
as an advocate which prompts observers such as Snyder to comment:
"There is little doubt that the Admiralty is the most effective
of the three Service headquarters . "^
It is profitable to consider briefly the sources of the
Admiralty's relative superiority in this area. As previously
noted the civil servants are considered the experts on bureau-
cratic matters. To them falls the major burden for taking the
pulse of the other departments, drafting the Navy's arguments
in terms acceptable to bureaucrats and for steering proposals
through the political structure. All the Service departments,
however, have civil servants performing these tasks. There must
be additional reasons explaining the Navy's excellence in the
political arena. Fundamentally, the Admiralty's success in
this area derives from the fact that it has so successfully
capitalized on this expertise, and merged the efforts of the
56
civil servants with those of naval officers. There is a re-
markable harmony between the two groups which "is the envy of
ti57the other Services.
There are a number of reasons for this harmony. The
most significant is the organizational structure which carefully
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integrates civil servants and naval officers in each branch of
eft
the Admiralty. They work side by side on the whole spectrum
of naval problems. There is a constant dialogue between the
two groups, meshing their views and bringing their especial
skills to bear in a coordinated manner throughout the policy
process. The Permanent Secretary's position on the Board of
Admiralty insures that the civil servants as a group are repre-
sented at the highest level. By virtue of his rank, experience
and competence the senior civil servant would wield heavy in-
fluence in the Admiralty no matter what the organizational
arrangement, but the tradition of collective responsibility
which governs Board decisions gives him even a stronger voice
in policy matters.
This integrated arrangement is a source of pride to the
Admiralty and depends on the personal relationships between
the two groups. There are several favorable pressures at work
here. The similar common backgrounds of both groups of decision-
makers tends to lubricate the machinery and draw civilians and
officers together.
Moreover, the visible symbol of the Navy's spirit is
the Fleet, and it likewise is a source of strength to the
Admiralty. It unifies the headquarters organization and gives
both the naval officer and civil servant a single object of
attention, a single criterion against which to measure recom-
mendations and new projects. And because the Royal Navy has
been, over the years, so closely associated with the nation's
fortunes, the Admiralty assumes that what benefits the Fleet
benefits Britain. This is the one issue on which there is
absolute consensus between naval officers and civil servants In
the Admiralty. Unquestionably It strengthens the Navy's hand.
Even more important is the pervasive influence of the
Royal Navy's hallowed traditions. ^ A deliberate effort is
made to pass on to new administrative-class recruits a deep
feeling for the Navy's past exploits, customs and sacred mission.
The civil servant adopts his military colleague's reverent
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approach to ships, Nelsonian traditions, and sea power in
general. The two groups share a fierce pride in the Fleet.
Admiralty civil servants readily admit this, and most Insist
that such attitudes set them apart from their colleagues in
60
other departments. The outside observer cannot help but
stand In awe at the way Britain's naval heritage captures those
who are exposed to It. It is a spur and incentive to all who
work In the Admiralty, and it demands a high standard of per-
formance. Moreover It serves to promote the civil servant's
confidence in the officer corps and to develop a shared sense
of dedication. Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughry describes
it with admiration:
Even today the Admirals often carry more prestige and
influence with their civil servants and the Treasury than
corresponds with the Generals In the War Office or the
Air Marshals in the Air Ministry. One reason for this is
that most civil servants in responsible positions learned
at school the traditions, glories and power of the Royal
Navy and this learning still remains inherent in their
minds . . . These factors are so strong that they still
influence the Admiralty Civil Servants, even if uncon-
sciously, when dealing with Admirals. In fact the
Admirals are very largely masters in control and the
Civil Servants work with them as servants in great
mutual trust and confidence. 6
1
This relationship allows both to play their proper
roles and to contribute meaningfully to the decision-making
process. This same spirit of cooperation is what makes collec-
tive responsibility in the Board work so well. Within the
Admiralty the various elements argue vigorously for their posi-
tion, but they confront the outside world with one mind and voice.
As a Scientist and Technician
As previously mentioned the Navy has a public reputation
for conservatism. Right or wrong, this includes the conviction
that it has been slow in adjusting to the pace of post-war
technological advance. The writer's Interviews with non-naval
respondents elicited frequent remarks to this effect. These
general charges are vigorously denied by naval officers and many
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civilians close to the security scene. Both Snyder and Armstrong
in their work on the British defense establishment concluded that
this was a distorted image and that contrary to the popular im-
pression the Admiralty had demonstrated an impressive ability
to innovate technologically. What does this study suggest in
regard to the Admiralty's skill in responding to scientific and
technical developments?
The outside observer is inevitably struck with the modern
state of today's Fleet. British task forces bear little resem-
blance to those which fought World War II and include some of
the most advanced equipment afloat. The Sea Lords can boast a
formidable air-borne striking power which ranges the spectrum
from small tactical weapons to A-bombs, a covey of guided missile
destroyers, some of the most sophisticated anti-submarine ships
in the world, commando carriers with a helicopter assault capa-
bility, nuclear submarines and in the near future Polaris
submarines.
Unquestionably the Royal Navy has made some remarkable
contributions to naval technology. ** It is generally acknow-
ledged that British hull design and ship propulsion equipment
are outstanding. The Royal Navy's gas turbines probably lead
64the world. The three most important developments in the
handling of carrier aircraft since the war were of British
origin - the slanted flight deck, the steam catapult, and mirror
landing system. ^ All three of these innovations were instru-
mental in making it possible to send high performance aircraft
to sea and have been adopted by the U. S. Navy. Likewise
British research on sonar and ASW weapons has been both original
and excellent. In the submarine field they have succeeded in
producing some of the quietest conventional boats afloat,
and have done extensive research on propulsion reactors. Such
facts scarcely suggest an organization which refuses to recognize
change or to look ahead. No doubt it is the results of these
efforts which inspired Armstrong and Snyder to question the
popular stereotype of the Royal Navy as hidebound and dogmatic.
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However, the picture has another side. To say that the
Royal Navy has made some remarkable technical strides is not to
argue that it has always reacted expeditiously or with unusual
foresight. In fact the post-war Royal Navy has often been
hesitant to enter new fields until the ground has been broken
by others. There seems to be a built-in reluctance to conduct
pure research for its own sake or to attempt development of new
concepts until they can be firmly related to a tangible military
requirement. In short the changes in strategic policy do not
seem to have come from the laboratory, but rather modifications
in overall policy have stimulated the Navy's technical progress.
This can best be illustrated by reviewing some of the more
prominent technical developments, described more fully in
earlier chapters.
The first significant post-war example of the Admiralty's
halting approach to basic research was its reaction to nuclear
weapons. It is true, of course, that this work was being con-
ducted under the auspices of another department. It is also
fair to say that the Admiralty in all likelihood could not have
changed the general direction of the program, nor could it have
challenged the RAF's pre-eminent position, no matter how much
interest it took in atomic weapons. Nevertheless, once the
Admiralty concluded that the Air Force should have first
priority the RN hovered on the periphery and evinced only a
/TO
minimum of interest In the detailed research. Even when
weapons production commenced, the Admiralty made no determined
effort to carve out a naval role in the program. The point here
is that the Navy's leaders were leaving an Important area of re-
search to another organization and exerting very little pressure
on it to cater to the Fleet's needs. In time the Admiralty ex-
pressed some interest, and the Atomic Energy Authority did turn
its attention to tactical A-weapons, some of which were eventually
slated for deployment on carriers. However, the Admiralty's
failure to establish an early foothold in the program weakened
its bargaining position and delayed the Navy's entry into the
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field. It is significant to note that the first atomic weapons
did not join the Fleet until approximately 1959. Even then the
Royal Navy did not plan to use atomic explosives with missiles
or for ASW. It is perhaps unfair to say that this delay was
attributable solely to the Admiralty's failure to inject itself
into the early work, but there seems to be no doubt that this
69
was an important factor.
An even more significant example was nuclear propulsion.
The Admiralty expressed an early interest in the possibilities
of this phenomenon. Admittedly resources were scarce at the
time, and there were formidable obstacles inhibiting such
research. Still the writer found a rather surprising consensus
among respondents, both naval and non-naval, that a vital con-
sideration here was the Admiralty's apathy. It is true that in
194-8 there was some question as to what part submarines might
play in navies of the future and in the Royal Navy in particular.
Still nuclear propulsion held considerable promise, although the
ways it could be used were not entirely clear. It was not until
1955 when the Admiralty was developing serious doubts about the
Fleet's future and had witnessed the successful performance of
the Nautilus that this program was given any Intensive naval
support. In this case the Dreadnought did not get to sea until
1963, eight years after Nau1 lus , and several years after the
70first Russian nuclear submarines. This delay not only held
back general submarine development, but no doubt was partly
responsible for the Admiralty's delayed adoption of the missile
firing submarine.
The Polaris story of course follows a similar pattern.
Basic research on ballistic missiles was conducted by the
Ministry of Aviation, and the Navy assumed the attitude of a
neutral observer. Although the Admiralty's scientists were
following the course of this research, the Navy's leaders could
not relate it to the Fleet's major missions. It remained for
the U. S. Navy to pursue this project and to bring it to fruition,
It seems scarcely credible to the outside observer that the Royal
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Navy not only stood aloof from these weapons, but did not see
fit to complain when the Ministry of Aviation cut back work on
solid fuel ballistic missiles. This effectively ruled out sea-
borne weapons, and if any administrative agency in the government
was to keep this door open it had to be the Admiralty. In the
final stages it was the Conservative Party's commitment to the
deterrent v/hich thrust Polaris on the Royal Navy. Then it was
necessary to turn to the United States for the missiles.
These are the most prominent examples of the failure of
the Admiralty to stress basic research and technology which
would insure its future. The Royal Navy eventually entered all
three of these areas, but its reluctance to pursue such work
aggressively without tangible goals in sight meant that it was
consistently behind both the United States and Russia in im-
portant areas. On the other hand the Admiralty has been rather
prompt to respond to more practical stimuli. The first sophis-
ticated post-war experimental project initiated was an anti-
aircraft missile program which was launched in 1947- This was
motivated by the fear of high performance aircraft which were
coming off the drawing board. Research on the anti-submarine
problem was rapidly accelerated as soon as the Admiralty was
confident that the Russians were building up their submarine
force. Again the response lagged the threat, but when it came
it was positive and vigorous. Once the Fleet Air Arm digested
its experience in Korea there was a remarkable surge in aircraft
research which resulted in the carrier developments mentioned
earlier. In the same manner the Navy's soul-searching of the
mid-1 950 's and after Suez resulted in some remarkable develop-
ments in Fleet equipment - commando carriers, assault landing
ships, guided missile destroyers, Buccaneer aircraft - being
the most prominent examples. However, these were specific
responses to explicit challenges and were initiated as a result
of policy decisions to direct the Fleet's development in a
certain direction. Throughout the post-war period, once the
Admiralty has acknowledged a threat or a need its scientists
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and engineers have been more than equal to the task of designing
weapons and equipment to meet the requirement. Nowhere has this
been better illustrated than in the nuclear submarine and Polaris
program. Once the Admiralty elected to enter these areas its
technical skills proved more than equal to both of these tasks.
Thus it would appear that there are some grounds for
the charges of traditionalism that have been leveled at the
Admiralty. On the other hand, the criticisms have distorted
the picture. The Admiralty has responded to certain stimuli.
If it is at fault, it is in its reluctance to sponsor and to
take a deeper interest in longer range, exploratory research.
This conclusion should be read in the light of parameters.
It is impossible to lift out technical Judgments and examine them
with no reference to the economic background. As has been re-
peatedly noted, throughout the 19^5 to 1963 period the Sea Lords
were operating within severe budgetary restrictions. It was
necessary to cut back in many areas. It may well be that this
was the single most important determinant in shaping the effort
Invested in technical development. It is an irrefutable fact
of modern life that experimentation requires large expenditures,
and in military research a Government practices parsismony at
its own risk. Nevertheless, a great deal of money was spent
and equipment produced, so this by itself does not explain the
Admiralty's actions.
As noted in the foregoing discussion senior naval officers
presided over the technical departments, and it was through them
that scientific advice was injected into the Admiralty's policy
deliberations. It is obvious that the Sea Lords were hesitant
to divert resources to projects which did not promise to meet
an immediate and tangible need. There is little question that
professional military officers, if nothing else, are practical
men and theirs was, all things considered, a pragmatic approach.
But their reluctance to engage in fundamental research worked to
the Navy's and and the nation's disadvantage in the long run.
Past experience of the Sea Lords no doubt effects
technical programs. Ship design, propulsion machinery, gunnery,
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communications, ASY7 equipment - all items common in the Fleet
and with which senior officers were familiar - consistently
received support. Moreover, some remarkable advances have been
made in those fields. As aviators made their way to the higher
rungs of the command structure, aircraft research and develop-
ment received increasing support. In this instance the Ministry
of Supply (now Aviation) was responsible for the actual work.
The Board* s initial post-war attitude was that the Navy was
merely a customer, and that the Navy should leave the details
to the MOS. It was soon evident, however, to the men actually
flying the planes that naval aircraft were not receiving the
attention they deserved. Models designed for the Fleet were
always forced to defer to RAF aircraft, were inferior to their
land-based counterparts and were inevitably delayed in reaching
the production stage. After several years of dissatisfaction
the Fleet Air Arm succeeded in changing the Navy's approach and
moved its own people into the Ministry of Supply to oversee
naval projects. The result was a stronger voice for the Navy
in the Ministry of Supply and better aircraft for the seagoing
forces. It should be stressed, however, that these steps were
taken only after aviators began to wield a strong voice in the
71Board. The main lesson here is that the technical programs
reflect the experience of the decision-makers.
The conclusion is obvious. There is a need for better
representation at the higher levels of the technical interests
in the Navy. The elements besides the line officers with a
strong voice at the decision-making level are the politicians
and civil servants, and neither group is equipped either by
training or experience to supply this need. The increasing
complexity of naval warfare has consistently upgraded the
importance of scientists, engineers and naval officer specialists.
The number of such individuals employed by the Royal Navy since
194-5 has increased dramatically. Many of them hold heavy
responsibilities. However, they still have not gained the place
in the decision-making structure that the civil servants have.
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Also, the custom of having "line" officers as heads of the
technical departments has been persistently adhered to.
From 1945 to 1963 not even the Navy's Chief Scientist
sat on the Board. The "bulk of the Navy's ship-building,
weapons development, and electronics work is supervised by
73
naval officers specialized in various phases of engineering'-^
and a highly competent corps of civilian naval constructors.
However, none of these has ever been promoted to a top post
in the Admiralty. None has sat on the Admiralty Board. In
the early 1950's a group of the Navy's scientists were pushing
aggressively for more effort to be put into nuclear research,
but their arguments were blunted by the time they reached the
higher councils. Essentially the story was the same with the
Seaslug missile program, jet aircraft research, and solid fuel
propellants. It is hard to resist the conclusion that, in our
time when military success rests so heavily on science and
technology, that the collective leadership of the Admiralty
should include at least one or two experts in this area, either
officers or civilians. This suggestion is not a novel one and
has received some support among outside commentators. The
writer also found considerable agreement among respondents that
there was a need for such a change.
One other observation is in order. It is significant
to note that the Admiralty has performed better in the areas
where it has control of the research effort, and its own scientists
are engaged. For example atomic research has always been under
the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Authority. Similarly air-
craft and missile development is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Aviation. There has been a marked reluctance on
the Admiralty's part to interfere or inject itself into the
work of these agencies. This can always be rationalized by
pointing out that these other departments bear the responsibility,
not the Admiralty. The fact remains, however, that other agencies
are not necessarily interested in developing or producing items
specifically for use at sea. Until the Admiralty asserts an
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Interest and invests its cum people and money it will not get
the products It wants. Britain would not have a nuclear sub-
marine today if the Admiralty had left It entirely to the
Atomic Energy Authority. In the end the Navy seconded scientists
and technicians to Harwell and took over the development of a
maritime reactor. The same was true in naval aircraft and
missile research. It was not until the Admiralty took a de-
tailed interest in these programs and injected its own people
into the Ministry of Aviation that it began to get the planes
and missiles it wanted.
In the final analysis, no matter what the Administrative
arrangements, the Sea Lords cannot abdicate their basic responsi-
bility for the welfare of the Fleet. Only the Admiralty has a
primary interest in adapting scientific development to the needs
of the seagoing forces, and it cannot safely depend on other
agencies to take over this responsibility. At the same time,
the Government should recognize the risk v/hen it creates
departments which conduct development work, but are divorced
from the users. There are often pressing reasons for such moves,
such as tighter control and more efficient utilization of re-
sources. However, the final product to be effective must satisfy
the consumer. This suggests that both politicians and military
officers have a duty, which does not always seem to have been
recognized in the post-war era, to press aggressively for the
closest kind of cooperation between the Services and such agencies,
Under no circumstances can the Admiralty abdicate its responsi-
bility for the advancement of sea-borne ships, planes, equipment
and weapons.
As a Strategist
In the final analysis the most important aspect of the
Admiralty's decision-making role is its responsibility for re-
lating sea power to the nation's security requirements and for
devising ways to use the Fleet in promoting the country's inter-
ests. In the next few pages the study will review briefly the
Admiralty's post-war performance as an initiator of strategy.
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For the first few years after World War II the Admiralty
experienced some difficulty in adjusting to the changing conditions
which were plaguing all British life and in finding a suitable
role for the seagoing forces. However, around the mid- 1 950' s the
Sea Lords began to cast aside some of their more traditional
perspectives, and to fashion a radically new strategic case for
the Fleet. Today it is generally conceded that the Royal Navy
has achieved an eminently satisfactory accommodation with the
post-war military and political environments and that is due in
no small part to the Admiralty's ability as a strategist. This
can best be illustrated by some brief references to the events
described more fully in previous chapters.
The turn in the Fleet's fortunes can be traced to the
Judgment of their Lordships who, starting in the early months of
the Sandys regime, gradually directed the Navy away from its
traditional general war role and elected to develop its limited
war potential. However, this rather dramatic change in the
course of the Admiralty's thinking was 'by no means a desperation
move. It was the result of some careful deliberation and was
based on a reading of the military and international realities.
In retrospect there is little question that the Sea Lords
acted wisely. They predicted that the possession of nuclear
weapons would soon make general war less likely, and correspond-
ingly enhance the probability of small conventional wars. While
various commentators had been arguing this thesis for some years
the Royal Navy was one of the first (if not the first) military
organizations to face up to this new order and to risk its
future on what it believed would be an increasing stress on
74limited war and correspondingly a deemphasis of general war.
The Board, citing Korea and Sues, was confident that British
naval task forces could still make a meaningful and unique con-
tribution in this area. In its eyes the mobility of warships
and their capacity to project both land and air power on short
notice would be a valuable asset for some years to come. Time
has confirmed this reasoning.
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This significant shift in naval thinking likewise rested
on some shrewd political judgments. In the mid- 1 950* s, a strong
element in Great Britain argued that the country could no longer
afford its traditional overseas posture and advocated progressive
withdrawal from these responsibilities. The Navy's leaders
believed that the country would find it extremely difficult to
abdicate its commitments from Capetown to Singapore. They
further reasoned that the Fleet's task forces would allow Great
Britain to maintain an effective presence in the area, while at
the same time facilitating a reduction of bases, manpower and
expenses. Again they estimated correctly. Despite some half-
hearted gestures at withdrawal, treaty obligations, economic
interests and the desire for international prestige have all
combined to keep Britain heavily committed East of Suez. As a
result the Fleet's role has steadily expanded, and the nation
has willingly committed itself to a maritime strategy for some
time to come. On the strength of this performance the Navy is
generally considered "the most successful of the three Services
,,715in adjusting to the new conditions of the post-war period. ' -*
However, it is equally true that it was some ten years
before the Admiralty broke out of the doldrums that followed
World War II. In fact the transformation wrought in the
Admiralty's attitudes towards the Fleet's strategic role has
been one of the most interesting aspects of this study.
The early post-war period was marked by a disturbing
sense of self-satisfaction and a reluctance to alter the Navy's
basic strategic concepts. Throughout these years the Navy's
leaders made little effort to profit from the experience which
the Americans had accumulated in the Pacific or to exploit further
the Royal Navy's own association \*ith amphibious warfare. The
Fleet was deployed in much the same manner as it had been in
1939 with the emphasis on Europe's narrow seas. The Navy's
planners still envisioned a protracted war at sea on the World
War II pattern. The carrier had replaced the battleship as the
Fleet's main fighting unit, but otherwise there was very little
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change in tactical thinking. The Royal Navy's plans took little
account of many of the newest developments - atomic weapons, the
carrier's potential for attacking shore targets, amphibious tech-
niques, or the ability of ships to operate without shore support.
Unfortunately, this meant that the Royal Navy entered the 1950's
not only with out-of-date equipment but also with obsolete stra-
tegical doctrines. The failure to exploit fully the lessons of
World War II would later plague the Royal Navy in both Korea and
Suez, and defer for over a decade the development of the carrier
task forces which make up the current Fleet.
The Communist menace riveted Britain's attention on
Europe and, in turn, the Admiralty prepared to counter the Soviet
submarine force. In the eyes of the Sea Lords this threat con-
firmed their opinion that the next war would involve a protracted
struggle for control of the sea lanes. Nevertheless with the
onset of Korea one discovers a developing awareness of the chang-
ing environment as other challenges diverted the Admiralty from
its traditional frame of reference. Korea convincingly demon-
strated the contribution which the aircraft carrier could make
to land warfare. It was not long before officers returning from
the Far East were insisting that the Fleet develop a modern
offensive capability for striking land as well as maritime targets.
Concurrently, the aviators were asking for a tactical atomic cap-
ability and supporting the Navy's participation in NATO's Strike
Fleet. These innovations marked the first halting steps toward
today's carrier task forces.
These developments were shortly followed by the intro-
duction of hydrogen weapons which literally threw the Admiralty's
previous thinking into disarray. Faced with what it considered
a genuine challenge to the Navy's future, the Navy's leaders
commenced a serious reappraisal of the Fleet's strategic posture.
This resulted in a streamlining of the reserve fleet, the personnel
reserve, the logistic structure, and the operational forces. Added
to these efforts the Suez crisis demonstrated once again the Fleet's
potential in combatting brushfires and set the sate for the
Admiralty's final casting off of its World War II shackles.
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In examining the Royal Navy's strategic responses for
the first decade after the war, the observer is indelibly im-
pressed with the slowness of change and the Inability of the
Admiralty to adopt new concepts. Various considerations
fostered this conservatism and inhibited flexibility. Until
Korea the Royal Navy was hampered by a severe lack of funds, and
even after 1950 its appropriations although larger were extremely
limited. In such a situation there Is a tendency to forego new
schemes, to fall back on existing equipment, and to wait for a
better day. Their Lordships always had the problem of being
prepared to fight at the moment as well as looking to the future.
In addition the first post-war years presented a number of un-
anticipated problems which both complicated and confused the
strategical situation. Unprecedented technical advances have
characterized the military scene since 194-5* and made long range
strategical planning hazardous. Similarly, the fluid interna-
tional situation muddied the entire security picture and corres-
pondingly the Admiralty's view of the future. Nevertheless, an
important factor here was the difficulty in altering the deep
seated views of the Navy's leaders on the nature of war and the
Fleet's role. Rather than anticipating problems the Sea Lords
were reacting only when some outside force challenged their
traditional concepts. The Russian submarine force, Korea, Suez,
hydrogen weapons in turn, prodded the Admiralty into action and
contributed to the evolution of its strategic thinking. In each
case, however, the Admiralty reacted after, not before the events.
I suspect that this to some extent is a characteristic
of all large organizations - government or commercial. Unfortu-
nately, the military works under some additional handicaps.
Unlike a business organization which is tested annually when its
profit and loss statement is issued, the proof of an army or navy
is conflict, and between wars the incentive to change often sub-
sides to the danger level. Similarly, the rigid command heirarchy
which is designed to direct military operations is not as well
suited to generating policy changes. In the latter case a free
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flow of ideas and the clash of wills is essential. It is
difficult to create an environment in which individuals are
expected on one hand to obey orders unquestioningly and on the
other to speak their minds freely. To say the least, these con-
siderations complicate the military's policy-making problems and
make it necessary to combat constantly the spectre of inertia.
The remarkable thing,, however, about the Admiralty 1 s
post-war experience is that it did eventually shake off its
dogmatism. Starting in the mid-1 950' s, it displayed an increasing
capacity to face unpleasant facts and to cope with them. Today
it is widely conceded that it has made an effective post-war
adjustment, and in consequence the Royal Navy enjoys an enviable
reputation for its strategic innovations. What factors, outside
direct military challenge, such as Korea and Suez, have contri-
buted to this transformation?
First and foremost, British politicians have played an
important part here. Mr. Sandys' confrontation with the Navy
was in every sense a genuine challenge to its existence. His
increased power put him in a position to question the Navy's
arguments and to demand a Navy attuned to the nation's inter-
national and economic realities. In a sense he served to prod
the Navy's thinking just as war or battle would. The Admiralty
had already developed some self-doubt about its general war role.
However, the leadership was reluctant to "rock the boat" as long
as it continued to receive appropriations 'and was not required
to fight for its policies. Once threatened by outside pressure
from the Minister of Defense it proved fully capable of meeting
the challenge.
Since 1957 the Minister of Defense's powers have
continued to increase, and his staff assistance has been expanded
and broadened. Moreover, these moves have kept the pressure on
the Admiralty to stay abreast of the times and to support its
recommendations with convincing evidence. Irrefutably the
quality of its thought and performance has improved since then.
This is perhaps the most important lesson which the Admiralty's
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post-war experience suggests. Military organizations function
better in peacetime if they are stimulated externally . The
politicians (or the Ministry of Defense) cannot be expected to
do the Admiralty's thinking for it, but they can perform a
useful service by acting as catalyst, critic and skeptic. They
must continually demand quality performance and, in turn, cast
out those programs which cannot be supported. Huntington in
his excellent book Common Defense suggests this when he asserts
that "over the long run, alternating periods of expansion and
contraction may well produce a 'better defense 1 than a fixed
high-level military effort."' 1l1:c z/.-.y governmental department
the Admiralty must enjoy an environment stable enough to enable
it to carry out long term projects. Nevertheless, the Admiralty's
post-war history suggests that a military organization requires
outside challenges if it is to move with the times, and the
political leaders can to a certain extent provide that challenge.
However, outside stimulation by itself does not
adequately explain the Admiralty's effective adjustment to the
post-war milieu. All three Services have been subjected to these
pressures, yet the Navy is generally acknowledged to have suc-
ceeded better than the others. The writer found considerable
agreement among commentators that the steadily improving quality
of the Navy's leadership had accounted in large measure for its
success over the last decade. The inevitable question arises:
What accomplished these internal changes? Were they merely good
fortune, or the result of the system?
There seem to be a number of internal factors which have
facilitated the Admiralty's adjustment. A few pages earlier, the
harmonious relations between the civil servants and naval officers
was noted. This state of affairs has not only aided the presen-
tation of the Navy's case, but has also contributed to its sub-
stantive quality. As previously emphasized, the growing inter-
relation of economic, diplomatic, political and military policies
has steadily upgraded the civil servant's role. His knowledge of
economic matters, contacts with the Foreign Office and political
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astuteness have given him an important voice in formulating
strategic policy. Again the close working relation of the
civil servants and naval officers has served to bolster the
Admiralty's strategic judgment, Just as it has its political
skill.
Good fortune also seems to have played a hand. In 1955
when the Navy's prospects were at their nadir, a rather remarkable
flag officer was appointed First Sea Lord - Admiral Lord Louis
Mountbatten. He was destined to lead the Navy through its most
crucial post-war trials. By every criterion he was a most
unusual leader. Not only had he come from an old line Navy
family - his father was First Sea Lord before World V/ar I - but
he was a prominent member of the aristocracy with close family
ties to the monarchy. In addition he had served in a number of
posts outside the Navy, and assumed high responsibility at a
relatively young age. During World War II he had for two years
been the Chief of Combined Operations in which post he sat on
the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Shortly after being relieved of
that responsibility he was assigned as Supreme Allied Commander
77in the Burma-India theatre. ' In the latter post he was tempo-
rarily promoted to the rank of Admiral at the age of forty-three
and had elements from all three Services and the Allied countries
under his command. After the war he served for one year as the
last Viceroy of India and was instrumental in engineering the
political independence of that nation.
Although not overly popular in some naval quarters, he
is nevertheless credited with leading the Royal Navy out of its
post-war doldrums. He brought to the First Sea Lord's post an
enviable combination of political know-how, influential connections,
inter-Service experience, and a mind unusually receptive to new
ideas. He brought together, and served as a leader for, those
individuals pressing for the nuclear submarine. He personally
played a key role in negotiations concerning the Dreadnought
reactor. In the same manner he saw the possibilities of amphib-
ious warfare and set the Navy on this road even before Suez.
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His political acumen and influence were crucial in meeting the
Sandys attack and steering the Fleet toward its new-found limited
war role. He insisted that the Navy's future lay in closer
cooperation with the other military branches rather than in
assuming an independent role. He strove tirelessly to mesh the
Fleet's equipment and tactics with those of the other Services.
Even in the Polaris argument Mountbatten fought hard to project
the Navy into this field, but he could not carry the Board. It
is certainly the general consensus in and out of the Royal Navy
that his leadership was instrumental in revitalizing the
Admiralty and the Navy as a whole at the critical point in its
post-war evolution. His career well exemplifies the value of
broad experience, an inter-Service viewpoint, and familiarity
with the political milieu.
Vital as Lord Mountbatten 's leadership indubitably was,
it is at best only one factor in the Navy's adjustment. The
Admiralty structure, although not as responsive as many of its
critics would like, has nevertheless proved well suited to
accommodate to long-term change and to transmit pressures from
the Fleet to the policy-making levels. In interviews where the
subject was discussed, respondents were in strong agreement that
the Navy's leadership in the early post-war years had been re-
markably conservative and deaf to change. They likewise insisted
that this was not typical of the British Navy, but was more of
an aberration ' * due to rather unusual circumstances.
The question immediately arises: what were these
abnormal conditions? A number of factors seem to be involved.
Prior to World War II the Fleet was composed predominantly of
surface ships; equipment was simple; there was complete agreement
within the Navy on Fleet doctrine; and for that matter a national
consensus on the proper role of the Navy. With the onset of
World War II normal administrative procedures were suspended.
Rapid promotion was the order of the day, and many regular
officers found themselves in high command at a relatively young
age. Once the initial surge was completed the entire war was
fought with essentially the same leadership.
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Unfortunately, the nature of the Royal Navy's wartime
experience did little to alter the thinking of this leadership.
Prior to 1 938 the Fleet Air Arm had been a part of the Royal
Air Force and had only been transferred to the Admiralty just
before the outbreak of hostilities. This essentially meant
that 1945 found no career, aviators at the senior ranks.
Amphibious warfare had been ignored by the pre-war Fleet, and
unlike the American Navy, the Royal Navy had taken it on more
as an extra currlcular activity. Consequently amphibious tech-
niques had made little impression on the senior officers. Sim-
ilarly, the British high command had little opportunity to profit
from the lessons learned by the Americans in the Pacific - for
example the contributions made hy submarines and an extensive
fleet train. Essentially the high command emerged with its
pre-1939 strategic views still intact.
accelerated promotions in wartime meant that after the
armistice officer advancements, if not frozen, were considerably
throttled down. Many of the wartime commanders remained in power
well into the post-war period. This inevitably inhibited change.
The world was changing, but for several years the Navy's high
command was not. It was to be some time before the Navy could
return to its normal administrative patterns and replace the
leadership with younger blood which had a more adequate under-
standing of the post-war world.
Gradually but surely, however, significant changes were
wrought in the personnel and character of the Admiralty which
brought to the decision-making level fresh perspectives and more
imaginative thinking. This transformation was wrought by the
system which may be hampered by an abnormal situation such as
that described above, but which nevertheless assures long-term
change and under normal peacetime conditions works rather well.
Officers are frequently rotated between the Admiralty and the
operating forces. This ensures that the Navy's many activities
are represented in Whitehall. Moreover this practice furnishes
the Admiralty with continuous knowledge of problems in the field
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and a constant supply of new ideas. In short it offers the Fleet
a channel into the headquarters organization. As the Royal Navy's
post-war activities have grown more complex and diverse these
developments were reflected in the Admiralty and eventually at
the policy-making level. Hopefully, the system allows not only
for the leadership to transmit its orders and viev/s down the
chain, but simultaneously for pressure gradually to well up from
the lower echelons. Over the long run this arrangement facilitates
change and revitalizes the leadership.
This process is best illustrated by the rise of aviation
in the Royal Navy. In the inter-war years the Fleet Air Arm
was a branch of the RAF. _.: . ,,, ^_ the result of a _-jo_-
defense study, it was transferred to the Navy. Its pilots were
small in number and junior in rank. While the Fleet Air Arm's
size increased during World War II, it was still several years
0/-\
before naval aviators began to reach positions of prominence.
Nevertheless, after 194-5 their influence was to increase rapidly.
By the early 1950's several aviators had attained flag rank, a
section of the Naval Staff was devoted to aviation matters, a
great many career-pilots were serving in the Admiralty, and an
aviation Admiral was Fifth Sea Lord. Throughout the mid-1 950 's
the moves toward expanding the Fleet Air Arm's role were not
only inspired by aviators, but were shepherded through the
Admiralty, including the Board, by aviators. By the very nature
of their experience this group brought to the Admiralty fresh
perspectives, a more adventurous frame of mind, and a receptive-
::o:3 to new concepts. In addition many of these individuals,
unlike the pre-war surface officers, had served with other organ-
izations - the RAF, the Ministry of Aviation, the U. S. Navy.
They had a deep appreciation of the possibilities of air power
in general, of the capabilities of other military branches, and
tl'.~
- -
for ir.t^r- Service cooper^:io:_ "Jhi- was a refreshing
stream of new talent flowing into the policy mechanism.
In the same manner, although not so obviously, other
factions and groups within the Fleet have made their influence
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felt. Although the Navy sadly neglected amphibious warfare
after 19^5, its proponents at the junior ranks were continually
improving their position, and in 1955 when a new First Sea Lord,
who i*as sympathetic to their case, assumed office they greatly
facilitated the build up of an amphibious capability. Since
the establishment of NATO the Royal Navy has had officers serving
with a variety of international staffs, foreign navies, and other
Services. Gradually this type of talent has been cycled through
the Admiralty to enrich its deliberations and, in turn, eventually
to reach policy-making positions. The importance of this process
can likewise be illustrated in a negative manner. As the pre-
ceding discussion indicated the Admiralty has been slow in co-
opting scientific and technical talent at the decision-making
level. This has adversely affected the Admiralty's adjustment
to the necessity for basic research. Similarly, the submarine
force which, in accordance - it 3 own desires, enjoys a
separate administrative organization has had difficulty in in-
fluencing policy. Only with the advent of the Dreadnought and
Polaris has it really assumed a strong position in the heirarchy.
It is interesting to note that the Polaris program is administered
oy an organization physically located in the Admiralty, not in
Portsmouth where the submarine force has been traditionally
administered.
Unquestionably all organizations change with time, but
the point to be made here is that the British Navy has developed
a system which gives time an assist and tends to reflect at top
levels the character and thinking of the Fleet. In response to
a more complex world it has diversified the composition of the
Navy's top command and given the Board of Admiralty a more diffuse
personality than it ever had before 1939. This can be quickly
portrayed by a reference to the last four First Sea Lords. Lord
Mountbatten (1955-59) was an amphibious expert and had spent
considerable time in duties outside the Navy. Sir Charles Lambe
(1959-60) was a surface ship officer with an unusual amount of
staff duty behind him. Sir Caspar John (1960-63) was the first
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aviator to serve In the post. He had served an extended period
in aircraft production and development billets rather than
operational posts. "" Sir David Luce, the present First Sea Lord,
is the first submarine officer to serve in the billet. This
diverse composition is repeated at the lower levels.
It should be stressed at this point that it is not only
the rotating representation within the Admiralty which has served
to facilitate change, but also the Board's practice of collective
responsibility. This device ha3 increased the number of channels
of influence and the probability that the major factions and
opinions within the Navy will receive a hearing. It facilitates
the interchange of ideas and the dialogue which is as essential
to good policy-making in the Admiralty as it is in the govern-
ment in general. As the Navy's post-war composition has diversi-
fied it has allowed the Admiralty to take better advantage of these
fresh currents and viewpoints.
Thus far the discussion has dwelt only on the ability of
assignment policies and collective responsibility to broaden the
source of perspectives, ideas and people. The writer has no in-
tention of claiming that this system is either clairvoyant or
quickly reactive to changing conditions. All it can do is to
insure that over the longer run the leadership revitalizes it-
self and reflects the complex nature of the Navy as a whole.
However, it seems to have had a bonus effect. Although it is
difficult to document, more than one respondent asserted that
the calibre of the individual leader in the Navy had improved
during the last few years. Without exception they credited this
to the increased exposure of the Navy's leaders to a variety of
stimuli ranging from participation in the political environment
to the mechanics of nuclear weapons. The uniformity of experi-
ence and views which characterized the pre-war Navy is gone, and





Today the average flag officer is head and shoulders
above his pre-war contemporary. He still has much of
the pre-war training and background in him, but he is
otherwise the product of a different environment. He
has not only had command at sea, but more often than
not he has brushed up against the scientific community,
the diplomatic world and the political environment.
His decisions no longer concern just military factors,
but the whole range of military considerations. In
addition his confederates now represent a variety of
views - instead of one standard Navy line* He has had
to argue his case in an Admiralty where aviators, sub-
mariners and destroyer men are constantly in conflict.
It has given him a broader perspective and made a
better man out of him.
It is difficult to test the validity of this statement, but it
certainly accords with my own impressions. The very, fact that
the Navy deals with the whole military spectrum - air power,
land power, and sea power - gives it an advantage in developing
officers with a broader comprehension of the background against
which the military operates. At any rate the independent
evidence - the Navy's effective post-war adjustment - lends
support to the conclusion that the Navy's leadership has im-
proved in quality and is proving itself psychologically adapt-
able to changing conditions.
\ 12 ion
Overall the Admiralty as an organization has performed
well in the post-war period. This performance must always be
graded against the background of Britain's declining world
position and an unprecedented period of change technologically.
These changing conditions, political and economic as well as
military, have severely complicated the policy-making problem.
Not only have they made some past experience irrelevant, and
the future more difficult to foresee, but they have forced
British statesmen and military leaders to make some rather
traumatic psychological adjustments. It has been not only a
matter of accommodating to technological and economic pressures,
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but also to a different political position on the international
scale of power. In retrospect it is perhaps surprising that the
Royal Navy has done as well as it has both for the country and
for itself. Admittedly, the Navy's leaders are basically con-
servative, and at tines this delays adjustment to change. "On
the other hand, the (Navy's) tradition is such a fine one there
is a profit element in it as well." ^ The Admiralty would
appear to have reached a generally satisfactory balance between
the two poles of tradition and change.
This conclusion should not obscure the Admiralty's
mistakes, or convey an impression that there is no room for
improvement. The Admiralty exhibits the characteristics of all
bureaucratic organizations, and there are lessons to be learned
from its post-war experience* These can be summarized as follows:
(1) The Royal Navy like any large bureaucratic organi-
zation is susceptible to inertia and finds it particularly
difficult to cope with rapid change. It is unlikely that any
such organization which is charged not only with policy-making
responsibilities but also operational and administrative ones,
can be structured to change direction on short notice. Indeed
there is some merit in a system which demands continuity at the
same time it responds to new pressures. Only a judicious push
and pull between these two tendencies can produce sound politics
and at the same time allow long term projects to be implemented.
The danger in the case of a military organization is that the
pressures of inertia will completely overcome those contending
for progress. Generalising from the Royal Navy's experience
the best insurance against this is outside challenge and stim-
ulus which tests the organization's goals, recommendations and
doctrines. It is here that the political leadership has a
crucial role - indeed an obligation - to act constantly as a
critic, catalyst and judicious commander. Successful political
supervision can reap large rewards. No longer can security
problems be adequately handled from a purely military perspective.
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The professional officers must take into account the entire
political spectrum in making his recommendations. In turn, the
politician must assess the military judgments which go into the
policy process. Similarly, the politician also must be given
the resources and authority to allow him to carry out these
functions in a competent manner.
(2) The Admiralty's employment of civil servants has
proved eminently successful. They give the Navy a permanent
link with Whitehall, provide continuity, bureaucratic expertise,
and competent managers for engineering proposals through the
political maze. However, it is the Navy's relationships with
its civil servants which distinguishes the Admiralty from the
other military departments. This seems to depend primarily on
administrative arrangements which integrate the naval officers
and civil servants throughout the headquarters organization and
distributes the responsibility between the two groups. Similarly,
the Navy's leaders have gone tc ; lengths to instill in the
Admiralty's civil servants the same pride in the Fleet which
characterizes officer corps. There is little question that
these measures have brought the civil servants more closely
into the Navy fold and inspired improved performance. In fact
from a policy-making standpoint the Royal Navy's great traditions
have probably paid their greatest dividends in this area.
(3) At the same time the Admiralty's policy of counter-
balancing the permanent civil servants with a continuous stream
of officers from the operating forces strengthens the policy-
making side of the organization. It insures that the headquarters
organization reflects the general composition of the Navy and that
there is a channel for the lower echelons to exert influence. In
essence the Admiralty system provides for long-term change.
It should be emphasized that this practice insures only
that the Admiralty will react to alterations in the Fleet. It
in no sense guarantees that the Navy will foresee or act ahead
of time to meet challenges. This remains a prime function of
the political and military leadership. No organizational device
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can replace competent leaders. This weakness is amply illustrated
by the period of stagnation which beset the Royal Navy for the
first few years after World War II, Still it is instructive to
note that as the organization gradually emerged from the post-
war doldrums and fresh blood was introduced, the quality of
leadership has concurrently been improved. There is little
question that over the last decade the Navy's leaders have been
more adaptable and skillful in meeting outside challenge.
(4) The Board of Admiralty with its custom of
collective responsibility has likewise met the post-war test
reasonably well. It brings to bear on policy problems a
sufficient variety of perspectives and abilities to give policy
recommendations a high grade substantive content. At the same
time xtfide representation assures that its decisions embody a
sufficient consensus to them viable. This conciliar
arrangement is typical of British institutions and in the
Admiralty's case has proved both effective and adaptable over
the years. Again the prime danger is that some important group
may not have a voice on the Board. The important lesson here
.... .: _.t collective responsibility seems to be \;olI suited to
making policy decisions, but it is essential that all the im-
portant interests are represented. This is one area where the
First Lord can wield a tremendous influence. It is within his
power to scrutinize continually the Board of Admiralty and to
exercise a strong voice in controlling its composition and se-
lecting Sea Lords. The same inertia which threatens the organi-
zation as a whole often preclude- iges in the Board's pattern
of operation, and it may well be that only a detached observer
can diagnose the difficulty.
(5) One thing stands out through the course of the
entire study, the greatest voice in the higher councils of the
Navy is wielded by the senior naval officers and the quality of
the Admiralty's proposals to a large extent depends on their
judgment. In short the Admiralty's performance depends greatly
on the officer corps pushing up high grade leaders. Setting
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aside the first few years after the war, the professional
leadership seems to have "been remarkably flexible and to have
improved consistently with the passage of time. This speaks
highly of the Navy's recruiting and training system. At the same
time, however, leaders in today's military environment need an
unprecedented breadth of knowledge and abilities. Throughout
the post-war period the Navy's leaders have been faced with
challenges which demanded diplomatic, military, economic,
scientific and political skills. This problem can partly be
met by drawing on the advice of experts in various fields, but
at the same time the quality of the final decisions depends on
the competence and judgment of the men at the top. It is mani-
fest from the Navy's post-war experience that as the Navy's senior
officers broke out of the narrow frame of reference which confined
their pre-war and World War II counterparts the Navy's responses
to post-war conditions correspondingly improved. Today's senior
officer is still deeply dedicated to the Royal Navy, but as a
result of the variegated world in which he has had to operate
he possesses a wide-range of experience and knowledge outside
of the strictly naval field. The lesson here is an important
one. The Navy must constantly be on its guard to see that its
recruiting patterns, educational institutions, personnel assign-
ment policies and promotion criteria are geared to the times
and are producing adaptable officers. It is essential that the
officer who arrives at flag rank will have accumulated the type
of knowledge and experience that is relevant to decisionmaking
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ly the Admiralty civil
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the subject sec, H. E. Dale, The Higher Civil Service of
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Traditionally, Britain's security policy was designed
to defend the home islands against attack, to maintain the
Empire's sea communications, and to insure security and British
domination in the overseas colonial areas. These objectives
combined with the United Kingdom's unique geographical position
dictated a maritime strategy, and from the time of Queen
Elizabeth I, until the early 1900's Great Britain possessed the
world's foremost Navy. As long as there were no important powers
outside Europe the Fleet's control of the European narrow seas
"automatically resulted in a virtually world-wide command of the
sea. " This primacy was further buttressed by overseas bases
which flanked every major trade route and facilitated the pro-
tection of Britain's links with the Empire. Similarly, these
bases and the Royal Navy made it possible for Whitehall to pro-
ject force throughout its various areas of interest at time and
places of its own choosing. All in all it was a most enviable
arrangement which not only offered nineteenth century Britain
an unprecedented degree of security, but underwrote the nation's
remarkable economic and political achievements.
Around 1890 the pre-eminent role of the British Fleet
began changing - some would say declining. The twentieth
century witnessed a number of significant developments which
progressively undermined Britain's world position and in turn
her traditional strategical posture. As the industrial revolu-
tion spread to the Continent and overseas, Britain' s predominant
commercial position was gradually eroded. Similarly, strong




eventually led to autoncmjr for the colonies. The rise of the
American and Japanese navies drastically altered the distribution
of sea power and marked the end of the Pax Britanniea. Similarly,
the introduction of submarines, internal combustion engines,
torpedoes, and aircraft were gradually revolutionizing the
nature of war and more to the point the traditional role of
fleets.
However, the broader implications of these trends had
little influence on British thinking. up through the inter-war
period. The nation had emerged from World War I a member of the
victorious coalition and with burgeoning confidence. The Crown
still commanded at least th Ilegianee of a vast Empire,
London remained the financial capital of the world, Whitehall's
diplomats continued to wield a most respected voice at the
council table, Britons still :. d on the Fleet to defend the
homeland, to secure 3Z-India- ._ Lifeline and to
support the overseas garrisons. In fact the average Englishman
continued to think in terms of Pax Britannica and to endow his
I'.'-Vy \. __.. .::..-.:„. ..:. z.:yJz--l±tio^.
It took a socol I »ld war to reveal the extent to which
time, technology, and the changing configuration of power had
had erroded Britain's historic ..orld primacy. She emerged from
that conflict in dire economic straits with vast physical damage,
her invisible sources of inc. ^epleted and over one-third of
her overseas investments liquidated. Furthermore, the inter-
national distribution c .• had alt 1 radically, raising
the United States and the Sovl :_ion to positions of undis-
puted ascendancy. Militarily World War II witnessed the
phenomenal rise of air power and the end of the British home-
land's immunity from destruc ,_:. Salt water and a navy
could no longer insure Britain's defense or her international
position. As the post-war era unfolded all these developments
were to require a series of traumatic adjustments. In essence
British post-war Governments have had the unenviable task of
presiding over a ual retreat from Great Power status and of
making the process as painless as possible.
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This study has focus sed on the impacts of these pressures
on British naval policy from '.945 to 1963. Like all facets of
British life the Royal Navy has undergone some rather profound
changes since Germany and Japan capitulated. It was the Attlee
Government's original intention to concentrate on the nation's
economic rehabilitation and to relegate defense to the background -
a normal peacetime procedure. This plan was abruptly terminated
by Communist aggressiveness and the outbreak in Korea. Once
again Britain was forced to look to its defenses.
The Government soon discovered that it no longer had the
resources to go it alone» Even when devoting \0% of its GNP
to defense Britain was still falling behind Russia and the
United States. The Government's solution was to seek security
in the military and political strength of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. In short it linked Britain's defense to
that of western Europe and turned to an "alliance" strategy.
This was a striking departure from the country's traditional
maritime strategy and graphically illustrated that the Fleet no
longer occupied its historic central position in the defense
establishment. The Admiralty spent the first decade after the
armistice seeking to formulate a viable role for the Fleet in
the face of these new circumstances. Needless to say it was
reluctant to cast aside its general war strategy that it had
followed so long.
In the Government's eyes the NATO commitment demanded a
heavy consignment of air and ground forces to the Continent.
Not only were Britain's statesmen hoping to bolster SHAPE 's
ability to fend off the Soviet s, but also to demonstrate the
sincerity of their commitment and thereby to insure meaningful
American support for the defense of Europe. Needless to say
this diverted resources from the Fleet, and, by its very nature,
the Navy could contribute little to countering Russia's land
power. :ill the Soviet threat was not solely confined to
land. Russia was rapidly expanding its submarine force, and
the NATO powers were gravely concerned about the sea communications
between North America and Eurooe. Here was an area where the Fleet
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could contribute, and the Admiralty set its sights on the
Russian submarine menace.,
The formation of NATO was followed shortly by the
explosion of a British atomic weapon, and the Royal Air Force
soon achieved, at least temporarily, an undisputed ascendancy
in the defense heirarchy. Once the Government became convinced
'that there was n j.inst nuclear weapons, a
strategy of deterrence seemed irresistibly attractive -
particularly since there ;ome hope that a deterrence strategy
might permit cut-backs in manpower and conventional arms* The
turn to deterrence again reduc funds available to the Navy
and its importance in the sec picture. When SACLANT was
formed the Americans planned to use NATO's Strike Fleet offen-
sively in the event of a leral nuclear conflict, and the Royal
Navy had hopea to it this opportunity to expand its over-
all significance. However, tfc ~ .. a .bifcions were soon
frustrated. The introduction of hydrogen weapons, at least in
British eyes, seriously discredited £ .ntentions to use
naval forces in a nuclear e: . It no longer sd con-
vincing to arguo without a strategic capability
could play a major role in -nuclear war, This develop-
ment li] 3 threw a cloud of doubt over the whole concept of
a protracted w r .t t -. Considering the nation's economic
di_ Ities, it hardly see. rofitable to invest huge sums
in a Fleet which was being pr m ;t a questionable
threat, Wi' h its basic doct --:.:.-_-, 1- .-edibility and as ever
confronted hy severe financial limitations the Admiralty turned
elsewhere for its .
.
Just as the cold war has sated the defense of
western Europe, the post-T r _ ja has pre.. nt< - Gr at Britain
;h unanticipa roblems ov r The rise of nationalism
spread of Communism not y accelerated the retreat
from Empire, but also threatened Britain* s economic interests
political influence in .s. This, in turn, has
required a heavy military comm_ t outside of Europe which
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is shouldered in the main without assistance of the NATO
powers. It was here that the Admiralty found a convincing
justification for its mobile task forces which could project
both land and air power on short notice. Since 1957 the
Admiralty has been successful in fashioning effective political
support for this role and has bent every effort toward obtaining
the necessary hard . Today th ./y has a small general pur-
pose surface Fleet which is primarily configured to deal with
limited wars and disorders* Geographically it is concentrated
East of Suez where the bulk of I -.. -.in's overseas interests are
located. Its general mission is to furnish a British military
presence in the area and, if this is insufficient to maintain
stability and order, to act quickly in suppressing disturbances
before they can escalate into major conflict.
The g] „r part of the Admiralty's post-war efforts
have gone into carving out a viable role for its surface forces,
however, today the Fleet has one o-;lier significant mission. In
the early p«.->-.:.-:- ::^_-iod the Sql. >rds willingly assigned the
delivery of strategic weapons to the RAF and, In turn, abdicated
from any responsibility for the airborne deterrent. Just as
the advance of technology had seriously ^_-c:.^_ the Navy's im-
portances it was eventually tc _• the significance of manned
aircraft. By the mid-1 950* s both the Soviet Union and the United
States were seriously experi iti: ; with ballistic missiles, and
the British were soon to folic: suit* It .anifest. that,
as a delivery agent for nuclear weapons, missiles far surpassed
manned aircraft both in delivery t and vulnerability to counter
attack. Once attention ti to such systems the possibility of
surface ships and sue: rlne s carrying deterrent weapons invited
examination. Strangely enoughs once the Admiralty had decided
to emphasize the Fleet's limited war role, it was reluctant to
consider a deterrent mission for its men-of-war. Nevertheless,
the Royal Navy was to be overtaken by events beyond its control.
In 1960 the Government cancelled the Blue Streak missile
which was originally intended to replace manned bombers in
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delivering British nuclear warheads and contracted with the
United States Government for the Skybolt missile, to be opera-
tional in the late "sixties. Escalating costs and the remark-
able success of the American submarine launched Polaris dictated
the cancellation of Skybolt. In place of this abortive project
President Kennedy offered Prime Minister Macmillan Polaris.
Being deeply committed to the doctrine of deterrence, the
nation's political leaders accepted the offer despite the
Admiralty's reluctance. By 1970 the Royal Navy will have FBM
submarines at sea and is expected to carry prime responsibility
for the British deterrent
. a] ana system. These Polaris sub-,
marines combined with tl - task forces have given
the Fleet two major missions and restored the Royal Navy to a
central position in the Bri ih ise establishment.
Examining the po. iod as a whole, it is evident
that those responsible for sh naval policy, Admiralty
officials in particular, have adjusted re — p :'feetively to
altered political, economic, and technical military conditions.
These adjustments have d despite the fact that the
post-war era has been c! .rized by an unusual amount of
instability and uncertainty. Tc y's Fleet is taking full
advantage of the many n equipment and techniques
which engineering science has made available since 19^5* There
is little question that modern naval forces are well suited to
the two roles which the Admiralty has delineated for the Fleet.
The FBM submarine has no peer as a launching vehicle for nuclear
ballistic missiles. Similarly, from a military perspective the
general-purpose carrier task-force is well suited to bring force
to bear quickly and effectively in a troubled coastal area. Its
mobility c 1 -sufficiency are particularly valuable East of
Suez whe -itain's bases have steadily diminished; where the
forces available are necessarily limited; where trouble may
occur in id ly spread 1ocj:_c:..; ..._ -hero tli^ British presence
must be as politically inoffensive as possible. Considering
Britain's post-war limitations such a mission is more realistic
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from a military standpoint, than a general war role which would
put the Fleet In direct competition with Russia.
Even more important, the Navy's policy adjustments have
closely corresponded to the prevailing notions regarding the
role Britain should and can play in international politics.
Above all the Navy's leaders have had to make a rather trau-
matic psychological adjustment to Britain's new position on the
international scale of power - this is: no mean feat In Itself.
In this sector the Admiralty not only has responded to political
pressures, "but has often been an rtant actor in shaping
national wo„l;. _„_ '."...-._".. ~1:_l;_ _:i the nuclear propulsion field
made it possible for Britain to continue its strategy of deterrence
which, in the eyes of many, has t jed Britain's international
prestige and influence. T. -'-:"- strategy has likewise
made it possible for Briti to pro' .rests overseas,
and, in a £ . 3, to prole .re* These
achievements reflect a itive responsiveness to political,
economic, and technical realities. hen the military is inflex-
ible and finds Itself inc Le of accommodating to the changing
. . c.:... wild renditions of the na >n, it not only weakens the
Government's external influence, but may very well become a
source of serious domestic discontent. In short Britain's
naval policy seems to exhibit the virtues often associated with
most public policies in the United Kingdom - it has evolved slowly
but constantly, has consi*. i on a broad consensus, and
managed to reconcile conflicting objectives.
This is not to say that the Admiralty's decision-makers
have had no serious problems. One dominant theme of the foregoing
study has been the lack of sufficient funds to fulfill the Navy's
ambitions. Throughout the post-war era the Government has been
continuously under heavy pressure to reduce the resources allo-
cated to military purpc_ ame time, the Government has
been r it to scale down its ... ional objectives* Throughout
this period, successive Governments have attempted to play a




Despite the fact that post-war Britain has devoted
considerably - c. 3 of its GNP to defense than has been traditionally
customary, and that the Government has turned to an alliance
strategy which calls for merging its effort with other like
minded Powers, it has still "qqoxi overcommitted militarily since
the late 194-0's. That is to say, commitments have persistently
exceeded the available military capabilities. In consequence,
all three Services have been hard pressed throughout the period.
This pressure has been evident in a number of post-war crises.
In practically every instance where it has been called upon to
use force the Government has had to improvise, sometimes on a
large scale - Korea, Malaya, Sues, Jordan, Berlin, Kuwait, Cyprus
and Indonesia are cases in point. Fortunately, serious threats
have not often occurred simultaneously, and Whitehall was usually
able in the period studied to juggle its forces without serious
military consequences.
The basic reality has or national goals
are competing for resold- . The security establishment not
only requires money, but also draws heavily on industr_
manpower which are ne srately to stabilize the nation's
balance of payments. Likewise troublesome has oeen the Govern-
ment attempts to provide some sort of military response at every
possible level of conflict. Originally, it was hoped that the
strategic nuclear deterrent, which is generally estimated to
consume between 10 and 15$ of the ,.._'jnse budget, would permit
reductions in conventional force levels and the phasing out of
some traditional weapons. This has proved to be illusory. As
the nuclear stalemate developed, conventional arms once again
came to the fore, and today Britain has committed non-nuclear
forces both to NATO and to cover its responsibilities East of
Sues. This wide spectrum of cc i ^ents requires a broad-based
research and development program which severely taxes Britain's
limited resources. Similarly, the declining force levels of all
?ee Services . laller numbers of any particular item
. ._...__ and, correspondingly, makes it impossible to obtain
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the economies associated with large scale production. All these
factors aggravate Britain's defense problems.
This ha n graphically demonstrated by the Royal
Navy's post-war experience. It was ^--imarlly the scarcity of
resources which precluded the Admiralty from attempting to
fashion a strategic bombing role for the Fleet Air Arm. The
required investment in new carriers and planes would have been
prohibitive. One of the main 1 >ns for the Admiralty's turn
away from a general war mission was inability of the Royal
Navy to match the Soviet and American navies in size. By the
mid-1 950* s it was manifest that Britain's disposable resources
would not permit building _; ._ 1... .-junbers of anti-submarine
vessels and other ty: . be required to meet the
Russians weapon for weapon or to m sh the American contribution
to Western defense. In an reconcile economic, techno-
logical and political realities, the Admiralty turned to a limited
war strategy. It was si *rely believed that this mission would
be within the country's fi 3ity. From a detached
perspective it is notable tl .vy's leaders adjusted their
thinking to these limitations in _ manner that maximi-^d the
Navy's role in Bri I , This in Itself is a tribute
to the quality of today's naval leadership.
At fc me ti. te still must record 'doubt a3 to whether
the political G-overnme: ., i'acod squarely the basic problem of
balancing commitments and resources, and in the Navy's case whether
the Sea Lords can in the long run fashion as effective a Fleet as
they desire. As has already been noted the Navy's limited war
role .eterrent mission possess considerable political appeal
in Britain and are consistent with modern concepts of the proper
use of sea power. Similarly there is little question as to the
high c. llty of RN equipment, the skill of its leaders, or its
_lity to fight. Irrefutably. Admiralty has made considerable
stric - '.".aping the o fulfill elioir new functions.
Mor with the approval of a new carrier, Sea Lords have
succeeded in committing the Government at least in a qualified
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sense to a limited naval strategy for some time to come. However,
the Fleet's overall strength continues to be a source of serious
concern to the Navy's leaders and e many others who follow naval
affairs.
In regard to surface tack forces the Admiralty's present
objectives - which are considered tJ .nimum acceptable - are
to keep three carrier task fc ably two fixed wing and
one commando) East of Suez and to develop a modern amphibious
ability for lifting a b: e force of ground troops on
a moment's notice. Many strategists would contend that forces
available to carry out missions -dequate, considering
th- ^ from Capetown to Sing „ Th is no guarantee that
forces will be in the right place at the right time, and the
distances in that part of the ac -e formidable* Even more
disturbing, crises in two locations at once __ ..e be beyond the
Fleet's capacity to cope at all* There is some merit in these
arguments. But consider..
....
_n's economic circumstances it
is not realistic to argue for a vast Fleet which can cover any
number of contingencies. Some risks must be accepted, and the
.y's leaders must resign the_ res to the fact that the Fleet
will always be operating at {Jfull stretch." Thus far the Fleet
has proved itself capable of 'me~a_e.j the type of military threats
which develop on the littoral of the Indian Ocean*, There is no
reason to believe that it will not be just as adept in the future
at accomplishing much with little. In this regard it is reason-
able to expect that in the event of grave trouble the United
States would extend assistance. This is a constant factor which
.ie necessity for eny great increase in British force
levels. In essence -alty's overall objectives, while
involving some risk, nevertheless appear militarily realistic.
However, the Admiralty is hard pressed to meet even these
limited aims and to insure that the Fleet will not fall below a
minimal level in the future. There are indications that this is
-c-Lv- a_....a. It _e eoe early ee predict all t-.a effects
_ch the Polaris pa a will have on the Navy's limited war
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plans. But there is little doubt that it will reduce the
resources available for surface task forces. Even if the
expenses for the FBM submarine force are shared equally by the
three Services, as promised, this will still consume a sizeable
portion of the Navy's appropriation. Polaris will not make it-
self really felt until 1966 and after, but it has already begun
to pose personnel problems for the Admiralty, Qy diverting a
disproportionate share of skilled manpower. Similarly, FBM
submarines will consume time, effort, and logistics support which
are not taken into account in the appropriations. In fact the
writer found many officers and civil servants who were sincerely
convinced that eventually the I 'is project would severely
restrict the Admiralty' i for its limited surface forces.
Likewise, the carrier fight of the early 1960*3 suggests
that the Admiralty is heading into other troubled waters.
Although approval was obti 2 :....._ new carrier, the Treasury's
agreement was based on a three-carrier Fleet for the 1970's, com-
posed of one new and two mod .... zed carriers. There is unanimous
consensus among naval eom tors that this would be inadequate
to implement the brush fire role which the Admiralty envisions.
Due to the time consumed by maintenance, overhauls and training,
even t . ... carriers are barely sufficient to keep three
East of Sues. 9 All of the Navy's fixed wing carriers are approach-
ing th . 3 of their useful life. It may be questioned whether
further modernization of these ships is practical. If the Fleet
is to obtain the next generation of aircraft now in the test
stage, larger flight decks, more powerful catapults, and stronger
retrieving equipment will be needed. These requirements may well
dictate new instead of modernized carriers. Aside from the fixed
wing carriers, the commando carriers are also of World War II
vintage and are rapidly reaching the end of their useful lives.
In this case perhaps the older fixed wing carriers being phased
could '_ a converted - but eventually the
Admiralty will have to fight for one or _ore new commando carriers.
Recent experience indicates that obtaining these replacements may
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be a prolonged and difficult process. Spiraling cost 3 will
continue to play an important part, "The cost of replacing an
obsolete (weapons) sj'stem tends to rise anything up to ten times
faster than the Gross National Product,' and warships are no
exception. A carrier today costs over fifteen times as much as
Q
one built in the 1930's. Under such conditions the Navy's
leaders will have to fight d Just to keep the Fleet's strength
at what they consider its mi: .. -ctive size - much less
increase it. Altogether, cl.,.. ~__. .. -uggest that, although the
Admiralty has achieved a cor. rateglc rationale for the
seagoing forces, further challenges lie ahead.
In looking to the future the most appealing solution from
the Navy*s standpoint is to seek an increase in the total size
of the defense effort - or at least in the funds devoted to the
Navy. However, this does not seem too promi__:.g. The Government
has settled on a policy which devotes 7 to 8% -of the GNP to the
secur_ Jfort, and despite the flood of criticism from military
commentators there seems to be a rather remarkable consensus on
this policy among all major parties and factions. There is little
question that, if Brito::^ so inclined, the nation could
devote more of its limited re ?ces to weapons. However, this
•
—
L-l - _.....-.. .. cut-back in ./-L...\ ._-,. and other public corvico-
-obably an increase in taxes. Not since 1951 has the
Gov. seen fit to rcauco -cc:.-!-welfare expenditures in
favor of ai .nts. Barri::j. ....- ^L^rming rise in the temperature
of the cold war the Services can hardly expect to increase the
overall size of the security effort.
The Admiralty has also found it difficult to expand its
budget. Since 1957 the Navy's position has improved steadily
ir-dative to the Air Force and Army, but the losses of the other
ices seem to have gone to the Ministry of Defense, the
f Aviation, and - agencies which have been absorbed
intc fense Sstima' d the -. y. Although the
full extent of this help is still unknown, the Sea Lords were
allegedly successful in extracting funds from the other Services
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to support the Polaris commitment. Moreover, the Admiralty
contends that as the RAF's V-bomber force is phased out the funds
to support it should be transferred to Polaris. Experience
suggests that before that date the Air Council will have dis-
covered other pressing commitments which will preclude such a
transfer. In essence Admiralty cannot count on making any
serious inroads into either the Army or Air Force monies. On the
other hand, while the appropriations of the other two Services
have u jone considerable fluctuation, the Navy is relatively
better off than at any til ince 1 9^5« If the Admiralty can
successfully continue to relate its military mission to the
Government's political goals
.
it y very well further improve
its financial position at the ex_ 3 of some other departments.
.ide from expanding its financial estimates the only
alternative available to the Ad lty, if it finds it impossible
to reach the necessary force levels, is to reduce its commitments.
It must constantly review it ...ions in the light of the nation's
eco: . circumstances i . try to show that it is giving the
country value for its inv *nt. The fewer the available re-
sources the more important it is that the Navy's performance reaps
tangible benefits. In Britain's case it is manifest that it
should not be supporting military projects which give a question-
able return. With this in mind it is appropriate to look briefly
at the Fleet's two major roles and their alleged utilities.
Ironically the Navy's most recent obligation - Polaris -
is most vulnerable to criticism. When the Government first
adopted nuclear deterrence as a basic military policy the pre-
dominantive opinion both in Britain and America was that it was
a wise d ion. Western defense hinged on the United States'
nuclear lead over the Soviets, and it was naively hoped to pro-
lor; .. ,t superiority. The British contribution was enthusiast!
-
cally welcomed. At the same time, British statesmen and military
<s believed that atomic weapons were a symbol of Great Power
status and would insure their nation an influential voice in world
affairs along with the United States and Russia. Today all such
iptions are open to serious questioning.
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From a purely military standpoint, there is general
agreement on the basic situation. The United States still
possesses a relative superiority of fission and fusion weapons.
However, the Soviet Union's nuclear strength is increasing, and
the American edge is no longer particularly relevant. Both sides
have sufficient missiles and intercontinental bombers to raze the
other. Hence the nuclear stalemate. In the case of the Western
Alliance this arsenal consists of over 1 ,000 inter-continental
qballistic missiles and some 1,500 to 2,000 long range bombers.
With the exception of the United Kingdom's force of some 180
V-bombers, Western retaliatory strength is composed solely of
American forces. The British contribution has little military
impact on the balance of terror. is simply too small in
relation to the total power involved. This basic fact will not
be altered hy the replace: >f the obsolete V-bombers with
Polaris missile-.. Cert. .rines will give the
Government an up-to-date \. is sy.. , which will be relatively
invulnerable* However, with the entire force deployed on station
1
the Briv. . h contribution will 64 missiles.' Granted
this represents a respect. tu ...* punch, but in terms of
deterring Russia it is prot .__.-._ fie ant.
Its proponents insist that the American commitment to
Europe is not necessarily reliable. They contend that Britain
must possess nuclear we o avoid nuclear blackmail and to
give Europe an independent ns for deterring a Soviet attack.
These arguments have an unrealistic ring about them. To begin
.th there is considerable opinion that nuclear war is an un-
likely contingency; the Western Alliance, including Britain,
, been steadily moving toward this position since the late
50* s. Moreover, it is not credible that Britain could face
tl.ro ~t without American support. It defies reason to
- ,t the British would bo -..llling to risk total extinc-
z-ori in return for the damage sixty-four, or less, Polaris
ssiles could do on Soviet Russia. In turn it appears unlikely
that, with the risks balanced in such a manner, a determined
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Kremlin would be deterred. On this point the British Government
appears to agree. As Prime Minister Macmillan said in Ottawa in
/ 1963: "A Russian missile threat against Britain would be so
colossal that it would be deterred only by the combination of
1 o
United States and British nucl-. >r. "" It would be in-
accurate to contend that the British deterrent makes no military
contribution, but at best it seems to be a marginal one.
British &• n have been frank to acknowledge that
they cling to the deterrent primarily to enhance the nation's
international status and to expand their influence at the con-
ference table. It is impossible to determine with any assurance
whether this is so or not. It does appear that Britain's nuclear
force has raised her prestige in the eyes of the average man -
both British and foreign. Sh ... suit established a
.que re Lonship \. the Uni ... and Canada on the
exchange of information regard! - r energy both for warlike
L peaceful uses. Certainly in the mid-1 950' s when the United
States considered Bom .id's contribution to the Western
retaliatory forces a eign^f:. one, the British Government
enjoyed a close military collaboration with the Strategic Air
Command and had some voice in targeting matters.
Similarly, Britain's possession of nuclear weapons has
made her a key figure in the negotiations pointing toward dis-
Both in the United Nations and elsewhere the United
Kingdom has played an active role in seeking an effective agree-
ment. This was graphically illustrated in the recent test-ban
^tiations which were carried out directly between the United
State.,, the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain. In fact British leaders,
due to their unusual status, have often ^oeen able to pose as sort
of a "third party" seeking to facilitate agreement between the
^r powers. ' One might claim that this is evidence of
.tain's enhanced status.
. more significant, if Europe evolves in the direction
_red 'by General de Gaulle, the United Kingdom might well choose
to draw closer to a unified Europe. In that event a national
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nuclear force (and the related scientific and technical
facilities lis) might have considerable bargaining value
to facilitate Britain's entry into such an arrangement. One of
the major objectives of such a scheme is to build a viable and
credible third force in the world, and Britain could make a
aningful contribution in this regard. Certainly this is in
the mind3 of British statesmen.
On the other hand there is evidence that Britain has not
reaped all the political rewards she had anticipated when she
. the nuclear field. To begin with the deterrent, to a
certain extent, is undermining other important national policies.
The Gov... nt is solidly committed to attaining a rapprochement
between the East and West, and eventually disarmament. Many
critics contend that Britain 8 s ins: ce. on remaining in the
nuclear field threatens the stra - .lance between American
and Soviet forces, incr 'tunities for catalytic
war, and severely compile. :, negotiations. Moreover,
by maintaining her c. .tomic forces Britain may very well
be encouraging other European na1 to seek a similar indepen-
dence, further obstructing an eventual agreement with the Soviets.
These arguments have furnished "... motivation for examining means
of _...-./._.. Britain's nuclear weapons under the control of the
1 3
-ice. As yet, however, nothing has come of these schemes.
Furthermore, what evidence is available suggests that
although Britain has fashioned an enviable relationship with the
United States it has not gained the voice in world affairs it
... In the Suez crisis of 1956 President Eisenhower, after
careful deliberation literally made it impossible for them to
complete the takeover of the C. Significantly, Whitehall
3 informed but not consulted by Washington prior to the Cuban
ultimatum of 1952. There is a general consensus that in direct
confrontations bet. . the two "super powers" where the full
.merican power might possibly be brought into play
:. hardly count on having an influential voice - whether
333 nuclear weapons. Clearly, this is hardly what
British statesmen hoped to achieve.
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In the final analysis the significant question is one
of priorities. The arguments for maintaining a deterrent capa-
bility seem to offer a few rewards in terms of international
prestige and diplomatic leverage. Realistically or not, they
are regarded as a symbol of Great Power status and as a relevant
instrument for conducting foreign policy. Discarding nuclear
weapons would be an important political retreat. Such a step
would require major psychological adjustments as well as material
ones. These considerations would be more persuasive if G-reat
Britain were not so hard pressed economically. However, in view
of the British economy's wall known limitations it may well be
difficult to justify the capital expense which the Government is
preparing to invest in Polaris. However, before reaching this
conclusion, the deterrent should be compared with the other
demands on the Navy's resources.
The Fleet's other mission is to act as a police force
in the overseas areas where Britain previously had colonial
interests. Despite the post- ihdrawal from Empire and the
steady loosening of Commonwealth bonds, the Government has in-
sisted on maintaining a military presence East of Suez and has
retained its traditi^- il responsibility for maintaining order
in this area* As in the case of deterrence, Whitehall's motives
are complex involving a mixture of political and military con-
siderations. Formally the Government contends: (1) that it has
vital political and economic interests in the area which require
stability; and (2) that it can make a unique contribution to
world peace by policing the unstable areas East of Suez. These
two objectives require scrutiny.
It is true that Britain still has extensive economic
interests throughout the littoral of the Indian Ocean. British
subjects retain important investments from Malaya to South Africa,
and th itish economy is heavily dependent on oil from the
Middle East. In addition, Britain carries on an important trade
.th the Commonwealth and her former colonies. Unquestionably,
lity and order work to Britain's advantage throughout the
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area. However, when British statesmen comment glibly about the
nation's interests East: of Suez they are talking about more than
commerce and investments. Although the direct political ties have
been severed, there is little question that Whitehall is striving
to preserve or fashion some sort of special relationship with its
former colonies which will allow it to retain political influence
in these areas. L:' successful this will help to preserve Britain's
.que place in the international community and enhance its pres-
tige accordingly. In short the Government is attempting to make
the retreat from power as painless as possible.
It is e. tely difficult to determine with any accuracy
how relevant military force is to these objectives. But the
evidence suggests that it does play an important part. Practi-
cally every colony which has gained independence has continued
to rely at least temporarily on British assistance. For example,
one of the conditions governing the use of the Singapore base is
that England will provide e:. .1 defense for the Federation of
Malaysia. Similarly, the Commons ti, SSATO and CENTO states
have co:'. .ntly complained. British Government contem-
plated cut-backs in the Far Eastern naval forces. In the recent
disturbances in Abadan, Aq and Kenya Whitehall was explicitly
iked to intervene, although these were internal security matters.
Kuwait was a case " . 3 the Crown was tied by agreement to a
former col ,nse, and was specifically requested to come
to the local government's assistance. _.ile there is no guarantee
.t this type of assistance will reap permanent rewards, experi-
ence thus far indicates that it will allow Britain at least to
prolong its --.."luence East of Su,
However, the Government doe- not base its case for naval
task forces solel^r on national interests. It further contends
that the main danger to peace and to the Western Alliance is not
lll:~'ly to come from a direct confrontation between East and West,
pom l0( in he newly developing areas which
attract Communist attention and tl .ten to escalade into major




There is doubtless some rationalization here. In other
words. British statesmen have what they believe to be solid
reasons for diverting forces from NATO and are anxious to frame
their case in a manner which will make this policy more palatable
to their Allies. Similarly, the Government would prefer to de-
lineate a unique role for Britain within the framework of the
Western Alliance, rather than merely contribute forces to the
defense of Europe* This would give Britain greater latitude for
independent action, a stronger voice in NATO, and enhanced pres-
tige. At the same time it furnishes Britain's overseas forces
with a more acceptable rationale t strictly national goals
can supply. The Government is constantly accused of practicing
imperialism in a new form. By linking its overseas responsi-
bilities to supra-national objec it can hope to remove some
of the stigma of this charge.
But despite the f b Jritain stands to gain in a
number of ways, there is still a great deal of merit to the basic
argument. The f world is discovering daily - in Latin America,
Africa, the I'.. t, Viet Nam - that political unrest, civil
war and local conflicts are fertile ground for Communist sub-
version, and hold the seeds for a potential conflict between
Russia or China and the West. The British have witnessed this
in Ma! va, Cyprus, Kenya and are presently faced with such a
prospect in the Indonesian crisis. As a result of their colonial
background and their post-war experience maintaining order in a
variety of trouble spots, British military forces may be excep-
tionally qualified to shoulder a brush fire role East of Suez.
.lie many of the NATO countries remain unimpressed with
non-European problems, it is manifest that _ted States has
come to recognize the danger that lurks in the unstable areas of
1 . It is equally clear that Britain has American encour-
agement in policing the Indian Ocean area. Although the Pentagon
has considered seriously extending its commitments to the Indian
Ocean it has never felt it possible to do so. U. S. Forces are
: .1.1.' .:.-......_. Both America's political and military leaders
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are happy to see Britain attempt to fill this gap. They have
given their blessing to the British policy v/hile being fully
r>e that it is detracting from NATO. This suggests that
Britain been at 1 st partially successful in integrating
its overseas mission with the thinking of its Allies and in
acquiring a larger voice in ; Alliance.
pom a purely military perspective, U. S. recognition
of the importance of the underdeveloped areas has opened up new
avenues for cooperation between the American Navy and the Royal
Navy. For a number of years the . r has pressed for a fleet
to be deployed in the Indian Ocean. The British naval commit-
it has relaxed the pres . counterpart, and
has facilitated a workable division of the overall security
mission between the two nav:. - More significantly the U. S.
Navy has gradually adopted the British limited war doctrine.
As Polaris boats come into service Secretary M lara has decided
there is no longer a requirement for the American carriers to
support SAC in its deterrent role. In essence, the U. S. surface
task forces will be primarily configured for limited wars and
brush fires, just as their British equivalents are today. This
has brought the equipment demands of the two navies closer
together. It may well lead to an even greater exchange of infor-
mation, equipment and doctrine than prevails today. The RN*s
adoption of the Phantom aircraft is a major step in this direc-
tion. In the past, NATO governments have had difficulty practic-
ing genuine interdependence, yet there is every reason to believe
that these two navies can successfully achieve this goal. The
financial advantages to Britain can be significant, as witnessed
by the American reactor purchased for Dreadnought and the Phantom
aircraft contract.
'
It is always difficult to weigh competing missions whose
value depends so heavily on intangible political goals. Never-
theless, this analysis suggests that if in the future the
airalty is forced to look for further expedients its limited
r role promises the nation more return for the money invested.
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In the long run Britain's commitments on the periphery 02" the
Indian Ocean accord with the nation's conception of the role it
should play, and at the same time offer tangible prospects of
enhancing Britain's international position. Just as important
there is an undeniable security challenge in the overseas areas
which it is to the free world's advantage to meet. Britain can
make a vital contribution in this :• 2 i. As opposed to this
the overall value of the nuclear deterrent would s r to be
dubious. Probably it has enhanced the Britain's position some-
what, but at best it has been a marginal utility. A country
faced by severe economic problems should demand more of a
return on its investment.
Certainly the abandonment of nuclear weapons would release
funds which could be profitably employed elsewhere. In the Royal
.vy's case it would also free sorely needed manpower, and
facilities. The capital inv. estinu . for the four nuclear
submarines is £300 million, irr stive of operating costs. Just
one-third of this impre 3 figure would go a long way 3 in
assuring that the Fleet could adequately meet its policing
responsibilities* Ironically the Admiralty's unofficial position
from the late 1950's to Nassau was that the country would be
better advised to discard her dc policy. However, now
that the Navy is heavily involved in the Polaris program and a
large segment of the officer corps has a vested interest in its
success, there is some evidence that support is building within
the Navy for deterrence. ** This could be unfortunate in the
long run. The Fleet's limited war role can continue to be viable
and effective only if the Admiralty believes in it and is willing
to fight for it. No other group can assume this responsibility.
Still ^ing from the experience of the last decade the Navy's
leadership is fully capable of adjusting the Fie - the
cou:
.
- is and making whatever painful accom .ons new
conditions may dictate. There is every prospect that the Royal
Nav .1 continue to play a significant role in British security
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'•The sources for these data were the various Defense White Papers
and associated statistical data. The budgetary estimates are
those given in the annual Defense White Paper and do not in-
clude supplementary estimates except for the years 1951-53 when
those amounts were sizeable (due to the Korean War) and were
actually noted in the succeeding year's White Paper. They
likewise have not been adjusted to take account of U. S.
grants in aid.
The manpower figures are the number of men and women actually
in uniform at the beginning of the British fiscal year, April 1.
^The Ministry of Supply was deactivated in 1959. Its research
and development activities concerning aircraft, missiles, and
electronic equipment were taken over by the newly created
Ministry of Aviation. The allocation of expenditures within
these two agencies among the three Services is not published.
^Amounts for the Ministry of Public Works and Atomic Energy
Authority were not included as separate items in the Defense
Estimates until 1963 and thereafter.
^These figures are estimates, rather than actual figures, and
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